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Abstract
Naturalisation, the process whereby a non-national becomes a citizen, is a space 
where the national boundaries are demarcated institutionally and symbolically. Despite 
this, social psychology has generally disregarded citizenship as a topic of research. 
Against this background, this thesis argues that citizenship is a dynamic concept 
embedded in a system of self-other relations. The thesis examines processes of 
national identity construction within the naturalisation context of the United Kingdom. In 
particular, this research explores representations of citizenship held by three key 
stakeholders: naturalised citizens, citizenship officers and the British government. 
Thirty-three interviews with new British citizens, twenty interviews with citizenship 
officers and four key policy documents on earned citizenship have been analysed. 
Building on the theory of social representations and on a dialogical understanding of 
human thinking and identity, the thesis draws links between identity and processes of 
knowledge construction. Identity is defined as a process of positioning towards social 
representations and others. In studying processes of identity construction and 
negotiation, emphasis is placed on the quality of self-other relations and on the 
antinomic and argumentative nature of thinking about the social world. This research 
shows that Britishness, within this context, is constructed on the basis of the opposing 
themes of progress and decline. Consequently, identity construction takes the form of a 
complex negotiation between opposing positions or voices. For new citizens, ‘becoming 
British’ is constructed as both enrichment for the self and as identity threat. 
Furthermore, for citizenship officers, migrants are seen as both a resource and a 
burden, which resonates with the official distinction between skilled (elite) and unskilled 
(non-elite) migrants. These findings illustrate the interplay between the symbolic and 
institutional aspects of positioning processes and highlight the need for further social 
psychological study of citizenship.
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Preface
Although social psychology has studied issues of group membership and boundary 
construction, citizenship has been generally absent from its field of interest, with more 
emphasis being placed on national identity. This reluctance to study citizenship is 
based on the commonly held view that national identity is a social form of belonging, 
whereas citizenship is seen solely as a legal concept defining the citizen’s relationship 
to the state and to other citizens. Against this background, I argue that since social 
psychology deals with boundaries, identities and processes of exclusion and inclusion, 
citizenship as a socio-institutional form of membership provides a fruitful area of 
research.
Indeed, an examination of the development of the concept of citizenship shows that it is 
a dynamic concept which changes along with the re-formulation of national boundaries. 
Although it is usually framed in a supposedly unambiguous discourse of rights and 
duties, its association with immigration matters and broader societal changes places it 
at the centre of many current debates. As Anthias and Yuval-Davis argue, “immigration 
controls and nationality legislation are what define, both symbolically and actually, the 
boundaries of the national collectivity” (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992, p. 49). I believe, 
therefore, that considering citizenship a non-contested legal concept belies its 
constructed nature and its ideological functions (Stasiulis & Bakan, 1997). Citizenship 
is, in fact, located at the intersection of ideas of national identity, nationalism, ethnicity, 
group solidarity and accommodation of difference. Thus, by its very nature, it is closely 
associated with processes of inclusion and exclusion; in essence, citizenship is a way 
to achieve a balance between these two opposing poles.
The focus of this research is British citizenship and, in particular, the British 
naturalisation process. Naturalisation is directly linked with issues of membership since 
it is the process by which a non-member becomes a member of the national 
community. My interest in the topic was sparked by a ‘paradigm change’ in Britain’s 
policy towards citizenship. Since 2001, the British government has tried to redefine 
citizenship within a framework of common values and social cohesion. Two prominent 
measures towards this goal have been the introduction of the citizenship ceremony and 
the citizenship test into the naturalisation process. Both the citizenship test, where one 
has to prove that one has sufficient knowledge of the UK and its customs, and the 
citizenship ceremonies, where people need to pledge allegiance to the Queen and the 
country to become citizens, show that citizenship is becoming more associated with
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ideas of nationhood, cultural values and tradition. More recently, the social cohesion 
agenda has led to policies of ‘earned citizenship’ and ‘managed migration’, which make 
immigration and naturalisation in the UK increasingly difficult, especially for‘low skilled’ 
and ‘unskilled’ migrants.
This ‘paradigm shift’ in British policy is taking place in the era of globalisation, 
international migration and growing intercultural exchange. This situation challenges 
some of the foundational principles of the notion of citizenship: the idea that the national 
and the political communities are in alignment and, more importantly, the idea that the 
nation is a territorially bounded community with a shared, even homogeneous, culture 
and identity. Contrary to the view that nations can be clearly distinguished from each 
other, new forms of community and belonging are being established which are de- 
territorialised and challenge conventional notions of national identity. Boundary crossing 
has, indeed, become common practice for many people. The simple fact of being a dual 
citizen, for example, challenges the strict demarcation between nation-states and also 
the idea that national identities are mutually exclusive and singular.
A social psychological study of citizenship can shed light on the dynamics of 
membership and boundary construction under conditions of late modernity. This thesis 
explores the ways in which knowledge about British citizenship, in general, and 
naturalisation, in particular, is socially constructed and examines the impact that these 
constructions have on identity processes and the development of public policy. For this 
purpose, I am using the theory of social representatidns and the concept of positioning 
and seek to explore the links between representation and identity. Dialogical 
epistemology underpins my understanding of both lay knowledge and identity, as any 
act of knowledge construction and identification involves the interrelation between self 
and other. Employing a dialogical perspective, I perceive identity to be the dynamic 
interplay between identification and recognition. Within this framework, identity is 
approached as the position of a person or group in relation to a social representation 
and to others.
Three sets of stakeholders took part in this research: citizenship officers, naturalised 
citizens, and the UK Government. These stakeholders have different agendas and hold 
different power statuses, but are all active agents in the naturalisation context. By 
analysing these three perspectives on citizenship and naturalisation, I seek not only to 
gather a more holistic picture of the issue, but also to understand better the relations 
between citizenship as an institutionalised form of membership and national identity as
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symbolic form of belonging, as well as the implications of this relationship for processes 
of inclusion and exclusion.
The first chapter of the thesis outlines the research problem. Focusing on the British 
case, it gives an overview of the history of citizenship, its relation with national identity 
and its nature in contemporary globalised societies. The chapter argues that the British 
Government has recently adopted a new approach in dealing with immigration and 
citizenship which emphasises the need to develop a common British identity. In search 
of this unity, it has strengthened its immigration legislation making sure that only the 
‘right’ kinds of migrants are allowed into the country and have the opportunity to 
naturalise. In light of this, it is argued that citizenship legislation is not based on 
‘rational’ decision making, but draws on representations of British identity and its 
‘others’. Chapter 1 concludes by outlining the aims and research questions of this 
thesis.
The second and third chapters provide an analysis of the theoretical framework 
employed in this research. Chapter 2 discusses the processes of knowledge 
construction in relation to the social representations theory. Drawing on Billig’s 
rhetorical perspective and on Markova’s dialogical perspective on social 
representations, the chapter presents a framework for understanding the construction 
and transformation of social knowledge which takes into account the dynamic social 
relations which are at the core of construction processes. This framework 
conceptualises thinking as a dialogical, antinomic process, rooted in the tensions of 
self-other relations.
Chapter 3 discusses the processes of identity construction by exploring the links 
between identity and representation. This chapter draws on Duveen’s concept of 
positioning and on positioning theory’s elaboration of the same concept, in order to 
account for the dynamics of self-other relations in identity construction. Chapter 3 also 
explores the multiplicity and ambivalence of positioning process, by arguing that the 
plurality of social representations and ways of thinking create not only a state of 
‘cognitive polyphasia’, but also a multiplicity of identity positions which are in dialogical 
relationship with each other.
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology used for data collection and analysis. It explains 
the research design, sampling rationale and choice of methods for this research. 
Chapter 4 also describes the samples and procedure of the research, as well as the
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techniques used for the analysis of interviews and policy documents. It concludes with 
a discussion of the quality assurance of this research.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the findings of the research. Chapter 5 presents the 
perspective of citizenship officers on citizenship and naturalisation. It argues that 
participants drew on opposing discourses in order to make sense of these issues, 
which illustrates that social thinking has a dilemmatic and argumentative quality. The 
chapter also explores the implications of these thematic tensions for positioning 
processes and identity construction. It is argued that both the identity of migrants and 
British identity are constructed in a polarised way. Britishness is constructed as both 
humanitarian and open towards others, and as a declining identity due to the effects of 
immigration. At the same time, migrants are seen as both an asset, contributing to an 
‘idealised’ cosmopolitan image of Britishness, and a burden threatening the economy 
and culture of Britain.
Chapter 6 presents the perspective of naturalised citizens on citizenship and 
naturalisation. The chapter argues that representations of immigration and Britishness 
play a key role in how respondents construe their naturalisation experiences. In order to 
make sense of their place in the UK, respondents negotiate their position in relation to 
both representations of Britishness and representations of immigration. This process 
also entails re-positioning towards their country of origin. Positioning is further 
complicated by ‘dilemmas of cultural integration’. This multifaceted positioning process 
involves both narratives of similarity and narratives of difference in relation to 
Britishness. The chapter also discusses the institutionalised aspect of identity 
construction, focusing on the distinction between elite and non-elite migrants, as well as 
the distinction between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’, which frame the positionings of new 
citizens.
Chapter 7 presents the public policy perspective on citizenship and, specifically, the 
policy discourse on ‘earned citizenship’, which constitutes the current political 
framework. The chapter argues that assessment, selection and security are key terms 
in the public policy on earned citizenship. Three sets of ALCESTE analyses of four 
policy documents show that the public policy perspective is structured around three 
main themes: ‘immigration reform’, ‘immigration impact’ and ‘earned citizenship 
process’. These themes emphasise the profitability of skilled migration, whilst also 
stressing the undesirability of unskilled migrants and the prevention of immigration 
abuse. As such, immigration policies create a hierarchical system of classification of
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migrants and can, thus, be described as constituting a practice of ‘institutionalised 
positioning’.
Chapter 8 considers the theoretical and societal implications of this research. It 
discusses the main findings of the research in relation to the dilemmatic construction of 
Britishness and its implications for positioning. The chapter also discusses positioning 
as both a symbolic and an institutionalised process, which takes place at the level of 
representations and at the level of institutionalised practices, such as immigration 
policies. In addition, this chapter makes suggestions for further research and for the 
development of a social psychological study of citizenship. Chapter 8 concludes the 
thesis with some final thoughts on inclusion and tolerance in Britain.
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Chapter 1. The Research Problem: Citizenship Policy and the 
Construction of National Boundaries
1.1. Overview of Chapter 1
This chapter sets the scene for this research on naturalisation in the UK. By discussing 
the concept and practice of citizenship, in general, and also in relation to Britain, it aims 
to show that citizenship, rather than a ‘neutral’ set of laws and policies, is a dynamic 
social object which is closely linked with constructions of national identity. The following 
section describes the modern model of citizenship as articulated by Marshall (1964). It 
will be shown that this model assumes that there is alignment between the nation, as a 
community of shared identity, and the demos, as a political community. This model also 
assumes that nation-states can be clearly demarcated; each is seen as being 
associated with a particular territory and a peoplehood which is distinct from the others. 
However, this idealised model is increasingly challenged due to the effects of 
globalisation and international mobility. The third and fourth sections of this chapter 
focus on Britain and provide a review of British citizenship, immigration and 
naturalisation policies. It is argued that British citizenship has become progressively 
more exclusionary and more defined in ethno-cultural terms. Thus, citizenship, as a 
legal status, is not detached from how nationhood, as a symbolic identity, is imagined. 
Building on this idea, the fifth section argues that citizenship and national identity are 
intertwined. The sixth section focuses on Britishness, showing that it is a complex 
identity which assumes a variety of meanings and cannot be simply classified as an 
ethnic or a civic identity; on the contrary, it incorporates elements from both. Following 
this discussion, the seventh section of this chapter draws conclusions about the ‘nature’ 
of citizenship, while the last section outlines the objectives and research questions of 
this thesis.
1.2 The modern model of citizenship
The modern model of citizenship is based on what is called ‘Westphalian order’. The 
peace in Westphalia in 1648 is symbolically the starting point of the state building 
process in Europe, marking the transition from feudal or imperial structures to nation­
states (Hettne, 2000). Today, the term Westphalian order’ has come to mean an inter­
state system of independent and sovereign nation-states (Benhabib, 2004; Hettne, 
2000). Territoriality is a key concept here, since sovereign states are by definition 
territorially bounded and have ultimate authority over the national territory. This territory 
needs to have clearly circumscribed and widely recognised boundaries. It follows that in
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a territorially bounded nation-state system the distinction between insiders and 
outsiders, citizens and non-citizens, is crucial. Citizens are, in principle, equal members 
of the political community, sharing common rights and duties and having the same 
status towards the state. Conversely, as Hannah Arendt has argued, being stateless 
means being denied ‘the right to have rights’ (cited in Benhabib, 2004), since rights 
stem out of a citizen’s relation to a state and the state is the supreme protector of one’s 
rights.
The modern paradigm of citizenship, as a legal status endowed with a set of rights and 
responsibilities common to all nationals, has been articulated by Marshall (1964). This 
modern model of citizenship is egalitarian and inclusive, since all members share equal 
rights, and it is also uniform and universal, because rights are uniformly distributed 
(Cohen, 1999). For Marshall, full membership is defined by three types of rights: civil, 
like liberty and freedom of speech, political, like the right to vote and stand for an office, 
and social rights associated with the welfare state, like the right to healthcare and 
housing. Marshall traced the development of citizenship rights in England from the 18th 
to the 20th century. It is assumed in his conceptualisation of citizenship that the three 
sets of rights, historically expanded in scope and extended to all the population, provide 
a coherent whole. It has further been argued that a principal assumption in Marshall’s 
conceptualisation is that the demos, the political community, corresponds to a single 
nation (Cohen, 1999)1. Indeed, the ideal model of the citizen in the modern nation-state 
is a person who resides inside the national boundaries, is subject to the state’s 
administrative control, participates in the democratic process and shares a common 
culture with his or her fellow citizens. Territoriality, administrative control, democratic 
legitimacy and shared cultural or national identity form the traditional model of ‘unitary’ 
citizenship (Benhabib, 2002, 2004).
The backbone of the modern nation-state is territoriality, meaning that there is among 
people a ‘boundary consciousness’ of the world as naturally divided into nation-states 
(Billig, 1995). Both defining features of the nation-state, that the nation is equated with 
the demos and that the state has sovereign power over a demarcated territory, are 
based on this notion. Representations of space and place have been essential in the 
construction of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1991). In fact, spaces are 
transformed into national territories which belong to nations (Alonso, 1994). Thus, 
Germany belongs to the Germans, France to the French and so on. This way, an
1 Another problem with Marshall’s theory is that it is assumed that the three sets of rights have 
developed in a linear and unchallenged manner, whereas citizenship is best understood as a 
negotiated relationship among political actors (Stasiulis & Bakan, 1997).
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identity between people and places is created and often sustained through botanical 
metaphors, such as people having roots in certain countries, or kinship metaphors, like 
motherland, fatherland and others (Alonso, 1994; Malkki, 1992). In a way, the nation 
becomes concrete through this territorialisation; it becomes a body of people 
inextricably linked to a particular space. At the same time, citizenship becomes an 
inherited property based on a birthright (Shachar, 2007).
However, challenges to the taken for granted assumption that nation-states are strictly 
demarcated are evident in all spheres of life and are due to a range of phenomena 
grouped under the term globalisation. The effects of these transformations are so 
groundbreaking that many people speak of the nation-state as a thing of the past, 
whereas the future is seen as global or cosmopolitan. Above all, globalisation has an 
impact on the sovereignty of the state over the national territory. The 
internationalisation of the market, the existence of hegemonic powers, such as the 
U.S.A., and international organisations (e.g. NATO, EU), as well as the establishment 
of international law, constitute the most significant limitations to nation-state sovereignty 
(Held, 1996). What all this suggests is that the nation-state alone cannot make its own 
decisions; we have progressed from national sovereignty to a state of ‘plural 
sovereignty’ which is divided among various national, international and transnational 
parties (Held, 1996).
Since, by definition, citizenship is associated with the idea of the nation-state as a 
bounded political community, it follows that the declining sovereignty of the state has 
implications for citizenship. It is often argued that global society requires universalism 
(universal norms, values, laws etc.) and inclusion, whereas national society is based on 
particularism and exclusion of non-members2. A major issue in this respect is the scope 
of national legislation under conditions of increased human mobility. The conflict 
between universal human rights, which supposedly apply to all human beings, and 
national citizenship rights, which apply exclusively to citizens of a nation-state, alludes 
to these tensions between the universal and the particular. Several scholars have dealt 
with this issue, suggesting ways of integrating the two and developing an appropriate 
framework for cosmopolitan citizenship (Benhabib, 2002, 2006; Cohen, 1999; Falk, 
2000; Hettne, 2000). Others speak of a post-national type of citizenship whereby rights 
are decoupled from national citizenship (Soysal, 1994). Overall, the practice of
2 Interestingly, however, the very idea of nationalism is based on the accommodation of 
universalism and particularism. Following the principles of the French revolution, the rights of 
citizens are based on the rights of man which provide the source of democratic legitimacy in 
modern nation-states (Benhabib, 2004).
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citizenship in the contemporary world has changed; citizenship is no longer enacted in 
a narrow national framework (Soysal, 2000), nor is the state the only political formation 
within a territory (Walby, 2003).
What has been termed the ‘disaggregation of citizenship’ (Benhabib, 2002, 2004; 
Cohen, 1999) is already taking place, meaning that the components of citizenship have 
been disassociated from each other. As mentioned, modern citizenship is framed as a 
whole where political, civil and social rights are all linked with the status of being a 
member of the political community. Nonetheless, due to the effects of international 
mobility and migration, these three sets of rights no longer go hand in hand. One can 
be a foreign resident, rather than a citizen, and be able to enjoy social rights and 
benefits as a permanent resident. EU citizens have also political rights if they reside in 
another EU country, namely the right to vote and stand for an office in local elections. In 
other countries such rights have been granted to non-EU residents as well. Thus, the 
status of legal personhood has been disassociated from the status of citizenship in both 
international and national legislations.
The increasing diversity within national societies and the need to accommodate 
different sets of demands by various social groups pose another challenge for the 
modern paradigm of citizenship. Identity politics have created a tension between two 
analytically distinct justice paradigms: socio-economic justice, associated with claims of 
redistribution, and cultural justice, associated with recognition claims (for an effort to 
accommodate the two, see Fraser, 1996, 2000). Regarding the latter, the ‘liberal’ 
neutrality of the state, which conflates equality and sameness, has recently been 
questioned because it implies an ideal of assimilation and oppresses historically 
excluded groups. Against that, Young (1990) advocates the politics of difference 
whereby equality is conceptualised not as sameness, but as public respect of 
difference, as a type of democratic cultural pluralism. In this conceptualisation of 
‘differentiated’, rather than universal, citizenship, group rights would be recognised 
(Young, 1989). Similarly, Taylor argues in favour of the politics of recognition on the 
basis that misrecognition and non-recognition of people’s identities are forms of 
oppression (Taylor, 1992). Thus, whereas citizenship has traditionally been linked with 
political, civil and social rights, there is nowadays a strong claim that citizenship be 
extended to include cultural rights of groups (Pakulski, 1997).
The increased ethnic and cultural diversity within nation-states also challenges the 
taken-for-granted equation of the demos to the nation, leading to the ‘crisis of the 
hyphen’ as Benedict Anderson (1991) has famously observed. This is evident in
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processes of naturalisation. In 2007, more than 164,000 people acquired British 
citizenship (Freelove-Mensah, 2008). What is more, people do not only acquire 
citizenship status in countries other than the ones they have been born into, they may 
also have dual or multiple citizenships. This is the clearest evidence that political 
membership and national identity are not necessarily aligned. This also suggests that 
national identities may not be singular or mutually exclusive; people can belong to 
multiple national communities.
Overall, human mobility challenges the taken for granted equation of citizenship and 
national identity. More than that, it poses questions about the very nature of national 
identity in contemporary plural societies which goes beyond the simplistic 
ingroup/outgroup dichotomy (Chrysochoou, 2000). It can be argued that national 
identity has become irrelevant, giving its place to de-territorialised or cosmopolitan 
affiliations. However, as Billig (1995) observes, a national framework of conceiving the 
world is still in place, albeit in an unreflective way. This becomes more salient in border 
management practices. As will be shown in the following sections, efforts to boost a 
sense of British identity underscore recent immigration and citizenship policies in the 
UK, alluding to an increased uneasiness regarding the blurring of inter-national 
boundaries on the part of the British state.
1.3 The history of British citizenship and present state of affairs
Whereas the United Kingdom is one of the oldest democracies, British citizenship has a 
very short history (Hansen, 2000). Until the 1948 Nationality Act, the inhabitants of the 
British Isles and the British Empire in general were subjects to the Crown; membership 
was defined by loyalty to the monarch. This 'imperial model’ (Baldwin-Edwards & 
Schain, 1994) of citizenship was based on the law of territory {jus soli) and gave equal 
rights to all citizens of the British Empire by virtue of having been born within British 
territory. This is not to suggest that discrimination was absent; on the contrary, racism 
served to legitimise the domination of the British Colonies. Nonetheless, it was in the 
heyday of the Empire that Britain had its widest boundaries, as there was no distinction 
between colonisers and colonised: “This was not only a question of territory; both 
British colonies and the British colonised were seen as an inherent part of the national 
glory" (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992, p. 45).
After 1945, for immigration purposes, the Dominions wished to introduce national 
citizenships. As a result, in 1948 the Labour government implemented new legislation 
which created two classes of citizenship: citizenship of the United Kingdom and
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Colonies and citizenship of independent Commonwealth countries. The origins of 
British citizenship were both imperialist and liberal, since all citizens of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies enjoyed equal rights (Hansen, 2000). Citizenship at the time 
continued to be granted through birth within the UK or the British Colonies. Within this 
legal framework, people from the Colonies and new Commonwealth countries migrated 
to the UK in the ‘50s and early ‘60s at a time when post-war Britain was in need of 
cheap labour. Yet, anti-immigration attitudes towards non-white migrants escalated and 
new immigration restrictions were introduced in the ‘60s (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; 
Layton-Henry, 1994). The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act introduced for the first 
time restrictions to the rights of some Commonwealth citizens to enter the UK. The 
1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act and the 1971 Immigration Act stand out for their 
adoption of the partiality clause, which privileged citizens of the ‘old’ (white) 
Commonwealth compared to those of the ‘new’ (black) Commonwealth.
The notion of partiality was incorporated into the UK citizenship legislation in the 80’s 
when the British nationality law was amended to create the category of British 
citizenship. Under Margaret Thatcher’s government, the 1981 Nationality Act was voted 
and enacted in 1983. This piece of legislation defined British citizenship in more ethnic 
terms as it incorporated to some extent the law of blood (jus sanguinis) into the law of 
territory. With this legislation, people born in Britain cannot become British citizens or 
settle permanently in Britain unless they are born to a British citizen or to a parent who 
is legally settled in Britain (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992).
This brief sketch of British citizenship illustrates how it has become progressively more 
exclusionary. From distinguishing solely between fully entitled ‘British subjects' and 
‘aliens’, the post-war period saw the gradual reduction of the rights of the New 
Commonwealth citizens, constructing eventually a more exclusionary British citizenship. 
The past openness of British boundaries carried the imperial stamp of the country. 
Indeed, Britishness at the time has been described as an encompassing form of 
political identity which held together the various peoples and cultures under the 
Empire’s rule (McCrone, 1997; McCrone & Kiely, 2000).
The complexity of current British nationality law stems from the country’s history. There 
are currently six types of British nationality (see Table 1 below). Only British citizens 
and some British subjects with right of abode, through qualifying connections under the 
Immigration Act 1971, have the right to live and work in the UK (Home Office). All other 
British nationals can live and work in the UK only if their immigration status allows it 
(ibid.). However, European Union regulations mean that EU citizens have the right to
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visit, live and work in the UK. In terms of acquiring British citizenship, other than by birth 
or descent, naturalisation, which is the focus of this thesis, is the most common way3.
Table 1. Types of British nationality (source: Home Office)
British
citizenship
People born in the UK before January 1st 1983 are British citizens. People 
born in the UK on or after 1 January 1983 (or in a qualifying territory4 on or 
after 21 May 2002) to a parent who is a British citizen or legally settled in the 
UK are British citizens. Depending on the type of citizenship of the parents 
(British citizenship by descent or otherwise than by descent), people born 
outside the UK may also be British citizens.
British
overseas
citizenship
British overseas citizenship is a category of citizenship that was created by 
the British Nationality Act 1981. People became British overseas citizens on 1 
January 1983 if they were citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and 
did not become either British citizens or British overseas territories citizens on 
1 January 1983.
British
overseas
territories
citizenship
British overseas territories citizenship is a category of citizenship that was created 
by the British Nationality Act 1981 for people connected with the British overseas 
territories5. People became British overseas territories citizens on 1 January 
1983 if they had connections with a British overseas territory because they, 
their parents or their grandparents were born, registered or naturalised in that 
British overseas territory (if they did not have these connections, they may 
have become British overseas citizens). People born in a British overseas 
territory on or after 1 January 1983 are British overseas territories citizens if 
one of their parents is a British overseas territories citizen or is legally settled 
in a British overseas territory. On 21 May 2002, British overseas territories 
citizens became British citizens automatically if they had British overseas 
territories citizenship by connection with a qualifying territory.
British
national
(overseas)
When sovereignty of Hong Kong returned to China, British overseas 
territories citizens from Hong Kong lost that citizenship. In 1986 new 
legislation allowed them to acquire the new status of British nationals 
(overseas).
British
protected
person
People born in British protected places outside the British Empire are British 
protected persons. Nowadays, very few people hold this status. British 
protected persons lose their status upon acquisition of another nationality or 
when the territory they have been connected with becomes independent and 
they acquire the citizenship of a newly independent country.
British
subject
Until 1949 everyone connected to the UK by birth, adoption, descent, 
marriage, registration or naturalisation was a British subject. All citizens of 
Commonwealth countries were also British subjects until 1983. Since January 
1983 a person who gains citizenship of any other country cannot be a British 
subject. Since then very few categories of people now qualify as British 
subjects.
3 The other ways of becoming a British citizen are: being adopted by British citizens and 
registration which relates to British nationals who are not British citizens but who have been 
residing in the UK for at least five years.
4 Qualifying territories are the British overseas territories which qualify under certain sections of 
the nationality rules. They are all of the British overseas territories except for the sovereign base 
areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
5 British overseas territories were formerly known as the British dependent territories: Anguilla, 
Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, Cayman Islands, Falkland 
Islands and Dependencies, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands, 
St Helena and Dependencies, the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, Turks and 
Caicos Islands, and the Virgin Islands.
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1.4 Current policies towards immigration and naturalisation in the UK
Britain’s policy towards managing diversity has traditionally been based on a ‘race 
relations’ framework. In particular, a combination of strict immigration controls and 
racial equality legislation has shaped public policy in Britain (Favell, 2001; Well & 
Crowley, 1994). Limits on immigration in Britain have been accompanied by a series of 
Race Relations Acts (1965,1968, and 1976, as well as the Racial and Religious Hatred 
Act 2006) and the establishment of the Commission for Racial Equality (the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission since 2007). In fact, the 1976 Act contained legislation 
against indirect discrimination and for this reason it is considered a step towards the 
recognition of the right to cultural difference and a clear example of multicultural policy 
compared to the more assimilationist approach of the rest of Europe (Mitchell & 
Russell, 1996). Good race relations in the UK are seen as a way of ensuring social 
order and may have been influenced by the British imperial history (Favell, 2001). 
During the Empire, the principle of indirect rule meant that the colonised populations 
had a degree of freedom in matters of governance. Multicultural policy can thus be 
described as paternalistic and pragmatic, meaning that the advocacy of tolerance is not 
so much based on its moral value but, rather, on its efficiency (Favell, 2001). In any 
case, tolerance and respect for difference have had a place in British policies of 
integration.
However, in the past few years the effectiveness of multiculturalism has been severely 
challenged. Critics argue that it enhances separatism and undermines solidarity; that it 
stresses differences and de-emphasises commonalities. David Cameron in his speech 
at the 2007 Open to Question Debate, hosted by the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, depicted multiculturalism as “the idea that we should respect different 
cultures within Britain to the point of allowing them -  indeed encouraging them -  to live 
separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream” (Cameron, 2007).
The current debate on multiculturalism and cohesion was sparked by the ‘racial 
tensions’ in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in the spring and summer of 2001. In the 
aftermath of the events, a series of reports on community cohesion were published to 
advance governmental policy6. Policies on community cohesion have since then been
6 The Home Office established the Independent Review Team, chaired by Ted Cantle, to identify 
the reasons of the 'tensions’ and suggest ways to improve community cohesion after consulting 
local people and community organisations in Bradford, Oldham, Burnley and other towns. Also, 
the Home Secretary at the time, David Blunkett, set up a Ministerial Group on Public Order and 
Community Cohesion with the aim to provide recommendations on the enhancement of
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implemented predominantly on a local level. In the meantime, the 7th of July 2005 
attacks in London intensified the ‘cohesion-versus-multiculturalism’ discourse. Shared 
British values, integration and cohesion are among the terms most commonly used 
nowadays in political debates by all political parties. While immigration policies and race 
relation policies had been legally distinguished in the UK, concerns over terrorism and 
the integration of ‘suspect communities’ brought the two issues closer together in public 
policy discourse (Sales, 2007).
McGhee (2005a, 2005b) notes that current community cohesion strategies target ethnic 
and religious minorities and function as a risk management strategy to avoid tensions 
like the ones in 2001. Compared to the past, a ‘thicker’ conception of British citizenship 
is advocated, meaning that citizenship is increasingly associated with a shared 
national-cultural identity. The key concept in all these recent developments is an 
emphasis on failed integration which will be combated by establishing a common bond 
among the British (McGhee, 2005a). Yet, this begs the question: into which common 
values are the new British citizens (and ethnic minorities) supposed to integrate? This is 
in essence a question about the definition of Britishness. It can be argued, therefore, 
that community cohesion policies are part of a nation-building process in contemporary 
Britain; indeed, this is a top-down effort to (re)construct British national identity. For 
example, in a pamphlet entitled A Common Place, written for the Fabian Society by 
Ruth Kelly (State Secretary for Communities and Local Government at the time) and 
Liam Byrne (Immigration Minister at the time), the link between strengthening a sense 
of Britishness and citizenship is explicit (Kelly & Byrne, 2007, pp. 3-4):
Our approach to citizenship has been laissez faire. But today [...] we need a 
more vigorous debate about what it is that holds us together [...] W e believe 
that the way we collectively develop a more overt but inclusive sense of 
citizenship will be one of the issues that define the coming decade in British 
politics.
Social cohesion policies are located within a more general communitarian conception of 
citizenship which maintains that rights are conditional on associated responsibilities. 
This ‘active citizenship’ perspective has been advocated by the British Government in 
recent years. The report produced by the Advisory Group on Citizenship, set up in 1997 
by the Secretary of State for Education and Employment, is indicative of this trend. The 
Group, chaired by Bernard Crick, made proposals for the introduction of citizenship
community cohesion on a national level. These were the most prominent reports produced at the 
time.
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education in schools. Following these recommendations, compulsory citizenship 
education became part of the English National Curriculum. The final report of the 
Group, commonly referred to as the Crick Report, defines citizenship in a tripartite way 
entailing social and moral responsibility, community involvement and political literacy 
(Advisory Group on Citizenship, 1998). Having a sense of civic duty and being actively 
involved in the community are the key features of this definition of citizenship.
It is in this context that the UK Government’s recent naturalisation policies should be 
interpreted. In particular, two measures have been controversial and highlight the 
government’s increased efforts to enhance social cohesion and participation. The first 
one is the introduction of citizenship ceremonies in 2004. During the citizenship 
ceremony, new citizens affirm or swear allegiance to the Queen and also pledge their 
loyalty to the United Kingdom7. Before 2004, this took place privately in the presence of 
a solicitor. The rationale for implementing citizenship ceremonies according to the UK 
Border Agency is that “becoming a British citizen is a significant event and should be 
celebrated in a meaningful way” (Home Office). Citizenship ceremonies are conducted 
by the Registration Services of local councils. Applicants for naturalisation receive a 
letter inviting them to a ceremony at their local council when their application for 
naturalisation has been successful. In order to receive their certificate of naturalisation 
and complete the naturalisation process, they have to attend a citizenship ceremony. 
Ceremonies usually start with a speech given by the Registrar or an invited local 
dignitary. New citizens then take the oath and pledge of allegiance and are then asked 
to stand up for the national anthem. The ceremonies conclude by calling new citizens 
one by one and giving them their naturalisation certificates8.
In addition to the introduction of the citizenship ceremonies, in 2005 passing a 
citizenship test about life in the UK became a requirement for British citizenship and, 
more recently, for the indefinite leave to remain also. The UK Border and Immigration 
Agency explains the purpose of the ‘Life in the UK’ test to applicants for naturalisation
7 Oath o f allegiance: I (name) swear by Almighty God that on becoming a British citizen, I will 
be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and 
Successors, according to law.
Affirm ation of allegiance: I (name) do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that on 
becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen 
Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and Successors, according to law.
Pledge: I will give my loyalty to the United Kingdom and respect its rights and freedoms. I will 
uphold its democratic values. I will observe its laws faithfully and fulfill my duties and obligations 
as a British citizen.
8 These are the main elements of all citizenship ceremonies, but ceremonies also differ from 
council to council. In some councils, ceremonies are quite formal while in others they are not; 
some councils also arrange for ‘special’ ceremonies, for example inviting local schoolchildren to 
attend.
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as follows: “...becoming a British citizen or deciding to settle permanently in this country 
is an important event in your life. If you are applying for naturalisation as a British 
citizen or for indefinite leave to remain, you will need to show that you know about life in 
the UK” (Home Office). However, the ‘Britishness test’, as it is routinely referred to by 
the media, has been heavily criticised for its narrow focus and factual errors (e.g. 
Glendinning, 2006; White, 2009). The citizenship test is coupled with the English 
requirement as it is meant to test both English proficiency and knowledge of life in the 
UK. The Life in the UK test is based on the Life in the UK: A Journey to Citizenship 
book, which all applicants for naturalisation need to study before taking the test. Topics 
covered in the test include: history, population, governance and issues related to work, 
health and education in the UK.
Alongside social cohesion policies aimed at integrating migrants and other minority 
groups, the new decade saw the introduction of a new scheme of ‘managed migration’ 
through the establishment of firm selection criteria concerning who is eligible to reside, 
work and naturalise in the UK. Towards this aim, two interconnected policies have been 
implemented: ‘earned citizenship’ and the ‘points-based system’. Earned citizenship, as 
outlined in the green paper Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the 
Immigration System (Home Office, 2008a), is characterised by an emphasis on the 
duties, contribution and assessment of migrants and epitomises the communitarian 
discourse adopted by the UK Government. For instance, full citizenship or permanent 
residency will be conditional on having gone through a period of ‘probationary 
citizenship’. The rationale of this regulation is that during the probationary citizenship 
period potential citizens, who will, from now on, have limited access to social benefits, 
will be contributing to the country and making efforts to integrate. Supposedly, people 
who do voluntary work meet these requirements and, thus, will be rewarded by 
proceeding faster in acquiring full citizenship. Following a draft bill in July 2008, the 
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act received royal assent in July 2009.
Concerning immigration, Britain has adopted the Australian points-based system which 
states that migrants will have to fill in gaps in British economy in order to be granted 
entry to the country (Home Office, 2006). The government assesses these gaps in the 
economy with the advice of the Migration Advisory Committee and the Migration 
Impacts Forum. This selective immigration scheme aims to both reduce the number of 
migrants entering the country and enhance their contribution to the British economy. 
The nationalistic undertone of these measures is expressed by Gordon Brown’s ‘British 
jobs for British workers’ statement in his speech at the 2007 Labour annual conference
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(BBC, 2007). More efficient immigration controls, identity cards for foreign nationals and 
stricter penalties for illegal migration have also been part of the immigration reform 
agenda. More recently, in June 2010, the new coalition government announced its 
plans to set up an annual cap on immigration which will operate within the points 
system (Home Office, 2010).
On the whole, the British government (both Labour and Conservative-Liberal) is 
seeking to establish stricter selection criteria concerning immigration to the UK, while at 
the same time strongly emphasising contribution as a necessary requirement for 
integration in the country and as a precondition for good citizenship. Concerning these 
recent developments, it has been argued that the British state has revitalised an 
assimilationist project concerning its handling of diversity and migration (Alexander, 
2007; Back, Keith, Khan, Shukra, & Solomos, 2002; Shukra, Back, Keith, Khan, & 
Solomos, 2004; Yuval-Davis, Anthias, & Kofman, 2005) and that it is engaged in a 
‘hyper-nationalist’ project of securitocracy (Gilroy, 2008). On the whole, the new 
naturalisation requirements, as well as the stringent immigration controls, constitute an 
instance of what Isin and Turner (2007) call the ‘enclave society’, because they point to 
a new emphasis on security and territory.
Certainly, apart from the legal criteria of membership, symbolic processes of inclusion 
and exclusion also operate in the society, creating another set of boundaries, racial, 
cultural and others (Jacobson, 1997). Thus, the Tight to belong’ is determined by a 
variety of formal and symbolic boundaries. What is shown, however, by this brief review 
of immigration and citizenship legislation in the UK, is that these formal and informal 
boundaries have an impact on each other. Citizenship is inevitably intertwined with the 
broader politics of belonging (Crowley, 1999; Yuval-Davis, 2006). As the next section 
intends to show, citizenship and national identity cannot be distinguished from each 
other.
1.5 Citizenship and national identity
Citizenship and national identity are often seen as interchangeable terms in sociological 
theory (McCrone & Kiely, 2000). The very meaning of the term nation-state assumes 
that the state, as a sovereign and territorially bounded entity, is associated with an 
equally bounded population, the nation. The conflation of the political and cultural 
spheres of membership stems from the modern paradigm of citizenship (see section
1.2, p. 14), which has traditionally been the ideal model of citizenship and assumes that 
democratic participation and cultural membership are in alignment (Benhabib, 2002,
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2004). In other words, it is assumed that a nation’s ‘identity space’ is conterminous with 
the nation’s ‘decision space’ (Maier, 2000). This is not surprising as the cultural and the 
political spheres have been closely intertwined in the building of modern nations. 
Nationalism, the driving force for the development of the nation-state, is understood in 
political theory as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the 
national unit should be congruent” (Gellner, 1983, p. 1), meaning that the borders of the 
state should coincide with the borders of the nation. In other words, nationalism refers 
to a political claim that a peoplehood, the nation, is entitled to form a sovereign and 
territorially distinct political community.
Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches on the development of nationalism 
and nations in the modern era. For Anthony Smith (1996), modern nations have 
developed out of pre-existing communities of shared culture and identity which he calls 
‘ethnies’. While Smith argues that nations with their civic qualities are associated with 
modern developments, he maintains that they have been formed or reconstructed 
around pre-existing ethnic cores, comprising mythologies, symbolisms and cultures. 
These ethnic, rather that civic, elements of nations are ‘rediscovered’ in the process of 
nation building9. However, the idea that nations have such a long history has been 
controversial. For modernist scholars there is discontinuity between modern nations 
and pre-modern communities. Nations are seen as exclusively modern phenomena 
associated with socio-historical developments which led to the creation of nation-states 
in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Ernest Gellner has probably been the most 
cited modernist scholar. His theorisation of the nation as a modern phenomenon is 
based on the causal link between nationalism and industrialisation (cited in Poole, 
1999). Benedict Anderson, another modernist scholar, refers to print-capitalism, the 
emergence and mass dissemination of print press in the era of capitalism, as the ‘origin 
of national consciousness’: “the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the 
fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined 
community [other than religion], which in its basic morphology set the stage for the 
modern nation" (Anderson, 1991, p. 46).
By considering nations as cultural artefacts, Anderson was able to propose the 
following definition of the nation: “it is an imagined political community -  and imagined 
as both inherently limited [with specific boundaries] and sovereign” (Anderson, 1991, p. 
6). Consistent with this cultural perspective on nations, Anderson sees nationalism, not
9 It is important to stress that, for Smith, ethnicity refers to the perception of common culture and 
ancestry.
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as an ideology, but as a cultural system, similar to religion, because it gives people a 
sense of continuity and destiny. Culture and ethnicity are therefore used as symbolic 
resources for nation building. A shared descent or common history is often seen as so 
crucial that it has been claimed that nations without a past are contradictions in terms 
(Hobsbawm & Kertzer, 1992). According to scholars like Wallerstein and Balibar, 
nationalism can be seen as an ideology which produces the people as an ethnic 
community and naturalises the idea of national belonging (Balibar, 1991); in this sense, 
it can be argued that statehood precedes nationhood (Wallerstein, 1991). Basically, it is 
argued here that the idea of ethnicity becomes objectified and serves as the ‘glue’, the 
source of solidarity among nationals. Ernest Renan (1996), a very important scholar of 
nationalism, argues that national solidarity is rooted in the nation’s common legacy of 
memories.
That the creation of national cultures has been a key process in the development of the 
nation-state does not necessarily presuppose any kind of cultural homogeneity within 
nations, but it does suggest that some sort of commonality among nationals has been 
constructed so that a group of people can become imagined as a community. As 
Chryssochoou observes, “nationalism is a particular political project based on the 
reification of the nation and the essentialisation of the national character” (2004, p. 
109). The essentialisation of the national category has both an epistemic function 
(simplification of the world) and a legitimating function in that it helps justify particular 
projects and actions (Wagner, Holtz, & Kashima, 2009). The essentialisation of nations 
helps to construct them as distinct and cohesive communities of people.
Despite the close relationship between the forging of ethno-national identities and the 
advent of modern nation-states, Kohn (1944) has made a distinction between nations 
which have an ethnic or organic conception of nationhood and nations that have a civic 
conception of national belonging. The former are seen as based on an ethnically and 
culturally homogenous vision of the nation, while the latter are viewed as based on 
common territory and political values which determine rights and obligations. An 
example of ethnic nationalism would be Germany, which has until recently relied on the 
law of blood to define citizens. France is supposedly closer to the civic model since 
citizenship is granted on the basis of birth in national territory. However, a strict 
distinction between civic and ethnic nations does not hold empirically (Nieguth, 1999; 
Thomas, 2002). The French model, for instance, is grounded on a Western liberal 
conception of justice, which is in turn based on the distinction between the public and 
the private spheres. In this model, justice is achieved through public sameness and
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diversity is restricted to the private domain of life (Young, 1990). Since diversity is not 
publicly recognised, the logic of assimilation into the mainstream cultural norms 
underpins this model. The recent Veil affair’10 in France, which resulted in the banning 
of religious symbols from public schools under the spirit of laicite and secularism, 
illustrates how public policy and legislation can marginalise minority identities.
1.6 British identity: Ethnic or civic?
In terms of national identity, the UK is a particular case because it comprises four 
nations rather than one. The Irish also reside in two different states. There is no sense 
of a ‘UK identity’ within the UK. Rather, the term ‘British’ is commonly used to refer to all 
citizens of the United Kingdom, although it literally only refers to the people of Great 
Britain excluding Northern Ireland11.
The term ‘British’ has been used to unite all inhabitants of the British Empire under the 
‘umbrella identity’ of the British subject (see section 1.3, p. 18). Since the English were 
the dominant group of the Empire, Britishness and Englishness are to this day very 
often conflated (Kearney, 1991). Indeed, power asymmetries amongst the nations of 
the UK have partly led to the construction of stronger ‘local national identities’, rather 
than an overarching British identity. Being Scottish, Welsh or Irish is often defined in 
contrast to the dominant English identity. Interestingly, British identity is said to be much 
more adopted by the white English and the ethnic minority population of England 
compared to the rest of the UK population (Stone & Muir, 2007). This is due on the one 
hand, to a tendency to imbue Englishness and Britishness with imperialistic nuances 
and on the other hand, to the ethnic connotations of Englishness that exclude ethnic 
minorities (for the case of British Muslim identities, see Modood, 2005). In short, for the 
Scottish, Welsh and Irish, their ‘local national identities’ seem to be more salient (Stone 
& Muir, 2007).
Furthermore, the meaning of these identities tends to change along with changes in the 
context. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) have convincingly shown that national identity can
10 The Veil affair’ (Taffair du foulard’) refers to a set of public debates in France which started in 
1989 when three Muslim students were expelled from their school for refusing to remove their 
veils. Since then, more girls have been suspended for the same reason. In 1996, twenty-three 
Muslim girls were massively expelled. In 2004, the secularity law, also known as the Veil law’, 
was enacted and banned the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols, such as the Muslim veil, 
in French schools. The Veil affair’ has come to stand for all dilemmas of French identity in the 
era of multiculturalism (Benhabib, 2004).
11Nonetheless, the UK Home Office is consistently using the term ‘British citizenship’ to refer to 
citizenship in the United Kingdom. The term ’British’ will also be used in this thesis to refer to 
British citizens from all parts of the UK.
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take different meanings according to the political projects it serves. It has also been 
shown that Britishness, Englishness and Scottishness mean different things in England 
and in Scotland (Kiely, McCrone, & Bechhofer, 2005). While in England Britishness is 
seen as an inclusive identity, in Scotland it is associated with an ethnic conception of 
Englishness (ibid.). It is the very nature of national identity constructions that can 
change in different parts of the United Kingdom. For example, Condor and Abell 
(2006a) have argued that while in Scotland national identity helps to construct a 
communitarian feeling of ‘we’, in England it is treated as idiosyncratic due to its 
association with irrationality and xenophobia.
Overall, the term ‘British’ is quite an interesting case as it is a highly ambiguous and 
contested term. It can be equated with white Englishness, or have imperial 
connotations; but, it may also stand for values of pluralism and respect for diversity (e.g 
Parekh, 2000a). For some it may be a civic identity, defined by political values of 
freedom and democracy, whereas for others it is associated with an ethnic and cultural 
identity. Still, for others, British means nothing more than a passport. The fact that it is 
selectively embraced and that it acquires a variety of meanings suggests that it is a 
very complicated concept and it cannot have a simple definition (McCrone, 2002). As 
Cohen (1994, p. 35) has observed, Britishness is, above all, defined by its fuzziness:
British identity shows a general pattern of fragmentation. Multiple axes of 
identification have meant that Irish, Scots, Welsh and English people, those 
from the white, black and brown Commonwealth, Americans, English-speakers, 
Europeans and even aliens have had their lives intersect one with another in 
overlapping and complex circles of identity-construction and rejection. The 
shape and edges of British identity are thus historically changing, often vague 
and to a degree, malleable -  an aspect of the British identity I have called a 
‘fuzzy frontier’.
The idea that because the UK is a multinational state, British is a state-identity only 
overlooks the fact that Britain is not the only multi-national state; in fact, the situation in 
Britain is common around the world (McCrone & Kiely, 2000). Moreover, citizenship is, 
even in so called civic societies, closely related with national identity. The history of 
citizenship legislation in Britain shows that, rather than British nationality being a 
‘neutral’ legal concept, it has been used in racially exclusive ways (see section 1.3, p. 
18). Also, recent policies on immigration and naturalisation in the UK aim to ‘nationalise’ 
the idea of citizenship under the banner of shared values and social cohesion. 
Citizenship tests and ceremonies aim to assess the level of a migrant’s participation
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and commitment to the British society, as well as his or her understanding of the 
national culture and way of life. Current anti-immigration attitudes and racism towards 
foreigners are also indicators that a sense of the British nation does exist. For instance, 
a study by ETHNOS (2006) for the Commission for Racial Equality showed that British 
people perceive a decline of Britishness which is, among other reasons, attributed to 
immigration and multiculturalism. British debates over multiculturalism suggest that 
Britishness is, at least in part, a national-cultural identity, even it means different things 
to different people. The very idea of multiculturalism as a result of immigration, a 
discourse so commonly used in Britain, also implies a background of a homogeneous 
ethno-cultural British identity.
Britishness cannot, therefore, be simply positioned in one of the ends of the ethnic-civic 
continuum. It is a multifaceted identity that can acquire diverse meanings. Citizenship 
and immigration processes constitute one of the sites where British identity becomes 
constructed and enacted.
1.7 The ‘nature’ of citizenship
The conclusions that can be drawn from the previous discussion on the ‘nature’ of 
citizenship can be summarised as follows:
■ Citizenship has been traditionally conceptualised as a unitary form of membership 
based on the alignment of the political community with the national community. 
Citizenship and national identity are seen as the two sides of the same coin: the former 
defines the civic aspect of national membership and the latter is a form of ethno-cultural 
attachment that binds people together. However, the previous sections of this chapter 
have argued that the alignment between the nation and the demos does not hold 
empirically. On the one hand, not all nations are polities; rather, there are actually more 
nations than nation-states (Walby, 2003). On the other hand, the diversity of people’s 
backgrounds within contemporary states, such as Britain, suggests that people’s 
affiliations are increasingly more complex. People may be members of more than one 
ethnic or national group and have multiple national citizenships. People’s identities are 
not necessarily territorially bounded in the confines of a nation-state, as the unitary 
model suggests. Studies on diaspora and transnationalism have stressed this point: 
“immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their 
societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to 
emphasise that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, 
cultural and political borders” (Basch, Glick-Schiller, & Szanton-Blanc, 1994, p. 7).
30
■ Although citizenship and national identity do not necessarily coincide, they are 
interlinked, such that the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism is not as 
straightforward as has been conceived. Since citizenship legislation delimits who is to 
be a citizen and enjoy equal status with other citizens, it crystallises the existing model 
of social relations into a temporary equilibrium (Balibar, 1988). The dynamics of political 
membership become clear in the history of British citizenship and immigration policies, 
which shows that policy development goes hand in hand with changes in the ways that 
Britishness is imagined. This is even more evident in the current immigration and 
naturalisation law in the UK which aims to re-construct Britishness through managing 
immigration.
■ Citizenship in Western societies is at the moment undergoing serious changes, 
challenging the assumptions of Marshall’s (1964) unitary model. At the heart of these 
transformations is the tension between inclusion and exclusion. The increased mobility 
of people and the partial loss of national sovereignty lead to the reconstruction of 
national boundaries in a way that the relations between self and other are re­
negotiated. This is not simply a question of constructing boundaries between the out­
group and the in-group. A variety of institutions (EU, Human Rights conventions, 
national immigration policies) create many levels of inclusion and exclusion. For 
instance, European Union citizens are allowed entry in the UK, while unskilled overseas 
workers are excluded. At the same time, residents of the UK enjoy different sets of 
rights according to their immigration status. Whereas EU citizens enjoy political rights, 
other economic migrants have fewer social and political rights, alluding to what Castles 
(2005) has called ‘hierarchical citizenship’.
■ Citizenship and immigration law draws on discourses about the nation and its 
1others’ and is indicative of the quality of these relations. The conditions of entry and 
residence in a nation-state are grounded in the types of inter-state relations that are 
established and, in particular, on the level of trust between them. Free movement within 
the EU is indicative of relations of trust among member states. On the other hand, strict 
visa requirements for other nationals indicate mistrust. Similarly, the position of 
migrants within a nation-state is partly defined by the accessibility of citizenship rights. 
For instance, in Germany, until 2000 foreign ‘guest’workers could only naturalise if they 
had German ancestry. Being German was therefore constructed in a racially exclusive 
way, based on the strict distinction between the German nation and the ‘others’. More 
generally, the criteria which make someone eligible for citizenship are a way to 
demarcate the national boundaries. Underlying such ‘border management strategies’
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are ideas about what the nation symbolises. Conditions for naturalisation, like place of 
birth, ancestry, knowledge of cultural values and language, are essentially used as 
markers of similarity and difference.
Overall, it can be argued that citizenship is a dynamic and socially constructed concept. 
It does not hold an ‘objective’ neutral status, but is highly contested, mainly because it 
relates to perceptions of national and ethnic identity. Citizenship is a site where formal 
and lay discourses about the nation and its ‘others’ intersect. Naturalisation, in 
particular, is a context where the nation meets its ‘others’; it is a site where national 
boundaries are drawn, exercised and potentially negotiated.
1.8 Social psychological study of citizenship
1.8.1 Research objectives
Taking under consideration the above discussion on the nature and functions of 
citizenship policies, this thesis examines the naturalisation process of the United 
Kingdom. The perspectives of three stakeholders in this context are analysed: the 
official UK public policy, the civil servants working in the field and the naturalised British 
citizens. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis of these discourses, the 
overarching aim of this thesis is to explore the identity and boundary construction 
processes involved in naturalisation. More specifically the objectives of this research 
are:
1. To show the relevance of a social psychological approach on citizenship and 
naturalisation. The social psychological perspective offers the possibility for the 
integration of four levels of analysis: intra-personal, inter-personal, inter-group and 
societal or ideological level (Doise, 1986). Although the institutional level is part of 
this perspective, it is not always adequately explored12. This is evident in social 
psychology’s lack of interest in citizenship. Social psychology has traditionally 
been preoccupied with groups; the nation, being a collective of co-nationals, has 
been part of its field of research. But, citizenship, commonly conceived more as a 
legal status than a type of membership, has not been sufficiently studied. As 
such, the normative framework of national inclusion and exclusion has been 
largely ignored. We need, however, to unpack the social psychological 
dimensions of citizenship so as to recognise that the political, cultural, ethnic and
12There are only few exceptions where the institutional level of analysis of human behaviour 
is explicitly theorised in social psychology (see, for example, Lahlou, 2008).
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national are intertwined and define the position of each citizen within the national 
collectivity.
2. To explore the connections between the symbolic and the institutional levels in 
national identity processes as expressed within the British naturalisation context. 
Public policy, as a set of norms and practices, is interlinked with the lay 
representational field. It can be said that there is a dialogical relationship between 
social institutions and social representations. As will be shown in the next chapter, 
social representations are based on self-other relations and the types of 
communication which are established among people and groups. Social 
institutions, like citizenship and immigration practices, shape these relations and 
legitimise patterns of representations. Thus, they have a significant effect on the 
construction of national identities and the position of people within the existing 
network of social relations. However, institutions can also be challenged. Social 
representations express this tension between constancy and change. It is 
because social thinking is based on the self-other dynamics that there is always 
room for transformation of established patterns of thinking and acting.
3. To investigate lay understandings of citizenship within a dynamic framework of 
self-other relations. Very few studies have explored public perceptions of 
citizenship creating a need to explore the ways that citizens themselves construct 
citizenship (Jones & Gaventa, 2002). Furthermore, the studies that have 
examined the psychology of the citizen conceptualise it in an individualistic way, 
thus overlooking the dynamics of membership (Barnes, Auburn, & Lea, 2004). A 
bottom-up understanding of both citizenship and national identity can complement 
the macro-structural analysis of nationalism and help to show that ordinary people 
are “active producers -and not just passive consumers -  of national discourse” 
(Fox & Miller-ldriss, 2008, p. 539).
4. To understand the role that naturalisation plays in contemporary globalised 
societies. Naturalisation has been seen predominantly as an indicator of 
assimilation in the literature (Gilbertson & Singer, 2003). However, as argued, the 
link between national belonging and citizenship is not straightforward. People are, 
to a great extent, mobile, forming de-territorialised and transnational affiliations 
(Basch, Glick-Schiller, & Szanton-Blanc, 1994). Academic discussions of 
cosmopolitan and post-national citizenship illustrate this trend towards de­
nationalised forms of citizenship (Benhabib, 2004, 2006; Cohen, 1999; Falk, 
2000; Hettne, 2000; Soysal, 1994). The UK has responded to these challenges by 
making commitment and contribution to the country a condition for granting 
naturalisation to migrants. This paradoxical situation creates the need for the
33
exploration of the function of naturalisation in contemporary global societies for 
both the migrants and the ‘host’ country.
5. To offer a critical perspective on immigration and naturalisation in the UK. While 
strict immigration and citizenship policies are often portrayed as inevitable 
responses to problems of sustainability and social solidarity, this thesis adopts a 
more critical viewpoint. It aims to illustrate that public policy and lay discourses on 
national identity and immigration are not disassociated but together form an 
interwoven set of boundary management practices. As such, public policy is not 
necessarily based on rational decision making but draws on and reinforces 
representations of ‘others’.
6. To inform political debates on issues of naturalisation and immigration. By 
acquiring an in-depth understanding of representations related to naturalisation, I 
seek to understand better the processes of inclusion and exclusion which operate 
in this context. My aim is to highlight the factors that make the United Kingdom a 
welcoming society, whilst also uncovering the factors that create exclusion and 
construct migrants as ‘others’.
1.8.2 Research questions
As argued, citizenship in the UK is multifaceted and intertwined with representations of 
the nation and its ‘others’. In order to explore the links between identity construction 
processes and citizenship, we need to acknowledge the complex interplay of various 
discourses that define similarity and difference. In other words, we need to unpack the 
self-other relations and the interplay of inclusion and exclusion which underlie both 
national identity construction and citizenship policy. The theory of social representations 
provides such a tool because it theorises the self-other interdependence in knowledge 
construction. From a social representations perspective, social knowledge is a 
dialogical, dynamic process rooted in the relations between the self and the other 
(Markova, 2000, 2003a). This suggests that thinking is always a dialogue between the 
self and the other. It is a process of argumentation which draws on multiple, sometimes 
conflicting, ideas and themes (Billig, 1987, 1991; Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, 
Middleton, & Radley, 1988). Tensions and conflicts provide the basis for the 
development of dialogue and argumentation leading to re-negotiation and re­
construction of social representations. The prominence of self-other relations in the 
construction of social knowledge suggests that identity construction is also part of this 
process. Within this framework, identity can be theorised as a process of positioning of 
self and other in relation to the ‘polyphasic’ representational field which allows people to
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make sense of themselves and others. Positioning processes draw on existing social 
representations and are always embedded in the broader societal and institutional 
‘moral order’ that defines social relations by demarcating the rights and duties of social 
actors vis-a-vis each other (Davies & Harre, 1999; Harre & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harre 
& van Langehove, 1991, 1999b). Therefore, identity, as a process of relational 
positioning, is located at the intersection between micro and macro social processes; it 
is the concept that links the individual to his or her social world (Duveen, 1993). Using a 
social representations perspective, along with a positioning analysis of identity 
processes, this research seeks to answer the following research questions:
■ Which social representations are associated with citizenship in the United Kingdom 
by the three sets of social actors involved in this context? What are the underlying 
themes that form the basis for these constructions and how are these themes 
organised?
■ How are these social representations linked with positioning processes? In 
particular, how do people use these representations to construct and negotiate 
identities and what types of identities are constructed within the naturalisation context?
■ What types of self-other relations form the basis of these representations and 
identities?
This PhD further aims to explore the relationship between representation and identity. 
In particular, it seeks to address the following theoretical questions:
■ How can the notion of positioning be used to theorise the relationship between 
representation and identity through a consideration of self-other relations?
■ How can the concept of positioning be employed to account for the normative 
aspect of social representations and identities so that we can better account for the 
quality of relations between self and other? More specifically, how do the symbolic and 
institutional spheres intersect to shape identity positions and their ‘moral orders’?
■ What implications do knowledge plurality and ambivalence have for identity 
construction? That is, if people draw on diverse and opposing themes to make sense of 
the world, as the idea of dialogical (Markova, 2003a) and dilemmatic (Billig, 1987) 
thinking suggests, how is this reflected in positioning processes and identity 
construction?
On the whole, this PhD research contributes to the social psychological literature of 
identity and social representations through a careful consideration of self-other 
dynamics in processes of identity construction. By incorporating the institutional level
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into the study of nationhood, it offers a more holistic understanding of processes of 
inclusion and exclusion in contemporary societies. Furthermore, by highlighting the 
intersection of symbolic and institutional processes of positioning, it provides avenues 
for the integration of different levels of analysis which will benefit the study of social 
psychological phenomena in general. On an empirical level, this PhD, considering both 
the public policy approach and the lay perspectives of key actors in the naturalisation 
context, contributes to our understanding of the meanings and functions of citizenship 
in global and mobile societies. In addition, this thesis offers insights to the citizenship 
literature by unpacking the social-psychological processes involved in the process of 
becoming a citizen. Ultimately, this PhD contributes to our understanding of the factors 
that can enable dialogue between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.
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Chapter 2. The Construction of Social Knowledge
2.1 Overview of Chapter 2
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this research explores the social representations 
associated with citizenship within the UK naturalisation context, in an effort to 
understand the processes of national identity construction involved in this context. 
Since naturalisation is, in essence, a boundary crossing practice, exploring the 
dynamics of self-other relations are central in this study. The theory of social 
representations has been chosen as the theoretical framework for this research 
because it conceptualises knowledge construction through processes of social 
interaction and communication. The theory of social representations has provided a 
new approach to cognition in social psychology. Contrary to mainstream cognition 
research, it employs a ‘social thinking’ approach which views knowledge construction 
as a creative, social and dynamic process (Papastamou, 2001). The theory aims to 
understand the construction processes and products of the ‘thinking society’ 
(Moscovici, 2000a). As such, the social representations approach allows to view 
citizenship as a dynamic process embedded in the relations of the nation and its 
‘others’.
This chapter will introduce the theory of social representations and ground the 
theorisation of identity which is discussed in Chapter 3. The following section will 
discuss social representations as the ‘intellectual products’ of thinking societies and the 
third section will explore the conditions of their production, that is, the modes of 
communication and underlying social relations. Drawing on these two sections, the 
fourth section will discuss the notion of knowledge plurality which is based on the 
multiplicity of encounters between knowledge systems and on the diversity of 
relationships between self and other. The final section, drawing on the idea of plurality 
and multivoicedness, will consider the ambivalent and dilemmatic nature of social 
thinking.
2.2 Theorising common-sense knowledge: The theory of social 
representations
2.2.1 Sphere o f production
In his seminal 1961 book La Psychoanalyse, Son Image et Son Public, Moscovici 
(1961/1998) studied the ‘thinking society’ by exploring cognition as a social process
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undertaken by communities and not individual minds. His particular focus was the 
construction and transformation of lay knowledge about psychoanalysis when it moves 
from the field of science to the public sphere. Rather than ‘distorting’ or ‘popularising’ 
psychoanalysis, common sense knowledge ‘socialised’ this scientific theory. Moscovici 
‘rehabilitated’ common sense knowledge by arguing that this is a creative process 
which involves constructive appropriation and not passive simplification (Jovchelovitch, 
2008). What was important for Moscovici was that different types of knowledge serve 
different purposes. To make this case, Moscovici (1961/1998, 2000a) discussed the 
distinction between common sense, or social representations, and other forms of 
knowledge, namely science. The criteria for this distinction are the presence of 
dialogue, plurality and negotiation, as well as the sphere of production. Science is 
produced within a reified universe where only few have legitimate voices and where 
definiteness is the goal of communication. On the contrary, social representations are 
‘public’ and their goal is to make the social world intelligible for people (Moscovici, 
1981, 1988, 2000a). They are produced by lay people in everyday life and everyone 
has (potentially) a part in the knowledge construction process. Non-ambiguity is hardly 
achieved since disagreements and debates form an essential part of the public sphere. 
Although the strict dichotomisation between science and common sense has been 
criticised (Purkhardt, 1993), the distinction between systems of knowledge can still be 
maintained as a matter of degree rather than quality. We can, thus, make a distinction 
between belief-based representations (like religion and ideology) and knowledge-based 
representations (like common sense) according to the degree, not presence or 
absence, of dialogue, plurality and contestation (Markov^, 2003a).
2.2.2 Functions
Social representations are inextricably linked with communicative practices taking place 
in the public sphere. They are produced and transformed in the public sphere through 
dialogue and communication. Thus, social representations are more than a source of 
information for people. Moscovici (1973, p. xiii) has defined them as:
...systems of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function: first to 
establish an order which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their 
material and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable 
communication to take place among the members of a community by providing 
them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying 
unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group 
history.
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In other words, social representations have an instrumental function (mastering the 
world) and a communicative function (enabling communication) (Gillespie, 2008a). 
They constitute a framework of thinking about the social world and they provide a 
common frame of reference for groups and communities (Rose, Efram, Gervais, Joffe, 
Jovchelovitch, & Morant, 1995). What makes social representations social is not that 
they are shared, but that they are socially constituted through a communicative process 
and that they serve social functions by orienting social behaviour and communication 
among people (Moscovici, 1961/1998). As such, they constitute symbolic resources 
and mediate the relations between people and groups. They are also embedded in 
everyday practices, cultural habits and institutions. The relationship between practice, 
social relations and social representations has been aptly shown by Jodelet (1991). In 
her study on social representations of madness in rural France, Jodelet was able to 
show how everyday practices, such as washing, are permeated by stigmatising 
representations of madness. Such practices regulate social relations so that the 
villagers and the ‘mad’ are kept as far apart as possible.
It follows that social representations are localised systems of knowledge (Jovchelovitch, 
2007). They are dependent upon the context of their creation and are intrinsically linked 
to the identities of the group(s) that produce them. As such, knowledge is never 
‘disinterested’ (Duveen, 2000). In his original psychoanalysis study, for instance, 
Moscovici (1961/1998) was able to show that different groups create different 
representations for the same object. This depends on the group identity, interests and 
motivations, as well as on the medium of communication used for the construction of 
new knowledge.
The fundamental aim of the construction of social representations is to ‘make the 
unfamiliar familiar’ (Moscovici, 1981, 1988, 2000a). Social representations ‘fill in’ the 
gaps so as to enable communication between different people. In other words, the 
strangeness of unfamiliar objects is reduced when social representations develop. It is 
this strangeness that creates the need for ‘symbolic coping’ and activates a socio- 
cognitive process whereby unfamiliar ‘things’ become ‘objects’ of knowledge (Wagner, 
1998; Wagner, Duveen, Farr, Jovchelovitch, Fabio, Markova, & Rose, 1999a). Through 
anchoring, new ideas are classified into pre-established categories (Moscovici, 2000a). 
Thus, the unfamiliar idea acquires an identity, a set of features that characterises it. For 
instance, psychoanalysis, in order to be appropriated, was anchored in the notion of 
confession (Moscovici, 1961/1998). Anchoring gives social representations a historical 
foundation and links them with the identity and culture of a community (Moscovici,
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2000a). This is how social representations connect the past and the present of a 
community and maintain a degree of continuity between new knowledge and traditional 
knowledge.
The second mechanism of knowledge construction is objectification whereby abstract 
ideas become objects (Moscovici, 2000a). This means that they acquire the status of 
being ‘real’. To use the same example, the transformation of psychoanalysis into lay 
knowledge has eventually led to the use of psychoanalytic terms as if they were real 
entities. Moscovici (2000a) uses the example of neurosis to show that this term has 
come to signify a ‘real’ personality characteristic, to the extent that the elimination of the 
term ‘neurosis’ would essentially change the way we see other people and relate to 
them.
2.2.3 Constancy and change
A social representation, once objectified, is restrictive by its very ‘objective’ status, 
depending on the degree that it has been conventionalised within a community or social 
group. On the one hand, social representations are prescriptive because they are 
historical and connected to collective memory and culture in a way that informs 
people’s way of thinking; the more conventional and ‘taken for granted’ they get, the 
more autonomy and resistance to change they acquire (Jovchelovitch, 1996; Moscovici, 
2000a). On the other hand, however, social representations can never be wholly 
settled. It is precisely because knowledge is constructed through communication that 
whenever an object becomes the focus of public attention, it can potentially change 
through communication. Contrary to Durkheim who theorised collective representations 
as solid structures of knowledge which enhance group solidarity, Moscovici’s aim was 
rather to theorise negotiation and transformation of knowledge in contemporary plural 
public spheres (Markova, 2003a). This potential for social change is what gives a 
critical edge to the theory of social representations. This also suggests that even 
though there is a degree of sharedness of social representations within a society, they 
are never completely shared by a community; rather, there is always the possibility for 
disagreement and negotiation -  this point will be further elaborated in sections 2.4 and 
2.5 in relation to the dialogical nature of thinking.
To sum up, the key contributions of the theory of social representations to our 
understanding of social knowledge are:
1. The ‘rehabilitation’ of common sense knowledge in social psychology.
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2. The emphasis on communicative practices and dialogue in knowledge 
construction.
3. The de-individualisation of the social psychology of knowledge.
4. The theorisation of change and innovation in terms of knowledge construction.
2.3 The process of knowledge construction
The previous section described social representations as the ‘intellectual products’ of 
thinking societies. Apart from contents or ‘lay theories’, social representations are also 
defined as processes of knowledge construction. Indeed, within the theory of social 
representations, there is an inseparable link between the process and the structure of 
social knowledge, because different construction processes create different networks of 
meanings (Jovchelovitch, 1996).
2.3.1 Self-other relations in knowledge construction
Since communication is at the core of knowledge construction, it can be argued that 
different communicative processes, based on the dynamics of self-other relations, give 
rise to different types of representations. For instance, in Moscovici’s (1961/1998) 
psychoanalysis study, propaganda was the communication strategy employed by the 
communist press with regards to psychoanalysis. In that context, psychoanalysis was 
constructed as a tool of the American capitalist ideology which ran against the values 
and ideology of the Communist Party. The representations of psychoanalysis took the 
form of a stereotype based on the dichotomy between the American/capitalist and 
Soviet/communist ideology (Moscovici, 1961/1998). Each pole in this representation 
was defined and evaluated by its contrast to the other pole, creating a rigid opposition 
which prevented dialogue (Gillespie, 2008a). By offering no other alternatives but to 
reject psychoanalysis, propagandistic communication constructed a polarised 
representation.
Moscovici’s (1988) distinction among hegemonic, emancipated and polemical 
representations also exemplifies the point that different types of communication 
construct different representations. Hegemonic representations are shared, uniform and 
are constructed by groups of high solidarity, much like Durkheim’s collective 
representations. Emancipated representations reflect more heterogeneous social 
systems whereby different sub-communities construct different versions of the world; 
each version is not, however, detached from the others as there is exchange of ideas 
between groups. Finally, polemical representations are constructed on the basis of
41
antagonistic relations between groups; the polarised representation of psychoanalysis 
produced by the Marxist press is such an example.
Jovchelovitch (2007) has also distinguished between dialogical and non-dialogical 
encounters between people holding different representations. While dialogical 
encounters allow for the construction of hybrid and pluralistic representations, non- 
dialogical relations construct a hierarchy of knowledge, such that the knowledge 
produced by more powerful groups acquires more validity than the knowledge 
constructed by dominated groups.
Duveen and colleagues have discussed in more detail how self-other relations shape 
knowledge construction processes through the mediation of social representations. 
Drawing on Piaget’s distinction between symmetric and asymmetric social relations 
(constraint and cooperation), they have elaborated the role of recognition in cognitive 
development (Duveen & Psaltis, 2008; Leman & Duveen, 1999; Psaltis & Duveen, 
2006, 2007). These studies have mainly investigated the social representations of 
gender and their impact on knowledge construction processes. They have illustrated 
that recognition can be hindered or facilitated by the social representations of gender. 
These social representations, based on the bipolar male-female, position men as more 
knowledgeable than women. As a result, the knowledge produced by men is perceived 
as more ‘valid’ than the knowledge produced by women. Through this positioning, 
social representations shape patterns of interaction and mediate communication 
practices, thus having an effect on the construction of new knowledge. For instance, in 
Duveen and colleagues’ studies, it was shown that interactions characterised by 
recognition produced ‘intellectual exchange’ type processes of knowledge construction 
which resulted in the production of more original knowledge among children (Duveen & 
Psaltis, 2008; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006).
More recently, Duveen (2008) took this idea a step further by arguing that not only can 
we distinguish different representational types by the kinds of underlying 
communicative practices, but we can also use these communicative genres to 
distinguish types of groups from each other. In other words, we can identify forms of 
affiliation which correspond to different communication genres. Groups affiliated by 
relations of sympathy, whereby members are voluntarily associated, tend to diffuse 
information about new objects of social knowledge. Groups affiliated by communion, in 
the sense that the members share a particular belief system, tend to use propagation 
which sets limits on how new information is received. Groups which create clear 
boundaries between the in-group and the out-groups and are defined by solidarity, tend
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to use propaganda as a mode of communication. Therefore, there is a three-fold 
relationship between group structure or social relations, communicative practices, and 
types of representations produced.
2.3.2 Epistemological foundations: Dialogicality
It follows from the above that it is the quality of communication and self-other relations 
that shapes the knowledge construction process. Moscovici’s social representations 
theory is, indeed, based on the theorisation of self-other relations in knowledge 
construction. This is what he has called a ‘systematic social psychology’, defined as 
follows: "the relationship between Ego and Object is mediated through the intervention 
of another subject; this relationship becomes a complex triangular one in which each of 
the terms is fully determined by the other two” (Moscovici, 2000b, p. 107). This 
relationship among self, other and object/representation forms the unit of analysis in 
social representations theory (Markov^, 2000, 2003a, 2003b).
The significance of the dialogue and self-other interaction can be traced back to the 
Hegelian paradigm which stresses the dialogical nature of thought and places 
interaction at the centre of knowledge construction (Markov^, 1982, 2000). Markov^ 
(1996, 2000, 2003a, 2008a) has extensively studied the epistemological status of the 
social representations theory based on the idea that the individual and the society form 
an ontological unit. For Markova (2003a), the ontology of humanity is formulated in 
terms of communication, that is, to be is to communicate. Thus, the self (Ego) and the 
other (Alter) can only be conceived as interdependent, since the self has no meaning 
outside communication. It is communication that constructs both the self and the other 
simultaneously.
The idea that human beings are inherently social has also been expressed by 
developmental psychologists, like Vygotsky, Piaget and Winnicott (Jovchelovitch, 
2007). Moscovici (1990) has acknowledged the links between developmental and social 
psychology, suggesting that development is first and foremost a process of 
socialisation. The work of Winnicott, in particular, shows that the process of self 
construction is essentially the process whereby the child develops his/her identity as 
different from his/her mother’s; this takes place ontogenetically through the recognition 
of the other as different (Jovchelovitch, 2007; Markova, 2003b). Similarly, in Mead’s 
writings we find the idea that by appropriating the perspective of the other, an individual 
becomes socialised as a member of a community and develops self-consciousness: 
“only in so far as he takes the attitudes of the organised social group to which he
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belongs towards the organised, co-operative social activity or set of such activities in 
which that group as such is engaged, does he develop a complete self (Mead, 1934, p. 
155). It can be argued, therefore, that the other (or a representation of the other) is 
indeed part of the self (Hermans, 2001a; Markova, 2006) -  this point will be further 
discussed in the next chapter in relation to identity.
The de facto interdependence of self and other is the starting point for the theory of 
social representations and it is what distinguishes it from mainstream individualistic 
theories of cognition (Farr, 1987,1993b). If the self cannot be viewed independently of 
the other, it follows that knowledge as well ought to be dialogical, meaning that ‘the 
capacity to think is by definition the capacity to communicate’ (Markova, 2003a, pp. 
138-139). Thought and thus, knowledge, is indivisible from communication which 
involves the interaction between self and other. In other words, we only conceive 
objects or create knowledge in terms of the other(s). In epistemological terms, the dual 
relationship between knower and object becomes triadic as the relation between the 
self and the object is mediated by the other (Moscovici, 2000b). The self (or the Ego), 
as well as the other (or the Alter), can be an individual, a group, a nation etc. The 
relation of the two is the basis for the construction of social knowledge (see also 2.3.1, 
p. 39). This suggests that the individual and the society are to be conceived as 
interdependent; for social representations theory, cognition is, de facto, social and 
cultural (Voelklein & Howarth, 2005).
This triadic model of knowledge construction has been extended by Bauer and Gaskell 
who have added the project dimension (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999), which links the self 
and the other in time, and the intergroup context (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008), in order to 
capture the interaction of different social milieus in the representational process. For 
instance, the construction of social representations of Britishness involves various 
actors. One can think of the lay British public (which is composed of various social 
groups of a different status), the British state (which defines formal inclusion and 
exclusion), as well as the migrants (who, by claiming citizenship, redefine the national 
boundaries), as key actors in constructions of Britishness. While each actor has their 
own version or perspective on this issue, based on the project they are pursuing, it can 
be said that these versions intersect and overlap at points to construct Britishness as a 
complex and multifaceted representation.
Overall, the theory of social representations offers a systemic understanding of the 
social which is conceived, not as an aggregation of individuals, but as a whole that 
incorporates the individual and the social as aspects of the same system (Raudsepp,
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2005). Social representations permeate both the individual and the cultural or social, 
thus, integrating the intra-personal, inter-personal, inter-group and societal levels of 
analysis which Doise (1986) has identified. As Farr (1987, p. 359) puts it, social 
representations are ‘“ in the world’ as well as being in the ‘head’”. The theory of social 
representations, instead of looking at objects or subjects as the initiators of the 
knowledge production processes, it looks at their interaction, at how each shapes the 
other during the process. Thus, rather than the object or the subject, it is the in-between 
space of interaction that becomes here the unit of analysis.
2.3.3 Dialogical tensions
This dynamic relation between self, other and object is an epistemology of change 
because it presupposes tensions among the three parties (Markova, 2000,2003a). The 
tension between self and other is the starting point for change and construction of new 
knowledge. On the one hand, power relations define the legitimacy and validity of 
different knowledge systems. The degree of power asymmetry between groups defines 
who has more say in what becomes the 'truth' (Jovchelovitch, 2007). On the other 
hand, although asymmetries in dialogue and recognition help to maintain dominant 
representations, they are also the starting point for negotiations because they create 
debate and contestation; it is “the impossibility of consensus that is the basis of all 
dialogue" (Markova, 2000, p. 424). In other words, gaps in understanding and the 
impossibility of complete recognition of the perspective of the other provide the 
momentum for further dialogue. The continuous struggle for recognition is at the core of 
all self-other relations (Markova, 2000,2003a). Indeed, if people agreed on everything, 
there would be nothing left to discuss or debate, because in order to engage with the 
other, the other must maintain a degree of ‘strangeness’; our effort to reduce this 
strangeness enables dialogue (Markova, 2003a).
The third party in the knowledge construction triangle, the object, also has a dynamic 
role in representational processes. The object is, in a way, the ‘anchor’ of every 
dialogue. It poses restrictions on the representational process by its very status as an 
object. Depending on how conventionalised it has been, on how much it is rooted in the 
culture and the identity of a group, the object may not be easily transformed and 
contested.
In light of the above, it can be argued that the fundamental tension in the 
representational triangle is the tension between constancy and change. In belief-based 
social representations or in hegemonic representations (Moscovici, 1988) constancy
45
and conformity are stronger. Such representations, like the collective representations 
described by Durkheim, tend to be important for the identity and solidarity of a 
community. In knowledge-based social representations the balance leans towards 
change and negotiation, that is, the making of new knowledge. To put it differently, in 
belief-based representations the self-other relations are at the foreground (because 
such representations express commitment to the group), while in knowledge-based 
representations it is the self-object relations that are at the foreground (because the 
object of knowledge becomes a subject of examination -  it is not taken for granted) 
(Markova, 2003a).
On the whole, the dialogical tensions among self, other and object allow us to theorise 
both stability and change. The opposing forces of constancy and change make social 
representations an inherently dialogical knowledge construction process. It will be 
shown later in this chapter that thinking is, indeed, a dialectic and creative process 
which employs both arguments and counter-arguments.
2.4 Plurality of knowledge
Moscovici theorised social representations by differentiating them from collective 
representations, which were conceptualised by Durkheim (Moscovici, 2000a). He 
argued that if collective representations were a suitable way of knowing for pre-modern 
societies, social representations form the basis for common-sense rationality 
nowadays. In traditional societies knowledge was relatively stable and un-questioned. It 
took the form of collective representations, which functioned as facts or truths. As 
Jovchelovitch (2001, 2007) observes, Durkheim’s underlying goal when theorising 
collective representations was to explain how solidarity and stability comes about in a 
community. On the other hand, social representations is a theory of change and 
transformation akin to contemporary communities (Markova, 2003a).
As Beck and colleagues (Beck, Bonss, & Lau, 2003; Beck & Lau, 2005) argue, taken 
for granted distinctions, certainties and boundaries are dissolving in contemporary 
societies. This means that things are more ambiguous and that categories are based 
less on the either/or principle and more on the both/and principle. This multiplicity of 
boundaries goes hand in hand with the multiplicity of rationalities (Beck, Bonss, & Lau,
2003). Social representations are, thus, plural, dynamic and contested, reflecting the 
modern world in which knowledge is constantly circulated by various centres, none of 
which has complete authority over ‘the truth’ (Moscovici, 2000a). Social 
representations, as a phenomenon, are only possible because today there is no single
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legitimating authority over knowledge, which allows for increased debate and 
communication (Duveen, 2000). The modern public sphere provides the space for 
communication and exchange of ideas and is, thus, associated with the pluralisation of 
knowledge forms and claims (Jovchelovitch, 2001, 2007). It is this plurality of 
knowledge systems and our ability to adapt to this increasing ‘strangeness’ that the 
theory of social representations addresses and, in particular, the concept o f‘cognitive 
polyphasia’.
The cognitive polyphasia hypothesis was formulated by Moscovici (1961/1998, p. 301, 
my translation):
...the same group, and mutatis mutandis, the same individual are able to 
employ various logical registers, in domains to which they relate with 
perspectives, information and values that are distinctive to each of them... In a 
general way, we can argue that the dynamic co-existence... of different 
modalities of knowledge, corresponding to specific relations between man and 
his social context, determine a state of cognitive polyphasia.
The cognitive polyphasia hypothesis suggests that in order to be able to master the 
world, we have to combine a variety of conceptual tools which allow us to adjust to 
different circumstances. Thus, our relation to the world is not singular, defined by a 
unique set of beliefs about the nature of things (e.g. religion in the Middle Ages); rather, 
it is multifaceted, as different projects and contexts require different rationalities 
(Kalampalikis&Haas, 2008). Indeed, if knowledge is conceptualised as the result of the 
interaction between subjects and objects, then different types of interaction among the 
parties will produce different ways of knowing in different contexts.
Cognitive polyphasia has a diachronic and a synchronic aspect (Provencher, 2007). 
The diachronic perspective has to do with the temporal dimension of changes in ways 
of thinking. Polyphasia here refers to the coexistence of ‘older’ and ‘newer’ ways of 
thinking within the same community or individual. Several studies have, indeed, 
illustrated the combination of traditional and modern ways of thinking in different 
contexts: archaic and contemporary ideas about madness (Jodelet, 1991), traditional 
Chinese and biomedical knowledge (Jovchelovitch & Gervais, 1999), traditional Indian 
and Western views on mental illness (Wagner, Duveen, Themel, & Verma, 1999b). This 
type of polyphasia is also related with the disillusionment with knowledge systems 
which had been considered infallible in the past, such as science.
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The synchronic perspective, which is complementary to the diachronic perspective, 
suggests that different ways of thinking coexist within a society and that people draw on 
different knowledge systems in different contexts (Provencher, 2007). The synchronic 
perspective maintains that different ways of thinking are not necessarily incompatible, 
but can be accommodated within a community or person. Contexts, norms and goals 
are, for Moscovici (2000c), the elements that define the choice of knowledge to be 
employed. The context defines the particularities of the situation, the norms define what 
counts as the ‘appropriate way of thinking’ about an issue and the goals refer to the 
purpose of knowledge construction and communication. Thus, ‘cognitive systems’ and 
thinking modes are not tied to particular individuals or personalities, but are part of co­
constructed cultural resources on which people draw.
Within the synchronic approach in particular, cognitive polyphasia can be described as 
a way of dealing with change and unfamiliarity, since social representations are by 
definition a means of symbolic coping with unfamiliar situations (Wagner, 1998; Wagner 
& Kronberger, 2001). In our everyday life we all come across difference, otherness, 
novelty and change. Coping with this complex reality requires that we can mix and 
combine elements from different knowledge systems. If the aim of social 
representations is to make the unfamiliar familiar and to enable communication, it 
follows that for social reality to be rendered comprehensible, people must somehow 
come to grips with various kinds of knowledge produced by different communities. As 
Hermans and Dimaggio (2007) argue, the increasing cultural encounters of our 
globalised world create the need for dialogical capacity, meaning the capacity for 
dialogue between self and other. Thus, as Wagner (1998) notes, cognitive polyphasia 
can be conceptualised as a ‘representational repertoire’ which allows people to be 
flexible and deal with the variety and complexity of the social world.
The cognitive polyphasia hypothesis seems to suggest that people are increasingly 
more able to take on different perspectives. However, asymmetrical power relations 
pose constraints on the validity of different knowledge systems. This means that 
encounters between knowledge systems are not always dialogical (Jovchelovitch, 
2007). As Gillespie (2008a) observes, the plurality of social representations does not 
necessarily mean that people have become more tolerant; rather, people may employ 
various defensive strategies, which he calls ‘semantic barriers’, against alternative 
representations. Certainly, one such strategy is denying the agency or ability of the 
other to construct valid accounts of the world. This can be conceptualised as an 
instance of misrecognition whereby the other is not recognised as an equal partner in
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dialogue (Taylor, 1992). This again illustrates that the knowledge construction process 
depends on the kinds of relationships that are established between self and other.
To sum up, cognitive polyphasia is the outcome of multiple knowledge encounters 
among various groups and communities which lead to the construction of a plurality of 
representations that people can employ in their dealings with the world. Cognitive 
polyphasia furthermore suggests that contradictions and ambivalence are part of our 
common sense knowledge. In line with this, Rose and colleagues (1995, p. 4) describe 
the representational field as “susceptible to contradiction, fragmentation; negotiation 
and debate. In such a representational field, there is incoherence, tension and 
ambivalence”. It follows that representations are never autonomous; they interact, 
conflict and mix with other representations.
2.5 Dialogical thinking
This section draws on Markova’s dialogical perspective and Billig's rhetorical approach 
to discuss the antinomic nature of common sense. Both perspectives emphasise the 
social-individual dynamics in knowledge construction, as well as the creativity of 
common sense through the use of dialogue. While Markov^ focuses on the 
epistemological and ontological foundations of the idea of antinomic thinking, Billig 
stresses the argumentative and strategic nature of discourse.
For Markova (2003a), cognitive polyphasia is an expression of dialogicality (see section 
2.3.2, p. 43). According to this perspective, there is no self independent from the other 
as we can only speak of self and other within the realm of communication. Based on 
this premise, Markova (2003a) further argues that knowledge construction is a 
dialogical process, based on the dialogical tensions between self and other. 
Furthermore, the relation between the self and the other is not only external, but is also 
internal (Markova, 2003a, 2006). This suggests that different perspectives and 
representations do not only meet and interact in the public sphere, through public 
debates and discussions among various social agents. Rather, different perspectives 
are also located ‘inside individual minds’ and serve as symbolic resources on which 
people can draw in different contexts, as the cognitive polyphasia hypothesis suggests. 
Thus, thinking can be conceived as an internal dialogue with an ‘inner Alter’ defined as 
“symbolically and socially represented kinds of the A/terthat are in an internal dialogue 
with the Ego” (Markova, 2006, p. 145, emphasis in original). The inner Alter represents 
a different perspective on the world. This may be, for instance, the voice of a social 
group or a significant other.
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This theoretical perspective conceptualises the human mind as polyphonic: one can 
speak from many positions or have more than one voice, each linked with a particular 
perspective on the world. Bakhtin has used the concept ‘heteroglossia’ to refer to the 
different internal voices or perspectives people may employ (Markova, 2003a). 
Polyphasia and heteroglossia, therefore, refer to the same phenomenon from a 
different angle. The former refers to the coexistence of diverse knowledge systems in 
society and the latter to the expression of this plurality within the individual through the 
coexistence of multiple voices (Markova, 2003a). If polyphasia, as Moscovici 
(1961/1998) claims, is the rule rather than the exception, then ambivalence and 
contradiction are both part of our thinking and of the knowledge we construct.
Billig and colleagues (Billig, 1987, 1988, 1991, 1993; Billig et al., 1988) have 
conceptualised dialogue in thinking from a rhetorical perspective. This viewpoint 
maintains that lay people think in an argumentative way; they are able to argue by 
drawing on opposing themes. Billig takes thinking to be a form of argumentation 
consisting of both logos and anti-logos. The capacity to negate is especially important 
here because it emphasises our ability to criticise and contest. Every position or attitude 
is simultaneously the negation of an opposing argument (Billig, 1987). Billig (1988, p. 
12) comes very close to the idea of the dialogical mind when he argues that "thought is 
internalised argumentation”. This means that neither common sense nor individual 
minds are monological. Arguing means employing both logos and anti-logos, being able 
to use contrary ‘common-places’ to pursue different projects. This is evident in the 
official political discourse whereby politicians of different parties employ the same 
values (justice, equality, etc) to make different arguments. This not only suggests that 
the definitions of values are debatable, but also that the public is able to understand, 
and potentially agree, with different parties which argue in opposing directions (Billig, 
1987, pp. 233-234; Reicher& Hopkins, 2001).
In accordance with the notion of the ‘thinking society’ developed by Moscovici, this 
approach challenges the idea of inner consistency which assumes that the individual is 
essentially a rigid unthinking subject; rather, it is the arguments within cultures, not just 
between cultures, that provide the ‘matter’ of human thinking (Billig, 1988). The 
existence of contrary themes within common-sense makes change possible because it 
opens up a space for argumentation and debate. Thus, taken for granted ideas, or 
common-places for Billig (1987), are not only the basis of agreement, but also of 
disagreement.
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It follows that the human mind is antinomic; it is structured around the dialogue of 
opposites (Markova, 2003a). What is important is that the poles are interrelated; one is 
defined by the other. There is no ‘us’ if there is no ‘them’, nothing is ‘same’ if there is 
not something that is ‘different’.
The idea that thinking is antinomic has been elaborated in the theory of social 
representations through the notion of themata, which are defined as oppositional 
categories and constitute an expression of dialogicality (Markova, 2000, 2003a). 
Moscovici borrowed the term ‘thema’ from science philosopher Gerald Holton 
(Moscovici & Vignaux, 2000). For Holton, themata are fundamental ideas which 
underpin scientific thought, even across different paradigms. They constitute the basis 
of scientific theories and hypotheses. Moscovici was the first to introduce this term in 
the social psychology of representations (Moscovici, 1992; Moscovici & Vignaux, 2000). 
He describes them as ‘source’ or ‘primary’ ideas to refer to their primacy in generating 
social representations. Themata take the form of oppositions, like man/woman, 
we/they, justice/injustice and so on. Moscovici also points to their canonical or 
commonplace nature showing that they are relatively stable (Moscovici, 1992; 
Moscovici & Vignaux, 2000). It is the content of the categories that can change, rather 
than the oppositional categories themselves. For instance, the ‘we/they’ and 
‘same/different’ oppositions seem to be quite stable over time, even though the 
meanings of the poles change to include more people and/or exclude others. Thus, 
themata can be described as the ‘deep structures’ of social representations, resembling 
what the structural approach theorists call the ‘central core’ of a representation (Liu,
2004). Themata can be related to more than one social representations and also 
intermix with other themata in the construction of representations. Also, in the course of 
history themata can be re-thematized. The thema of ‘social recognition/denial of 
recognition’, for instance, has been said to be fundamental in human history, but with 
the development of modernity and humanism, it has been transformed from a matter of 
honour to a matter of dignity (Markova, 2003a).
Not all antinomies in thinking become themata. According to Markova (2000, 2003a), 
antinomies can become the primary ideas that generate social representations through 
a process of thematisation. For Markova, there are oppositions which may be ‘dormant’, 
not reflected upon. When an opposition becomes negotiated and communicated 
socially, that is, when it becomes socially relevant, it can become a thema. Specifically, 
when an object enters conscience and needs to become familiar, it gets anchored on a 
thema or more. This thema becomes negotiated and talked about. It is then that the
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potential meanings of the thema, which at this point is a very basic opposition, are 
enriched and the social representation develops as a network of meanings grounded in 
this opposition (Moscovici, 1992).
The dilemma between individual and group rights is an example of this. Nowadays the 
social representations of multiculturalism in Britain are partly based on the opposition 
between communitarianism and liberal individualism. This is exemplified in the tension 
between the liberal and the communitarian values of justice and citizenship. The former 
advocate universal individual rights, while the latter emphasise the need to recognise 
specific group rights. The very meaning of equality is a matter of debate here. This is 
what Hall calls the ‘multicultural question’: “How then can the particular and the 
universal, the claims of both difference and equality, be recognised? This is the 
dilemma, the conundrum -the multi-cultural question- at the heart of the multi-cultural’s 
transruptive and reconfigurative impact” (2000, p. 235, emphasis in original).
Billig and colleagues (Billig, 1991; Billig et al., 1988) use the term ‘ideological dilemmas’ 
for such phenomena, in order to emphasise both the antinomic and the argumentative 
nature of common-sense thinking, Dilemmas such as ‘the individual versus the social 
good’ and ‘serving justice versus showing sympathy’ are sources that people draw on 
to make arguments. Billig and colleagues’ use of the term ‘dilemma’ is also indicative of 
the fact that such contrary themes and arguments can appear equally reasonable to 
common sense. For instance, both justice and mercy are equally valued ideals, but 
guide social behaviour in opposing directions.
These dilemmas are rooted in the history of modern societies. For example, the tension 
between prejudice and rationality originates in Enlightenment’s ideal of rationality and 
rejection of prejudice (Billig, 1991; Billig etal., 1988; Figgou & Condor, 2006). Condor 
has highlighted similar tensions in constructions of national identity in Britain and has 
drawn attention to the strategic nature of these constructions. In one of her studies 
(Condor, 2006a), she has shown that respondents in England made strategic temporal 
comparisons between the past and the present. A homogenous and singular national 
character was portrayed as anachronistic, whereas diversity was seen as 
characterising British society in the present. For Condor (2006a) this was an effort to 
suppress negative stereotypes for the ingroup. Moreover, she argues that there may be 
an assumption of superiority in such discourses, since cultural diversity makes Britain 
distinctively interesting and tolerant. Similar results have also been found by Condor 
(2006b) in her analysis of the Labour party representations of ‘multicultural Britain’, 
where multiculturalism was portrayed as a distinct British virtue or accomplishment,
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whereas at the same time an Anglocentric historical narrative was evident in the 
politicians’ accounts. These studies have shown that the British nation is represented 
as both culturally homogeneous and diverse, while ethnic minorities can be 
ambivalently positioned as both ‘similar’ and ‘different’.
Billig (1987,1988,1993) discusses this strategic aspect of discourse with regards to the 
process of categorisation. He maintains that categorisation is not a straightforward 
process of neutral classification. Rather, categorising involves arguing about the 
essence of categories. For instance, ‘who counts as British’ is a question about the 
definition of not only the boundaries of Britishness, but also its very meaning, its 
defining features. Categories can be strategically constructed and selected to pursue 
various projects. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) have shown, for example, that there was 
a clear link between the way the Scottish identity was defined by the political parties 
during the 1992 election and the way people were mobilised in order to protect it. They 
demonstrated that unionists (Conservative Party) and devolutionists (Labour Party), as 
well as separatists/nationalists (Scottish National Party), all evoked Scottish identity to 
pursue different political projects. For everyone, Scottish identity (defined as an 
independent nation or as an indispensable part of the UK) was under threat and all 
claimed to represent the Scottish national interests with the aim to protect the nation 
either by devolution, independence or by remaining under the same status quo. Thus, 
category definitions were used as arguments that promoted different types of social 
action.
To sum up, dialogical epistemology suggests that thinking is a dialogic process which 
incorporates multiple and opposing themes or perspectives. Such themes, once 
thematised, form the core of social representations. They become dilemmas that are 
talked and argued about, often in a strategic manner. It is in the nature of common 
sense to comprise ambivalence and conflict between different ideas. This provides the 
impetus for creativity, change and innovation. By combining the dialogical approach to 
knowledge construction with the notion of argumentation, we have a framework which 
can explain the genesis of different ideas, as well as their (strategic) function in social 
relations.
2.6 Summary of Chapter 2
Chapter 2 has discussed the processes of knowledge construction through the lens of 
the social representations theory. The theory conceptualises knowledge both as 
content and as process embedded in the socio-historical context. Social
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representations are constructed through communicative processes and are, therefore, 
linked with the dynamics of social relations. As such, they are constrained by power 
asymmetries which define the validity of different accounts. The self-other-object 
triangle for knowledge construction illustrates the interdependence among the three 
parties. Social representations are created and transformed through the dialogue 
between self and other within the context of already established knowledge systems 
which set the scene for new constructions. Based on this self-other-object 
epistemology, this chapter has further argued that thinking is a dialogical process that 
involves both the self and the other. It is a form of ‘internal’ interaction between different 
perspectives or, to put it differently, a form of internal argumentation drawing on 
different and opposing themes. Thinking is, thus, based on antinomies or themata, 
which are found at the core of social representations. These antinomies make thinking 
and argumentation possible. Drawing on these ideas, in particular on the centrality of 
self-other dynamics and dialogicality in thinking, the next chapter will discuss the 
construction of social identities.
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Chapter 3. The Construction of Social Identities
3.1 Overview of Chapter 3
Chapter 2 discussed social representations as knowledge systems which arise through 
social interaction. Communicative practices are at the heart of their production and 
transformation and, because of that, they are always ‘in the making’. Social 
representations can also accommodate plurality and ambivalence. Billig’s idea of 
dilemmatic thinking and Markova’s elaboration of themata have been used to describe 
the antinomic thinking which characterises human cognition, as well as the antinomic 
nature of common sense knowledge itself. Based on these ideas and drawing on the 
work of Duveen and on positioning theory, this chapter explores identity as a process of 
positioning in relation to the symbolic environment and to others, which provides people 
with a perspective on the world and with a social location in relation to others. Like 
social knowledge, identity is conceptualised here as a process embedded in social 
relations.
After identifying the main aspects of identity, this chapter will discuss identity as a 
function of social representations, that is, as the position of a person or a group in 
relation to a social representation. The next section will elaborate the processes of 
identity construction through a consideration of self-other relations and positioning 
processes, giving emphasis to the normative context of interactions. The last section of 
Chapter 3 will discuss the interlinked topics of multiplicity and ambivalence of identities. 
In line with the dialogical self theory, it will be argued that people can speak from more 
than one positions because they draw on multiple social representations to make sense 
of themselves and the world around them. Multivoicedness inside the person is, thus, 
seen as equivalent to cognitive polyphasia in society. Furthermore, the idea that we 
think in opposites and are able to take on different positions suggests that identities are 
not univocal. Rather, the last section will explore the idea that identities are fraught with 
tensions. This originates in the dynamics self-other relations which are based on the 
tensions between unity and differentiation of self and other.
3.2 Defining identity
Although it now appears to be an invaluable concept for social scientists, identity is a 
recent term within social science. Gleason (1983, p. 910) in his semantic history of 
identity notes that the original 1930s Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences had no entry 
for ‘identity’ while ‘identification’ referred mainly to criminal investigations and
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fingerprinting. It was much later that identity became a key term in the social science. 
The psychologist Erickson was an important figure in popularising the term in the 
1950s. However, even from the first uses of the term, the definition of identity was 
somewhat elusive. Erikson himself argued that identity is a process “located in the core 
of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture, a process which 
establishes, in fact, the identity of those two identities" (Erikson, 1950, cited in Gleason, 
1983, p. 914). Identity is, thus, a subtle term because it is located at the 
social/individual interface; it is neither just ‘inside’ nor ‘outside’ the individual.
Exactly because of this complexity, identity has been employed to explain a variety of 
phenomena and has been defined in various and often conflicting ways. It has been 
predominantly associated with stability, sameness and uniqueness within psychology. It 
has been conceived as the essence that differentiates an individual (or group) from all 
the other people (or groups). Recently, such ideas have been challenged by scholars 
working in a variety of disciplines. With regards to migrant identities, for instance, terms 
like ‘diaspora’, ‘hybridity’, and 'transnationalism’ have been employed to describe 
affiliations and cultural transformations which are far more complex, multifaceted and 
intersecting. Beck captures this in his critique of the methodological nationalism of the 
social science which takes society as meaning the nation-state and conceives a 
fundamental dualism between the national and the international, the former being 
internal to societies and the latter external (Beck, 2006; Beck & Sznaider, 2006). Within 
this approach, the intersection of the national and the international is left un-theorised. 
At the same time, because of this dualistic perception of identities, inter-cultural 
exchanges and the development of hybrid cultures are not acknowledged. Beck (2006) 
argues for a dialectical perspective that acknowledges the ‘in-between space’ and what 
he calls the ‘both/and principle of inclusive oppositions’. Not only do people identify in 
multiple ways, but these identities are also intersected and negotiated in a variety of 
settings.
Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue that identity has lost its analytical significance 
because it has acquired an array of conflicting meanings, from essentialist notions 
which focus on unity and distinctiveness to conceptions which emphasise the 
fragmentation of the modern subject. This critique is well-founded, but it is argued here 
that identity maintains explanatory power as a term that links the individual to his or her 
social world in multiple ways and contexts. The challenge in defining identity stems 
from the fact that it is located at the social/individual interface; as such, it is relational, 
dynamic and hard to pin down in fixed categories. Like social knowledge, identity is
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constructed and re-negotiated through communicative processes. It is an open-ended 
project that involves simultaneously both the self and the other. Identity is, furthermore, 
embedded in the historical socio-cultural context which has an impact on how relations 
between the self and the other are constituted and negotiated. As Hall (1996, p. 4) 
observes, “identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language 
and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not ‘who we are’ or ‘where we 
came from’, so much as what we might become".
In line with the self-other-object triangle of knowledge construction, identity is viewed 
here as linked with processes of representation which involve the dialogical relationship 
between self and other. Identity is defined as a position towards a social representation 
in relation to others. There are three interconnected aspects of identity which all need to 
be considered in identity research:
i. Identity can be approached as a position from where one speaks and acts 
(Davies & Harre, 1999). The content of these positions can be said to be a 
function of representations which define groups and social categories (Duveen, 
1993; Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). For instance, representations of gender define 
what it means to be male or female and what type of behaviour is expected of 
men and women in a certain setting. The same applies for all social groups, 
whereby different types of social representations are indicative of different types 
of social formations (Wagner, 1994). Identity, therefore, provides the symbolic 
material that helps people define themselves and others and orient their 
behaviour accordingly.
ii. Identity can be approached as a process of constructing a sense of ‘who I am’ 
and ‘who we are’ by appropriating social representations (Duveen, 1993; 
Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). This appropriation process takes place through an act 
of positioning towards the symbolic field of a society or community on the basis 
of social relations. When we position ourselves towards social representations, 
we acquire a viewpoint stemming from that position. Being a woman, for 
instance, and positioning oneself in relation to the meanings of womanhood 
gives someone a way of interpreting themselves and the world around them, as 
well as a guideline for action. Points i and ii together suggest that pre-existing 
social representations define identities, but these identities are also elaborated 
and argued upon by individuals and groups through a process of positioning. In 
other words, there is a tension between constancy and change, as social 
representations allow for both change and stability (see section 2.2.3, p. 40).
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iii. Identity can be seen as a relationship with an other. To use the same example, 
being a woman inevitably implies a relationship with men as the two concepts 
(male/female) are interdependent and, quite often, defined in opposition to each 
other. Identities are, thus, embedded within the system of social relations. The 
types of social relations established between self and other shape the 
normative aspect, or ‘moral order’ of identities (what is expected from each 
position) (Davies & Harre, 1990; Harre & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harre & van 
Langehove, 1991,1999b). Also, the fact that social relations are dynamic and 
multifaceted suggests that social identities are also dynamic and complex.
On the whole, identity contents, processes and relationships with others constitute the 
three fundamental elements of identities. These three aspects are intertwined since 
identity is a process of positioning in relation to social representations on the basis of 
social relations. In other words, identity refers to three main questions: ‘Who am I?’, 
‘Who are they?’ and What is our relationship?’ (Chrysochoou, 2003).
3.3 Identities as functions of social representations
Henri Tajfel, in developing social identity theory, defined identity as “that part of an 
individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a 
social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to 
that membership" (1981, p. 255, emphasis in original). The question here is what is it 
that defines social groups and categories. We can argue that categories, which are 
used for the construction of identities, are social representations (Augoustinos, 2001). 
As social representations, they are systems of meaning which are developed through 
social interaction and guide behaviour.
Regarding national categories, Anderson (1991), acknowledging the contingent nature 
of nation formation, has argued that nations are cultural artefacts, they are ‘imagined 
communities’. As Hall (1992) observes, a nation is not only a political institution, but a 
‘system of cultural representation’, represented in the national culture. As such, people 
are not just citizens, in the legal sense of the term, but they also take part in nation 
formation practices. National symbols, like flags, and practices, like celebrations of 
national anniversaries, illustrate the embeddedness of nationalism into our everyday 
life. National identities are often so embedded in everyday habitual practices (Fox & 
Miller-ldriss, 2008) that it is taken for granted that different nationalities reflect essential 
differences among people of this world. Indeed, Billig (1995) describes ‘banal 
nationalism’ as a lay ideology based on the idea that the world is naturally divided in a
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world of nations. This lay representation of nations helps people categorise the world 
and classify others by attributing essential features to constructed categories. 
Chryssochoou (2004) links this idea with the concept of social representations, by 
arguing that nationalism is a social representation which objectifies the existing system 
of social relations.
Being a member of a nation, or any other community or grouping, is a symbolic 
resource for people. Belonging to a group allows people access to a particular stock of 
knowledge on which they can draw to make sense of the world. Moscovici (1961/1998) 
has argued that social representations are aspects of groups; groups can be defined 
and differentiated from each other through the social representations that they hold. 
Thus, social representations, as symbolic systems of knowledge, have an identity 
function because different groups hold different representations about social objects 
which help them engage with the world. It follows that identities are rooted in the culture 
and history of social groups and communities. In that sense, social representations are 
the ‘glue’ of social life (Brewer, 2001).
Social representations can, thus, be seen as the appropriations of a social object by a 
group of people in order to communicate and guide their interactions (Moscovici, 1963). 
This suggests that shared meanings and understandings of the world within groups 
make coordinated action possible. Groups do not only share meanings but also norms 
that guide behaviour, both of which form part of social representations. These 
meanings and norms develop through repeated patterns of interaction within groups 
which involve certain activities and objects. These patterns of interaction are what make 
group knowledge possible. In short, the social representations perspective suggests 
that different groups engage in different types of communicative practices, hold different 
representations and have different ways of acting upon the world (see also section 
2.3.1, p. 39). For example, in Moscovici’s (1961/1998) psychoanalysis study, the three 
social milieus, the Communist Party, the Catholic Church and the urban-liberal milieu, 
communicated about psychoanalysis in different manners and appropriated this object 
in different ways. Each group’s representation, in turn, provided different ways of acting 
towards that object. The Communist press dictated, via propaganda, the full rejection of 
the psychoanalytic discipline. The Catholic Church, via propagation, aimed to shape 
attitudes rather than stereotypes and thus allowed for partial acceptance of 
psychoanalysis. Finally, diffusion, employed by the urban-liberal milieu, aimed at 
informing people about psychoanalysis without providing a particular guide for action 
towards it (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999).
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Based on these ideas, Wagner links the socio-genetic character of social 
representations with identities and defines social identities as shared understandings 
that guide communication and coordinate action in groups (Wagner, 1994; Wagner et 
al., 1999a). Thus, social identity involves both a sense of group membership and 
access to the group’s knowledge systems. As such, social identity allows group 
members to position themselves within a ‘common discursive space’ (Wagner, 1994). 
Thus, the world inhabited by social groups is a ‘domesticated world’ (Wagner, 1998), in 
that it is constructed specifically by that group in order to make sense of the world. 
Identity, thus, defines a group’s perspective on the world. Moreover, Wagner (1994) 
argues that social representations regulate the joint action of group members. Adopting 
an identity, therefore, suggests that one activates a ‘cluster of knowledge’ that 
incorporates collective goals and normative interaction patters (Halloran & Kashima, 
2006). It follows that identities provide ways of organising meanings and, because of 
that, they provide a sense of stability (Duveen, 2001). Even in cases where 
communities undergo change, new social representations can develop to re-construct 
the group identity. Jovchelovitch and Gervais (1999) have shown, for instance, that 
hybrid representations of health and illness, combining elements from Western and 
Chinese knowledge, provide the source of cultural identity for different generations of 
Chinese in England.
To conclude, within a social representations framework, identities have been 
approached in relation to the development of different social representations in groups; 
identities, in other words, attach people to particular sets of representations. Different 
groups construct different representations which give them a way of understanding and 
engaging with the social world. Subject and object are, thus, linked in the 
representational process because the content and elaboration of social representations 
depends on the social position of the bearers (Wagner & Hayes, 2005, pp. 206-207). In 
other words, representations do not only define an object, but they are also indicative of 
the relation between the subject and the object. But, while it makes sense to define 
identity in terms of group membership and shared social representations, we also need 
to have a framework for the very process of identity construction. The question is, in 
other words, how these representations become appropriated to construct social 
identities. By using the idea of positions, we are able to account for the process of 
identity construction which takes place in a dynamic framework of self-other relations. 
We are also able to account for the development of different identities with respect to 
the same representational field, rather than only study social identities as the causes for 
the construction of different representations among groups (Duveen, 1993; Duveen &
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Lloyd, 1990; Lloyd & Duveen, 1990). Based on the idea that identities are functions of 
representations, the next section will elaborate the links between social representations 
and identity through a discussion of positioning as a process of appropriating social 
representations.
3.4 The process of identity construction: Self-other relations and 
positioning processes
3.4.1 Self-other relations
Tajfel, acknowledging the relational character of social identities, used ‘inter-group 
comparison’ and ‘group distinctiveness’ as key terms in conceptualising identity 
processes (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Indeed, in exploring the process of 
identity construction, we need to pay close attention to the self-other relations involved 
in a given context. Based on the self-other-object epistemology of social 
representations, Markova (2007, p. 219) argues that the relationship between self and 
other is fundamental in conceptualising identity:
One cannot meaningfully ask the question about identity without posing the 
question about self and other. And one cannot talk about social representations 
as a theory of social knowledge without examining public discourses in which 
different dialogues between the Ego and the Alter take place and through which 
they generate representations.
If we take the interdependence of the social and the individual, or of the Ego and the 
Alter, as a central theoretical premise, we are forced to acknowledge that identity 
should also accommodate the ‘other’. Identity is above all a social location; it binds an 
individual or group to the social world. It can be conceived as a position from where one 
speaks and acts towards others. Duveen has defined identity as “a psychological 
process through which meanings are organised and which enables the person to 
position themselves as a social actor. Social identity in this sense is a way of organising 
experience which contributes towards the definition of self, but does so by locating the 
self within the collective world" (1993, p. 2).
The fact that social identities construct people as actors in the social world has two 
implications: first, that people have to be positioned in relation to other social actors and 
second, that in order for people to become social actors, they need to be recognised as 
such. Regarding the former, it is argued here that identities are de facto relational. What 
it means to be a child is defined by what it means to be an adult; the same applies for
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minority/majority relations, gender identities and so on. Billig (1995) has shown, for 
example, that in order to imagine our nation as a collectivity, we need to also locate it 
within a world of nations. Similarly Triandafyllidou (1998) has argued that national 
identities are defined in relation to a nation’s significant others. Every identity 
construction provides a model of social relations (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001); it locates 
not only the self but also the others. In the construction of identities there is always a 
fundamental distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, which can be conceptualised as a 
thema defining the boundaries between different groups. The boundaries can change, 
but any change would be the result of a re-negotiation of social relations and 
associated representations.
Concerning social recognition, identity is a matter of both being identified and making 
identifications (Duveen, 2001); it is the interplay between identification and recognition. 
Several social representations studies have shown the interrelation between 
representations and identity in inter-group and minority/majority contexts (e.g. 
Augoustinos & Riggs, 2007; Howarth, 2002, 2007; Philogene, 2007). This field of 
research highlights the impact of self-other relations and (mis-)recognition on the 
construction of identities.
On the whole, the ‘other’ in identity needs to be seen as more than a reference group. 
Different types of social relations and different types of interactions give rise to different 
types of knowledge construction processes; it is through this representational activity 
that social positions are jointly constructed and negotiated. Thus, in constructing 
identities, that is to say, in positioning oneself in relation to the social world, it is the 
quality of self-other relations that is important (e.g. relations of trust/mistrust, 
recognition/misrecognition). What differentiates one social position from another is not 
just who the ‘self is and who the ‘other’ is, but the forms of communication which shape 
these positions.
3.4.2 The positioning process
In order to account for self-other relations in the construction of identities, the term 
positioning will be used here because it emphasises the dynamic and relational 
character of identity processes (see also Andreouli, 2010). Both Duveen and 
positioning theory scholars have used this term. Duveen, on the.one hand, used it to 
link identity with processes of representation. Positioning theorists, on the other hand, 
have used it to explain meaning construction processes within micro-interactions. 
Although they concentrate on different levels of analysis, both approaches share an
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interest in social-individual dynamics and self-other relations. The integration of the two 
can shed light on the relation between micro and macro social exchanges between 
social actors. While a focus on local discursive practices allows us to look at patterns of 
argumentation which shape positioning processes, there is a need to further illustrate 
how these patterns draw on social representations. This section, employing ideas from 
the two frameworks, will show how people use social knowledge to construct and argue 
about identities and how this takes place on the basis of existing social relations.
Duveen (1993) introduced the term ‘position’ to clarify the link between representation 
and identity. Although he argued for the primacy of the social, by claiming that social 
representations precede individual existence (Duveen, 2001), by employing the term 
position, he was able to account for variation in the development of identities within the 
same representational field (Duveen, 1993). Thus, he acknowledged the possibility of 
resistance through the negotiation of identity positions, that is, through the active 
appropriation and re-appropriation of the meanings of social representations (Duveen,
2001).
Duveen’s (1993) primary proposition is that social representations provide a variety of 
possible identities which allow people to position themselves in different ways in 
relation to the symbolic field of culture. These identities are taken on, but are also 
negotiated by individuals. Identities allow people to both structure their social world and 
orient themselves within this world. In other words, social representations provide both 
the meanings associated with an object and the positions towards that object that are 
available for people; meanings and positions are the two components of social 
identities (Lloyd & Duveen, 1990). It can be argued, therefore, that social identities 
“reflect individuals’ efforts to situate themselves in their societies in relation to the social 
representations of their societies" (Duveen & Lloyd, 1986, p. 220). Identities can be 
defined as positions in relation to social representations, since people make sense of 
themselves and their experiences by drawing on and reconstructing social 
representations (Duveen, 1993, 2001; Duveen & Lloyd, 1986; Lloyd & Duveen, 1990). 
In addition, social identities are an essential prerequisite for participation in social life as 
they provide people with both a location and a value in relation to other individuals who 
occupy different identity positions (Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). Thus, social representations 
provide people with a variety of positions but these positions are further elaborated by 
one’s relations with an ‘other’. As the previous section illustrated, self-other relations 
are at the basis of the construction of identity.
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Through everyday interaction, positions become negotiated and social identities 
become elaborated and transformed. ‘Microgenesis’ has been described as the micro­
scale social interaction whereby people construct an understanding of the situation and 
locate themselves and their interlocutors (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). Focusing on the level 
of language use and meaning construction through discourse, Harre and colleagues 
have developed positioning theory (Davies & Harre, 1990; Harre & Moghaddam, 2003a; 
Harre & van Langehove, 1991, 1999b) which offers an elaboration of the discursive 
processes involved in identity construction. Positioning theory shares with the theory of 
social representations a focus on the dynamic co-construction of meaning which 
organises and mediates social relations. Based on speech act theory, it offers an 
account of meaning construction through a discussion of discursive practices.
In order to emphasise the contextual and fluid nature of selves, the term positioning, 
within this theory, is an alternative to the concepts of personhood and role (Davies & 
Harr6,1990,1999). Under this perspective, identity is discursively co-produced in the 
course of communication (see also Burr, 1995/2003). Societal discourses make 
available a range of categories. By participating in discursive practices, people learn 
about these categories and position themselves towards them. This perspective is 
similar to the social representations approach in that positions not only situate people 
within a system of social relations and discursive ‘storylines’, but they also provide 
people with ways of making sense of the world (Davies & Harre, 1999, p. 35):
A subject position incorporates both a conceptual repertoire and a location for 
persons within the structure of rights and duties for those who use that 
repertoire. Once having taken up a particular position as one’s own, a person 
inevitably sees the world from the vantage point of that position and in terms of 
the particular images, metaphors, storylines and concepts which are made 
relevant within the particular discursive practice in which they are positioned.
Positioning theory also conceptualises the ‘other’ as an essential part of the positioning 
process; both self and other participate in meaning making. Positionings are always co­
constructed so that the adoption of a position always assumes a position for the 
interlocutor as well (Harre & van Langehove, 1991; van Langehove & Harre, 1999). 
Furthermore, the positioning triangle is dynamic. Harr6 and his colleagues (Davies & 
Harre, 1990; Harre & van Langehove, 1991) argue that people can creatively negotiate 
and interpret the positions assigned to them. An interlocutor may not accept the 
position assigned to him or her and negotiate both the meaning of the situation and
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his/her position with regards to this context13. Thus, positionings are dynamic, dialogical 
and plural: a person in a single encounter may adopt diverse, even contradictory, 
positions.
According to positioning theory, in addition to positions, the construction of meaning in 
interactions is also defined by storylines and social forces of speech acts (Davies & 
Harre, 1990; Harre & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harre & van Langehove, 1991, 1999b). 
Social forces refer to the illocutionary force of speech and other acts, that is, on how 
they are interpreted in relation to the storyline. For instance, a handshake may signify 
agreement, or it may just be a greeting when meeting someone for the first time. 
Storylines are the third element of the meaning construction triangle. They refer to the 
unfolding episodes in conversations and other forms of discursive interactions. 
Storylines are, in a way, the context of the interaction (Slocum-Bradley, 2010); they 
structure the interaction and define which types of positions are relevant or salient. It 
should be noted that the elements of the positioning triangle are interdependent and 
mutually define each other. The meaning of a speech act depends on the positions of 
the interlocutors within a jointly produced storyline.
The concept of storylines in positioning theory suggests that meaning construction is 
seen as taking a narrative form. The claim that knowledge is organised in a narrative 
form has been made by others as well (e.g. Lazio, 1997). Although I do not subscribe to 
the idea that all social knowledge has necessarily a narrative format, I do believe that 
thinking has an argumentative format (Billig, 1987), which, very often, takes the form of 
evolving narratives; each ‘episode’ can be seen as an argument backed up by previous 
arguments or claims. Also, despite the fact that thinking is not as coherent as 
narratives, but is rather dialogical and open-ended, we can view storylines as 
argumentation lines or patterns of reasoning which support certain kinds of actions 
(Harre, Moghaddam, Pilkerton-Cairnie, Rothbart, & Sabat, 2009). In line with Billig’s 
(1987) approach, I maintain that the themes and arguments that make up 
‘argumentation storylines’ are drawn from common sense knowledge, or social 
representations, and are not, thus, re-created in every self-other encounter. As van 
Langehove and Harre (1999, pp. 19-20) argue, every conversation has a familiar air 
because it reflects ‘already existing narrative forms’ which are part of the symbolic 
material people use to participate in the social world.
13 In social identity theory, this has been conceptualised as the strategy of ‘social creativity’ for 
maintaining a positive social identity when social mobility is not possible. Social creativity is 
essentially a redefinition of an unfavourable social comparison between the in-group and the 
out-group. It may take the form of changing the comparison dimension, changing the evaluation 
of the attributes to the group, and changing the comparison out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
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The fact that interactions may involve more than one storylines also illustrates the 
argumentative and dialogical nature of ‘thinking with others'. For instance, it has been 
shown that the Danish referendum on joining the European Economic Monetary Union 
was seen through different storylines by various social actors; it was seen as ‘eroding 
Danish identity’ or as ‘increasing the power of Denmark' (Slocum-Bradley & Van 
Langehove, 2003). Each of these storylines justified a different course of action. At the 
same time, each storyline positioned Denmark in different ways in relation to Europe.
Discursive positioning processes can, thus, be seen through the lens of a rhetorical 
approach. They can take the form of argumentation strategies that justify some actions 
and not others. This point relates to the strategic nature of identity construction and 
categorisation (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996; Hopkins, Reicher, & Levine, 1997; Kahani- 
Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). For instance, Moghaddam, 
Hanley and Harre (2003) studied conversations between Kissinger (Assistant to the US 
President for National Security Affairs) and Mao Zedong (Chairman of the Communist 
Party in China) and between Kissinger and Brezhnev (General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), which took place between 
1971-1976. Kissinger, by positioning Zedong and Brezhnevas friends and maintaining 
the storyline that these conversations were among friends, tried to achieve dialogue 
between the US and China and the USSR. Positions here become a resource for 
action. Linking this to Billig’s (1987) rhetorical approach, it can be argued that identity 
definitions can take the form of arguments. Indeed, every category selection and 
definition is an argument against alternative categorisations and definitions. Identity, 
therefore, is a project which entails negotiations and argumentation (Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001, see also 3.5, p. 68).
It is very useful to connect the notions of positioning as a (strategic) discursive practice 
and social representations as broader symbolic meanings and practices in studying 
identities (Elejabarrieta, 1994). Positioning, within positioning theory, can be seen as a 
conceptualisation of ‘doing identities’ or ‘arguing about identities’ in discourse. With a 
few exceptions (for intergroup positioning, see Lee, Lessem, & Moghaddam, 2008; Tan 
& Moghaddam, 1999), positioning, as has been originally elaborated, refers to local, 
here-and-now discursive practices among interlocutors. However, it is important to link 
those local discursive practices with broader societal processes (Falmagne, 2004). 
Linking the level of micro-exchanges and broader societal structures and knowledge 
systems is particularly important in theorising identity. If we consider the self as a set of 
positions which guide both our actions and the actions of others towards us, then, in
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order to appreciate this multilayered process, we need to consider how stable social 
positions, which are associated with social structures, have an impact on micro­
exchanges between agents (Wagoner & Kadianaki, 2007). In other words, we need to 
appreciate the social-individual dynamics in identity construction. The theory of social 
representations aims to link the individual and social levels of analysis within an 
integrated theory of knowledge construction via a careful consideration of 
communicative processes. Social representations and institutionalised practices and 
discourses both enable local positioning processes and constrain them. It is through 
broader discourses that local discursive practices acquire their meaning (Falmagne, 
2004). Therefore, positioning processes draw on already established patterns of social 
interaction and social representations which define the meanings and availability of 
positions for people. However, as Duveen (2001) notes, individuals can also elaborate 
these positions; through processes of argumentation, they can re-negotiate their social 
location.
3.4.3 The normative aspect o f social relations and identities
The impact of social representations in shaping positionings can be seen in relation to 
the normative context of interactions. Social representations are not only meanings, but 
also norms and practices. As Wagner (1994) notes, group norms derive from social 
representations and coordinate the joint action of group members both within the group 
and towards other groups.
The normative aspect of interactions has been examined in positioning theory through 
the concept of ‘moral orders’. Every position has a ‘moral quality’ in the sense that it is 
associated with a set of rights and duties which delimit what can be said or done from a 
certain position, in a particular context and towards a particular interlocutor (Davies & 
Harre, 1990; Harre & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harre & van Langehove, 1991, 1999b). 
Taking the above under consideration, a position can be defined as “a cluster of rights 
and duties to perform certain actions with a certain significance as acts, but which also 
may include prohibitions or denials of access to some of the local repertoire of 
meaningful acts” (Harre & Moghaddam, 2003b, pp. 5-6). More recently, the positioning 
triangle for the construction of meaning (positions, storylines, social forces of discursive 
acts) has been extended to a positioning diamond that distinguishes between identities 
as discursive constructs (referring to the attribution of character, group membership etc. 
to an actor), on the one hand, and rights and duties, on the other hand (Slocum- 
Bradley, 2010).
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The link between rights and duties and identity positions brings communication and 
social relations to the centre of identity processes (Andreouli, 2010). Rights and duties 
define what can be communicated from a position and what types of actions are 
tolerated or expected from that position. Duveen (2001) has also made a similar point in 
his writings by arguing that the stability of certain forms of identity is associated with the 
stability of forms of social interactions which sustain dominant representations. In other 
words, asymmetrical relationships constrain what can be communicated by the social 
actors involved, thus, contributing to the maintenance of social representations. When 
the patterns of social interaction change, so do the patterns of identity which are a 
function of those representations.
Duveen and colleagues’ studies on cognitive development have, indeed, shown that 
identities mediate the knowledge construction process because they shape the kinds of 
communication that can be established between social actors (Duveen & Psaltis, 2008; 
Leman & Duveen, 1999; Psaltis, 2005; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007). An important 
finding of these studies is that recognition or misrecognition, by defining the degree of 
participation of each participant, has a direct impact on what kind of knowledge will be 
created. In Duveen and colleagues’ studies, an individual may be recognised as 
knowledgeable or misrecognised as unknowledgeable. This is a matter of legitimacy as 
defined by existing power dynamics and social hierarchies (Leman & Duveen, 1999). In 
Duveen’s gender studies young girls were positioned as lacking the expertise to solve 
the experimental task, while boys were positioned as having more expertise, thus, their 
knowledge was more legitimate. This shows how social positioning processes can 
legitimise types of social behaviour and patterns of interaction.
Issues of legitimacy and entitlement are intertwined with the allocation of rights and 
duties but, as Moghaddam (2006) argues, despite the centrality of rights and duties in 
social relationships, they have been neglected in inter-group research. Positioning 
theory helps to elaborate such dialogical asymmetries because it emphasises the rights 
and duties associated with positioning processes (Andreouli, 2010). Positioning theory 
conceptualises power dynamics and legitimacy in terms of entitlements for action and 
participation. The differential assignment of rights and duties to social actors can be an 
indication of asymmetrical power relations. Thus, the girls of Duveen and colleagues’ 
studies, positioned as less knowledgeable, had the duty to listen to the boys and a 
limited right to contribute to the research task. Therefore, they were less entitled to 
participate in knowledge construction. On the other hand, the boys, positioned as 
knowledgeable, had the right to express their view and the duty to provide the right
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answer. In other words, there was an unequal distribution of ‘epistemic responsibility’ 
(Rommetveit, 1991). This asymmetry is derived from the social representations of 
gender which, by attributing gender identity positions to boys and girls, shape the 
norms that guide intergroup interactions.
The assignment of rights and duties to social actors can become a matter of negotiation 
so that certain actors can be legitimated and others de-legitimated (Slocum-Bradley, 
2006). Generally, dominant groups are powerful actors in a society. They have more 
legitimate voices and produce more ‘valid’ representations (Moghaddam, 2003, 2006; 
Tan & Moghaddam, 1999). They employ what Gergen (1989) has called a ‘warranting 
voice’ which grants them superiority in defining reality. The question here is how is such 
an entitlement justified, that is, which are the criteria that make someone entitled to 
speak on behalf of a community. For the case of national communities, Reicher and 
Hopkins (2001) argue that claims of prototypicality can justify speaking on behalf of the 
nation. The criteria that define who counts as a member of the nation can be subject to 
contestation, but are also sometimes associated with deeply held beliefs. For instance, 
ethnic representations of nationhood, based on a narrative of ethnic origins and 
antiquity, are still, to a large extent, taken for granted. Being ethnically similar to the 
majority can, therefore, serve as a justification that makes someone more entitled to 
have a say in national matters.
On the whole, allocations of rights, duties and entitlements to social actors reflect social 
norms (Luis & Taylor, 2005) and are derived from social representations (Wagner, 
1994). It can be argued that these ‘moral orders’ constitute the normative aspect of 
identities; as such, they guide individual behaviour, as well as social interactions and 
communications. They place ‘behavioural demands’ upon people, on the basis of social 
relations (Luis & Taylor, 2005). In this sense, identity re-positionings may entail 
challenges to group or societal norms. For instance, social competition, a strategy for 
maintaining positive social identity according to social identity theory, when the social 
system is perceived as illegitimate, constitutes a direct challenge to the normative 
context of social relations in an effort to change the position of the in-group towards the 
outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Similarly, 'identity conflicts’ involve a type of 
normative conflict between expectations associated with different positions. The 
tensions arising out of the different identity positions are based on the diverse 
expectations (i.e. rights and duties) placed upon people by different communities and 
normative contexts. Within a dialogical perspective, such tensions are seen as 
providing the source for dialogical negotiations of these positions (Aveling & Gillespie,
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2008; Bhatia & Ram, 2001; Gillespie, Cornish, Aveling-E.-L, & Zittoun, 2008). The final 
two sections of this chapter will continue this discussion by considering the multiplicity 
of identity positions and the dialogical tensions in identity construction.
3.5 Multiplicity and ambivalence in positioning
3.5.1 Multiple identity positions
The framework presented so far describes identity as a position in relation to social 
knowledge and to others. In addition to this, it can be argued that the multiplicity of self- 
other relations and the multiplicity of social representations lead to the multiplicity of 
identities. This idea goes against the notion of the self as a bounded entity and 
suggests that identity is an open-ended dynamic process, as people have to position 
themselves in relation to various knowledge systems and different 'others’.
I wish to explore further the relation between the idea that people make use of different 
rationalities (polyphasia) and the idea that they occupy diverse positions towards social 
representations and towards others. This process varies according to the object of the 
representation, as different representations demarcate different positions for people. 
Thus, it is suggested here that the "enlarging complexity of society adds to the 
complexity of the self (Hermans, 2002, p. 148), meaning that the polyphasic rationality 
of people is associated with a multiplicity of positions. In this section, I will draw on 
Hermans’ theory of the dialogical self (Hermans, 1996, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Hermans 
& Dimaggio, 2007; Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010; Hermans & Kempen, 1998) 
and on Markova’s (2000, 2003a) perspective on the cognitive polyphasia hypothesis, 
both of whom have been greatly inspired by the work of Bakhtin. Dialogicality is again 
the underlying epistemological assumption. That is, the dialogue, the relation, between 
self and other is the basis for the formation of self.
The other, however, needs not be ‘external’; the other, be it a person, a group, or 
another representation, can be part of the self and “occupy positions in a multivoiced 
se lf (Hermans, 2001 a, p. 250). As argued in section 2.5 (p. 47), people employ multiple 
representations to make sense of the world. Drawing on this idea, it can be argued that 
each of these different representations or perspectives constitutes a voice or position 
within the self. Therefore, there is no dualism between individual and society, but the 
society or the culture becomes part of the self (Hermans, 2001 a, 2002). In this respect, 
we can make a distinction between external and internal interaction (Markova, 2003a,
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2003b, 2006). Apart from external interaction among people and groups, there is also 
internal interaction of perspectives within ‘individual minds’.
The other as part of the self can be termed ‘inner alter’, defined by Markova as 
“symbolically and socially represented kinds of the A/ter that are in an internal dialogue 
with the Ego” (2006, p. 135, emphasis in original ). The inner alter can take many 
forms. It may represent the voice of a significant other, or the voice of a community and 
its norms, the voice of a group, an institution and so on. It can also be a ‘relatively 
stabilised perspective’ (Markova, 2006), like Mead’s (1934) ‘generalised other’, 
traditions, or dominant social representations. These voices are not the ‘real’ voices of 
institutions and groups; they are appropriated or personalised by the individual. 
Hermans (Hermans, 2001a, 2001b) refers to them as ‘external positions’ which are 
relevant from the perspective of one or more of the internal positions.
This theoretical perspective sees the self as polyphonic: one can speak from many 
positions or have more that one voice. According to dialogical self theory, the self is 
multiple and dynamic; it can be conceptualised as a set of l-positions (Hermans, 2001 a,
2002). The T moves from one position to the other in accordance with changes in 
context. For example, when people speak to their colleagues, they position themselves 
as professionals, when they speak to their children as parents and so on. Furthermore, 
these positions are in dialogical relation with each other and may be more or less in 
tension.
The notion of multivoicednesss stems from Bakhtin and his concept of ‘heteroglossia’ 
which refers to different styles of speech, to the different voices people may employ 
when they speak (Markova, 2003a). Polyphasia and heteroglossia are, for Markova 
(2003a), the two sides of the same coin. The former refers to the coexistence of diverse 
knowledge systems and the latter to the coexistence of multiple voices within the self. 
The multiplicity of inter-cultural encounters leads to the multiplicity of cultural positions 
or voices within an individual, as people need to cope with a variety of different cultural 
systems (Hermans, 1996,2001a, 2001b, 2002; Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007; Hermans 
& Hermans-Konopka, 2010; Hermans & Kempen, 1998). Thus, it is argued that 
“different and contrasting cultures can be part of a repertoire of collective voices playing 
their part in a multivoiced self (Hermans & Kempen, 1998, p. 1118). These voices 
represent different representations as appropriated by the individual in relation to which 
he or she is positioned. In other words, the same process of knowledge construction, 
the outcome of communication between groups and people with various perspectives, 
can be said to operate ‘within individuals’. Thinking can be conceptualised, therefore,
71
as a dialogical process which involves the dialogue between different positions, each 
representing a different perspective on the world. This has been exemplified in focus 
group research whereby participants spoke from diverse positions according to their 
line of argumentation (Markova, Linell, Grossen, & Salazar-Orvig, 2007).
But how can individuals retain a sense of unity within this multiplicity of positions? 
Maintaining coherence within a plural identity has been addressed by Salgado and 
Hermans (2005, p. 10) in terms of the subjectivity of the T:
...a  human being is able to subjectively sense and centre every experience in 
herself or himself...In the temporal movement, from moment to moment, the I 
may occupy a different position, for example, stating something quite different 
from what it was saying until then. In a sense, this is a different position; in 
another, it still remains an l-position: unity and multiplicity are brought together 
in the notion of l-position.
On the whole, the multiplicity of selves is associated with the multiplicity of discourses 
which people employ to understand the world. Each identity position is a ‘tool’ for 
engaging with the social world and organising experience. People are ‘equipped’ with a 
‘positioning repertoire’ (Hermans, 2001 b), which enables them to situate themselves in 
various circumstances and towards various others. This idea finds particular relevance 
in migrant and transnational identities whereby people need to negotiate different 
identities and cultures (Aveling & Gillespie, 2008; Bhatia, 2002; Bhatia & Ram, 2001). It 
can be further argued that this positioning repertoire is the result of continuing patterns 
of interaction, some of which can become more conventionalised than others and, thus, 
advance certain positions over others. Furthermore, recognition by one’s community or 
significant others may have an impact on which voices of the self will become more 
salient (Gillespie, Cornish, Aveling-E.-L., & Zittoun, 2008). Power asymmetries also 
play a part in the formation and salience of positions. Asymmetrical relations between 
voices reflect, in part, societal structures and inequalities (Hermans, 1996). Thus, the 
positions of the multivoiced self are not necessarily harmonious, but can be conflicting 
in a way that reflects societal power asymmetries (Bhatia, 2002; Valsiner, 2002). This 
suggests that dominant, ‘entitled’ voices within the self could correspond to the 
perspective of the majority. In other words, dialogical tensions between knowledge 
systems in society find expression in the dialogical self (Aveling & Gillespie, 2008). 
This theorisation goes beyond conceptualisations of identity as a singular sense of self. 
It also suggests that, although it is restrained by established patterns of social relations
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and social representations, identity is neither choiceless nor predetermined (Sen, 
2006).
3.5.2 ‘Dialectic’ identities
As shown in the previous chapter, people draw on opposing common sense themes to 
create knowledge about the world. The tension between arguments and counter­
arguments, or opposing poles in themata, provides the source for the development of 
thinking. Furthermore, as stated in the previous section, these opposing themes 
correspond to different voices or positions within the self, so that an individual can draw 
on opposing discourses to make sense of his or her experiences. An implication of this 
approach is that identities can be constructed in an ambivalent way.
Tensions within identity originate in tensions in self-other relations. As developmental 
psychologists, like Vygotsky and Winnicott, have shown, the development of the self 
goes hand in hand with the development of otherness. According to this viewpoint, the 
ontogeny of humans is based on encounters with others (Jovchelovitch, 2007), It is 
through the relation with the other that the self develops as an individual. The self 
arises through a tension between ‘fusing’ with the other and drawing boundaries 
between self and other; this interplay between sameness and difference defines 
individuals as both unique and similar to each other (Jovchelovitch, 2007). In order to 
become selves, we need to recognise the difference of the others. The interaction 
between the self and the other is the basis for mutual recognition. By seeing oneself 
through the eyes of the other, by taking the perspective of the other, the self becomes 
an object to itself; this ability to see ourselves as objects is the basis of self- 
consciousness (Mead, 1934). For Winnicott (cited in Jovchelovitch, 2007), this requires 
to move from a stage of un-differentiation (holding), where the baby conceives the 
caretaker as an extension of the self, to the acknowledgement of the other as someone 
outside the self (handling).
Similar ideas have been conceptualised under the framework of intersubjectivity (see 
Coelho & Claudio, 2003). Research, mainly the work of Trevarthen (e.g. Trevarthen, 
1979; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001; Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978), has shown that children 
are born with primary intersubjectivity, that is, an instinctive orientation towards others, 
an innate sociability and openness to the perspective of the other. But as Markova 
(2003a, 2003b) argues, self-other relations are not only about mutuality and the 
development of a common ground, but also about tension. While intersubjectivity tends 
to emphasise the fusion of self and other through closing the gap between them, the
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approach of dialogicality stresses the tensions between the two parties. The desire for 
recognition of one’s perspective is the driving force of dialogue. Complete recognition 
suggests that the self and the other are fused; however, the other always maintains a 
strangeness which mobilises continuing dialogue (Markova, 2003a, p. 104). There is, 
therefore, a tension between unity and division which is central in self-other relations. 
Identification with the ‘other’ and distancing oneself from the ‘other’ is the basis for 
identity construction: “...the self is deeply penetrated by “otherness-in-the-self” 
whereas, at the same time, it wants to confirm its own identity by the process of 
“othering”’’ (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 132).
From a social representations perspective, Joffe (1999,2003,2007; Joffe & Lee, 2004) 
has explored the notion of otherness and its functions in identity. Drawing on the work 
of the psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, Joffe maintains that otherising is a process of 
projecting negative feelings and thoughts outside ourselves. She explains this process 
through the defence mechanism of ‘splitting’ (projecting all the negatives to a ‘bad 
other’, while keeping all positives within a ‘good self’) which is present in infants. 
Through splitting in times of increased anxiety, the infant is able to protect itself against 
anxiety. Extending this to adult social life, Joffe argues that when we encounter risks, 
we re-invoke this mechanism and have a ‘not me -  other’ response towards impending 
dangers. This is a protection against an incoming threat; by projecting the threat outside 
of us, we distance ourselves from it. Social representations of ‘others’ serve as 
symbolic tools which maintain this in-group purity, mainly by associating ‘others’ with 
the violation of highly-esteemed social values (Joffe, 2007; Joffe & Staekl6, 2007). By 
representing the ‘deviant other’ as the opposite of us, we are able to protect the 
cohesion and identity of the in-group.
I would add to this, however, that the ‘other’ is not necessarily only ‘bad’. In line with the 
view presented in Chapter 2, I argue that social representations are networks of 
meanings structured around contrary themes (or themata). Since thinking has been 
conceptualised in this thesis as an argumentative and dialogical process which uses a 
multiplicity of symbolic resources, it follows that people can draw on oppositional 
themes in order to make sense of the world. Therefore, the process of constructing the 
‘other’ can also incorporate an image of the other as ‘good’ or ‘desired’ -  even though 
this pole of the opposition may be less salient. Postcolonial theory, drawing on 
psychoanalytic ideas, has explored this ambivalence with regards to colonial 
encounters in which the ‘other’ is both the object of desire and the object of aversion 
(Young, 1995). Edward Said (1995), the pioneer in this field, has argued that
74
representations of the Orient have been central in the development of Western 
identities: the West is defined by its opposition to the East. Both France and Britain that 
have colonised the Orient have depicted it as something that is both exotic and 
uncivilised. The ‘other’, objectified in the image of the Orient, is both desirable, as 
something exotic, and fearsome, as a threat. This ambivalence towards the other 
serves to construct colonial identities. As the mirror image of the East, the West is 
constructed as civilised and rational. But, as Billig (1987) argues, the meaning of terms 
can be the subject of negotiation between contrary definitions. The Orient can 
potentially be something attractive and desired, or something fearful and threatening. 
The two poles are not mutually exclusive, rather, they are interdependent like figure and 
ground (Markova, 2003a). It is precisely this tension between the two poles that defines 
the Orient. Still, both poles need not be salient simultaneously. One of them may be 
implicit or hidden (Markova, 2003a). This is the case with the Orient whereby the 
negative pole has taken precedence over the positive one.
Thus, the dialogue between opposing themes is at the root of category constructions. 
The co-existence of conflicting themes on which people draw can be the basis for the 
construction of ambivalent identities because these themes allow for the existence of 
multiple and conflicting positions for the self and the other (Renedo, 2010; Renedo & 
Jovchelovitch, 2007). Susan Condor has illustrated, for instance, the existence of 
ideological dilemmas in national identity construction in Britain. She has shown that 
national identity and citizenship can be represented on the basis of opposing themes, 
such as multiculturalism and Anglo-centrism (Condor, 2006b), nationalism and 
imperialism (Condor & Abell, 2006a), communitarianism and liberal individualism 
(Condor & Gibson, 2007), national diversity/tolerance and cultural homogeneity 
(Condor, 2006b; Verkuyten, 2004), national pride and ethnocentrism (Condor, 2000). 
These dilemmas, mainly structured around tolerance towards and rejection of ethno­
cultural diversity, illustrate the interplay between sameness and diversity, or inclusion 
and exclusion, in constructions of national identities.
3.6 Summary of Chapter 3
This chapter has drawn on the idea of thinking as a dialogical and argumentative 
process, which was discussed in Chapter 2, to elaborate the process of identity 
construction. Drawing mainly on the work of Duveen and on positioning theory, identity 
has been defined as a position of a person or group towards social representations in 
relation to others. Identity is, thus, a social location; it defines a person’s place within a
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community. It is also a symbolic resource in that it gives people a way of making sense 
of the world through the appropriation of social representations. This appropriation 
takes place through a process of positioning of both self and other. Social 
representations demarcate the positions available for people, as well as the 
expectations, or moral orders, associated with these positions within the existing 
system of social relations. Although this normative context constrains individuals, 
identity positions are not choiceless; they can be negotiated and argued upon. Indeed, 
positioning processes can be seen through the lens of argumentation, such that each 
position can be seen an argument against an alternative position. This suggests that 
identities can be both strategically constructed and potentially negotiated.
Furthermore, because people are involved in a variety of relationships and draw on a 
variety of social representations, identities are also multiple and intersecting. In other 
words, polyphasia in ways of thinking is associated with multivoicednesss, that is, 
multiple identity positions from where people act and organise their experiences. 
Further to this, I have argued that as long as knowledge can be constructed on the 
basis of oppositions, so are identities. Identities are grounded in the tension between 
unity and differentiation of self and other. As such, both the self and the other can be 
constructed in an ambivalent way. Studies on otherness have, indeed, shown that the 
‘other’ can be both ‘good’ and ‘bad’, although the two poles need not be salient 
simultaneously.
In short, the theoretical framework employed here is based on the conceptualisation of 
self-other relations. These relations are fraught with tensions, which make both social 
representations and identities plural and dialogical processes. This framework guides 
the present research on citizenship in the UK naturalisation context. It is considered 
suitable for this research for three main reasons:
• Firstly, this theoretical framework can conceptualise the centrality of self-other 
dynamics in processes of boundary construction and negotiation. Citizenship is, 
indeed, a dynamic concept that cannot be seen in isolation from social relations, 
which are established both nationally (within the nation-state) and internationally 
(in relation to other nation-states). What is more, naturalisation, as a boundary 
crossing process, is a site where self-other relations become especially 
prominent.
• Secondly, the theoretical framework presented here also allows us to consider 
the intricacies of identity processes, which take place in such boundary crossing
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processes. It allows us, in other words, to understand the complexity and 
multiplicity of identity positions and the tensions between self and other 
associated with processes of identity.
• Thirdly, the theory of social representations, especially the dialogical and 
rhetorical perspective adopted here, allows for the elaboration of 
representational complexity with regards to citizenship and its manifold 
functions in defining ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.
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Chapter 4. Methodology
4.1 Overview of Chapter 4
The aim of this research is to explore the social representations of British citizenship 
and the positioning processes which take place within this representational field. As 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, the social representations of British citizenship 
held by three sets of stakeholders are being examined: citizenship officers, naturalised 
citizens, and the UK Government. Twenty interviews with citizenship officers and thirty- 
three interviews with naturalised citizens have been conducted. Also, four reports 
commissioned by the UK Home Office have been selected for the analysis of the official 
political discourse using the ALCESTE software for text analysis.
This chapter clarifies the methodology used for this project. The following section 
discusses the research design of this study. The epistemological foundations of the 
research will be first considered, followed by a discussion of the rationale for the 
selection of three social milieus (public policy, naturalised citizens, citizenship officers) 
and the methods employed for data collection. The third section of this chapter 
describes the samples of the study (interviewees and policy documents). The fourth 
section describes the research procedure and the fifth section discusses the analytic 
procedures used for the analysis of interviews and policy documents. The final section 
reviews the quality assurance procedures applied to this research.
4.2 Research design
4.2.1 Epistemological foundations: Constructionism & dialogicality
This thesis adopts a constructionist approach to research. For social constructionism, 
research does not aim to discover objective facts and make truth claims (Burr, 
1995/2003). Rather, it locates its phenomena of study within a socio-historical context 
and focuses on the communicative processes that produce them. Kitzinger (2004, p. 
128, cited in Silverman, 2006, p. 129) describes this in relation to the study of women’s 
experience as follows:
Constructionism [...] disputes the possibility of uncovering ‘facts’, ‘realities’ or ‘truths’ 
behind the talk, and treats as inappropriate any attempts to vet what people say for its 
’accuracy’, ‘reliability’, or ‘validity1 -  thereby sidestepping altogether the positivist 
problems raised [...] From that perspective, what women say should not be taken as
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evidence of their experience, but only as a form of talk -  a ‘discourse’, ‘account’ or 
‘repertoire -  which represents a culturally available way of packaging experience. This 
approach is valuable insofar as it draws attention to the fact that experience is never 
‘raw’, but is embedded in a social wed of interpretation and re-interpretation. Women’s 
‘experience’ does not spring uncontaminated from an essential inner female way of 
knowing, but is structured within, and in opposition to, social (heterosexist, patriarchical 
etc.) discourses.
Social representations theory, which provides the backbone of this research, is based 
on a consructionist epistemology. It takes knowledge construction to be a process of 
active ‘re-creation’ of the social world. Communication is at the core of transformations 
of common sense knowledge. In order to theorise this dynamic aspect of social 
representations, Markova has extensively discussed the dialogical foundations of the 
theory (2000, see also Chapter 2). Drawing on the self-other-object model of knowledge 
construction (Moscovici, 2000b), Markova (2003a) has argued that the interdependence 
of self and other forms the ontology of humanity: to be means to communicate with an 
other. It is the dialogue between self and other that makes knowledge possible. The 
self-other-object model does not necessarily refer to inter-personal interaction, as the 
self and the other can be individuals or groups. There are two main implications of this 
epistemology: firstly, that knowledge is plural, as the result of multiple knowledge 
encounters, and secondly, that thinking is itself a dialogical process. Billig and 
colleagues (Billig, 1987,1991; Billig et al., 1988) have made a similar point by arguing 
that thinking has a dilemmatic quality. According to this view, thinking is a dialogue 
between different themes or points of view which makes it inherently dialectic (see also 
Markova, 2003a). This thesis adopts the same perspective on identity, which is 
considered here as a process of positioning embedded in the context of self-other 
relations (see Chapter 3). The epistemological perspective adopted here has four 
significant implications for this research on citizenship in the UK:
■ There is a need to take into account the relations between the self and the other 
and between different perspectives on citizenship and immigration.
■ We have to take into account the positioning processes which enable people to 
make sense of these issues and locate themselves within this representational 
field.
■ We need to be able to study the negotiation and argumentation processes in 
the way people understand citizenship in the UK.
■ We have to be able to identify the multiple sources of knowledge that people 
draw on to make sense of naturalisation and immigration.
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4.2.2 Sources o f data and sampling rationale
Sampling in qualitative research is different from quantitative research. The purpose is 
not to achieve representativeness but to establish correspondence between research 
questions and sampling (Bryman, 2008). This purposive sampling is based on the idea 
that participants and other data sources are selected on the basis of their relevance in 
relation to the research questions and the phenomenon under study (Flick, 2007). 
Thus, the aim is not to generalise the results, but to achieve a more in-depth 
understanding of how people engage with a social object. This means that, rather than 
identifying patterns and commonalities across a population, qualitative research is more 
interested in identifying a variety of perspectives and ways of thinking about a topic. As 
Gaskell observes: “The real purpose of qualitative research is not counting opinions or 
people but rather exploring the range of opinions, the different representations of the 
issue...Given a particular social milieu...what one is interested in finding out is the 
variety of views on the issue in question" (2000, p. 41).
Following this line of reasoning, the purpose of this study has not been to collect data 
from a representative population sample, but rather to explore different perspectives on 
citizenship by including in the study different actors involved in the naturalisation 
process. The selection of participants and other data sources was based on exploring 
on the one hand, the diversity of views on the issue and, on the other hand, on 
selecting social milieus that are in one way or another engaged with the issue of 
citizenship. I selected social actors who are relevant to the citizenship context and for 
whom citizenship and naturalisation would be salient matters. This study explores the 
social representations of citizenship in Britain within three social milieus: citizenship 
officers, naturalised citizens, and the UK Government (see Figure 1). Each of the three 
stakeholders has different positions, agendas and perspectives, which makes it likely 
that they hold a range of views, but are all active actors in the naturalisation process.
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Figure 1. Research design
Representations
Citizenship in 
UK
Naturalisation
Context
Naturalised Citizens
Semi-structured 
interviews (n= 33), 
selected from 8 
London councils
Citizenship Officers
Semi-structured 
interviews (n= 20), 
selected from 12 
London councils
UK Public Policy
(Home Office) 
ALCESTE analysis of 
consultation 
documents (n= 4)
Naturalised citizens are lay people who have shifted from a migrant status to being 
citizens of the UK. They are an interesting population to study because not only have 
they decided to become citizens and have personally experienced the new 
naturalisation process in the UK, but they have also experienced both exclusion and 
inclusion in terms of their formal membership in Britain. They constitute the most 
relevant population to be studied in terms of naturalisation because they constitute the 
‘target population’ of naturalisation policies. In addition, they are an interesting 
population to study because their boundary crossing practices challenge the 
conventional ‘territorial theories of identity’ (Beck, 2006), as well as some of 
foundational myths of the nation-state, such as the taken for granted equation of the 
nation to the demos. It can, thus, be assumed that the experiences of naturalised 
citizens would provide a window to understanding better identity processes in the era of 
globalisation. Exploring the perspective of naturalised citizens also enables us to 
appreciate the diverse meanings that citizenship and national identity can have for 
migrant people.
Citizenship officers are also involved in the citizenship process, but hold a different 
position and a different perspective. Following the ‘paradigm shift’ in British 
naturalisation policy, citizenship officers have become key actors in the citizenship 
process. One of the political strategies used to enhance social cohesion and British
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identity by the government has been an increased emphasis on ‘localism’, that is, the 
strengthening of local or community bonds. Within this framework, local councils play 
now a mediating role between the Home Office and the public in the process of 
naturalisation. Citizenship officers are the first point of contact for applicants for 
naturalisation. The officers organise and conduct the citizenship ceremonies and 
usually provide the Nationality Checking Service which helps applicants with their 
naturalisation applications. Thus, they are familiar with the relevant legislation and 
procedures and also come into frequent contact with people wishing to naturalise. Not 
only is naturalisation an everyday matter for them, but they also constitute an integral 
element of the whole process.
The UK Government, the third selected stakeholder, determines public policy on 
matters of citizenship. Citizenship and immigration have a very significant institutional 
aspect and this study would be incomplete if it excluded the public policy perspective. 
By analysing the discourse produced by the government, I aim to understand the 
state’s perspective on citizenship. The voice of the state is very powerful in that it 
shapes policy and determines who is entitled to become a British citizen and who is not. 
For this reason, it frames the issue and sets the agenda for any debates.
The combination of different sources of data is a source of triangulation for this 
research. Analysis of the discourses of the three main stakeholders in the naturalisation 
context helps to achieve an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon by exploring 
different perspectives on the issue (Fielding & Fielding, 1986). It constitutes an effort to 
map out the complexity of this topic by studying it from various angles.
It should be noted that this study is London-based. It can be argued that this is limiting 
its scope. However, the aim here is not to describe the entire range of representations 
of citizenship in the whole of the UK, but to explore the interrelations of identity and 
knowledge construction processes within the naturalisation context. Therefore, instead 
of selecting a representative sample, I opted for the criteria of salience and relevance in 
my sampling technique. I have sampled social actors who are relevant to the process of 
naturalisation and for whom naturalisation and citizenship would be salient matters. In 
this sense, London is the ideal context because it has a very large concentration of 
migrant and foreign-born populations (Rendall & Salt, 2005). Also, more than half of all 
citizenship ceremonies in the UK are held in Greater London -  52% in 2007 (Freelove- 
Mensah, 2008). It follows that matters of migration and inclusion or exclusion tend to be 
more prominent in the capital. London is a place where diverse cultures and people 
meet, making it an appropriate setting for the study of identity.
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4.2.3 Methods
A variety of methodological approaches have been used for research in social 
representations (e.g. Wagner et al., 1999a). Although the theory is open to both 
qualitative and quantitative methods, there is a general departure from the traditional 
positivist attitude to research. This general stance marks the theory’s socio-cultural 
approach towards phenomena and places it within a European or, to be exact, a French 
tradition of research (Farr, 1993a).
It has been argued that the study’s research interests should determine the 
methodology to be used in terms of both data collection and analysis (Bauer, Gaskell, & 
Allum, 2000). This research aims to investigate the dialogical themes which ground 
knowledge about citizenship within the UK naturalisation context and also to explore the 
positioning processes that go hand in hand with these knowledge processes. The study 
of argumentation and negotiation of dilemmatic themes is essential in this research. In 
order to capture the dialogical co-construction of knowledge and the processes of 
positioning, this study requires a flexible, actor-oriented tool that allows for reflexivity 
and negotiation by the participant. Moscovici (1988) has himself advocated the use of 
observational methods that take into consideration the communicative and dynamic 
nature of social representations. In line with this, in-depth semi-structured interviewing 
was chosen as the appropriate tool for data elicitation, as in this type of data collection 
method, the interviewees are active participants in the research process (Silverman, 
2006). For Farr (1984, p. 182), the interview is "essentially a technique or method for 
establishing or discovering that there are perspectives or viewpoints on events other 
than those of the person initiating the interview”. In other words, interviewing is a 
method used when the interviewer seeks to understand the perspective of the 
interviewee without imposing his or her own perspective upon the participant. It aims to 
unfold the ‘subjective theories’ of the respondents, their way of thinking about a certain 
topic (Flick, 1998).
Furthermore, interviewing can capture the interaction between the subject and the 
object and the ways that people position themselves in relation to others and to the 
social world. Negotiation, polyphasia and multiplicity of positions are all elements of the 
knowledge construction process. Interviewing can, if used sensibly, bring to the fore the 
complexity of people’s constructions because it is an actor-oriented technique and thus, 
can help explore how people think rather than just what people think. With interviews, 
the interaction of subject and object can be studied because in-depth interviewing
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leaves room for the elaboration and negotiation of the meanings produced by the 
participants. Therefore, this method has the potential advantage of encouraging 
reflexivity and is, thus, sensitive to the multilayered nature of human thought (Markova, 
1996). Focus groups have also been used as a way to study dilemmas in common 
sense thinking (Markova et al., 2007), but the participants of this research, especially 
the newly naturalised citizens, have different trajectories and do not form a 
homogeneous group that could be recruited for focus group research.
Regarding the study of the public policy discourse, I selected four consultation 
documents on ‘earned citizenship’ policy which represents the current UK approach on 
naturalisation and immigration. In order to analyse this set of data, I used the ALCESTE 
software package. ALCESTE was selected because it can handle the analysis of a 
large corpus of textual data and it can also identify the underlying themes which ground 
discourses on a particular topic. It requires that the text is ‘clean’, meaning that the 
language used is relatively homogeneous (without the use of many synonyms), 
accurate and with correct grammar and appropriate punctuation. This is extremely hard 
to do with verbal data such as interviews, but clearly written official documents are ideal 
for this analysis. ALCESTE conducts a statistical analysis based on word co­
occurrences and identifies classes of words which tend to appear together in the text. 
These word classes represent ‘chunks’ of meaning which frame the discourse around a 
topic. Although ALCESTE does not analyse the interactions among word classes, it is a 
very powerful tool because it identifies the themes which structure a particular 
discourse, based on the assumption that different ways of talking about an issue 
represent different ways of thinking about this issue. The researcher can then go 
through every class in more detail in order to identify subtler nuances in the discourse. 
Table 2 below describes the objectives of the different data collection methods.
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Table 2. Methods and objectives
Naturalised
Citizens
In-depth semi-structured 
interviews (20)
■ Obtain lay perspective on citizenship 
and naturalisation
■ Identify main themes and positions in 
representations of citizenship
■ Identify dilemmas and tensions in the 
representational field
Citizenship
Officers
In-depth semi-structured 
interviews (33)
■ Obtain lay perspective on citizenship 
and naturalisation
■ Identify main themes and positions in 
representations of citizenship
■ Identify dilemmas and tensions in the 
representational field
UK Public 
Policy
Policy consultation 
documents on ‘earned 
citizenship’ (4)
■ Obtain official public policy perspective 
on citizenship and naturalisation
■ Identify main themes and 
‘institutionalised’ positioning patterns in 
citizenship policies
4.3 Sample selection
4.3.1 Local councils in London
In order to sample the interviewees of this research, I first selected a sample of local 
councils and sought to interview citizenship officers working there and new British 
citizens who had their citizenship ceremony at the same council. London is divided in 
thirty-two boroughs. I selected twelve of these boroughs based on their socio-economic 
and ethnic profiles. The initial selection was eight boroughs, but, in order to achieve 
more citizenship officers in the sample, I selected three more. My aim was to include 
boroughs that are relatively ethnically homogeneous and boroughs that are 
heterogeneous and, also, boroughs that are economically deprived and boroughs that 
are non-deprived, according to data obtained from the 2001 Census by the Office for 
National Statistics and the 2007 Indices of Deprivation. In particular, the selection was 
based on the rank of the number of people in the borough who are income deprived 
(income deprivation refers to the proportion of people living in low income families) 
(Office for National Statistics, 2007), the percentages of the people in each borough 
who are White British, White Irish and Other White, Mixed, Asian or Asian British, Black 
or Black British, and Chinese or Other Ethnic Group (Data Management and Analysis 
Group, 2005b), as well as the total percentage of ethnic minorities in each borough
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(Data Management and Analysis Group, 2005a)14. Table 3 below shows the average 
socio-demographics of the boroughs that took part in the study and of all the boroughs 
of London. It is shown that the difference between the selected boroughs and all the 
boroughs of London is rather small in all the criteria used for the selection. Table 4 
describes the local councils that took part in the study compared to the London 
average.
Table 3. Socio-demographics of selected boroughs and all London boroughs15
White British (%) 58.69 59.80
White Irish and White 
Other (%)
11.54 11.40
Mixed (%) 3.10 3.20
Asian or Asian British (%) 12.71 12.10
Black or Black British (%) 11.10 10.90
Chinese or Other Ethnic 
Group (%)
2.75 2.70
Ethnic Minorities 
in general (%)
41.30 40.20
People born outside the UK 28.20 27.10
Rank of Income Deprivation 10 53.16 51.18
14 Ethnic minorities refer to all ethnic groups that are not White British.
15 The mean percentage or mean rank is given in each cell.
16 Rank of number of people in the district who are income deprived (1 is most deprived).
Table 4. Description of London boroughs selected compared to London average and 
number of participants in each borough17_______________________________________
A Below average White population, very large 
ethnic minority population, very low income 
deprivation rank
2 3
B Below average White population, large ethnic 
minority population (mainly Black and Black 
British), low income deprivation rank
2 4
C Below average White population, large ethnic 
minority population (mainly Asian and Asian 
British), above average income deprivation rank
1 5
D About average ethnic minority and White 
population, below average income deprivation 
rank
2 4
E Above average White British population, below 
average ethnic minority population, above 
average income deprivation rank
1 5
F About average White population, somewhat 
above average ethnic minority population, below 
average income deprivation rank
2 4
G Below average White population, large ethnic 
minority population, quite low income deprivation 
rank
3 5
H Somewhat above average White population, 
below average ethnic minority population, about 
average income deprivation rank
3 3
I Somewhat above average White population, 
below average ethnic minority population, above 
average income deprivation rank
1 0
J Above average White population, below average 
ethnic minority population, very high income 
deprivation rank
1 0
K Somewhat above average White population, 
below average ethnic minority population, below 
average income deprivation rank
1 0
L Somewhat above average White population, 
below average ethnic minority population, above 
average income deprivation rank
1 0
Total 20 33
17 The local councils that took part in this research cannot be named for confidentiality 
reasons.
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4.3.2 Citizenship officers
As mentioned, citizenship officers are civil servants working in local councils who 
organise and conduct citizenship ceremonies, which have been mandatory for 
naturalised and registered British citizens since 2004. In some of the councils they also 
provide the Nationality Checking Service, a service put in place to assist migrants with 
their citizenship applications. In each of the local councils selected, I interviewed one, 
two or three officers depending on the number of citizenship officers working there -  
some councils had one officer, while others had four or more. In each council I tried to 
interview the officers who had the most experience with citizenship matters, were of 
higher rank (for example, coordinating a designated citizenship team), or whose job 
was more relevant to citizenship compared to the other officers. However, recruitment 
was also dependent on the officers’ keenness to participate.
Not all of the respondents’ job title was ‘citizenship officer’ because not all councils had 
a designated citizenship team. Some of them were registrars with additional citizenship 
duties, while others were solely involved in citizenship matters. Also, in some councils 
there was just one designated citizenship officer, while in other councils the entire 
registration team dealt with citizenship. The level of specialisation of the officers’ duties 
depended on the council’s structure which was quite varied across boroughs. The 
interviewees’ rank within the council was also varied. Some of the interviewees held 
higher positions, whereas others were lower-rank officers. Furthermore, there was 
variety in terms of the duration of their involvement with citizenship matters. A few of 
the officers had been involved with the citizenship ceremonies and the Nationality 
Checking Service since they were implemented in 2004. Others, however, had only 
been employed as citizenship officers for only a few months.
Regarding the sample size, following Gaskell (2000), I sought to conduct at least fifteen 
to twenty interviews with each sample of participants (new citizens and citizenship 
officers), but primarily, I sought to achieve 'meaning saturation’ before terminating the 
interviews. Meaning saturation was easier to achieve with citizenship officers, 
compared to naturalised citizens, as this sample was more homogeneous. Twenty 
interviews were sufficient to establish that there would be no more surprise findings by 
conducting further interviews.
Seventeen of the citizenship officers were British citizens. Three were foreign nationals, 
having permanent residency status in the UK. The mean age of citizenship officers was
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43.5 years old, but it ranged from 28 to 65 years. Eight officers were male and twelve 
were female. Table 5 below shows the officers’ demographics and job positions.
Table 5. Citizenship Officers' demographics and job positions
1 Male 43 Black British Registration Officer A
2 Male 60 White
British
Registration and Ceremonies 
Officer
3 Female 27 White
British
Citizenship Officer B
4 Female 43 Black British Citizenship Officer
5 Female 65 White
British
Interim Superintendent 
Registrar
C
6 Male 34 White Other Citizenship Officer D
7 Male 32 White Other Citizenship Officer
8 Female 36 White
British
Additional Superintendent 
Registrar
E
9 Female 32 Asian
British
Citizenship Administrator, 
Nationality Checking Advisor
F
10 Female 56 White
British
Citizenship Administrator, 
Nationality Checking Advisor, 
Deputy Superintendent 
Registrar
11 Female 33 Mixed
British
Deputy Director of Registration 
and Nationality
G
12 Male 43 White
British
Director of Registration and 
Nationality
13 Female 29 Asian
British
Citizenship Officer
14 Male 60 White
British
Registration Officer (higher 
rank)
H
15 Male 60 White
British
Lead Ceremonies Officer
16 Male 47 White
British
Superintendent Registrar
17 Female 52 White
British
Ceremonies Coordinator I
18 Female 42 Asian
British
Citizenship Officer J
19 Female 48 White Other Administrator K
20 Female 28 Other
British
Citizenship Officer L
18 The categories for ethnicity that are used here are the same as the ones used by the Office 
for National Statistics.
89
4,3.3 Naturalised citizens
In eight of the twelve councils selected, I conducted three to five interviews with 
naturalised citizens. The new citizens were contacted at the citizenship ceremonies. 
The selection of this part of the sample was less controlled by the researcher due to 
significant practical constraints (see section 4.4.1 below). Thirty-three naturalised 
British citizens were interviewed. The total interview sample is therefore fifty-three 
participants.
Compared to citizenship officers, naturalised citizens were a more heterogeneous 
sample; they came from different parts of the world and had different immigration 
trajectories. Thirty-three interviews were conducted in order to identify common 
patterns of thinking and arguing about citizenship. This sample size was adequate to 
achieve meaning saturation and make sure that there will be no more surprise findings 
by conducting additional interviews (Gaskell, 2000).
The new British citizens who took part in this study had a varied migration background. 
Out of the thirty-three respondents, seven of them had migrated to the UK to seek 
asylum, either on their own or as minors with their parents. The rest of the participants 
had moved to the UK to work, study and/or travel and gain new experiences. 
Participants originated in Europe, Asia, America, Africa and Australia.
The amount of time that the participants had spent in Britain ranged from 3 years to 40 
years. Some of the participants can be described as ‘newcomers’, while others had 
spent most of their lives in the UK; some had migrated as adults and others as children. 
More than half of the respondents had spent between 5 and 10 years in the UK -  the 
mean years in the UK was 10.5 years. About a quarter of them applied for 
naturalisation as soon as they became eligible (3-6 years, depending on their 
immigration status), while others applied later on.
Sixteen participants were male and seventeen were female. Their mean age was 
approximately 32 years old, but it ranged from 18 to 58 years. The vast majority (28 
participants) were, however, less than forty years old, which resonates with the overall 
picture of naturalised citizens in the UK (Freelove-Mensah, 2008). Table 6 shows the 
naturalised citizens’ socio-demographics and local councils where their citizenship 
ceremonies were held.
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Table 6. Naturalised Citizens' socio-demographics and local councils
21 37 Albania Male Asylum 10-15 E
22 40 Sierra Leone Male Asylum 5-9
23 37 Serbia Female Study 16-20
24 32 Australia Male Travel*” 5-9
25 22 Lithuania Female Family*1 10-15
26 29 Nigeria Male Study 10-15 C
27 26 Sri Lanka Female Marriage 5-9
28 25 Raised in Kenya, 
Indian origin
Female Study 5-9
29 41 India Female Marriage 10-15
30 35 Jamaica Female Family 5-9
31 36 Australia Female Travel 5-9 H
32 33 Australia Female Travel 5-9
33 35 South Africa Male T ravel 5-9
34 37 USA Female Travel 16-20 F
35 26 Thailand Male Study 10-15
36 31 Germany Male Study 5-9
37 58 USA Female Study 20+
38 32 South Africa Female Travel 5-9 D
39 28 Greece Female Study 10-15
40 43 Venezuela Male Study 16-20
41 27 Russia Female Travel 5-9
42 23 Sierra Leone Male Family & 
Asylum22
5-9 B
43 43 India Male Study & 
T ravel
10-15
44 28 Soviet Union Female Study 10-15
45 35 Raised in Syria, 
Armenian origin
Male Asylum 5-9
46 34 Canada Male Study & 
Travel
10-15 A
47 30 India Male Work 5-9
48 29 Ghana Male Work 5-9
49 25 Raised in Lebanon, 
Undisclosed origin
Male Asylum 5-9 G
50 20 China Female Family 5-9
51 21 Raised in Iran, Iraqi Female Family & 
Asylum
10-15
52 18 Afghanistan Male Family & 
Asylum
10-15
53 32 Fiji Female Family 20+
19 The country or origin of participants is strictly derived from how participants themselves 
described their ethnic and national backgrounds.
20 Travel refers to moving to the UK in order to gain new experiences and live abroad.
21 Family refers to family reunification.
22 Family & Asylum refers to migrating to the UK for family reunification in cases where a 
member of the family (usually a parent) had migrated and sought asylum in the UK either earlier 
in time or at the same time.
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4.3.4 Policy documents
As argued in Chapter 2, the British state has recently tried to redefine British national 
identity within a framework of enhancing integration, cohesion and a shared sense of 
common identity. Policies regarding immigration have been central in these efforts. 
There are three main strands of immigration reform policy that the government is 
pursuing with that objective: i) policies regarding managed labour migration (points- 
based system), ii) policies regarding stronger border control (the newly established UK 
Border Agency is now responsible for this; also, the controversial ID card scheme for 
foreign nationals is part of this project), iii) policies regarding the process of 
naturalisation and permanent residency in the UK (earned citizenship). With respect to 
naturalisation, the governmental approach in the past few years has been defined by 
the idea of earned citizenship. New policies are being introduced on the principle that 
migrants must earn their right to stay and settle in Britain, which resonates with both the 
idea of managed migration and the general objective of social cohesion and integration.
Against this background, I decided to focus specifically on policies of earned citizenship 
in exploring the public policy approach on naturalisation. The four consultation 
documents published on the topic of earned citizenship were all selected for analysis. 
Table 7 provides a description of these documents.
Table 7. Policy documents selected for analysis
The Path to 
Citizenship: Next 
Steps in Reforming 
the Immigration 
System
Green paper; 
outlines new policies 
on earned citizenship
February 2008 Home Office, Border 
and Immigration 
Agency
The Path to 
Citizenship: Next 
Steps in Reforming 
the Immigration 
System: Analysis of 
Consultation 
Responses
Analysis of green 
paper responses
July 2008 Home Office, UK 
Border Agency
The Path to 
Citizenship: Next 
Steps in Reforming 
the Immigration 
System: Government 
Response to 
Consultation
Outlines new policy 
in light of analysis of 
green paper 
responses
July 2008 Home Office, UK 
Border Agency
Earning the Right to 
Stay: A New Points 
Test for Citizenship
Consultation 
document on further 
earned citizenship 
provisions
July 2009 Home Office, UK 
Border Agency
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Earned citizenship was first introduced in the "Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in 
Reforming the Immigration System” green paper, published in February 2008 by the 
Border and Immigration Agency (Home Office, 2008a). The green paper depicts the 
‘journey to citizenship’ as a process whereby migrants ‘earn their right to stay’ by 
showing that they have contributed to the country and that the benefits they acquire by 
living in Britain are matched by their responsibilities. Within the proposed framework, 
eligible migrants will have to go through three stages in what is called the “journey to 
citizenship”: temporary residence, probationary citizenship and British
citizenship/permanent residency. Migrants will have to earn the right to progress to the 
next stage or they will be asked to leave the country. The government is actively 
encouraging ‘probationary citizens’ to become full citizens rather than permanent 
residents by extending the probationary citizenship period for those who choose to 
become permanent residents. The criteria to progress from each stage to the next as 
outlined in the green paper are: English language proficiency, economic contribution 
through work and paying taxes, obeying the law and actively participating in the society. 
By doing voluntary work, for example, migrants will be able to proceed faster to the full 
citizenship stage. Overall, the government policy on earned citizenship emphasises the 
assessment of migrants by introducing a series of stages on the route to naturalisation, 
as well as their contribution to the economy and integration into the British society.
The results and analysis of the green paper responses were published by the UK 
Border Agency in July 2008 in the document “Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in 
Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses” {Home Office, 
2008b). The government’s response to the consultation was also published in July 2008 
in the report “Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: 
Government Response to Consultation” (Home Office, 2008c).
Based on these developments, earned citizenship became part of the Borders, 
Citizenship and Immigration Act which received royal assent in July 2009. The earned 
citizenship provisions of the Act are to be enforced in the summer of 2011. Building on 
these provisions, Phil Woolas, at the time Minister of State for Borders and Immigration, 
introduced the idea of a new points test for citizenship in the consultation document 
“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship” (Home Office, 2009). 
This test is planned to be incorporated into the earned citizenship process so that 
migrants who wish to proceed from the stage of temporary residence to permanent 
settlement will have to go through a process of assessment. Within this system, points 
would be awarded on the basis of a number of criteria, including knowledge of English
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language and professional qualifications. Furthermore, in line with the notion of skilled 
migration, the government will be able to raise the threshold of the test in order to 
manage better the number of people allowed to stay permanently in the UK.
Overall, these four documents, issued by the Home Office and the UK Border Agency, 
outline the new earned citizenship legislation that characterises the current approach of 
the British government to naturalisation and immigration23.
4.4 Research procedure
4.4.1 Recruitment o f participants
Participants were recruited by first contacting the local authorities that were selected. I 
telephoned the local councils, explained the nature and aim of the research and asked 
to attend a few citizenship ceremonies for the purposes of my research. When I 
attended the ceremonies, I met the citizenship officers, gave them more details about 
the study and asked them to participate by giving an interview. The response rate of the 
citizenship officers was quite high; only two local councils refused permission to be 
included in the study and in only one of the local councils did the majority of citizenship 
officers refuse to be interviewed. Overall, citizenship officers were keen to take part in 
the study and allowed me to attend citizenship ceremonies.
After having gained permission from the citizenship officers, I met the naturalised 
citizens at their citizenship ceremonies. It was not possible to contact them prior to the 
ceremony, since their details were kept confidential by the local councils. I was also not 
able to speak to them during the ceremony or at the time when their details were being 
checked by the citizenship officers just before the ceremony started. I had to approach 
potential participants before the checking, when not everyone had yet arrived, or after 
the ceremony, when the new citizens would start departing. In the cases of busy 
ceremonies, it was impossible to have a chance to speak to everyone. To address 
these difficulties in recruitment, I tried giving an information sheet to the citizenship 
officers to pass on to naturalisation applicants at the Nationality Checking stage of the 
application, in case applicants were interested in taking part in the study. However, this
23 More recently, on June 28th 2010, the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government published a consultation document proposing an annual cap on immigration (Home 
Office, 2010). This cap will operate within the five-tier points system that was introduced by the 
previous Labour government. This consultation document, which was only published a few  
weeks prior to the submission of this thesis, was not included in the analysis as it is not strictly 
an earned citizenship proposal, but rather constitutes an immigration measure building on the 
points-based system.
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did not prove to be an efficient technique for recruitment; only one of the participants 
was recruited this way. Due to these practical constraints, I did not have total control of 
the selection of the naturalised citizens to be interviewed. However, I made every effort 
to approach everyone present in the ceremonies and ask them to participate in the 
research. I attended as many ceremonies as necessary in each borough in order to 
gather at least four participants from each council, but, unfortunately, in two of the 
boroughs this was not achieved, so I settled for more interviewees from other councils. 
As a result of these problems, the response rate of the naturalised citizens’ sample was 
rather low in comparison to the citizenship officers. The average response rate across 
boroughs was approximately 11 % for the naturalised citizens24.
4.4.2 Interview topic guides
The interview topic guides were designed to address the general issues of migration, 
citizenship and national identity through the discussion of the naturalisation context in 
Britain (see Appendix 1, for the detailed topic guides). One pilot interview with a 
naturalised citizen in London was used to check the relevance of the questions asked, 
as well as the overall structure of the topic guide. Due to the relatively small number of 
citizenship officers working in London and also because of access issues, I did not 
conduct pilot interviews with citizenship officers. Rather, I conducted two interviews 
with British-born, non-naturalised citizens. Furthermore, as a means to familiarise 
myself with the field of study, I had informal discussions with citizenship officers and I 
attended fifteen citizenship ceremonies.
The topic guide for the citizenship officers was developed around a few general 
themes: questions regarding the citizenship officers’ work, questions about the process 
of naturalisation with an emphasis on the citizenship ceremony and the ‘Life in the UK’ 
test, questions about naturalisation and immigration and finally, questions about British 
citizenship. Their personal views, experiences and feelings were asked about, as well 
as their views on how applicants for naturalisation relate to these issues. The interview 
topic guide for the naturalised citizens had a similar format and included questions 
regarding: migration to Britain, naturalisation, with emphasis on the citizenship test and 
ceremony, and British citizenship. Each interview, for both samples, started with a 
‘warming-up’ general discussion concerning the interviewees’ locality and their work in 
general. The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth in format in order to allow
24 This response rate is calculated as if I had contacted all applicants for an interview in each 
ceremony I attended. However, I was unable to speak to all applicants at some of the 
ceremonies; thus, this response rate is an estimation and is lower than the actual response rate.
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the participants to talk freely about the issues that were most relevant or significant for 
them and also in order to allow for the expression of unanticipated responses (see 
Appendix 2 for a typical interview with a citizenship officer and a typical interview with a 
naturalised citizen).
4.4.3 Interview procedure
The interviews with the citizenship officers were mostly conducted in the local councils 
during the officers’ break. Only one was conducted at a restaurant after work. The 
interviews were conducted in the period from October 2007 to April 2008. They lasted 
from thirty to ninety minutes, most of them around one hour.
The interviews with the naturalised citizens were conducted in a variety of places 
(cafes, restaurants, participants’ homes, workplaces) according to the interviewees’ 
preference. They were conducted in the period November 2007-April 2008. They lasted 
from 35 minutes to two hours.
Both the citizenship officers and the naturalised citizens contacted for recruitment were 
given an information sheet with some basic information about the project and the 
interview process along with my contact details (see Appendix 3). Any other information 
requested by the participants about the nature of the research was also provided.
All of the participants were informed about the general aims of this study and their 
rights not to participate and withdraw at any point. They were also reassured that their 
identity would be protected and full confidentiality would be kept according to the British 
Psychological Society’s code of ethics. After having been informed about the study and 
how their contribution would be used, they were asked to sign a consent form which 
would allow me to use and publicise extracts from the interviews provided that their 
identity is not revealed (see Appendix 4). All of the participants were encouraged to 
freely express their opinions. They were told that there were no right or wrong answers 
and that I was only interested in their personal views.
All interviews were recorded, with the permission of participants, and transcribed for the 
purposes of analysis.
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4.5 Data analysis
4.5.1 Analysis o f interviews
The analysis of the interviews with citizenship officers and naturalised citizens sought to 
address the following questions:
■ How do participants engage with citizenship as an object of social knowledge? 
In other words, what are the themes they use to make sense of it?
■ How are participants positioned in relation to this representational field and how 
do they negotiate these positions?
■ What types of social relations are the basis for these representations?
In order to answer these questions, the analysis was conducted on two levels. On a first 
level, thematic analysis was used to identify the different themes that interviewees drew 
on to make sense of citizenship and naturalisation. On a second level, I sought to 
explore how participants positioned themselves and others in relation to the 
representational field of citizenship. This more subtle analysis aimed at investigating the 
dynamics of the self-other-object triangle in the representational field of citizenship.
The interviews with citizenship officers and naturalised citizens were analysed 
separately in order to allow for the exploration of different perspectives across the data 
set. Instead of strictly comparing the officers and new citizens, my aim has been to 
identify different perspectives on citizenship as expressed by different actors in order to 
capture the complexity of the issue. However, there were commonalities in how 
participants as a whole discussed citizenship -  these will be discussed in the last 
chapter of the thesis.
The first step of the analysis was to listen to the interviews and read repeatedly the 
interview transcripts. This helped me familiarise myself with the data and make some 
first notes, comments and hypotheses about the underlying themes of discourses. The 
Nvivo qualitative analysis software was then used to code the interview data. This 
made the process easier and quicker, whilst also allowing for the better compilation of 
the coding framework. Although the use of computer software does not replace the 
researcher’s role in segmenting and interpreting the data, it does render the process 
much more efficient. Nvivo is a particularly useful programme because it is very flexible 
and allows the researcher to easily rearrange the codes, making the process more 
open to re-interpretation and exploration of new ideas. Nvivo organises the codes
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hierarchically, allowing for a large number of sub-codes, which helps establish links 
between abstract and descriptive codes. The creation of memos and annotations also 
helps to draw links between data and codes and ideas that emerge during the coding 
process.
The coding technique was mainly inductive. Although the three questions mentioned in 
the beginning of the chapter guided my reading of the data and my interpretation of the 
text, I used a data-driven approach to coding in order not to confine the richness of the 
interview data and allow for surprise findings to emerge. The unit of analysis was the 
meaning unit which could be a sentence or a whole paragraph. Codes were not 
mutually exclusive and interview segments were often multiply coded. Coding is an 
ongoing process, so the categories were refined many times during the course of the 
analysis. I started by coding separately four interviews from each sample. Based on 
these interviews, I devised a preliminary coding framework which I applied to the rest of 
the data. However, in the course of coding more interviews, some codes were 
abandoned while new ones were created and others were refined. With every change 
in the coding frame, I had to go back to my previous analysis and refine it in light of the 
amendments on the coding framework. This open approach to coding was quite lengthy 
and required a constant ‘back-and-forth’ process of re-reading the interviews and 
applying new codes. This process also allowed my to refine my research questions by 
drawing clearer links between my theoretical perspective and the empirical findings.
Once the whole data set was coded into codes and sub-codes, the codes were sorted 
into potential themes (Attride-Stirling, 2001; Braun & Clarke, 2006). At this stage the 
coding framework consisted of a set of preliminary themes, each of which comprised a 
series of interrelated codes and sub-codes. After I finalised the coding framework, I 
went back to the interview extracts and re-worked the coding framework in order to 
create a ‘coherent story’ within each theme. This part of analysis was more 
interpretative than descriptive as the themes were abstract and often latent topics in the 
interviews.
The themes were organised hierarchically according to the suggestions made by 
Attride-Stirling (2001): basic themes are descriptive and made up by codes or groups of 
codes, organising themes summarise the assumptions of a group of basic themes, and 
global themes are the higher-order, more abstract themes which summarise the main 
point or assumption of a group of organising themes. It should be noted that the way 
the themes have been devised does not necessarily reflect their frequency within the 
data set; rather, the ‘keyness’ of a theme depended more on its significance in
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answering the research questions (Braun & Clarke, 2006) (see Appendix 5, for the 
complete coding frameworks).
In exploring the relations between themes and the ways of thinking that underlie them, I 
was particularly interested in oppositions and dilemmas in the ways participants talked 
about citizenship. As Billig (1987) observes, thinking takes the form of argumentation, 
since every theme on which people draw to make sense of the world has an opposing 
theme. Themes and counter-themes are in dialectical relationship with each other; they 
are linked with each other like figure and ground (Markova, 2003a). Social 
representations and common thinking are based on such basic oppositions -  what 
Markova (2000, 2003a) calls ‘themata’. In seeking to understand this dynamic way of 
talking and arguing about citizenship and naturalisation, I paid attention to thematic 
tensions in the discourses of participants. I tried to identify not only the themes but also 
the counter themes that structured the discourses of participants. Examining such 
tensions allowed me to appreciate the dynamic and dialogical nature of thinking about 
citizenship and also follow the argumentation of participants.
Concerning the second level of the analysis, I sought to further examine how 
participants negotiated their position within this complex representational field. In order 
to study this dynamic aspect of representations, I explored the self-other relations that 
were advanced and negotiated in the interviews. Following Moscovici’s (2000b) triangle 
concerning the relation among self, other and object, it can be said that every 
representation involves the positioning of the self in relation to the other and to the 
object or representation. In this sense, every representational process also defines the 
relationship between self and other. Thus, the multiple ways in which people position 
themselves and are positioned by others with regards to an object is inherent in all acts 
of socially representing the world. Adopting a dialogical approach to knowledge 
construction, meaning that in every act of representation there is always an interlocutor 
(real or imagined), I tried to answer the following question in analysing the data: which 
voices come forth when people speak of citizenship and towards whom are people 
positioned? (Markova et al., 2007). As Hermans (2001a, 2002) argues, people are 
‘multivoiced’, that is, they can assume a multiplicity of positions. A position can be seen 
as a “conceptual repertoire” (Davies & Harre, 1999) which is based on the location of 
an individual within the social world vis-a-vis others. I did not conduct a detailed 
analysis of every position taken up; rather, I was more interested in the prevalent 
positions associated with the main themes of representations of citizenship.
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I was also interested in exploring how these positions were negotiated. Positioning 
processes can be seen through the lens of rhetoric and argumentation (Billig, 1987). 
This discursive approach to positioning has been advanced by positioning theory which 
sees positioning as a process of negotiation between different viewpoints (Harr6 & van 
Langehove, 1999). Therefore, tensions between themes are accompanied by tensions 
between different positions. By drawing on different representations, people are 
proposing different 'versions’ of themselves towards others. Following Duveen and 
colleagues (Duveen, 1993,2001; Duveen & Lloyd, 1986), who argue that identities are 
positions towards social representations, it can be said that negotiations between 
different dialogical themes are also negotiations of identities. This process can take the 
form of an ‘internal dialogue’ since different discourses represent different voices in the 
self (see Chapter 3). The divergence between voices becomes a resource for 
argumentation for participants (Markova et al., 2007).
Based on this rationale, in studying the positions of interviewees, I was guided by the 
following questions:
a) Which main positions become available for the participants within the 
representational field that defines citizenship and naturalisation and how do 
participants negotiate these positions?
b) How do participants position themselves in relation to thematic tensions? In 
other words, how do participants use opposing themes to make different identity 
claims and arguments?
4.5.2 Analysis o f policy documents
The analysis of the four policy documents on earned citizenship was conducted using 
the ALCESTE software for analysis of text. Compared to qualitative analysis software 
packages, like Nvivo, which only helps to systematise the coding process, ALCESTE is 
a tool which analyses the text with relatively little intervention by the researcher. 
ALCESTE is a very sophisticated tool which operates under the principle that different 
ways of talking about a subject correspond to different was of thinking about it. Based 
on this principle, it conducts a statistical analysis of word co-occurrences in the text and 
produces classes of words that appear together. These classes represent the themes 
that underlie the discourse around the topic. ALCESTE allows to alter the parameters of 
the analysis to suit the aims of the research. In this study, I conducted three different 
sets of analyses which allowed me to identify three levels of classification ranging from 
broad classes to more detailed classes. I interpreted the classes by going through the
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typical words and sentences in each class. I also explored the relations among classes 
using the dengrogram of descending hierarchical classification which shows how the 
classes have been divided. The details of the ALCESTE analysis are outlined in 
Chapter 7 which presents the procedure and findings of this analysis.
4.6 Quality assurance
Qualitative research has been heavily criticised for its lack of quality assessment 
criteria. Responding to this challenge, Gaskell and Bauer (2000) have devised a set of 
quality assurance criteria which can be applied in qualitative research and are 
functionally equivalent to the criteria used in quantitative research. Confidence and 
relevance are, for Gaskell and Bauer (2000), the guiding principles of quality 
assessment because they render qualitative research ‘publicly accountable’ for the 
claims it makes. Confidence refers to being confident that the results of the research 
represent the accounts of participants and are not fabricated by the researcher. 
Relevance indicators incorporate both ‘utility and importance’ (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000, 
p. 345); a ‘relevant’ research contributes theoretically and/or empirically with 
unexpected findings. Drawing on Gaskell and Bauer (2000), I have used five 
confidence and relevance markers for quality assurance in this research.
Triangulation is one of the proposed criteria for quality assessment (Gaskell & Bauer, 
2000, see also section 4.2.2, p. 78). The aim of triangulating perspectives is not to 
obtain a ‘true’ representation of a phenomenon. Triangulation "is best understood as a 
strategy that adds rigour, breadth, complexity, richness and depth to any inquiry” 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 5). In the current study, I have sought to achieve 
triangulation of data and of methods. The former refers to collecting data from different 
sources (Flick, 2004). By studying three sets of social actors in the naturalisation 
context, this research achieves triangulation of perspectives on the issue of citizenship. 
Citizenship officers, the UK Government and naturalised citizens are the three most 
important stakeholders in this context. By analysing and comparing their different 
perspectives, I aim to understand the complexity of citizenship in contemporary Britain. 
Triangulation of methods, on the other hand, most commonly refers to the combination 
of qualitative and quantitative methods. This research has combined these different 
types of analyses, through the use of semi-structured interviewing and statistical 
analysis of text (ALCESTE). More importantly, however, it has combined reactive 
procedures of data collection (interviews) and non-reactive procedures (collection of 
policy documents) (Marotzki, 1995, cited in Flick, 2004). The most important benefit of
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triangulation is that it enhances the reflexivity of the researcher because it requires that 
the researcher addresses the complexity of the issue in question and explores potential 
inconsistencies (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000). Triangulation helps not only to appreciate this 
complexity, but also to interpret each perspective in light of the overall context. For 
example, public policy on naturalisation sets the scene for the experiences of 
naturalised citizens. Their accounts are defined against the background of immigration 
legislation as set by the UK Government.
Transparency and procedural clarity constitute another confidence marker for Gaskell 
and Bauer (2000). I have sought transparency and procedural clarity in this research by 
describing explicitly all the procedures of data collection and analysis.
Corpus construction is the third confidence and relevance marker used here (Gaskell & 
Bauer, 2000). Corpus construction, as a method of sample selection in qualitative 
research, aims to map the variety of representations on an issue (Bauer & Aarts, 2000). 
By selecting different sets of relevant actors, I aimed to investigate the diversity of 
perspectives on citizenship, rather than identifying the ‘representative representation’ of 
this topic. I also selected local councils with diverse ethnic and socio-economic profiles 
in order to recruit respondents with a variety of backgrounds.
Thick description, the extensive use of extracts from the data, constitutes one more 
confidence and relevance marker (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000). In the findings chapters that 
follow, I have used extracts from the analysed interviews and documents in order to 
support my interpretation. The claims made in this research, based on the evidence I 
have collected and which I report, are therefore open for potential alternative 
interpretations by another reader.
Finally, the fifth relevance marker of this research is surprise as a contribution to theory 
and/or common sense (Gaskell & Bauer, 2000). The surprise value of this research lies 
firstly in studying a topic that has not been adequately explored by social psychology so 
far. As mentioned in Chapter 1, while social psychology has studied national identities, 
it has been reluctant to study citizenship. I aim to contribute towards filling this gap by 
studying naturalisation as a context where the ‘self meets the ‘other’. Furthermore, new 
policies on earned citizenship and managed migration deserve close attention, but have 
so far been studied from only a legal or political perspective. Such policies define the 
national boundaries and pose restrictions on the movement of people. In the era of 
globalisation and transnational identities, they create, as Baumann (1998) has argued, 
a new form of social stratification defined by people’s capability to be mobile. This
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thesis is a step towards understanding the social psychological parameters of such 
boundary management strategies and their implications for social relations. In terms of 
theory, this thesis aims to contribute to the elaboration of the concept of identity, 
particularly national identity, in contemporary societies, by drawing links with the 
concepts of social representations and positions.
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Chapter 5. The Perspective of Citizenship Officers
5.1 Overview of Chapter 5
This chapter will discuss the findings from the interviews with citizenship officers. The 
analysis of interviews is based on three main questions:
■ How do participants engage with citizenship as an object of social knowledge? 
In other words, what are the themes they use to make sense of this issue?
■ How do participants position themselves and others in relation to this 
representational field?
■ What types of social relations are the basis of these representations?
In addressing these questions, I draw on Billig’s and Markova’s (see Chapter 2) ideas 
on dialogical thinking as well as on Duveen’s and positioning theory’s theorisation of 
positioning vis-3-vis the other (see Chapter 3). This chapter will highlight: i) the 
polyphasic and antinomic nature of representations associated with citizenship, and ii) 
the implications of such antinomies for processes of identity construction.
Citizenship officers adopted in general an ‘earned citizenship’ storyline which also 
frames current public policy discourse in the UK. 'Earned citizenship’ is based on the 
assumption that British citizenship is a conditional privilege selectively granted to those 
who deserve it. It emphasises the duties of new citizens, as well as the need to assess 
them rigorously during the naturalisation process. Three main duties were most salient 
in the interviews: contributing to the economy, integrating and being proud of becoming 
British. At the heart of the earned citizenship narrative was the distinction between the 
deserving and the undeserving new citizens. Thus, there were two ‘branches’ in this 
storyline: one that emphasised migrants’ lack of contribution and participation, and one 
that saw migrants as worthy of British citizenship. These argumentation narratives 
structured the thematic content of representations. There were two main themes in the 
representation of citizenship by citizenship officers: citizenship as belonging and 
citizenship as opportunity. Within both these themes the opposing ideas of hospitality 
and abuse of hospitality by migrants were in dialogical relation to each other. 
Citizenship was, thus, constructed in a ‘polyphasic’ way, alluding to the existence of 
antinomic thinking. The dialogical tension between inclusion and exclusion created 
multiple positionings and for self and other. Migrants and new citizens were constructed 
in an ambivalent way, as both ‘good’ and ‘bad’. While participants differed in how much 
they drew on each image of the immigrant, this tension was evident in the arguments of
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all interviewees. It is argued in this chapter that these tensions are at the basis of the 
construction of Britishness. On the one hand, the migrant as ‘good’ supports Britain’s 
image as a hospitable and freedom-loving country, but on the other hand, the migrant 
as ‘bad’ maintains the purity of Britain against the ‘migrant threat’. The next section of 
this chapter will discuss the earned citizenship storyline,, while the third and fourth 
sections will discuss the theme of citizenship as belonging and the theme of citizenship 
as opportunity respectively. The fifth section will elaborate the ambivalence between 
the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ immigrant as well as its implications for the construction of 
Britishness. The final section of this chapter will conclude with an overview and 
discussion of the findings.
5.2 Earned citizenship discourse
The discourse of earned citizenship was the underlying storyline in the majority of the 
interviews with citizenship officers. It was based on the idea that British citizenship is a 
right to be earned in contrast to the birthright of the native population. In this storyline, 
Britain was positioned as a giver (mainly of freedom and economic prosperity), whereas 
immigrants were seen as the beneficiaries of these goods. While earned citizenship is 
based on both the image of the deserving new citizen (who has earned his/her right to 
citizenship) and the image of the undeserving new citizen (who has not earned his/her 
right to citizenship), the negative aspect of immigration was more common in the 
interviews. More often than not, participants argued that the UK has been too lenient on 
immigration allowing immigrants to abuse the system to their benefit. For many 
participants, the economic decline of the country and the problems of segregation and 
lack of social cohesion were seen as an outcome of this situation. Britain was seen, 
therefore, as having the right and the duty to limit immigration and be more selective 
about which migrants should be allowed in the country. At the same time, migrants and 
new citizens were seen as having the duty to contribute to the economy, integrate and 
be committed to the country. They were seen as having the right to reside in Britain and 
become citizens only if these conditions are met.
In accordance with this storyline, the privilege of British citizenship was taken for 
granted in the interviews. The idea that migrants are ‘better off1 in the UK than in their 
countries of origin was wholly unchallenged. Based on the taken-for-grantedness of the 
privilege of British citizenship, the discourses of the citizenship officers were framed in a 
social exchange framework. Britain was positioned as a provider of freedom and 
prosperity, while migrants were seen as the takers. In line with a reciprocity principle,
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migrants can earn the right to British citizenship and associated benefits only if they 
abide by a set of conditions:
... [The increased importance attributed to citizenship] for us, as a nation, I 
think it’s not... not being taken for granted. That, you know, this isn’t something 
that’s open to everyone. You have to fulfil certain criteria before you are 
granted citizenship. And that's important for the growth of the country. 
(Participant 16, male, 47 years old)
The criteria for deserving citizenship were formulated in terms of duties: the duty to 
contribute, the duty to integrate and the duty to be proud of becoming British (see 
Andreouli & Stockdale, 2009). Regarding the former, most of the citizenship officers 
mentioned the duty to contribute to British economy as a fundamental criterion of good 
citizenship. A distinction was often constructed in the interviews between people who 
migrate to Britain and give back to the community and those who take advantage of the 
welfare system. This stance towards migration is also reflected in the government’s 
recent policy on migration; a new series of ‘skilled migration’ regulations has recently 
been introduced, that is, a points-based system that will regulate immigration on the 
grounds of the skills needed in British economy. All, but one, of the participants who 
mentioned the idea of skilled migration considered it a step towards the right direction. 
The main idea was that Britain has to be selective. It needs to be able to screen 
migrants efficiently on the basis of their skills and contribution. Most of the participants 
also argued for more stringent immigration controls in order to protect the British 
infrastructure, arguing at the same time that immigration is more of an economic burden 
than a resource for Britain. This ‘rationalistic’ argument, by framing the issue in a 
sustainability framework, manages to counter accusations of prejudice.
Whilst our economy is actually healthy, people who want to come here, I think 
what we have to do is make a decision about who are the people we actually 
want to come to the UK in terms of their skills, in terms of the skills and abilities 
that we need to make the economy grow and continue to grow. [...] I think for 
people who are virtually economic migrants, who are not able to contribute in 
the way in which we need them to do, then perhaps there’s an argument, 
perhaps it’s saying “Well, I think we got to be restrictive” [...] I think that’s a 
perfectly reasonable aspiration, we do have a finite amount of resource in 
terms of just the infrastructure; the burden on the National Health Service, the 
burden on schools, the burden on GP practices, the burden on housing has all 
been difficult in terms... and made more difficult by the number of migrants 
coming to the UK. (Participant 12, male, 43 years old)
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In addition to contribution to the economy, the duty to participate actively in British 
society was also a recurrent theme in the interviews. It was related to civic 
engagement, being able to speak English, learning about the British culture and making 
efforts to integrate. Generally, lack of integration and English proficiency was seen as a 
problem in the migrant populations in Britain by most participants:
I mean, I’ve had couples come here with their kid, the child was like 12 years 
old you know, because the child has been studying in the UK, schooling in the 
UK for five-six years, kids tend to pick up a language quite easier than adults, 
you know, it’s just been proved, so the child will come as an interpreter for the 
mother and the father, which I don’t really approve of. (Participant 7, male, 32 
years old)
Another criterion for who deserves to be British was the responsibility to be proud or 
happy to become a citizen. This was construed as a moral duty for new citizens who 
need to be grateful for what Britain offers them. This was most frequently framed as a 
matter of freedom; the most important good that Britain offers to new citizens was seen 
as the opportunity to live in a democratic country. Like the duties to contribute and 
integrate, the duty to be proud was mostly viewed as something that is lacking and that 
should be enhanced. Obtaining the British passport was seen as a principal reason for 
naturalisation and it was construed as being in conflict with feeling proud to be British 
(this point will be elaborated later in the chapter, see section 5.4, p. 116).
There’s been a few people that have been very happy to become British 
citizens. I had one guy, he came to do a private ceremony and after he did his 
oath and he swore, he put the flag around him, he was very happy and he was 
kissing the flag, I was like, oh, he’s very happy. Some of them are very very 
happy, you know. A lot of them are very happy, but you do get obviously the 
people who just want the passport because it makes things easier for them, 
easier to travel out of the country and go everywhere and they’re not really 
interested in anything else, you know. I think you get that in every country, you 
get people that don’t wanna be part of... (Participant 6, male, 34 years old)
In a few of the interviews, participants took this idea a step further by arguing that new 
citizens should not only be proud to become British citizens, but they should also ‘feel’ 
British. In fact, although the distinction between the legal aspect of citizenship and the 
identity aspect of nationhood was made in the interviews, identification with Britain was 
generally seen positively in contrast with only wishing to obtain the legal advantages of 
citizenship. Therefore, people who really deserve to be British were sometimes seen as
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the ones who ‘feel British’. This representation of citizenship is very close to images of 
Britishness as a cultural identity rather than a civic one. As the following extract shows, 
the legal aspect of nationhood can be associated with an opportunistic attitude to 
citizenship.
Although they may have lived here for 20, 30 years, this is their home, if you 
see what I mean, so I think it’s hard for some to say, you know, I’m giving that 
up, it seems you’re giving up all your birthplace and... as I said, I think through 
the ceremonies when their first words are "a British passport", I still think that 
deep down they’re more with their country from where they were born. 
Although they’re becoming a British citizen, to them, they’re not, if you see what 
I mean, they’re still maybe, I don’t know, Bangladeshi, Polish or they’re still 
that. I think they may use the British citizenship more for legal or travelling [...] I 
don’t see why become a British citizen. They’re only getting benefits to become 
a British citizen... (Participant 10, female, 56 years old)
Overall, the three duties of contribution, participation and pride constitute the moral 
order of the position of naturalised citizens within the earned citizenship storyline. They 
define what is expected from that position. I argue that this positioning draws on a 
deeper distinction between two different modes of identification, ‘being’ and ‘having’ 
(Fromm, 1997)25. British can be something that one is by virtue of being born in Britain 
(birthright) or it can be something that one has by virtue of naturalising (earned right). 
Thus, the distinction between the birthright and the earned right of citizenship translates 
into two different identity positions26:
This has been an eye-opener to- for me to realise how privileged it is for me to 
be born here; that I don’t have to go through that. You know, it’s my birthright 
whereas they have to buy this service, pay to become, you know, and that was, 
yes, an eye-opener. (Participant 4, female, 43 years old)
The distinction between ‘being’ and ‘having’ is evident in the kinds of claims one can 
make in relation to the ‘management’ of Britain. A few of the citizenship officers seemed 
to overtly express a kind of ‘territorial entitlement’ to speak on behalf of Britain or the 
nation with regards to the issue of naturalisation criteria (see also Andreouli & 
Stockdale, 2009). I term this symbolic entitlement ‘territorial’ because it is related to
25 This point will be further elaborated in the next chapter in relation to the interviews with 
naturalised citizens.
26 There are subtler distinctions in-between the two poles, since social representations construct 
a variety of positions that can be taken on (Duveen, 1993). Representations of culture and race 
play a part in what kinds of claims one can make towards Britishness. As will be shown, in the 
next section, some cultures are perceived as less able to integrate into the British society.
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perceiving the national space as the property of the native population27; essentially it is 
a matter of ‘ownership’. This position of authority in managing the national space was 
most evident in a few of the interviews in which citizenship officers referred to their 
authority to block the naturalisation process. In reality, decisions over citizenship 
applications are made by the Home Office. However, some of the officers had sent 
back to the Home Office some applicants’ naturalisation certificates for reconsideration 
of the application in cases when they thought that the eligibility of the applicant was 
insufficient. Such cases mainly had to do with the applicant not speaking up when 
saying the oath of allegiance during the ceremony or the applicant lacking knowledge of 
English and being unable to speak English during the nationality checking process.
I am in a position, if I’m not happy with an applicant, to not allow the ceremony 
to take place [...] So I said, I’m not prepared to do your ceremony today, and 
afterwards I sent the certificate back to the Home Office with my views. I said I 
wasn’t happy with his standard of English comprehension, you know... his 
friend was slightly better than him. I said, at the end, when I was trying to 
explain to him, I used a 14-year old boy as an interpreter. (Participant 2, male,
60 years old)
Here, the interviewee explicitly puts himself in a position of a decision-maker as to who 
has the right to claim citizenship. Gergen (1989) calls this a ‘warranting voice’ because 
it is based on the warrant that one’s voice is superior or more legitimate compared to 
that of another. In the interviews, justification of the interviewees’ warranting voice 
came from the superiority of birthrights compared to earned rights which positions 
British born citizens as ‘fuller’ members of the British community. Speaking from this 
warranting position means that one uses British identity as a resource for claim-making. 
Being ‘properly British’, in other words, legitimates people’s expectations towards new 
citizens. This entitlement is quite similar to what Hage (1998) has called ‘governmental 
belonging’. For Hage, there are two ways of belonging to a nation: feeling at home in 
the nation (passive belonging); and the belief that one has a right over that nation, the 
right to contribute to its management so that it remains one’s home (governmental 
belonging). This is essentially a matter of having legitimate symbolic power to define or 
demarcate the national territory.
27 Following Sack, territoriality can be defined as “the attempt by an individual or group [and 
states] to affect, influence, or control people, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting 
control over a geographic area" (Sack, 1986, p. 19).
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5.3 Citizenship and belonging
While the earned citizenship discourse framed the argumentation of participants, two 
main themes, belonging and opportunity, provided the thematic content for 
constructions of citizenship. The theme of belonging was linked with an image of 
citizenship that incorporated civic and cultural elements. Belonging was mainly 
conceptualised as being integrated or making efforts to integrate. Settling and making a 
home in Britain was often seen as a main reason for naturalisation. Some respondents 
also made the assumption that by becoming British, migrants were relinquishing their 
previous nationality. In that case naturalisation was taken almost literally: acquiring the 
British citizenship meant that one also acquired (or should acquire) a British identity.
For my parents, they came from Bangladesh back in the 60s, I think it was a 
very important thing for them to feel part of this country cos they decided to live 
here and to get citizenship meant that they were part of this country. Before, 
they were still foreigners even though they decided to settle here, they always 
felt like outsiders, you know. So, to get citizenship meant they were part of this 
country, so to them it was an important thing [...] it is more than a passport. It is 
a whole sort of way of life, I suppose. It’s ... a lot of people feel like a part of the 
country [...] of the way of life in the sense that... just being part of everything 
really. Being accepted, I guess it’s what I’m trying to say, not being different, 
yeah. Because when you are a different nationality... (Participant 9, female, 32 
years old)
I suppose it depends from their background. If they’re coming because it is a 
better place to live, maybe they just want to disown everything else. You know?
Maybe people think, I’m not that person anymore, I’m British, I’m here, let's get 
on with it [the naturalisation]. I can only think that’s why [people naturalise]... 
(Participant 8, female, 36 years old)
At the same time, Britishness was commonly constructed as a plural identity that can 
accommodate diversity. Respondents employed a ‘narrative of national diversification’ 
which described British diversity as the result of a historical process of migration inflows 
(Condor, 2006a, 2006b). Diversity was, thus, something that could be tolerated or even 
celebrated as a cultural resource. It was seen as making life in Britain generally and 
London in particular, more exciting. What is more, interviewees also expressed pride in 
the cultural diversity of Britain as it affirmed the value of tolerance, which was 
constructed as distinctively British (see also Condor, 2006b).
110
... [this borough] is the most diverse in the UK, over 53% of our population are 
black or Asian [...] and a recent census actually said that if you’re walking down 
the High Road, you have 50% chance of actually meeting somebody, not of a 
different ethnic origin, but actually somebody not born in the United Kingdom.
So, it’s the most diverse in the UK and probably in Europe [...] If it's the most 
diverse in London, I’m sure it’s the most diverse in Europe, yeah [...] I think it’s 
tremendous, yeah. I mean, it makes life incredibly interesting. I'd be very bored 
in a very sort of stable white community. (Participant 12, male, 43 years old)
This idea that diversity can be a cultural resource was often expressed in the 
interviews. Indeed, the need to build a sense of community by welcoming new citizens 
and encouraging their integration was evident in the data. In this regard, the new 
naturalisation rules, which involve the citizenship test and the ceremony where new 
citizens take an oath of allegiance, were welcomed by most participants. It was further 
argued that the naturalisation process should incorporate symbols of Britishness. Many 
participants talked about having the picture of the Queen in the ceremony and about 
the importance of the national anthem as part of the process. The call to build a sense 
of community through the citizenship process portrays a welcoming and other-oriented 
attitude towards new citizens. It suggests that the native and British born population 
makes efforts to embrace the new citizens. This is an instance of recognition of the 
other as part of ‘our’ community.
I see this [citizenship ceremony] as a much better way of welcoming citizens 
and hopefully giving them that sense of belonging and I think it definitely has a 
worth that the ceremony itself gives a sense of pride and, you know, 
presentation of a gift to commemorate the fact that you’re obtaining your 
citizenship, I think it is a good thing [...] and hopefully it makes them want to be 
welcomed into the community and feel part of that community. (Participant 11, 
female, 33 years old)
However, there was both a negative and a positive subtext in the integration discourse 
employed by citizenship officers, based on the tension between two opposing themes 
(Billig, 1987; Markov^, 2003a). On the one hand, the integration discourse was about 
creating a sense of community among all British citizens, but on the other hand, it was 
also an expression of concerns over segregation. This tension between cultural threat 
and cultural enrichment by immigration was the source for the development of 
arguments on the part of participants. Moving from a rhetoric of community (that 
emphasises commonality and unity) to a rhetoric of segregation (that emphasises 
difference and dividedness) was commonplace in the data. An example is given in the
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extract below. The respondent starts off by saying that the citizenship ceremony is a 
welcoming event. But, he bases his argument on the lack of integration of minority 
communities. So he moves from an other-oriented discourse of approaching new 
citizens to a discourse that emphasises their reluctance to integrate causing lack of 
cohesion. In the end, integration is seen as the personal responsibility of people who 
migrate to Britain:
W e start off [the ceremonies] with giving people a civic welcome and we have 
the mayor there cos we want to say, you know, this is a welcome into the 
community, and then we go on to actually explain, you know, a little bit of what 
citizenship is. That, you know, it brings rights to people, but it also brings 
responsibilities. And the responsibilities are basically, they go back to the very 
original interpretations of being a citizen. It’s to participate, it’s participation, it’s 
getting involved and that’s what we say, it’s your side of the deal, you know, we 
will give you citizenship and that’ll give you certain rights, but you have to 
contribute as well. And the contribution you make is that, you know, you see 
that this is your community, you get involved in this community, you contribute 
and you try to make this community a better place in which to live [...] And, you 
know, this is all part of this process of community cohesion and, you know, 
people can still have their own cultures and all like that, but they still have got to 
take steps towards more integration [...] I think the riots of North, when there 
was the troubles in a number of northern cities, when they reviewed, then they 
found that people had no sense of being British people28. Lots of people there, 
you know, still saw themselves as their country of origin and didn’t feel any part 
of this country and so forth. They felt very distant, remote and I think that Ted 
Cantle was the one who said that we, you know, we need to move, you know, a 
little bit away from this multicultural approach and into more an integrationist 
approach... (Participant 14, male, 60 years old)
The above quotation alludes also to a sense of loss on the part of the participant. What 
is being lost is the feeling of solidarity and unity which is giving its place to diversity and 
multiculturalism. Thus, the perceived negative impact of immigration was linked in the 
interviews with a sense of decline of Britishness and nostalgia for the past. Claims to 
raise the importance of British citizenship were made by participants in response to this 
challenge. For that reason, the citizenship ceremony, as a rite of passage that marks a
28 The participant refers to the 'race riots’ in the spring and summer of 2001 in Bradford, Oldham 
and Burnley. A series of reports were commissioned by the Home Office at that time in an effort 
to understand the causes of the events. The most prominent of them, the Cantle report (Cantle, 
2001), attributed the protests to the lack of cohesion of ethnic minority communities, giving rise 
to the general social cohesion agenda of the Labour government.
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migrant’s transition to full membership, was generally seen in a very positive way (see 
Participant 9 below). The idea that citizenship acquisition is important and should be 
celebrated is, indeed, a reason for the implementation of the ceremonies. For instance, 
in Lord Goldsmith’s Citizenship Review, commissioned by the Prime Minister, 
recommendations regarding the citizenship ceremonies were focused on making this 
event more meaningful for both new citizens and local communities (Rimmer, 2007).
.. .because obviously before the ceremonies came out, when people applied for 
citizenship, I think they had to go in front of a solicitor to say the oath and 
affirmation [or] whatever. And then they used to get their certificates through 
the post and that would be it. But now that it's made into more of a bigger thing, 
into a ceremony, I think it makes them feel...I don’t know, I think they 
appreciate it more, if you like, and also, at the same time, meeting other people 
that have applied and [who are] in the same, you know, same position as 
themselves. So, they do appreciate it more, I think, the whole ceremony 
concept. (Participant 9, female, 32 years old)
While a feeling of loss of unity permeated the interviews, none of the participants 
explicitly argued that people should discard their cultural or ethnic backgrounds when 
migrating to Britain. Instead, what was common across interviews was a ‘keep your 
own culture as well’ argument. Interviewees argued extensively that migrants and new 
citizens have the right to maintain their 'original cultures’. But, this argument also 
suggested that ‘different cultures’ are not part of British culture but parallel to it. 
Diversity was constructed as external to Britishnesss since it is the already established 
British culture that defines the common core of Britishness. In line with the recent 
governmental approach, this common core was defined by ‘British values’ in the 
interviews. These values were about tolerance, freedom and democracy and were often 
constructed as distinctively British. This suggests that not abiding by British values was 
not only seen as a sign of segregation but also as a sign of insularity and lack of 
tolerance on the part of migrants and new citizens. This line of argumentation both 
reiterates British tolerance and attributes segregation to minorities’ conservatism. This 
identity management technique allowed participants to counter accusations of racism 
and xenophobia (see also Condor, 2000, 2006a; Condor & Abell, 2006b; Condor, 
Gibson, & Abell, 2006). Furthermore, while minority identities were defined in cultural 
terms, British identity was defined, in this case, in terms of political values. The 
juxtaposition of the two creates the impression that there is a conflict between some 
cultural traditions and democratic values epitomised in British democracy. This conflict 
is explicitly expressed in some of the interviews with regards to Muslim communities,
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constructing a contrast between Western and British tolerance and ‘Islamic intolerance’ 
(see also Said, 1981).
I don’t think the two are mutually exclusive. I think there is an element of 
integration between those two things. I think if you're a new migrant, some 
elements of your national identity will still remain in your country of origin [...]
That doesn’t mean to say that you will not also have an affinity and affection to 
the country in which you’ve chosen to live in. So, I think you’re signing up to a 
national identity, you’re signing up to some shared values, you’re sharing, 
you’re signing up to the fact that you’re now living in a free and democratic 
society as you were before, but effectively if you come from a country which 
isn’t free and democratic... You may come from an Islamic country that 
recognises or doesn’t recognise certain rights for females for example. When 
you come here you’re signing up to rights for females, you’re signing up to 
equality and equality of access. Now, that is different with your old identity in 
some ways and you have to sort of shelve that because that’s in the past... 
(Participant 12, male, 43 years old)
The use of tolerance here serves as an argumentative strategy to protect Britishness. 
By equating Britishness with values of democracy and tolerance participants were 
essentially arguing against change. If Britishness is defined by tolerance and open- 
mindedness, then it does not have to change to incorporate other cultural elements. On 
the contrary, it is assumed that it is already open to diversity.
However, the meaning of tolerance was not fixed in the interviews, but was re­
negotiated according to the types of arguments participants wished to make. While 
tolerance was described above as a political value which positively differentiates 
Britishness from other cultures, it was, on other occasions, constructed negatively as 
political correctness. Interestingly, while a civic conceptualisation of Britishness was 
promoted in the extract above, in this case, British traditional culture becomes a more 
salient feature of Britishness. Many respondents expressed concerns about the decline 
of British cultural traditions due to political correctness. In this regard, ‘bending over 
backwards’ to accommodate minority cultures was often viewed as a threat to the unity 
of Britain and to British identity. A typically cited example of this was Christmas 
celebrations. It was argued in many interviews that political correctness can be 
detrimental to British traditions, mainly the ones associated with religion. While ethnic 
minorities were seen as maintaining and celebrating their cultures, the mainstream 
British culture was seen as being downplayed so as not to offend others. There are two 
implications of this. First, that political correctness is the other side of tolerance. As
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Billig (1987) argues, the meaning of words can be a source of argumentation and 
debate. In the interviews tolerance could signify respect for diversity, but it could also 
mean political correctness linked with loss of British cultural identity. By complaining 
about political correctness, participants were effectively expressing concerns about the 
negative aspect of tolerance. Secondly, although political correctness characterises the 
behaviour of native British citizens, it was attributed to the ‘sensitivity’ of minority 
populations who were seen as being easily offended. This is why both participants 
below claim that minorities should make more efforts to participate in the majority 
culture. Reluctance to do so is construed as an abuse of hospitality and as a result of 
the migrants’ intolerance. At the same time, both participants try not to sound intolerant, 
denying potential accusations of racism (Billig, 1991; van Dijk, 1992). Participant 8 
asserts her respect to diversity before arguing against the segregation of migrant 
communities. Participant 14 downplays the racial connotation of his statement by 
saying that it is ’common courtesy’ to integrate into the British culture. ‘Common 
courtesy’ is construed here as a universal social value that everyone should adhere to. 
Not participating in the mainstream culture becomes a sign of backwardness and 
incivility.
I think it’s very good when in schools, when we celebrate different religions and 
different nationality days [...] But, I also think it’s very sad when we feel like we 
can’t do things [...] I think that's quite sad when people think, oh, what about 
the Christmas lights, when it’s Christmas and the council says, oh, we can’t do 
that because it will offend other cultures [...] And I think if you’re willing to live in 
another country then that’s something that you should entertain, cos there’re 
things that they do on their day. And there’s always that argument on 
Christmas, isn’t it? Oh, you know, Father Christmas and Christmas lights, and 
you might be offending other religions... well, you know, this is what we do 
here, but then also bringing whatever religions and more so, I suppose 
concentrated in an area, celebrate that as well, because children surely can 
only benefit from it. (Participant 8, female, 36 years old)
I think the things that do us terribly harm in this country, and again it goes back 
to political correctness, you know, is things like, when you get, when it’s 
Christmas and so forth and you get someone say, don’t send Christmas cards 
cos that’ll offend someone [...] And there are a lot of Muslims who have 
Christmas trees and have presents and lots of Sikhs who do the same and so 
forth and, cos they say, you know that’s what, when you go to a country and, 
you know, you’re living there that’s what you do! I mean if I went to any country 
in the world, you know, I’d celebrate the Eid or whatever, or anything like that, it
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wouldn’t necessarily mean I’d want to become an Hindu or a Muslim or 
whatever, but that’s basic, you know, common courtesy... (Participant 14, 
male, 60 years old)
Overall, there was a tension in the interviews between diversity as something positive 
and diversity as something negative. This dilemma was exemplified in the tensions 
between tolerance and political correctness, and between cultural enrichment and 
threat to cultural identity. These oppositions formed part of an ‘internal dialogue’ in the 
discourses of the interviewees (Markova, 2006). Susan Condor and colleagues 
(Condor, 2006a, 2006b; Condor, Gibson, & Abell, 2006) have found similar results in 
their studies on Britishness. These studies found a tension between mono-cultural and 
poly-cultural constructions of Britishness. In my findings, tolerance is the main source of 
tension as it can be discursively employed to emphasise openness towards otherness 
but also, when construed as political correctness, it can be employed to argue against 
diversity. I would also add here that there is an implicit tension between taking pride in 
people wanting to migrate to the UK, mainly because it asserts Britain’s hospitality and 
tolerance to diversity, and resenting this very tolerance (or rather, political correctness) 
because it is sometimes equated to a 'bending over backwards’ attitude towards 
‘foreigners’. On the one hand, diversity is constructed as something positive and 
enriching (or even as part of Britishness), but on the other hand, it ought to be limited. 
Diversity therefore is both a resource and a threat to national identity and lifestyle of 
Britain. While participants drew more on one or the other pole of this opposition, it was 
the tension between the two that was the source of their arguments.
5.4 Citizenship and opportunity
In addition to the theme of belonging, citizenship was also construed as an opportunity 
for new citizens. This theme was based on the image of Britain as a country of 
prosperity that can offer many opportunities to people who migrate. Mainly because of 
this, the fact that people want to migrate to Britain and become British was not really 
problematised in the interviews. Rather, with the exception of one participant, the 
advantages of becoming British in terms of work opportunities, safety and quality of life 
were taken as self-evident. Life in Britain was unquestionably considered better than in 
other countries.
People always knock this country, but you can’t always blame them and kick 
them out. You know, everybody wants to get here, you know, from all quarters
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of the world, they wanna come to Britain, you know, and it must have 
something to offer, you know. (Participant 14, make, 60 years old)
The concept of opportunity took many forms in the interviews. Most frequently, it 
signified safety for those migrants who come to the UK as asylum seekers. Through the 
Nationality Checking Service most of the interviewees were in frequent contact with 
applicants for citizenship. Many of the participants told me stories about new citizens 
who had fled their country to come to the UK. In these stories, the image of Britain as a 
democratic and freedom-loving country was very salient.
Obviously, you get those people that have come from disadvantaged countries 
or countries where there is war or something like that. I suppose for them, they 
happily have a place they can call home and they know they can bring up their 
children in safer surroundings and not have to worry about somebody coming 
along to kill them or something like that. (Participant 6, male, 34 years old)
You know, they’ve come from, yeah, we don’t know what their backgrounds 
are, but, you know, you just need to read in the papers, whatever the different 
countries undergoing different regimes or whatever, that people come here 
because in England there is a freedom that they wouldn’t experience in their 
own country. Freedom to express their sexuality, their religion, their political 
beliefs. All those things that they can get here that they’re not getting or were 
getting in their own country. (Participant 16, male, 47 years old)
At the same time, asylum seekers were constructed as victims in need of Britain’s help. 
This missionary connotation of humanitarianism is evident in the extract below where 
the participant argues that accepting and protecting people in need is a moral duty of 
Britain. What is more, her claim that helping others is ‘part of us’ shows that this is 
considered a defining feature of Britishness and Britain’s place in the world.
I wouldn’t feel happy if we turned them away, where would they go? [...] we 
should still be seen as a safe haven for people who really need help and need 
assistance, that need to flee their country. W e shouldn’t take that away, you 
know, that’s part of us. (Participant 18, female, 42 years old)
However, in the interviews, the theme of democracy and humanitarianism towards 
those in need was in dialogical tension with the theme of abuse of hospitality by 
migrants. The distinction between ‘genuine’ and ‘bogus’ asylum seekers (e.g. Kushner, 
2003; Lynn & Lea, 2003) is anchored in this dialogue. Here, the theme of hospitality 
abuse took mainly the form of abuse of welfare benefits. The ambivalence between
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being humanitarian and limiting the help given to migrants is shown in the extracts 
below. The participants consider receiving benefits a case of abuse that puts a strain on 
welfare and creates a burden for the rest of society. Interestingly, from a person in 
need, the immigrant is now positioned as an opportunist. While removing agency from 
migrants, especially asylum seekers, is necessary for constructions of humanitarianism, 
this agency has to be re-invoked in order to construct them as abusers of welfare 
benefits and to argue against immigration. The extracts illustrate the internal dialogue 
between the two themes in the discourses of the interviewees (Markova, 2006). The 
participants seem to be struggling to both argue that Britain should be a welcoming 
country and make claims against the financial help given to immigrants and especially 
asylum seekers. In other words, they engage in a negotiation between humanitarianism 
and pragmatism which is based on a sustainability discourse (see also van Dijk, 1992).
At first when they’re going through asylum, they do get a payment. I don't think 
it's actually money, it’s more like a voucher system. [...] And then once they get 
their indefinite leave, then they can go and get the benefits and... you know, it’s 
as if to say, well, let’s go to Great Britain, you don’t have to work because they 
pay you what we would have got in a week’s wages in benefits and you don’t 
have to do anything. [...] You know, for some asylum seekers that’s a get-away 
from their countries. Which is only right, you know. It’s, sad things have 
happened to them in their own countries and you wouldn’t wish that on anyone.
But to come here and then just sit around and not even look for work, you 
know, just think, well, I’m gonna get benefits, that’s OK, I can sit here and... 
you know, I wouldn’t want to say, right, no, back you go, because that’s not, 
that’s not fair, they’ve got to live and they’ve got to live somewhere. (Participant 
10, female, 56 years old)
W e do get an awful, ninety per cent of the applications are unemployed and 
aren’t contributing and I think that a lot of resentment comes from the fact that, 
you know, you do have a lot of people that are getting citizenship and have 
been on benefits since they came into the country. Now, they can work after 
they get indefinite leave to remain, but a lot don’t. And I do see an awful lot of 
applications that are unemployed [...] Cos I don’t think we can survive as a 
nation just giving out, giving out, giving out all the time. Especially in the 
national health services it’s just in a complete mess at the moment. Well, at the 
moment, that will be for a long time because, you know, you just can’t survive 
on... it’s very nice you know, handing out benefits to people that are in need.
Don’t get me wrong, they are in need, they do need it, but it has to go, if you’re 
giving out, you have to have some form of money coming back in again. 
(Participant 5, female, 65 years old)
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The theme of abuse of welfare benefits was more salient than the theme of immigration 
as a resource for Britain. In fact, as the following extract shows, the image of the 
contributing migrant often served to only stress the inadequacy of ‘ordinary’ migrants. In 
other words, the ‘good migrant’ was in some interviews the exception to the rule. As 
Billig (1987, 1993) argues, people do only have the ability to categorise, but also the 
counter-ability to ‘particularise’, that is, to negate categorisation and identify special 
cases. In this case, particularisation can be described as a strategy to maintain the 
dominant categorisation of immigrants as abusers of hospitality.
I mean why is it that all the Eastern Europeans, all flock through France and 
then sit in Calais waiting to jump on the back of the lorry? Or train or something 
like that? Because they know that England is the place where they want to be.
So they can get as much as they can out of the country. I mean I've met some 
youngsters that have come into this country, 12 or 14 year old, and when 
they’ve gone to 18 or 19 they apply to become British citizens. And then they’re 
telling me what they’ve done and I’ve met some nice... and they’ve got letters 
that they’ve brought in from particular places and they say, he’s done a 
fantastic job, voluntary work, he’s helping do this and he’s helping do that and 
he’s now, you know, he’s got a little job as a photographer and blah-blah-blah...
Great, this is a success story. (Participant 2, male, 60 years old)
As in the case of the loss of social solidarity which was identified in the opportunity 
theme, the perceived decline of the welfare state, attributed to the adverse effects of 
immigration, made participants wary about the future of Britain. The loss of social 
solidarity, along with the increasing decline of the economic prosperity of Britain, 
created a very grim image of the future of the country. This discourse of welfare 
benefits abuse was formed upon a relationship of mistrust between the ‘native’ and the 
‘new’ British citizens. The latter were seen as taking advantage of British hospitality and 
this was considered a threat to the resources of Britain. Overall, officers seemed to 
perceive a clash of interests between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ British citizens. Abuse of 
benefits was, indeed, the most significant complaint of the interviewees in matters of 
immigration. It was mentioned in all interviews and evoked resentment towards 
immigrants. In contrast to my initial expectations, resentment towards ‘foreigners’ was 
often framed in issues of fairness, exemplified in benefits allocation complaints, rather 
than in issues of cultural and/or racial diversity (see also Andreouli & Stockdale, 2009). 
By employing a ‘rational’ social justice framework and making ‘reasonable’ arguments 
(like Participant 5 above), participants were able to counter potential accusations of 
prejudice and legitimise anti-immigration attitudes (see also Billig, 1991; Figgou &
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Condor, 2006; van Dijk, 1992). However, this ‘rationalistic’ discourse was based on an 
‘us-them’ dichotomy that excluded and otherised migrants -  a phenomenon which has 
been termed ‘welfare chauvinism’ (Betz, 1994, cited in Wells & Watson, 2005). As 
shown in the extract below, the underlying assumption of this fairness discourse is that 
Britain belongs to the native population.
The only time I get frustrated from that is when you hear that British people 
can’t get jobs or British people can’t get housing, I think that’s probably when it 
goes slightly wrong, it doesn’t seem to be looking after the citizens first [...] I 
think it is quite sad when you don't come first in your own country of origin. 
(Participant 8, female, 36 years old)
In addition to welfare benefits, the second type of abuse of the opportunities offered in 
Britain was applying for citizenship in order to obtain the British passport. For the 
majority of citizenship officers, this motive was considered a sign of lack of commitment 
and ungratefulness. In some cases it even signified lack of respect towards Britain, as 
the following quotation shows. Participant 15 below undermines the motive of new 
citizens by arguing that citizenship is for them an opportunistic act rather than a sign of 
commitment to the UK. Gillespie (2008a) has identified this mechanism of undermining 
the motive as a ‘semantic barrier’ that hinders the dialogue between self and other. 
Indeed, the participant below, by claiming that new citizens ‘are not truly interested in 
Britain’, completely disqualifies their perspective29.
I think a lot of people who come to be British citizens will never understand 
what it means to be British, because they don’t really care. They, they’ve done 
it for a reason. They want to stay here, they want to have the advantages of 
having a British passport. But they don’t really care too much about anything 
else. A lot of Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans are like that. They 
don’t really. Some are not. Some are, you know, truly interested in, in Britain. 
(Participant 15, male, 60 years old)
Overall, there was a fundamental ambivalence in constructions of citizenship as 
opportunity in the interviews. On the one hand, opportunity meant that Britain is a 
developed, prosperous and democratic country. On the other hand, opportunity could 
also mean taking advantage of what this country has to offer. Thus, there was a tension 
between migrants who use opportunities in Britain to make a better life for themselves
29 As will be shown in the next chapter, applying for citizenship in order to obtain the British 
passport cannot be simply interpreted as a sign of opportunism. Rather, for naturalised citizens 
the passport signifies freedom of mobility and inclusion in the UK and the Western world in 
general. More than a practical issue, it is a symbol of a new position towards the West.
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and migrants who abuse these opportunities. The former were seen as grateful towards 
Britain while the latter were seen as exploitative and opportunistic. Although 
immigration was more commonly seen in a negative light, participants used both 
argumentation narratives to make arguments about immigration. As will be shown in the 
next section, Britishness is based on this ambivalent relation with the ‘other’.
5.5 Ambivalence towards the ‘other1: The ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ 
immigrant
As argued in the beginning of this chapter, the discourse of earned citizenship was 
rooted in the distinction between the deserving ‘good’ and the undeserving ‘bad’ 
immigrants. There were two potential ‘endings’ in the storyline adopted by citizenship 
officers: earning the right to become British and being entitled to what Britain offers, and 
not earning this right due to failure to abide by the criteria set. As Slocum-Bradley 
(2006) argues, failure to fulfil one’s duties (contribution, integration and commitment in 
this case) de-legitimates an actor.
In line with the earned citizenship narrative, migrants were seen as having a moral duty 
to be grateful and committed to Britain. This expectation of gratefulness suggests that 
humanitarianism and hospitality are not freely given in an altruistic fashion. Migrants 
have to give something back in return. Especially in the case of refugees and asylum 
seekers, being grateful and committed is what is expected of them. Thus, the language 
of humanitarianism easily slips into the rhetoric of charity (Grove & Zwi, 2006; 
Pickering, 2001). Rather than a moral and legal obligation under international law, 
British humanitarianism becomes an expression of generosity that requires reciprocity.
I think the people that should be applying are people that have probably come 
here as asylum seekers, people that have spent many years here, people that 
want to put back into the community, into Britain, what Britain has done for 
them. I think if Britain, how can I explain, when you take somebody in and offer 
them shelter, then, when they’re in a position, they should repay, I think they 
should put back into society what society has given to them to enable them to 
be safe and secure. (Participant 5, female, 65 years old)
Freedom in Britain was a common argument used to explain why becoming a British 
citizen should be appreciated as something important in a person’s life. Here, the image 
of the asylum seeker as a person in need is dominant. Thus, the refugee is given an 
identity: he or she is a victim of a terrible regime, in need of Britain’s humanitarianism 
(Malkki, 1996; Rajaram, 2002). Citizenship then is a matter of safety. Migrants are
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represented here as victims who are need of Britain’s philanthropy or generosity. 
Simultaneously, Britain is represented as a prosperous, free and humanitarian country 
that acts as a saviour for those in need. I argue that the image of the ‘good’ immigrant 
serves to confirm British hospitality, humanitarianism and respect for freedom, as both 
extracts below illustrate. By being grateful, migrants boost this idealised British identity. 
In fact, a surprise finding of this research was that some participants argued that 
naturalised citizens are prouder than British-born citizens about being British, as shown 
in the second extract below. In a way, naturalised citizens, having more of an 
observer’s perspective towards Britishness, are positioned as ‘objective reviewers’ of 
British values. By appreciating British tolerance and freedom, new citizens validate this 
idealised image of Britishness.
In my experience, the majority of them have been quite moved by the whole 
experience. Last week, we had a guy from Bulgaria who actually filled with 
tears. At the end, when he came up and said, thank you for the ceremony, or 
whatever and, yeah, this is such a wonderful country. He was just moved by 
the whole thing. And lot of people from other countries that have come from 
quite tough areas, yeah, where there is civil war, there is different strife, their 
political beliefs or whatever, have meant that they were really sort of under a 
terrible regime. And they come here and having their naturalisation affirmed in 
such a formal way is really moving from them. (Participant 16, male, 47 years 
old)
I think sometimes the people that we take as citizens are prouder than people 
that are actually born here, to be honest, I think cos they know how important it 
is, they’ve taken on the importance, they have lived in other cultures, so they, 
they know the differences and they appreciate. (Participant 17, female, 52 
years old)
While the need to be free was valued, the passport was disapproved of as a reason for 
naturalisation because it was seen as a sign of ungratefulness towards Britain (see 
previous section). Freedom and the passport were often contrasted as the ‘good vs. not 
good enough’ reason to become British which distinguished the deserving from the 
undeserving new citizens. While the ‘deserving’ migrants were seen as wanting to live 
and settle in the UK, the ‘undeserving’ ones were seen as not being committed to 
Britain.
P 1 7 :... I think that for everyone that you get like that, you get the genuine ones 
and that kind of, you know...
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E: What, what do you mean by genuine ones?
P17: Well, that’s probably the wrong way to phrase it I suppose. People that 
actually want to come to this country, contribute to the country, work to earn a 
living I think, and are here, you know, for genuine reasons, they want to be part 
of the community. W e do see, a lot in the citizenships ceremonies which is 
nice, you know, the bit where they stand up, take their oath and the national 
anthem. It is quite nice to see, an awful lot of them are very proud at that point, 
to sort of stand up, take the oath and the national anthem, which, I kind of sit 
here and I think, now, that’s, it actually does, this means something, but you 
also get people that will ring up and come in, and you know, it doesn’t mean a 
thing really, it’s just a piece of paper, it’s a kind of thing for a British passport 
and the fact that they got British citizenship doesn’t mean anything really to 
them. (Participant 17, female, 52 years old)
Therefore, the interviewees constructed a distinction between the practicality of the 
passport and feelings of pride towards British citizenship. The two were constructed as 
opposite and mutually exclusive, so that naturalising for the sake of the passport did not 
leave any room for pride and commitment towards Britain. More than a travel 
document, the passport acquired a significant symbolic value for citizenship officers. In 
a way, the passport was the objectification of opportunism on the part of ‘bad 
immigrants’, while pride and commitment were associated with ‘good migrants’.
This discursive strategy of ‘differentiating the other’ (Lynn & Lea, 2003) was key in the 
arguments of participants. The grateful migrant, who is committed and contributes to 
society, symbolises the ideal new British citizen. However, at the heart of this discourse 
is ‘the good versus the bad immigrant’ distinction. The immigrant in need who 
appreciates British hospitality and contributes to society is in conflict with the image of 
the immigrant who puts a strain on the British welfare system and is driven by 
opportunistic motives such as obtaining a European Union passport. There are two 
different categorisation processes here which serve distinct functions. On the one hand, 
the category of the ‘good immigrant’ serves a positive function of familiarisation with the 
‘other’. On the other hand, the category of the ‘bad immigrant’ serves to maintain the 
threat posed by the ‘other’ (Joffe, 1999,2003,2007; Joffe & Lee, 2004; Joffe & Staekle, 
2007). In the former case, the ‘other’ is embraced, while, in the latter case, the ‘other’ is 
stigmatised and kept at safe distance (Kalampalikis & Haas, 2008). 'Semantic barriers’, 
like undermining the motive of migrants, allows participants to avoid engaging with the 
stigmatised ‘other’ (Gillespie, 2008a).
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Participants used both images of the immigrant showing ambivalence towards 
immigration. As a result, the migrant was positioned in two contrasting ways: as a 
person in need, who is entitled of help, and as an abuser of British hospitality, who 
should not be entitled to British hospitality. In the former case, a relationship of 
assistance and humanitarianism was created between Britain and migrants; in the latter 
case, a relationship of mistrust and defence against the threat posed by the immigrant 
was established (see also Grove & Zwi, 2006). At the same time, Britain was positioned 
as prosperous and humanitarian, and as a country in decline. These two opposing 
positioning processes draw on the dialogical relation between the themes of 
hospitality/humanitarianism and abuse/threat. Thus, in constructions of Britishness 
there is a deeply held ambivalence towards the ‘other’ who is both desired and 
unwanted. As Markova (2003a) argues, the two themes are interdependent like figure 
and ground. Britishness is anchored in and against both images of the immigrant.
5.6 Summary and conclusions
The distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, with ‘us’ being the British nation and ‘them’ 
being the immigrants wishing to naturalise as British, is a key thema (Markova, 2003a) 
of the representations associated with immigration, citizenship and Britishness. This 
chapter has explored how this relationship is enriched with meanings and negotiated in 
order to frame discourses of citizenship. The meanings associated with ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
were not fixed in the interviews. In accordance with the earned citizenship discourse, 
which rests on the distinction between ‘being’ and ‘having’ and emphasises the duties 
of potential new citizens towards Britain as well as the constant assessment of their 
eligibility, migrants were constructed on occasions as deserving to become British and 
on other occasions as undeserving. The emphasis on duties and the downplaying of 
rights of potential new citizens constitute the moral order of this discourse. The 
distinction between deserving and undeserving is based on a deeper ambivalence 
between the ‘other’ as desirable, because he or she confirms British tolerance, and the 
‘other’ as undesirable, because he or she threatens the culture and economic 
resources of Britain. As has been shown in this chapter, Britishness is grounded in this 
ambivalence towards the ‘other’.
The observed ambivalence between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ immigrant is an instance 
of what Billig and colleagues (1988) call ‘ideological dilemmas’. It is a dilemma between 
particularism and universalism. On the one hand, tolerance and universalism are based 
on the ideals of the Enlightenment and, in particular, the idea that prejudice, as an
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‘irrational’ belief, should be eradicated (Billig et al., 1988). What is more, tolerance, 
constructed as a distinctive British trait has historically framed Britain’s relations 
towards ‘others’. For example, the ruling system used to govern the colonies during the 
Empire was often a modification of the pre-existing system of governance, allowing a 
degree of freedom to the colonised populations (Favell, 2001). To this day, British 
‘multiculturalist’ policies tend to recognise the right to cultural difference compared to 
the more assimilationist approach of the rest of Europe (Mitchell & Russell, 1996). 
Kumar (2000) maintains that the history of the Empire is the basis for the construction 
of Britishness as a missionary imperial identity. This imperial identity is characterised by 
tolerance of minority cultures and the downplaying of dominant ethnic identities. In the 
case of the United Kingdom and the British Empire, the English had to restrain 
assertions of their identity and promote a broader British identity. Rejection of popular 
nationalism has been documented particularly in England (Condor, 1996,2000; Condor 
& Abell, 2006b). However, this is not so much a matter of identity suppression but an 
issue of identity construction as the assumption of superiority is part of the constitution 
of privileged identities; without the need to be explicitly articulated, mainstream 
identities are often the implicit universal to which others need to aspire (Johnson, 
2002). Although there are not enough grounds to argue that Britain’s moral duty to help 
and accept ‘others’ is a direct remnant of an imperial missionary identity, as Kumar 
(2000) maintains30, it can be argued that the discourse of British tolerance, coupled with 
the assumption of national superiority, serves as a symbolic resource, which has been 
historically used as a means of making sense of and relating with the ‘other’.
A more critical reading of the interviews suggests that tolerance towards other identities 
can be seen as a complimentary privilege given to ‘less fortunate’ groups. As Hage 
observes, tolerance is a way to manage the national space and maintain hegemony as 
well as a hierarchy of belonging among groups as it is the dominant social group that 
has the power to grant or withdraw tolerance towards minority groups (Hage, 1994, 
1998; Wemuss, 2006). Therefore, tolerance goes hand in hand with intolerance and is 
always embedded in a system of asymmetrical power relations between the tolerators 
and the tolerated. In this sense, particularism and the construction of boundaries 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ constitute the other side of values of cosmopolitanism and 
tolerance. These boundaries are evident in the positioning of minority cultures as 
external to Britishness, that is, as cultures which are tolerated but not necessarily 
embraced. More importantly, the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are constructed
30 Indeed, discourses of British tolerance may originate in Britain's long history of democracy, 
rather than in Britain's imperial heritage.
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and maintained by positioning migrants as a burden to Britain’s resources and as 
abusers of British hospitality. In contrast to Britishness as an inclusive humanitarian 
identity, Britishness is constructed here as a declining identity due to the negative 
effects of immigration and cultural diversity (see also ETHNOS, 2006). Figure 2 below 
illustrates the central dilemmas in constructions of citizenship by citizenship officers.
Figure 2. Central dilemmas in representations of citizenship by Citizenship Officers
Tolerance Prosperity & 
Democracy
Abuse of 
Hospitality
Threat
Belonging Opportunity
Thus, representations of citizenship and associated representations of immigration 
were constructed in a binary logic in the interviews (see also Pickering, 2001). 
Participants engaged in an ‘internal dialogue’ (Markova, 2006) between the opposing 
themes, drawing on one or the other according to the argumentation strategies they 
adopted. This logic polarises both the identity of the migrant and the British identity. 
Words such as ungrateful, demanding and different are juxtaposed with words like 
grateful and committed. Figure 3 shows the opposing positionings that ground 
arguments within the earned citizenship storyline.
Figure 3. Main positions in earned citizenship storyline
Britain as a Giver Migrants as Takers
Contributors/
Grateful
OpportunistsProsperous/
Humanitarian
Declining/
Threatened
There is a strategic aspect (Billig, 1987; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) in these 
constructions of citizenship since each image of the immigrant helps to make an
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argument about Britishness. The ‘bad immigrant’ representation helps to protect Britain 
from cultural threat and economic decline. As Joffe and colleagues argue (Joffe, 1999, 
2003, 2007; Joffe & Lee, 2004; Joffe & Staekte, 2007), constructing ‘bad others’ is a 
strategy of risk reduction in that everything that is negative and risky is projected onto 
the ‘other’ while the self remains protected. Indeed, the ‘bad immigrant’ helps maintain 
the ‘purity’ of the nation from external influences. However, taking this one step further, 
I argue here that both the positive and the negative image of immigrants are essential 
for the construction of Britishness. While the ‘bad immigrant’ representation helps to 
protect Britain from cultural threat and economic decline, the ‘good immigrant’ 
constructs an idealised image of Britishness as the epitome of values of freedom and 
humanitarianism. The tension between the two themes is at the root of British identity 
and defines the relations of Britain to ‘others’. By drawing on opposing themes, 
participants spoke from multiple positions which allowed them to negotiate their 
relationship towards the other. We can observe here a negotiation between openness 
towards the other (recognition and trust), but also defence against the risk that the other 
poses (mistrust and control).
Ever since colonial times Britishness has been defined by this dialectic between desire 
of and aversion to the colonised ‘other’ (Young, 1995). The ‘other’ cannot just be 
welcomed to satisfy the imagery of British hospitality; the ‘other’ also needs to be kept 
at a distance to maintain the integrity and purity of the nation. Therefore, the dilemma 
between universalism and particularism can also be framed as a distinction between 
humanism and solidarity (Triandafyllidou, 2000). The former opens the self towards the 
other, while the later aims to secure the self against the other. On the one hand, we 
have a relationship of hospitality and engagement of the self with the other, and, on the 
other hand, we have an antagonistic or defensive relationship which leads to lack of 
engagement or dialogue with the other. The two themes are opposing but are not 
mutually exclusive, alluding to the dilemmatic nature of thinking (Billig, 1987, 1991; 
Billig et al., 1988; Markova, 2000,2003a). The ambivalence between unity and division 
forms the basis for the construction of Britishness. This dilemma is not settled; rather 
the dialogue between the two positions forms the basis for argumentation on 
immigration and identity.
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Chapter 6. The Perspective of Naturalised Citizens
6.1 Overview of Chapter 6
This chapter discusses the findings from thirty-three interviews conducted with new 
British citizens. This sample of participants was more heterogeneous than the 
citizenship officers due to the variety of participants’ experiences and backgrounds (for 
more details, see Chapter 4 on methodology). As with the interviews with officers, the 
following questions guided the analysis of these interviews:
■ How do participants engage with citizenship as an object of social knowledge? 
In other words, what are the themes they use to make sense of it?
■ How do participants position themselves and others in relation to this 
representational field?
■ What types of social relations are the basis of these representations?
As in the previous chapter, in addressing these questions I will emphasise, firstly, the 
dialogical and argumentative nature of thinking about the social world (Billig, 1987; 
Markova, 2003a) and, secondly, the self-other relations that ground identity processes. 
Owing to the variety of interviewees, there was no overarching storyline in the 
interviews as was the case with citizenship officers. However, the main themes used to 
make sense of experiences of naturalisation were generally shared across interviews.
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part discusses identity construction 
on the symbolic representational level and the second part discusses positioning as 
embedded in institutionalised practices of immigration management. Regarding the 
former, it will be argued that identity construction requires a complex positioning 
process towards not only representations of Britishness, but also towards 
representations of the participants’ country of origin. Respondents can be said to be 
overall located between the two positions that Schutz (1964a, 1964b) has identified: the 
position of the ‘stranger’ and the position of the ‘homecomer’. Integrating into a new 
environment is, thus, not a straightforward process, but requires negotiation between 
the ‘here’ and the ‘there’. Furthermore, Britain was represented in an ambivalent way in 
the interviews: on the one hand, it represented progress, freedom and openness to 
which new citizens aspired, but on the other hand, it also represented the decline of 
moral values. Integration in Britain involves, therefore, a negotiation of participants’ 
positions in relation to both these poles. This process entails assertions of both 
difference and sameness in relation to Britishness. Social representations also pose
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restrictions on the types of claims a migrant or new citizen can make towards 
Britishness. British identity is predominantly represented in an ethnic way which 
suggests that some types of migrants are positioned ‘closer’ to Britishness than others. 
This differential positioning is related to representations of immigration and the 
distinction between elite and non-elite migrants which permeates these representations.
Concerning the institutional level of immigration management, it will be shown that civic 
and ethnic representations of Britishness are not mutually exclusive, but are intertwined 
in the discourse and practice of earned citizenship. The distinction between the earned 
right and the birthright of citizenship marks the distinction between identity as 
something that one ‘has’ (and can thus be lost) and something that one ‘is’ (which is an 
essential part of the self). Not being British ‘by nature’ and, thus, having a precarious 
position in Britain, many participants acquired citizenship as a means to solidify their 
right to be in the UK. However, not all migrants viewed their position in the UK as 
insecure. This depends on where one is positioned within the ‘West/Rest’ opposition. 
For many participants who had been excluded from the prosperous Western world, the 
British passport, allowing for inter-national mobility, was a symbol of freedom and 
openness. In this sense, the passport is the objectification of inter-national relations and 
serves as an institutionalised positioning tool.
To sum up, representations of Britishness and immigration, structured around the 
distinction between the ‘West and the Rest’, gave meaning to the respondents’ new 
status in the UK. While representations of Britishness and immigration define who is 
seen as similar and who is seen as different, tangible immigration policies exemplify 
this positioning through immigration control practices.
6.2 Positioning within the symbolic field of naturalisation
6.2.1 Identity transformations: Between the ‘stranger’ and the ‘homecomer’
Identity has been defined in this thesis as a social location that binds an individual to his 
or her social world. As has been argued, identity has an organisational function in that it 
helps individuals make sense of themselves, their relationships with others and their 
dealings with the social world (Duveen, 1993, 2001; Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). Thus, 
identities provide a sense of stability by locating individuals within a network of social 
relations. Migration, however, creates a rupture of identity as the network of meanings 
and the system of social relations embedded in a person’s country of origin may not 
fully apply in a new setting. The new citizens interviewed for this research differed in the
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amount of time they had spent in the UK (see section 4.3.3, p. 90). While some had 
spent a considerable amount of time in Britain, the majority of them had spent most of 
their lives in their country of origin. The latter respondents, in particular, described the 
first years of their life in the UK as a period of transition whereby they had to re­
negotiate their cultural values and identities. Acquiring new social knowledge and re­
positioning themselves within a new system of social relations is a process of coping 
with this rupture of identity. For Participant 52, as well as for other respondents, the 
ethno-cultural diversity of Britain, in general, and London, in particular, was something 
novel to which he had to adapt. Other new citizens experienced more substantial 
integration difficulties due to their lack of English proficiency when they first arrived in 
the country, like Participant 29.
I remember [my first experiences in Britain]. I came to Luton airport and I was 
very young and I was a bit afraid because it’s like when you’re young you just 
come to this country, the people are different, the culture is different [...] And 
everything is multicultural, this country is so multicultural, it's unbelievable, I 
mean, to be very honest with you, I first saw a black person [when I came to 
the UK], I mean not seen it myself, on the TV. So, I started to see all these new 
things and my eyes started opening and at the airport I saw so many different 
multicultural people... (Participant 52, male, 18 years old)
I never spoke English in my country. When I came here I was just a stranger. I 
was a stranger for everybody. Once you can’t communicate, you just feel like 
you’re in a bubble. Nobody can touch, nobody can feel you. You know what I 
mean? (Participant 29, female, 41 years old)
Both extracts above describe a feeling of discontinuity between the participants’ 
previous experiences and their experiences in the UK. Due to this discontinuity, these 
respondents lacked the necessary symbolic tools (knowledge of cultural diversity and 
language proficiency) that would allow them to make sense of their new environment. 
This rupture of identity and of taken-for-granted knowledge associated with migration 
has been described by Schutz (1964a) as the position of the ‘stranger’. The ‘stranger’, 
according to Schutz, is an outsider in that his or her knowledge of the new environment 
is acquired through an observer’s perspective; it is not the result of his or her 
embeddedness into the cultural patterns of the society. It is not that the ‘stranger’ is 
unable to understand the differences between the two societies; rather, he or she lacks 
the unquestioned or ‘matter-of-course’ nature of common-sense thinking in the new 
socio-cultural setting. Because of that, the ‘stranger’ does not have the tools to make 
full sense of the new environment and his or her place in it. Ways of thinking in the
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‘host’ society, as Schutz (1964a, p. 104) correctly observes, rather than a means of 
sense making, become a ‘field of adventure’. Identity rupture creates anxiety which 
originates in the individual’s inability to master a new symbolic order.
In order to cope with this rupture, one needs to go through a process of ‘making the 
unfamiliar familiar’ (Moscovici, 1981, 1988, 2000a). Migration, in other words, is a 
learning experience because a migrant needs to learn new ways of thinking and re­
assess his or her previously taken-for-granted knowledge. This idea challenges the 
assumption that identity is, in some way, fixed. Indeed, it is commonly assumed that 
national, cultural and ethnic identities are, to borrow Kronberger’s and Wagner’s (2007) 
term, ‘inviolable identities’, defined by an unalterable essence (Wagner, Holtz, & 
Kashima, 2009). Contrary to this view, Reicherand Hopkins (Reicher, 2004; Reicher& 
Hopkins, 2001) have convincingly argued that identity is a project; it is a process of 
becoming rather than a state of being. In the migration context investigated here, such 
identity projects become more salient. Many of the new citizens in this study were 
reflective about how immigration changed how they viewed the world and their place 
within it. Participants differed in how deep they perceived this change to be, but most of 
them described an ‘identity transformation’ process whereby they accommodated new 
ways of thinking into their perspective on the world. Becoming more open-minded was 
an example commonly cited by interviewees.
People sometimes say to me that you are not the same person that I used to 
be [...] Even my wife said, I mean, cos I got friends from my country, when they 
come sometimes to my place and she sees the difference [...] And they got 
different things to say. They don’t want to marry to an English person; they 
would like to marry to an Albanian person. Or they don’t even mind to marry to 
an Eastern European girl, to put it our way, because they got similar things I 
think. That’s the way they see it. I don’t see it that way. [...] As I said, the rights 
that you get in here, you don’t get in my country. The women got more rights in 
this country, of course, definitely, than in my country. You know what I’m 
saying? That’s the thing, you learn things about... things that you never had it 
in your mind before. To say, put it our way, I never thought that when women 
got the first time to vote or whatever, or wherever the first time to get separated 
from their husbands and get a share from them. You know, so you learn those 
things in here, when I was back in my country, I didn’t even... I wasn’t even 
interested to know. (Participant 21, male, 37 years old)
The above quotation constructs a distinction between an open-minded way of thinking 
associated with Britain and a conservative way of thinking associated with the
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respondent’s country of origin, Albania. The participant argues that by living in Britain, 
he has become more tolerant in a way that differentiates him from his Albanian friends. 
The ‘identity change’ that the participant is describing is essentially a process of re­
positioning himself in relation to the representations and values associated with his 
country of origin, as well as in relation to values associated with Britishness.
Participants of this study had spent a minimum of five years in the UK and thus, were 
not just ‘strangers’ in Schutz’ use of the term. Rather, most of the participants were 
located in-between the two positions that Schutz has identified: that of the ‘stranger’ 
(1964a) and that of the ‘homecomer’ (1964b). The position of the ‘homecomer’ is the 
position of a person who, after being away for some time, returns home to find that he 
or she no longer finds this ‘home’ familiar. This change is more the result of the 
homecomer’s transformation than a change in his or her home. This position explicates 
the experiences of many participants who described being ‘de-identified’ and ‘de­
familiarised’ with their country of origin31. In the extract above, the participant explains 
how, by changing his perspective on the rights of women, he has less common points 
of reference with his old friends. Other respondents also described a lack of 
understanding of their new experiences and lives by their friends and relatives in their 
countries of origin. These participants, like Participant 39 below, found it hard to 
translate their experiences in Britain in a way that would make sense to their friends. In 
the following quotation, the respondent argues that the plurality and diversity which 
characterises Britain 'clashes’ with the expectations and experiences of people who live 
in Greece. There is, in other words, a discrepancy of perspectives which makes 
communication more challenging.
There’s been a lot of discontinuity [between my life in Greece and my life in 
Britain] [...] The people in Greece, they can’t have an image of my other life 
here [...] They've seen I’ve changed, but they don’t know how to understand it.
You know, in conversation there are more gaps in the discussion... after a 
while, what is there to say and explain? I mean, they ask, how is your work?
And then you think of the whole setting [of work] and it’s completely different 
from that of Greece and you just say, it’s OK, it’s fine. I mean, what I can I say?
If I start explaining, like say, my colleague, Francesco who is Italian... I mean, 
this simple statement is already strange to them back home. Everyone would 
be like, oh, he’s Italian? [with admiration and surprise] But, this is something
31 This depended on how participants made sense of the differences between life in the UK and 
their country of origin. This point will be elaborated in the following section on ‘Dilemmas of 
cultural integration’.
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normal here. But, for them it’s not, so I just say, you know, I’m fine. (Participant 
39, female, 28 years old)
On the whole, participants were located between the positions of the ‘stranger’ and the 
‘homecomer’. In constructing a new position in the UK, they were also re-negotiating 
their position in relation to their countries of origin. Thus, identity construction requires a 
negotiation process on at least two ‘fronts’; it requires positioning towards multiple 
systems of social representations. The following two sections will elaborate these 
processes of identity negotiation and positioning. The next section, in particular, will 
discuss how interviewees negotiated the cultural differences between their countries of 
origin and Britain.
6.2.2 Dilemmas o f cultural integration
As both Billig (1987) and Markova (2003a) have noted, thinking is a dialogical process 
which takes the form of arguing by drawing on opposing themes. In accordance with 
this theoretical perspective, Britishness was represented in the interviews in a 
‘dilemmatic’ way. It was structured around two dialectic themes: progress and moral 
decline. The theme of progress signified openness (exemplified in values of freedom, 
tolerance and democracy), but also prosperity (exemplified in economic and 
professional opportunities). On the other hand, the theme of moral decline was 
associated with individualism, crime, violence and lack of respect for family and 
communitarian values. The themes were interdependent in that one was defined by the 
other (Markova, 2003a). The way participants positioned themselves in relation to these 
dialogical themes was a way to negotiate their identity and integration in the UK. 
Becoming more ‘integrated’ into the British culture could mean becoming more open- 
minded and tolerant, but it could also constitute a threat to a person’s moral values and 
cultural identity associated with that person’s country of origin. In other words, there 
was an ‘internal negotiation’, or ‘internal dialogue’, between the two opposing themes 
within individuals (Markova, 2006). As a result, participants positioned themselves in 
multiple ways and asserted both their similarity to and their difference from Britishness.
The theme of prosperity and openness in Britain was very salient in the interviews. 
Most of the naturalised citizens stressed the importance of the economic and career 
opportunities in Britain as a main reason for having migrated to the country and also the 
idea that the UK is developed, free and safe. Britain, as part of an idealised developed 
West, became a symbol of progress, democracy and future prosperity. What is more, 
values of openness and tolerance were frequently objectified as distinctively British
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values. Consequently, reluctance to integrate into the British cultural system, attributed 
to other migrants, was viewed as a sign of closed-mindedness. On the contrary, 
openness to learning new things was one of the positive experiences that being in 
Britain could offer. The way participants positioned themselves in relation to this theme 
was dependent on how they represented their country of origin. For Participant 41, 
Britain is a space that allows for personal development. Russia, on the other hand, 
which is her country of origin, is seen as restraining and authoritarian. It is represented 
as having an almost backward mentality, whereas Britain is constructed as superior.
I think there are more opportunities to develop for one, if you want, if you 
actually want. And also, you see, you are free from the things that keep you like 
restricted in your country, the mentality of your country and the traditions 
sometimes make [it] really, really hard for your development. I feel very free 
here. And no one will say, oh, you should do this or that. Of course you have 
commitments, like professional commitments and commitments to other 
people. But, it’s not like there’s something stupid about the mentality that 
doesn't make you the thing you want [...] So, in my country, many parents are 
very authoritative. They try to push their children to the things they want. And 
that’s why I have many friends who’ve actually gone abroad or to other cities, 
yeah, because of this. (Participant 41, female, 27 years old)
Because of this openness, Britain was seen as a welcoming country by most 
interviewees. For Participant 45 below, moving to Britain was a liberating and 
empowering experience. It has allowed him to live openly as a gay man and have his 
sexual identity publicly recognised and respected. Not being recognised as a gay man 
in Syria, where he comes from, has led him to reject a Syrian identity altogether. 
Moreover, a close reading of the extract shows that Britain for him (and the West in 
general) is not only a place where he feels comfortable in because he is accepted; it 
also represents an ideal that he admires and that he wants to be affiliated with. Being 
called ‘West’ by his friends in Syria is something that he takes pride in because it shows 
that he is more similar to the British culture than the Syrian one. The extract below is 
structured around the bipolar ‘Britain/tolerance versus Syria/intolerance’: Britain’s 
freedom is constructed as the opposite of Syrian narrow-mindedness. For him, being 
Syrian is incompatible with being British as the two identities are seen as based on 
opposing values. Being Syrian means that he does not have the right to be gay, while 
the moral order of being British allows him to be homosexual. By making assertions of 
similarity towards Britishness, he is also asserting his dissimilarity from Syria. As such, 
he does not make an effort to integrate the two identities, but chooses one over the
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other. For this participant, integration is not a very complicated process; he wishes to 
fully assimilate into an idealised image of Britishness and leave his past experiences 
behind.
One of my friends used to call me ‘W est’ in Arabic, because the things I came 
up with were more Western and that’s, you know, in a nice way and I quite 
enjoyed that. So, I wasn’t fitting in there at all and I knew that, you know, this is 
more where I’m going to feel comfortable. And I’m not talking only about the 
UK, I think in any Western country I would adapt a lot quicker than I ever 
adapted in Syria. [...] When I first arrived here, I felt that I’m home. I was more 
confident, I could say what I wanted to say, not like there, you know, you have 
to think about what you say, and your friends are going to take the piss out of 
you and start laughing at you, or you’d be in trouble if you say things like that, 
the gay thing is... you would be in trouble for instance, you know? If you say,
I’m gay, it would be even double that trouble. So it was a very, very restricted, 
under-pressure life. In a way, well, I was living a double life [...] Britain gave me 
the rights that I need in my life. But, Syria didn’t give me these rights, you 
know? The way you live in Syria is forced on you. It says to you, this is you, this 
is the way, and you're gonna go this way. You don’t have a say, you can’t say 
’No’, you can’t choose another way, so it’s kind of a feeling of everything is 
forced on you, indirectly. Here I had choice. I always had a choice here to do 
whatever I want, you know? This country gave me the right as a gay man... 
(Participant 45, male, 35 years old)
However, British openness and progress were not one-dimensional values in the 
interviews. As Billig (1987) notes, for every value there is an opposing value, or even, 
the same value can have conflicting definitions. In the interviews, the other side of 
individual freedom and open-mindedness, which defined Britishness, was the lack of 
respect for traditions and communitarian values. In other words, some participants saw 
Britain as a country where individual freedom, independence and tolerance were 
counterbalanced by the lack of family, religious and moral values. It can be argued that 
participants made a distinction between political values (such as freedom and equality), 
which were seen to thrive in Britain, and moral values (such as community and 
solidarity), which were seen to be in decline in the UK but are still part of the culture of 
their country of origin. Because of this ambivalence, assertions of sameness towards 
Britishness and the desire to assimilate into the British culture were, in a way, 
counterbalanced by assertions of difference in the interviews. This depended on 
whether participants perceived a ‘cultural clash’ between Britain and their home country 
and also, on how they positioned themselves in relation to these opposing values.
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The negative aspect of British culture was commonly exemplified in the youth culture of 
the country. Interviewees discussed gangs, promiscuity, crime, drinking and disrespect 
towards elders as some of the main features of this culture. These attributes were a 
source of concern. Some participants were, for instance, reluctant to raise their children 
in the UK. Therefore, Britain and the British ‘way of life’ represented an identity threat 
for some respondents, a threat to their value system and moral integrity. Participant 36 
below responded to this by fully rejecting an English identity32. The quotation below is 
extracted from the beginning of the interview when the participant was quick to assert 
his Germaness. His total rejection of Englishness is based on a very grim view of the 
country. Englishness, he argues, is not defined by achievements which would make a 
nation proud, but by moral decline exemplified in collective alcohol abuse. In direct 
opposition to the previous participant, Britishness (or Englishness) here is not a positive 
ideal for someone to achieve, but represents moral decline which is to be avoided. 
Britishness does not pose a serious identity threat for this participant as it is fully 
rejected from the beginning. In other words, there is no negotiation of identity positions 
or a dialogue between different values. It can be said that Britain is, in a way, ‘otherised’ 
and that the boundaries between the ‘self and the ‘other’ are so clear and solid that the 
participant does not need to engage with Britishness at a deeper level.
I’m not a great fan, I live here and I enjoy it for what it is at the moment, but I’m 
not so impressed with England to be honest, I’m German [...] Different 
communities have this idea of Britain as a negative one. They say, yeah, we 
are not like the rest of this country, and also new communities, they only have a 
negative view of Britain; and it’s true, it’s true for Christians, Jews and Muslims.
Muslims are very involved in that you see in all the news etc, everyone knows 
of it. With Jews it’s exactly the same and part of the Christian community too, 
like [they say], we have nothing to do with people drinking, people having sex in 
the streets, these kind of things, that’s Britain, but that’s not us. So, Britain 
functions as a modulus idea, it functions only as a negative rather as a positive.
[...] Well, I mean, to some extend that’s how Britain portrays itself; if you see on 
TV, they show people just booze drinking and there is documentaries on 
people drinking [...] I’ve got nothing against alcohol, it’s just, it’s the culture, it is 
just combined with, like, common, experiences of alcoholism, that’s just, it’s 
pretty sad [...] that’s the only thing, you know, that really is worth mentioning 
almost, right? It’s kind of an expression of societal life... (Participant 36, male,
31 years old)
32 Many participants equated Britishness with Englishness in the interviews.
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While the above position is rather extreme, it illustrates the theme of moral decline 
which made respondents wary about Britishness. Indeed, while very few participants 
challenged the idea that Britain is a developed country with opportunities for people, 
they also emphasised moral decline as a defining feature of the West and consequently 
of Britain. Compared to the participant above, other respondents struggled more to 
negotiate their position in relation to these dialogical themes. For Participant 51 below, 
freedom in Britain is an ambivalent ideal. On the one hand, it is positive compared to 
the ‘rigidity’ of Eastern countries. But, on the other hand, it is associated with lack of 
discipline and religiosity. This lack of religiosity seems to be a significant concern for 
this participant. The fact that she has ‘become more Western’ is uttered in an almost 
apologetic manner and it is something that she tries to ‘control’. On a representational 
level, this identity threat can be dealt with through the construction of ‘bad others’ 
(Joffe, 1999, 2003, 2007; Joffe & Lee, 2004; Joffe & Staekle, 2007). Like the previous 
respondent, she constructs Britishness mainly in a negative light. The difference 
between this participant and Participant 36 above, who also constructed a very 
negative representation of Britishness, is that she considers herself British to a certain 
extent. As such, she cannot but engage with Britishness and position herself towards it. 
Because of that, she cannot just construct Britishness as a ‘bad other’ and she also 
acknowledges some negative elements of ‘Eastern’ culture (rigidity and corruption). 
Still, she is unable to accommodate the two value systems as she constructs an 
unbridgeable opposition between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’. The former is principally 
seen as ‘pure’, while the latter is mainly seen as ‘immoral’. She creates, in other words, 
a clear-cut boundary between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’. Gillespie (2008a) has described 
this mechanism of constructing rigid oppositions as a ‘semantic barrier’ that inhibits the 
dialogue between different perspectives. For this reason, Participant 51 is unable to 
accommodate her ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ selves. To put it differently, the moral order 
associated with being ‘Eastern’ clashes with the moral order of being “Western’ (Davies 
& Harre, 1990; Harre & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harre & van Langehove, 1991,1999). The 
rights and duties of each position are seen as incompatible. While her position as 
‘Eastern’ demands that she be religious and disciplined, for instance, her position as 
‘Western’ demands that she set very few limits on her individual freedom. The lack of 
dialogue between the two positions means that she has to choose one over the other. 
However, she does acknowledge that she has both ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ elements in 
her identity, which makes it harder for her to maintain her ‘Eastern purity’ and her 
distance from ‘Western values’. In the end, trying to negotiate her identity in relation to 
this ‘representational conflict’, she solves this incompatibility by distancing herself from 
both the East and the West and asserting a Muslim identity that supersedes the East-
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West binary opposition, as well as the primacy of territorialised identities over other 
group identities such as religion33.
Eastern people are very... as much as they have a lot of advantages, there are 
a lot of good sides to the way morally they behave and their way they speak 
and stuff, but at the same time they’re very rigid. And they’re very rigid and like, 
you know, for someone who’s lived here and they’re like, you know, kind of free 
[...] they will expect things from you, because I’m Iraqi and I’m supposed to be 
like them and I’m sure I wouldn’t satisfy their expectations. I’m sure they will 
expect to see you different from, like if they know that I’m gonna come there, 
they will expect someone different, someone who is Iraqi and very, you know, 
very strong Iraqi and this and that, and when they see me, I'm sure they’ll be 
like 'what the hell!’ you know, ‘you brought like a British person here’, you 
know! (laughs) [...] I know I have become very Western here. I’ve become very 
Western, I can’t deny that. But, I still obviously try to hold on to the Eastern. I 
mean, it’s not about an East and Western thing, you know. The Western way of 
life has affected me. But, I’m trying to control it. Recently I have tried to put 
more limits, trying to become more religious. So just to ... because the Western 
way of life can really make you think outside your religion. Hence, all these 
problems with Muslims and stuff they’re having. So, I’m not saying that they 
have, they have a lot of problems in the East anyway there, they’re so corrupt 
there, but it’s like, but the Western way of life, the freedom and the ideas they 
give you can really affect you. So, I can say to a certain extent, yeah, I’m a 
Westerner but... [...] what I’m trying to understand, like explain to myself like, 
does it make a difference?, I mean if I’m trying to be, you know, I’m trying to be 
myself you know, I’m just trying to be myself, I don’t want to identify, say I’m an 
Easterner or a Westerner, I’m just trying to be myself, I’m trying to, God help 
me, just be a better Muslim... (Participant 51, female, 21 years old)
Tensions between opposing themes, like the dilemma between openness and moral 
decline, are the basis for the development of argumentation. Drawing on opposing 
ideas, individuals can argue in different and conflicting directions; this provides the 
impetus for dialogue and creative thinking. This is exemplified in the extract below. This 
participant is negotiating the tension between two conflicting values: women’s rights to 
behave as they wish, and setting limits to women’s ’inappropriate’ behaviour. She starts 
off by arguing that youngsters in the UK are not controlled by their parents as much as
33 Other participants also challenged national identities and nation-state boundaries as arbitrary 
by asserting de-territorialised and transnational identities. More commonly, London identities 
were asserted by these respondents. Being a Londoner was seen as an international and open 
identity which is not part of Britishness, but rather, constitutes a ’glocal’ identity that transcends 
national boundaries (Sassen, 2000).
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they should be. She then tells a story about a girl who was murdered waiting for the bus 
late at night. Throughout this extract, the participant constructs opposing arguments 
drawing on two different discourses. On the one hand, she blames the girl for being out 
at that time, and thus not having had enough control by her parents, but on the other 
hand, she draws on a gender equality discourse and argues for women’s right to 
behave as men would. But, neither of the two sits very easily with her. She is against 
gender inequality, but also against lack of discipline by women. She negotiates her 
position by trying to find some common ground between individual freedom and 
discipline. Using the need to protect women, as a vulnerable population, as an 
argument, she is able to accommodate the two opposing values.
A lot of youngsters [in Britain] they get to know only one thing; they want to go 
out at night. When I had that need back home, I had it yes, when I was a 
teenager, you know, I wanted to go out. Yeah, you wanted to go and you have 
to socialise, that’s part of life, you have to allow them to go, but, at the same 
time, parents, they see whether that’s a good place for them to go or not. [...]
[My parents] could just go and drop me in and then they come pick me up after 
the party. They try to protect you, I would say. They don’t want to leave room 
for anything bad to happen. Now, here, yes, parents will go and drop them and 
pick them. I think, in most cases, children, they are very arrogant and very 
aggressive, I would say. Because sometimes parents can’t control them [...] If 
you’re at the wrong place, at the wrong time, that’s what my husband says, 
wrong place, wrong time, you can get attacked. You don’t have to provoke 
anyone, you can just walk down the road, maybe you’re going somewhere, but 
things can happen.[...] I heard somewhere that a girl around 1.15 at night, who 
was trying to catch a bus, I don’t know maybe it was an emergency or what, I 
don’t know [for being out this late]. That’s what I mean, I have to respect her for 
what she did. A man drugged her into a car park and then he killed her. So, 
what I'm saying is, it must have been an emergency that she had to go 
somewhere, I don’t know. But, when you do things like that, if you stand at the 
bus stop, at that time of night all alone, you’re looking for things. Don’t you think 
so? But, as a woman you must have the freedom to go out at night and then do 
what we like or go wherever we want. That should be the culture, but it is not 
so. Because it is not so, we have to take extra precaution steps so as not to 
leave room for it. (Participant 27, female, 26 years old)
Overall, while some participants felt comfortable with what they perceived to be the 
mainstream value system of Britain, others faced dilemmas about howto accommodate 
different cultural values. This tension is indicative of the dilemmatic representation of
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British culture: at the one pole, there is freedom and openness and, at the other pole, 
there is a lack of moral values and lack of respect for tradition. The two themes that 
structure the representation of Britain are like figure and ground; they are 
interdependent (Markova, 2003a). Individual freedom, for instance, can be construed 
both as a positive value, associated with tolerance, but also as a negative one, 
associated with lack of discipline. Becoming ‘more British’ can, thus, provide a sense of 
empowerment (by becoming part of a developed country) and enrichment for the self 
(by becoming more open-minded and tolerant), but it can also signify loss and threat to 
someone’s religious and/or cultural identity.
Generally, participants drew on both themes of the representations of Britishness to 
negotiate their position towards British culture. Some participants seemed to give more 
prominence to the positive pole and, thus, felt that they fitted well in the UK; for others, 
the negative pole was more salient making Britishness an unappealing identity. Others 
perceived an incompatible tension between different values and, having adopted 
cultural elements from both Britain and their country of origin, felt ‘torn’ between two 
opposing cultural systems. For these participants, identity was a more strenuous and 
reflexive project. Therefore, the ‘rupture’ of identity that participants experienced was 
not only dependent on how deep they perceived the 'cultural clash’ between the UK 
and their countries of origin to be. Rather, it was the level of engagement with both 
cultures and the stakes involved that determined how participants argued about their 
integration in the UK. Integration is, therefore, a much more complex process than it is 
commonly perceived to be. Since Britain is represented in a dilemmatic way, 
incorporating interdependent opposing themes, integration requires much more than 
holding on to the ‘best of both worlds’. It requires employing narratives of both 
sameness and difference (see also Nagel, 2002). It demands an elaborate negotiation 
between opposing values, such as individual freedom and values of family, and 
community. By doing this, new citizens negotiate not only their position within British 
culture, but also their relationship with their countries of origin.
But immigration is not only a matter of accommodating novel ways of thinking; it is also 
a process of being positioned within a new system of social relations. In this case, 
representations of immigration and Britishness play a central role as they mediate the
140
relation between the native or British-born population and the migrants or naturalised 
citizens34.
6.2.3 Representational constraints on identity: Discourses of Britishness and 
immigration
Social representations are not easily malleable as they often comprise taken-for- 
granted assumptions and deeply held beliefs which permeate human behaviour and 
social institutions. This prescriptive nature of social knowledge creates ‘inertia’ in the 
social positions that people adopt (Duveen, 1993). In other words, social 
representations, by shaping patterns of interaction between individuals and groups, 
pose constraints upon the types of social positions that are available to people. Drawing 
on the power of history and long-established social structures, this inertia hinders 
change and resistance.
The ethnic conceptualisation of nations is a long-lasting representation, originating in 
the myths of origin that modern nation-states have used to turn pre-modem 
collectivities into nations (see Chapter 1). Billig (1995), indeed, argues that it has 
become ‘banal’ to think of the world in terms of clearly distinguishable nations. This 
unambiguous demarcation between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ essentialises the 
differences between the two. Essentialising representations define social relations 
(Wagner, Holtz, & Kashima, 2009) and pose constraints on which positions can be 
taken on by individuals of various ethno-cultural backgrounds (Duveen, 1993, 2001). 
We can further conceptualise the ‘insider-outsider’ distinction as a continuum which 
contains a range of positions that one can occupy in between the two poles. This 
section will show that, although being British and being an immigrant are constructed as 
opposites, drawing on the us/them thema (Markova, 2003a), some types of migrants 
are seen as ‘more similar’ or prototypical in relation to Britishness than others. This is 
exemplified in the migrants’ symbolic right to make claims of similarity towards 
Britishness. Representations of race, ethnicity and cultural difference mediate this 
process. It follows that in order for a naturalised citizen to negotiate his or her position 
towards Britishness, he or must also negotiate his or her position towards 
representations of immigration.
34 Whereas naturalised citizens are not formally immigrants, they are still predominantly seen 
through the lens of representations of immigration, as was shown in the analysis of interviews 
with citizenship officers (see previous chapter). Furthermore, as will be shown in this chapter, 
most participants were reluctant to label themselves as British, which illustrates that 'becoming 
British’ is a more complex process than acquiring the citizenship.
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Concerning Britishness, it was predominantly represented in the interviews in ethnic 
and racial terms, which made it inaccessible for new citizens. Respondents differed in 
how much they drew on this ethnic representation of nations, but, for most of them, 
being part of the British nation meant being ethnically British. Thus, participants defined 
themselves primarily by their country of origin. It seems that for the participants 
‘identity-proper’ was ethnic, as the boundaries between nations were seen as relatively 
impermeable. Therefore, becoming part of British society and feeling at home in Britain 
did not make participants feel part of the nation. Even when participants spoke about 
the impact that living in Britain has had on them, they did not position themselves as 
British. Most of them overtly rejected this idea, while only a small minority of 
participants (mainly the ones who had grown up in Britain) considered themselves 
British. It was also common that when participants called themselves British, this was 
qualified by a statement of their ethnic origin, for example being British-Albanian. This is 
similar to the discourse of citizenship officers who argued that Britishness is a tolerant 
rather than a plural identity, so that ‘other’ cultures were ultimately constructed as 
external to it, rather than as part of it (see Chapter 5).
In line with this representation, becoming British ‘by name’, that is, acquiring the 
citizenship, was generally distinguished from being ‘really British’. However, living in 
Britain for some time made participants feel that they were becoming increasingly more 
‘acculturated’ in the UK. Some participants, therefore, discussed Britishness as 
something that can potentially be learnt. In that case, becoming ‘acculturated’ into the 
customs of the country makes someone increasingly ‘more British’. In the following 
extract, Britishness is seen as an identity that one can actually take on later in life. 
Although it is still conceived in ethno-cultural terms (as a set of cultural habits, like 
having carpet throughout one’s home), it is not a fully essentialised identity, but is 
accessible through a learning process. Importantly, what makes this participant British 
is not only learning the customs and assimilating into the culture, but also the social 
recognition that she receives from friends and colleagues.
I would probably [describe myself as British], because I grew up and matured 
here, I lived in Belgrade and I went to school in Belgrade and I started to learn 
about life in Belgrade, but I think that I became who I am here. And I don’t think 
that anything that I learned here in English I could have then transposed back, 
like for example, living in Belgrade again. I could certainly not speak to you in 
scientific terms, in life science terms, in any other language but in English, 
because this is where I learned it and it’s all I know. I’d say that, yes, I do feel 
British and probably my friends and colleagues think more, or think, or see me
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as British more than I see myself. I think it is the behaviour and living and the 
lifestyle that I adopted, and certainly in appearance I don’t look like a Brit 
(laughs) and I never will (laughs), which is good, but it’s just, the habits I think, 
have almost, you know, I’m integrated into my everyday living and going into 
work and being with my colleagues and in terms of writing and using 
punctuation marks even when I write, it is... not quite the lifestyle, but, yes, it’s 
almost as... even my flat is carpeted throughout (laughs) which is horrible, oh 
my God, fit from wall to wall. And, so they probably see me [as British] more 
than I do, but I just, I think I just went with the flow, I didn’t notice the transition 
from one to the other, if there is a transition. (Participant 23, female, 37 years 
old)
The above extract, however, alludes to the fact that learning the culture may not be 
enough for someone to become ‘fully British’; being ethnically similar does play a part 
as well (“in my appearance I don’t look like a Brit”). An assumption permeating the 
interviews was that being considered culturally and ethnically similar (white European, 
American or Australian, for instance) positions someone ‘closer’ to Britishness. This 
positioning draws on representations of Britishness as an ethno-cultural identity and on 
associated constructions of difference exemplified in representations of immigration. 
The moral order of this positioning has to do with entitlements of making claims of 
similarity towards Britishness. Participant 49, coming from Lebanon, would not define 
himself as English. He thinks that this would be absurd and would not make sense to 
other people. The ethnic representation of Britishness, equated with Englishness in this 
extract, positions him as fundamentally different such that his identity cannot be altered. 
Here, Britishness is not something that one can become but something that one is (this 
point will be further elaborated in section 6.3.1, p. 146). In other words, his position 
does not allow him to make similarity claims towards Britishness. On the other hand, 
Participant 34, a white naturalised citizen originating in the U.S.A., seems to have more 
rights towards this form of symbolic inclusion. These contradictory views are evident in 
the following quotes:
This is strange, like, you’re English now, you know? But you are not. You are 
not looking English. Your language is not English. Your accent, I mean, you 
speak your English, but if someone asks you, you know, where you’re from, if 
you say ‘English’, I see myself [like] I’m silly, you know? The other one will start 
to think, ‘oh, my God, he:s very stupid’. He thinks I’m stupid believing I’m 
English; [he will think] he’s not, he’s looking fucking Arabic or Spanish or Italian. 
(Participant 49, male, 25 years old)
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I’m comfortable [in the UK] and it’s also a place that, because of my 
background, I am quite safe. So, I’m not black. You know, or, you know, or in 
France I’m not Arab, I’m, you know, I’m safe. You know, as I’m not in a position 
where I’m going to be excluded. (Participant 34, female, 37 years old)
These different positionings mark the distinction between elite and non-elite migrants, 
which will be further elaborated later in this chapter. The former are objectified in the 
image of the white, Western and skilled migrant, while the latter are objectified in the 
image of the poor migrant or asylum seeker who comes from a developing country.
This distinction between different types of migrants and the viability of their claims to 
similarity was most evident in the ways participants talked about issues of integration 
and immigration. While immigration and integration have been linked together in the 
current political discourse on social cohesion, some of the participants positioned 
themselves outside the scope of this debate. They did not consider themselves 
immigrants, nor did they think that integration debates in Britain concerned them in any 
way. This suggests that they saw themselves as similar while positioning other migrants 
as different. The following extract by Participant 37 is an argument in favour of making 
the naturalisation process more accessible to the 'people for whom it has been 
designed’. The Bangladeshi woman without personal income and with poor IT skills 
exemplifies the objectification of this group of people. It is implied that these people 
constitute the epitome of the immigrant, or, to put it differently they constitute the 
prototype of this category (Rosch, 1978). Thus, the participant is also implicitly arguing 
about the definition of the immigrant category by arguing about which types of people 
constitute its prototype and which elements make up its essential, defining features 
(Billig, 1987). Immigrants here epitomise difference on several levels: they are 
underprivileged, in economic and educational terms, and are also culturally different. At 
the same time, Participant 37 positions herself as ‘hardly an immigrant’ because, as an 
American, she can easily ‘relate’ to the English. As in the interviews with citizenship 
officers, immigrants are constructed here as people who lack resources and are in need 
of British hospitality. Although they are more in need, it is implied that they are less able 
to integrate because of their cultural difference.
P37: I mean, I think there are two things I would say. One is, who is this 
process directed towards? Is it directed towards people who have lived here for 
a long time however they first came here?
E: Such as yourself?
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P37: Well, not particularly myself because it’s easy for me, I mean I’m very 
hugely integrated, I mean I’m hardly an immigrant, partly because that’s just the 
way Americans and the English relate, I’m thinking about the Bangladeshi 
woman who’s been living in East London for ten years, whose husband was 
British but she wasn’t and she’s here by right of his passport, not her own. And 
she, quite reasonably, lives here, wishes to become a UK citizen and I can’t 
see how this process [naturalisation] is for her, but it should be. I think there’s 
sort of lack of cultural sensitivity, if you like, from people who are coming from 
different cultures. Different IT levels of awareness for example. I think the cost 
of it is prohibiting for some groups, not short of a thousand quid, to get your 
nationality and a passport. I think some people would argue, well people 
receive a lot of benefits by coming here and this is a bit of payback for them. I 
just think the process is very expensive and I think it disfranchises people for 
whom this process might have been designed. (Participant 37, female, 58 
years old)
In the interviews, the epitome of the immigrant, the immigrant par excellence, emerged 
as the disadvantaged asylum seeker who has difficulty integrating. Being an immigrant 
was constructed in opposition to being British, because the image of the immigrant was 
tantamount to the image of difference. Having lived in the UK for many years, some 
respondents did not want to be categorised as immigrants; they negotiated their 
position within this representational field. This is exemplified by one of the participants 
who was born in China but has lived in the UK since she was very young. The 
participant defined herself predominantly as British even before acquiring the British 
citizenship. However, it has been a struggle for her to be accepted as British. In the 
extract that follows she describes her experience of being excluded from the definition 
of Britishness and her efforts to be recognised.
I mean, my old name, previous name was [...], it’s a lovely name in Chinese, 
but it doesn’t work in English. It’s not feminine, it’s not elegant, it’s different from 
others. Then I thought, I think I have to change it just for the sake of getting 
good jobs. And also I did study in A-level as well, there was a study on 
discrimination. So there’s two CVs, same education, and there’s one called, for 
example, Mohamed Abudu or something and the other one is John Smith, for 
example. And then, see the management, they would select John Smith rather 
than Mohamed Abudu or something, which is because of the name and your 
ethnicity. And I think, if I apply for a British passport and change my name, it 
would be easier for me. But then in a way, I still feel I’m British, but people don’t 
accept it in that aspect. (Participant 50, female, 20 years old)
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Comparing herself to the ‘norm’ this participant ‘lacks’ Britishness because she has 
Chinese heritage. She is being positioned as ‘other’ by representations that define 
Britishness as an ethnic identity. The ethnic representations of Britishness do notallow 
her to position herself as ‘fully British’; in other words, this identity position does not 
seem to be available to her (‘I still feel I’m British, but people don’t accept it in that 
aspect’). The participant experiences this as a form of exclusion and in order to be 
included, to be recognised as British, she changed her name and applied for British 
citizenship -  a strategy that social identity theorists have termed ‘social mobility’ (Tajfel, 
1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In making efforts to become ‘more British’, she is in a way 
‘acting through’ the dichotomising and exclusionary representations of Britishness.
In the following quotation, the same participant argues that she ‘feels like an outsider’ 
because representations of Britishness and immigration, as well as the institutionalised 
practices of naturalisation, position her in the same group as immigrants. This is again 
an instance of misrecognition. The social representations of Britishness that position 
her as ‘other’ are still at play here. However, in line with Duveen’s (1993) framework, 
the assimilatory ethnic representation of Britishness constructs a range of identity 
positions that can potentially be taken on depending on the ethnic background and level 
of assimilation of migrants. Thus, although the ethnic representation of Britishness 
poses significant constraints on her position towards Britishness, it still leaves room for 
negotiation of her inclusion. The participant does not challenge the ethnic 
representation of Britishness per se, but in order to negotiate her position in Britain, she 
discusses the moral order of the naturalised citizen position (see also Andreouli, 2010). 
Like other new citizens who were interviewed, she draws on representations of 
immigrants as ungrateful abusers of the immigration system to de-legitimise other 
migrants, while asserting her own entitlement towards Britishness. In other words, by 
using the ‘bad immigrant’ category, which was substantially employed by citizenship 
officers (see Chapter 5), and distancing herself from it, she is able to position herself as 
similar to Britishness. In the following extract, she draws a line between assimilated 
naturalised citizens like herself (who are ‘as good as British’) and non-assimilated, 
exploitative new citizens (who deserve neither Britishness nor British citizenship).
It shouldn’t be tougher for me because I was growing up here. It’s like my own 
country, I have to go through the same process as other people [...] This is my 
country. I think it’s my country, you know? It’s not fair! Why should I be tested?
I know all the norms and values. You know, you don’t have to be tested to 
prove you can be the citizen. To myself without the passport or with it, it doesn’t 
make a difference. You know? I belong here. That’s what I feel like, that’s what
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I believe. [...] I can understand it. It’s for the security reasons. You know? They 
want to limit the immigration numbers because they have too many foreigners 
[...] In the nationalisation the other day, I felt I’m an outsider. I don’t know, it’s a 
strange feeling, it’s like looking at those people in the ceremony, I feel, hold on 
a minute, I’m a British no matter if I’m applying for it, I’m British, it won’t make a 
difference [...] I think in English, I speak English, you know, but then, I’m not 
against those people, but I think they have got, not that we don’t have the same 
norms and values... I don’t know, if you’re looking at them, you think, do they 
actually deserve to be a British citizen? [...] [In order to be British] you have to 
follow the rules and, you know, the traditional views of this country. But, then 
those people don’t actually communicate with you, that’s the reason. I may just 
be judgmental, I don’t know. [...] I heard stories, but I don’t know if they're true 
or not. It’s like the test they pay for the people working in the centres, so if 
they’re same race and then they roughly look the same and they pay you like 
300 pounds for those people to do it for you. (Participant 50, female, 20 years 
old)
Overall, naturalised citizens employed similar representations of immigration as the 
citizenship officers. As shown in this section, they made reference to both ‘good 
immigrants’ who are in need, and ‘bad immigrants’ who take advantage of British 
hospitality. Compared to citizenship officers, however, this distinction was not as central 
in their accounts. Nevertheless, the image of the ‘bad immigrant’ served to highlight 
participants’ commitment to Britain and, consequently, their entitlement to stay in the 
country and naturalise. On the other hand, the representation of the ‘good immigrant’ 
allowed participants to position themselves as more privileged and ‘more British’35.
Representations of immigration, therefore, contain constructions of ethno-cultural 
similarity and difference. These representations, as well as ethnic representations of 
Britishness posed constraints on the level of belonging that participants were able to 
claim in the UK. But, this ‘moral order’ can also be contested. As the last extract shows, 
the definition of categories is never settled; people can re-negotiate their position by 
arguing about the definition of categories.
35 This latter position resonates with what can be called the position of the 'elite migrant’, who 
originates in a developed country and is seen as being easily integrated and having skills which 
allow him/her to contribute to the economy. This is the type of migrant who is also easily allowed 
entry into the UK in the first place (see section 6.3.2, p. 152).
147
6.3 Positioning and immigration management
6.3.1 Earning citizenship: On ‘being’ and ‘having’
As with citizenship officers, the discourse of earned citizenship was also employed by 
naturalised citizens. Participants argued that making a contribution (to the economy 
mainly, but also in other spheres of life) was an important criterion for being entitled to 
become British. Although, on the surface, earned citizenship seems to be based on a 
civic conceptualisation of national belonging, as it defines membership on the basis of 
participation, it is not completely detached from an ethnic conceptualisation of the 
British nation. On the contrary, it perpetuates a system of ‘inherited inequality’ 
(Shachar, 2007), because it is grounded in the idea that people who do not have a 
birthright to British citizenship should be treated differently than people who do.
Within the earned citizenship storyline, employed by both public policy and lay people, 
contribution to the economy serves, in a way, as a compensation for not being British 
by birth or by origin. This is the reason why earned citizenship places the assessment 
of migrants’ contribution in the heart of the system. The emphasis on assessment of 
contribution, embedded in the earned citizenship process, was seen in two different 
ways in the interviews. Some new citizens saw naturalisation as recognition of their 
contribution to the country which allowed them to further participate in the society. 
However, the scrutiny embedded in the process was seen by other participants as 
something which questioned what they took for granted: that they were already part of 
the society and that they had been contributing to the economy. On the one hand, the 
emphasis on assessment suggests that citizenship is an achievement (like passing a 
very difficult exam); while on the other hand, it is based on a priori mistrust, on the 
assumption that migrants need to be scrutinised.
Furthermore, earned citizenship draws on a discourse of hospitality which defines the 
relation of the British nation (‘hosts’) with the migrants (‘guests’). These relations of 
hospitality between Britain and migrants are based on a reciprocity norm which 
suggests that migrants pay something back in return for what Britain offers them. As the 
analysis of the interviews with citizenship officers has shown, earning citizenship 
through contribution is seen not only as a benefit to the country but also as a sign of 
gratitude on the part of migrants. This idea draws on the ethnic representation of 
nations and the notion that the political community is aligned with the national 
community. When the naturalisation process unsettles this alignment, a balance is re­
established through a ‘give-and-take’ process.
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The distinction between the birthright and the earned right of citizenship is key in 
understanding the discourses of naturalised citizens. This distinction is exemplified in 
the quotation below. Participant 38 argues that in order to earn the right to citizenship, 
or even stay in the country, one has to contribute to the economy. Moreover, the 
participant argues that not being born in the country disqualifies someone from having a 
say regarding who has the right to stay in the country and who does not (“It’s not your 
right to say, I suppose if you’re not born here”). On the other hand, however, she also 
argues that making a contribution entitles someone to stay in the UK. In other words, 
within the earned citizenship discourse, there is an asymmetry between British-born 
citizens, whose entitlements are unquestioned, and migrants, whose contribution has to 
be assessed in order to become British. Contribution to the economy is, thus, 
reparation for not being from the UK.
I don’t think it’s unfair to expect people to do the test, I think thirty-five, or thirty- 
four pounds, whatever it is, is quite expensive. But, you know, the whole 
process is ridiculously expensive. But then, you know, it’s, I suppose you’re 
paying your right to ... [ . . . ]  I think that, well, I think if you’ve been living here for 
a few years and you’ve kind of done your time then you, say you have earned 
the right to stay [...] I don’t know, I think as in any country, if you are living 
there, if you’re contributing, if you’re, you know, then yeah, I suppose you do 
[have the right to stay]. Maybe not. It’s not your right to say, I suppose if you’re 
not born here, but then if you have made you contribution and then, yeah, I 
suppose it is... (Participant 38, female, 32 years old)
This distinction between British-born or native British citizens and naturalised British 
citizens suggests that the earned citizenship discourse is permeated by an 
essentialistic view of national identity. It can further be argued that this discourse draws 
on a deeply held distinction between ‘being’ and ‘having’ as two different modes of 
identity. Identity can be something that one ‘is’.essentially, or it can be something that 
one ‘obtains’ but can never fully become part of one’s being. Erick Fromm’s (1997) 
analysis of this distinction, albeit within a different framework36, is useful here. For 
Fromm, ‘being’ and ‘having’ are two distinct modes of existence, two different ways of 
relating to the world. The former is an ‘authentic’, even ‘natural’, way of existing in the 
world, while the latter is a form of owning rather than a ‘real’ or essential identity. 
Applying this to citizenship, it can be argued that being British by origin makes
36 Fromm’s book is a critique of capitalism and consumerism which are driven by the unauthentic 
‘having’ mode.
149
someone ‘really British’, while obtaining the British citizenship is not seen as an 
‘authentic’ identity but only as a possession.
It follows that what one has can be lost, and is thus ephemeral, while what one is 
provides a stable core identity that cannot, by definition, be removed or changed. 
Therefore, the two modes of existence offer different levels of security to the individual: 
“The anxiety and insecurity engendered by the danger of losing what one has are 
absent in the being mode. If I am who I am and not what I have, nobody can deprive 
me or threaten my security and my sense of identity... the danger of losing is inherent 
in having” (Fromm, 1997, p. 90, emphasis in original). Such feelings of insecurity were 
expressed in the interviews with naturalised citizens especially when they described 
their immigration histories. The position of the immigrant is deeply precarious as 
migrants are commonly unwanted, or at least, potentially unwanted. The extract below 
illustrates this position. Participant 22, by being ‘well-behaved’ and playing by the rules, 
tries to make sure that his right to be in the country will not be taken away from him.
...You should understand this, as long as you are in this country [and] you stay 
off crime, then you’re fine. And as long as you’re in crime then it’s hard for you 
to become a British, so and I’m the kind of person [that] I'm not, I’m never found 
around crime, crime scene. I don’t want to be found and I don’t want to get 
myself involved into any of that. So, I knew I was gonna get accepted [as a 
citizen] cos I’ve never done anything wrong in this country. I always make sure 
I never get myself involved into any trouble and I always advise my own family, 
my little family, my wife and kids, that they always have to stay away from 
trouble in this place. The minute you get yourself into trouble, they’ve messed 
up your whole life. So, I know that for sure. [...] The most important thing is you 
shouldn’t have a criminal record. Once you have a criminal record it’s over... 
(Participant 22, male, 23 years old)
Owing to this insecurity on the part of migrants, the process of acquiring citizenship was 
an effort to secure their presence in the UK. Participants were, in fact, aware of the 
increasingly stricter immigration controls which, they thought, could in the future 
threaten their residency status in the UK. In other words, they saw themselves as 
(potentially) unwanted. Citizenship was a way to solidify their right to be in Britain, as 
Participant 31 below explains. Acquiring the ‘right to be here’ was mentioned by many 
participants as a principal reason for applying for naturalisation. Gillbertson and Singer 
(2003) refer to this as ‘protective citizenship’ because it serves to protect migrants’ right 
to stay in the country (see also Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2006, for similar findings in 
Germany and U.S.A.). Citizenship in this case signifies a positioning shift from an
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unwanted resident to a legitimate and entitled one who has an irrevocable ‘right to be 
here’.
I think, probably [I applied for citizenship] just cos I can. I mean, I know that 
sounds a bit silly, given that it costs so much (laughs), but what I had in mind 
was, I live here and I need to live here and I can currently live here on what I’ve 
got, but you never know what’s going to happen in the future, you know, if 
some really right wing government gets in and starts making different rules, you 
know, it would be better to just get it, while I can... (Participant 31, female, 36 
years old)
It could be argued that naturalisation (as implied by the term itself) is a process of 
moving from a state of ‘having’ to a state of ‘being’. However, as shown in the previous 
section, the ethnic representation of Britishness means that naturalised citizens are 
distinguished from native or British-born citizens. Indeed, a small minority of 
participants did not see their place in the UK as completely secure even after 
naturalisation. Participant 49 below, a former asylum seeker, expressed, during the 
interview, his appreciation for being in the UK and being protected by the British state. 
British citizenship gave him security and optimism for the future. However, in the extract 
below, he argues that his citizenship can be easily revoked because ‘they gave it to him 
and they can take it back’. This quotation exemplifies the distinction between ‘being’ 
and ‘having’; the former is part of who we are, while the latter is given and, thus, can 
also be taken away from us. Consequently, being British by naturalisation is only a 
‘paper’; it makes someone 'British by name’ only.
P49: [I plan to stay in the country] if they accept me to stay here.
E: You are a British citizen now.
P49: Yeah, but, you know, they give to me, they can take it back.
E: Do you think they might do that?
P49: Why not? [...] I always ask myself. OK, they give to me this paper to 
protect me, I appreciate that, but anytime they can take it back. But, I’m not 
going to do anything dirty, like crime or something. (Participant 49, male, 25 
years old)
It follows that naturalised citizens, to a certain extent, still saw themselves as migrants 
or ‘foreigners’, albeit with more rights to be in the UK37. The move from ‘non-British’ to 
‘British’, as well as the move from ‘migrant’ to ‘citizen’, is not a straightforward transition
37 Citizenship officers also approached naturalised citizens through representations of 
immigration (see Chapter 5).
151
of acquiring one’s citizenship certificate; it is also mediated by representations of 
similarity and difference. Furthermore, migrants are not a uniform category. Different 
types of migrants have different rights and positions in the UK. In this regard, it will be 
shown in the following section that the distinction between elite and non-elite migrants 
is a fundamental one and that this positioning is associated with representations of the 
‘West’ and its relation with the ‘Rest’.
6.3.2 The ‘West’and the ‘Rest’: The meaning of British citizenship in the context 
of a hierarchical system of nation-states
Processes of inclusion and exclusion do not only operate on the symbolic level of 
constructions of similarity and difference. When it comes to immigration, managing 
otherness is also an institutionalised process which takes the form of various space 
management techniques. The symbolic aspect of boundary construction has to do with 
discourses of fitting in which demarcate ‘who belongs where’. Physical borders, taking 
the form of immigration controls and visa requirements, regulate formal inclusion and 
exclusion by defining entitlements and rights of access. As Dixon and Durrheim (2000) 
argue, ‘who am I’ is often equivalent to 'where am I’. In the interviews, where one is and 
where one can enter were salient markers of classification. Indeed, through 
differentiated visa requirements, immigration controls take partin a positioning process 
by making a clear distinction between welcomed (and trusted) and non-welcomed (and 
mistrusted) migrants. The former have the right to travel while the latter are forced to be 
immobile. Within this context, the most salient aspect of citizenship in the interviews 
with naturalised citizens was acquiring the British passport which gives rights of free 
movement.
Almost all the participants in this study referred to the passport as one, or often the 
principal, reason that made them decide to naturalise. On a superficial level, this 
appears to be an instrumental use of citizenship. Certainly, many participants made a 
distinction between the passport as a practical issue and as an official top-down 
identification, and their everyday lives and identities. However, although the practical 
advantages of naturalisation in terms of the right to travel freely within the European 
Union and elsewhere were prevalent, the passport was not just a practical matter. It 
also acquired a symbolic significance in the interviews. It represented freedom of 
mobility and accessibility. As Bauman argues, “freedom has come to mean above all 
freedom of choice, and choice has acquired, conspicuously, a spatial dimension” (1998,
p. 121).
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Many of the participants of this study had been forced to be immobile and had 
encountered difficulties passing through immigration controls. This was construed as a 
devaluing and exclusionary experience for most interviewees. The very practice of 
going through immigration controls and visa applications positioned them as ‘others’ to 
the West. It was also a widely held view among the interviewees that the UK is 
becoming increasingly stricter on immigration. In fact, participants were familiar with the 
storyline that migrants move to Britain to abuse the welfare state -  a storyline that was 
adopted by citizenship officers (see previous chapter). Within this narrative, migrants 
are positioned as ‘unwanted guests’ and as a burden to the economy. The following 
quotation shows how space management, as practised by immigration controls, creates 
a dichotomy between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’ and also between wanted and unwanted 
migrants, keeping ‘others’ spatially confined.
If you’re carrying a Syrian passport, you’re a young man, and you wanna go to 
Europe or States or Australia, Canada, whichever Western country, they will 
reject you because they know most likely you go and won’t come back. And 
obviously Western countries they don’t want that. They don’t want people, you 
know, they have to have strict rules to keep you away from them and that’s, I 
think that’s a normal thing to do but, at the same time, it’s not that fair, but 
understandable. That the Western countries they have certain rules to... 
because when you arrive here, you know, there’s lots of people arriving in this 
country, lots of migrants and, you know, they have problems with the migrants, 
you know, no integration, and, you know, people come and ask for benefits. 
(Participant 45, male, 35 years old)
In light of this, the passport signified a new position associated with a new set of rights. 
More than inclusion in the British society, the passport symbolised a broader type of 
‘inter-national inclusion’, which expands beyond national borders and allows for inter­
national mobility. The passport marked a positioning shift from an unwanted migrant to 
a welcomed traveller (see Brettell, 2006, for similar findings among U.S. migrants). It 
represented social recognition and a ‘status upgrade’ in the global class hierarchy that 
is increasingly based on the criterion of mobility and rights of access38.
38 Indeed, some scholars see free movement as a basic right and the restriction of movement 
as diminishing a person’s freedom (Bauman, 1998; Torresi, 2010; van Houtum & van Naerssen, 
2002) and as a form of entrapment (Jansen, 2009), or even a new form of ‘transnational racism’ 
(Castles, 2005). Mobility has also been described as an essential feature of human life: “Human 
beings are, as the old definition goes, featherless bipeds -  that is, creatures whose form of life is 
in part constituted by the ability to move from place to place in a certain characteristic way, not 
only through the aid of tools that we have made but with our very own bodies. Human beings 
like moving about and dislike being deprived of mobility. An anthropomorphic being who, without
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In the beginning I only had two wishes which were: one, to speak English 
fluently to the level of the native speaker and the other one was to have a 
British passport. Form e it was like a symbol of freedom [...] I mean Russia and 
Belarus particularly are quite poor countries and after the Soviet Union 
collapsed, there was this whole Western and American way kind of penetrating 
the country [...] the Western values became very prominent and I guess one of 
the values is that, you know, you see these people who travel from one place to 
another which was impossible for most of the people. Like my dad, he’s never 
been abroad. The Soviet Union has been completely cut off, so going to 
Europe was, is such a big thing. [...] When you can’t have it and you really 
want it and I can’t say that I wanted the lifestyle, but I didn’t see why if I wanted 
I don’t have an option of doing it, because to go anywhere you need to get a 
visa and that’s what killed me. (Participant 44, female, 28 years old)
Furthermore, the UK, as part of the West, was seen in the interviews through an 
imagery of progress and opportunity; it was seen as a place of prosperity and 
advancement, as well as a secure place for those fleeing prosecution. Having access to 
it meant that one has access to all the benefits that this world can offer. As such, for 
some interviewees, holding the British passport was a matter of pride, a personal 
achievement owing to becoming part of an ‘elite Western club’.
You have to apply for the visa and once you apply for the visa it's like people 
will do the check on you. Because, obviously, it’s just a routine check but 
they’re showing that like, you know, there’s no trust in it. But, if you hold the 
British passport, they say OK, they are fine [because] the British people, they’re 
not going to do anything bad to the country or they’re not going to settle here 
for like whatever. So, they’re free to travel, whenever they want it. So, I think it’s 
a privilege. (Participant 35, male, 26 years old)
When I came out of the ceremony, there was a feeling of relief, because 
becoming a British citizen makes your life easier. If you go to any country, any 
other country and they ask you where you’re from, [and you say] British citizen, 
it’s like they give you more respect, I don’t understand why, but they just give 
you more respect... (Participant 52, male, 18 years old)
But, while some people are forced to be immobile, others are free to travel, since the 
right to mobility is selectively granted to certain types of migrants. The permeability of 
national borders is dependent upon various classification criteria (such as being an EU
disability, chose never to move from birth to death would be hard to view as human” (Nussbaum, 
1992, p. 218).
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citizen and being a skilled or unskilled worker), which create a set of categories of 
different migrants based on their (un-)desirability. Above all, rights to mobility are based 
on the quality of relationships between different nation-states. Not being able to enter a 
country suggests that one is a priori mistrusted, while being allowed entry means that 
one is a priori trusted. It can, thus, be argued that nowadays the passport has become 
the objectification of inter-national relations.
Thus, the status of British citizenship in the eyes of the respondents depended on 
where participants came from and on how they compared their previous position to their 
new one. While for some participants, the British citizenship and the passport were 
symbols of freedom, safety and opportunity, for others they were only a matter of 
convenience. In the following extract, the respondent compares himself with other 
migrants who, he argues, appreciate citizenship more. This links back to the ‘prototype’ 
immigrant, exemplified in the image of the asylum seeker, as a poor, uneducated 
person in need of Britain’s philanthropy (see section 6.2.3, p. 141). For the participant 
below, becoming British does not make any difference to his life and his position in the 
UK. It is seen as a practicality only. While he jokes about becoming British himself, he 
argues that asylum seekers would see it as an ‘achievement’.
Before the ceremony I completely was, like, oh my God another, you know, 
hurdle, hassle [...] and I was like completely joking about it to everybody before 
and people also joked about it to me, “oh, are you going to, you know, declare 
your allegiance to the Queen?” [sarcastic tone] [...] And then, when I went 
there and I saw people from, you know, different parts of the world, and, you 
know, for example people from Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, you know, a lot 
of people, those people probably didn’t have even a country, you know, they 
were asylum seekers and for them to reach that level, was probably a long and 
hard journey than me who had a fairly easy journey to that level, you know, and 
for them probably it is quite an achievement, you know, and now, you know, at 
least they can say that they belong to a country now, you know. And then, for 
them it is something for a celebration [...] I only went along because it didn’t 
mean anything to me, it was just another thing to do... (Participant 43, male, 43 
years old)
6.4 Summary and conclusions
This chapter has explored the main themes of the interviews with new British citizens. 
The focus has been on how British citizenship and Britishness were represented and 
the positions of the participants in relation to these representations.
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Participants were generally located between the position of the ‘stranger’ and the 
position of the ‘homecomer’ (Schutz, 1964a, 1964b). By being ‘strangers’ in the UK, 
they had to accommodate new ways of thinking into their symbolic ‘toolkit’. Many 
participants, in different degrees, experienced this as an ‘identity rupture’ whereby they 
had to re-assess the knowledge that they had taken for granted in the past. As part of 
this process, respondents had to also re-position themselves towards the 
representations and values associated with their countries of origin. This complex 
process of negotiation was evident in the ways respondents articulated their position in 
relation to ‘integration dilemmas’. These dilemmas were exemplified in the distinction 
between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’. Participants drew on this opposition to make sense 
of their experiences in the UK and to negotiate their position within British society and 
culture. The ‘West’, epitomised in the UK, was seen a place of progress, prosperity and 
freedom, while the ‘Rest’ was everything that the West was not: poor, underdeveloped, 
unsafe and conservative. As was shown, however, Britain was not solely constructed in 
a positive progress framework, but was ‘dilemmatically’ represented as both a place of 
progress and a place of moral decline compared to the participants’ countries of 
origin39. For new citizens, ideas of British openness and development were 
counterbalanced by the image of Britain as a country of moral decline, evident in the 
country’s youth culture. Because of this, participants, in different degrees, experienced 
an ‘identity dilemma’, exemplified in the clash between the moral order associated with 
their position within British culture and the moral order of their position in relation to the 
culture of their countries of origin. Thus, becoming ‘more British’ was both something 
enriching and something that could pose a threat to their religious and/or cultural 
identity. Britishness was something that participants aspired to, symbolising openness 
and tolerance, and something they resisted. In order to negotiate their identity in the 
UK, as well as their relationship with their country of origin, participants negotiated their 
position in relation to both these opposing themes, making claims of both similarity 
towards and difference from Britishness. Figure 4 below illustrates this dilemma and its 
implications for identity.
39 This dilemma is very similar to the representation of Britishness by citizenship officers 
(Chapter 5). However, the meaning of decline took different meanings in the two data sets. For 
citizenship officers, decline mainly signified economic decline largely attributed to immigration, 
while for naturalised citizens decline was defined in moral terms and was associated with 
negative representations of the West.
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Figure 4. Central identity dilemma in representations of Britishness by Naturalised 
Citizens
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It needs to be noted, however, that claims of similarity and difference were not just a 
matter of personal choice. As Duveen (2001) notes, representations precede identities. 
That is, representations demarcate the positions available to people. In that regard, the 
ethnic representation of Britishness had a major impact on the way participants 
positioned themselves in the UK. For most of the participants, belonging in Britain did 
not mean that they were also part of the British nation. Rather, belonging in British 
society in a civic way and feeling at home in Britain were distinguished from being 
'really British’. In other words, prevalent ethnic representations of Britishness positioned 
them as outsiders. However, the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was not that 
straightforward. Representations of Britishness and immigration entail more nuanced 
ideas about similarity and difference which add complexity to this issue. Some migrants 
(e.g. white Anglo-Saxon or European) are positioned as 'more similar’ than others. 
Therefore, in order to negotiate their position towards Britishness, participants also had 
to negotiate their position towards representations of immigration. Thus, a new citizen’s 
position depended not only on how Britishness was ‘imagined’, but also on how he or 
she was positioned in relation to representations of immigration. Indeed, being British 
and being an immigrant in Britain occupy the two opposing poles of a continuum. A 
naturalised citizen going through the citizenship process, which is designed for 
migrants, can be a no-win situation because in order to be British, one cannot be an 
immigrant. However, although the ‘prototypes’ of the British and the immigrant 
categories are shaped by dominant representations, they can still become a matter of 
argumentation (Billig, 1987).
It has been further argued in this chapter that positioning processes operate on both the 
symbolic, or representational, level and on a tangible institutional level. As such, 
immigration is an area where the politics of space and the politics of otherness are 
directly linked: “if it is acknowledged that cultural difference is produced and maintained
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in a field of power relations in a world always already spatially interconnected, then the 
restriction of immigration becomes visible as one of the main means through which the 
disempowered as kept this way” (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992, p. 17).
The institutional level of positioning takes the form of immigration controls and 
naturalisation legislation which define rights of entry and criteria of membership. In 
terms of naturalisation, it has been argued in this chapter that earned citizenship 
policies, which emphasise the assessment of the contribution of migrants, are based on 
the distinction between the birthright and the earned right of citizenship. In fact, civic 
participation and contribution, as preconditions for earned citizenship, can be said to 
compensate for a naturalised citizen’s lack of British ethnic origins. Through economic 
contribution one can earn the right to be a legitimate member of the society, an 
entitlement granted without question to the British by birth. This discourse draws on a 
deeper distinction between ‘being’ and ‘having’ as two different types of relationship 
with Britishness, which was also identified in the interviews with the citizenship officers. 
One can be British by virtue of being born British, but having earned the right to 
citizenship is not the same. Rather, naturalising refers to having a British identity. This 
identity is not construed as a stable or essential part of the self, but as something that 
can be acquired or gained and, thus, can also be lost. Jodelet (1991) has also identified 
these two modes of being in her research. In her study of mental illness in a small 
French community, she found that mental illness was constructed as an essence rather 
than as something that one has and can be treated. Therefore, the being-having 
distinction of identity modes can take different forms in different contexts. In every case, 
however, it serves a protective function, constructing an unbridgeable, essentialised 
boundary between those who ‘have’ and those who ‘are’.
Concerning the second aspect of institutionalised positioning processes, immigration 
controls, they mainly refer to issues of spatial mobility and accessibility. The differential 
entitlements given to different types of migrants constitute the moral order of this 
positioning of migrants. The main distinction here is between elite and non-elite 
migrants. Within the current hierarchical nation-state system (Castles, 2005), a non­
elite migrant, originating in a poor or unstable country does not have access to the 
prosperous Western life. Under these conditions, the British passport, which allows 
unrestricted entry to the affluent Western world, became, for some interviewees, a 
symbol of freedom and accessibility, or, in other words, a sign of social recognition. It 
marked a positioning shift from an unwelcomed immigrant to a welcomed traveller. On 
the other hand, elite migrants, originating in developed Western countries, constitute an
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educated ‘transnational elite’ and can be defined by their ‘spatial autonomy’ (Beck, 
2007; Weiss, 2005). Bauman (1998) has captured this new form of social classification 
by making a distinction between tourists and vagabonds. The former are allowed to 
travel freely and are welcomed, while the latter are resented because they are seen as 
an economic and social burden to their ‘host’ countries. In light of this, the passport can 
be conceptualised as the objectification of social relations. It is an institutionalised 
positioning tool which defines the level of trustworthiness of its holder. For instance, a 
European passport is a signifier of relations of trust, while a non-European passport 
stands for relations of mistrust between a migrant and a European state. Figure 5 
illustrates the positioning of elite and non-elite migrants on both the representational 
and institutional levels.
Figure 5. Key positions of Naturalised Citizens on representational and institutional levels
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As the figure shows, there is an intersection between symbolic representations of 
immigration (containing ideas about similarity and difference) and tangible immigration 
policies and practices (which define rights of mobility based mainly on skilled migration 
regimes). Migrants are positioned on both these levels, with the most fundamental 
distinction being that between elite and non-elite migrants. On the whole, it can be 
argued that constructions of similarity and difference, which target particular types of 
migrants, are translated into and enhanced by actual bordering mechanisms.
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Chapter 7. The Perspective of Public Policy
7.1 Overview of Chapter 7
This chapter discusses the official public policy approach on naturalisation. It focuses 
on the governmental discourse on earned citizenship as expressed in four policy 
documents selected for analysis using the ALCESTE software package:
I. “The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System” 
(Home Office Border and Immigration Agency, February 2008)
II. “The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: 
Analysis of Consultation Responses" (UK Border Agency, July 2008)
III. “The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: 
Government Response to Consultation” (UK Border Agency, July 2008)
IV. “Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship” (UK Border 
Agency, July 2009)
The chapter is divided in four parts. The first part describes ALCESTE and explains 
how it can be used for the analysis of textual data within a social representations 
framework. The second part of the chapter outlines the different analyses which have 
been conducted and provides an overview of the lexical classes produced by 
ALCESTE. By modifying the parameters of ALCESTE, three types of analyses were 
conducted in order to identify both broad and detailed word classes of the policy 
discourse. The third section is a discussion of the classes identified using exemplary 
quotations to illustrate the interpretation of themes. The final section of the chapter 
draws conclusions about the main themes of the official governmental discourse on 
earned citizenship. It will be overall shown that public policy discourse represents 
naturalisation in terms of three main themes: immigration reform (which incorporates 
the subthemes of simplification of the immigration system and border control), 
immigration impact (which creates a dichotomy between skilled migration as a resource 
and unskilled migration as a burden) and earned citizenship (which emphasises 
assessment and penalisation). Objectifying migrants and classifying them in terms of 
their profitability and trustworthiness are central in this discourse.
7.2 Using ALCESTE for text analysis
ALCESTE (Analyse de Lexemes Coocurrents dans les Enonces Simples d’un Texte) 
was created by Max Reinert (1983) as a method for investigating the distribution of
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vocabulary in a corpus of text. It conducts a statistical analysis of word co-occurrences 
and is particularly useful for analysing large amounts of textual data.
ALCESTE is based on the assumption that different ways of talking about a topic 
represent different ways of thinking about the topic (Kronberger & Wagner, 2000). 
Using word co-occurrences, ALCESTE identifies word classes that signify different 
forms of discourse about a specific subject. Roure and Reinert (1993, cited in Guerin- 
Pace, 1998, p. 76) argue that:
...in the course of his statement, the speaker occupies a series of personal 
worlds... [which] impose their own type of vocabulary. Consequently, the 
statistical study of the distribution of this vocabulary must aim to recover the 
trace of the ‘mental environments’ that the speaker has successively occupied, 
a trace that can be detected in the form of 'lexical worlds'.
Some social representations researchers have used ALCESTE as a tool for identifying 
clusters of meanings through classes of co-occurring words. Lahlou (1996), for 
example, in his study of representations of eating, makes a link between semantic 
classes, which form the basic nuclei of social representations, and lexical classes 
produced by ALCESTE. Wagner, Kronberger and colleagues (Wagner & Kronberger, 
2002b; Wagner, Kronberger, Allum, de Cheveign6, Diego, Gaskell, Heinssen, Midden, 
Odegaard, Olsson, Rizzo, Rusannen, & Stathopoulou, 2002a) have also used 
ALCESTE to study perceptions of biotechnology in Europe within a social 
representations framework, while Hohl and Gaskell (2008) have used it in their study of 
representations of food risk. Overall, although under-utilised40, ALCESTE is gaining 
more ground in social science research and especially in a field that traditionally 
employs qualitative techniques, i.e. social representations. Still, the analysis conducted 
by ALCESTE cannot substitute the interpretation of the researcher who has to be able 
to describe and explain the output in light of other data and knowledge of the field.
ALCESTE works by first reducing the vocabulary of the corpus in root-forms. This 
process is called lemmatisation and allows ALCESTE to analyse all expressions of a 
root word as if they were one word -  these are called ‘reduced forms’. Also, ALCESTE 
categorises the words of the text according to their grammatical function. According to 
this classification, some words are used in the analysis, others are supplementary,
40 This is partly because ALCESTE is only available in French and its English dictionary is not as 
elaborate as its French dictionary.
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while others, like prepositions, are excluded from the analysis. This first step of analysis 
constructs the dictionary of the analysis.
ALCESTE divides the text into two types of units used for the analysis. The ‘initial 
context units’ (ICUs) are predetermined by the researcher and usually refer to book 
chapters, documents, newspaper articles and so on. In this study the initial context 
units are the four policy documents selected for the analysis. The second type of units 
is the ‘elementary contextual units’ (ECUs) which are constructed by ALCESTE based 
on the criteria of punctuation and number of words. After identifying the two types of 
units, ALCESTE conducts a descending hierarchical classification in order to detect 
repetitive language patterns (Guerin-Pace, 1998; Kronberger & Wagner, 2000). Starting 
from the total set of contextual units (CUs)41 as the first class, ALCESTE partitions the 
text into two new classes in a way that there is as less overlap between the classes as 
possible; it then divides the larger of the two new classes into two smaller classes and 
continues this process until it finds the ‘best fitting model’. To do these divisions, 
ALCESTE constructs an indicator matrix with contextual units in rows and words in 
columns42. It then decomposes the matrix into more classes using a chi-square criterion 
(for more details, see Kronberger & Wagner, 2000).
Because the size of contextual units may influence the results, ALCESTE conducts two 
separate preliminary analyses using slightly different sizes of contextual units. If the 
classes resulting from the two analyses are similar, then it is assumed that the classes 
are stable. ALCESTE gives the percent of ECUs that are classified in the same classes 
in both analyses. This is the stability coefficient of the analysis.
The output produced by ALCESTE provides the most typical and atypical words of each 
class and their chi-square values which represent each word’s strength of association 
with the entire class. It also gives the typical ECUs of each class which can be used for 
the interpretation of results.
A complementary analysis conducted by ALCESTE is a factor analysis of 
correspondence on the contingency table cross-tabulating the words and the classes; 
from this analysis a spatial representation of the results is derived (Gu£rin-Pace, 1998). 
Furthermore, ALCESTE conducts more calculations on each class, giving the most 
specific vocabulary for each class, the most representative ECUs per class, the most
41A contextual unit (CU) corresponds to one or more ECUs within an ICU. A CU is measured by 
the number of analysed words.
42 An indicator matrix is a table with 1 if a word is present in a contextual unit and 0 if a word is 
absent. This means that most cells in the indicator matrix are 0.
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frequent strings of words in each class and an ascending hierarchical classification 
which helps to understand the links between words within a class.
Overall, ALCESTE provides a very rich output that can be used for the interpretation of 
the classification. It also allows to modify the default parameters of the analysis. In fact, 
conducting a single analysis in ALCESTE may be misleading because changes in the 
vocabulary or parameters of the analysis may have an impact on the division of 
classes. Therefore, it is useful to conduct multiple analyses to check the stability of the 
classification. For this research, I have conducted a series of analyses modifying the 
vocabulary of the corpus and the parameters used for the analysis.
7.3 Analysis & overview of results
7.3.1 Preparing the corpus and dictionary of analysis
Before conducting an ALCESTE analysis, the corpus needs to be prepared so that it 
meets the requirements of the software. Some punctuation marks and symbols, like 
asterisks, dollar signs and apostrophes, are interpreted differently by ALCESTE and 
interfere with the analysis and segmentation of the text. I checked and removed these 
symbols from the text. Also, I turned capitalised words into lower case words because 
ALCESTE excludes capitalised words from the analysis. Acronyms were also turned 
into their original forms. Moreover, I used underscores to link sets of words which have 
a particular meaning, so that ALCESTE treats them as single words. For example, I 
changed the words ‘European Union’ to ‘EuropeanJJnion’ and ‘European Economic 
Area’ to ‘European_Economic_Area’. To decide which words to link together with 
underscores, I used the ALCESTE output which shows which words tend to appear 
together in the text. Furthermore, because ALCESTE rests on the assumption that 
different ways of thinking about an object represent different ways of talking about an 
object, it is important to homogenise the text. Since changing the vocabulary may 
interfere with the analysis, I did not change words that were synonyms but only words 
that mean the exact same thing. For example, the words ‘UK’ and ‘United Kingdom’ 
were homogenised and turned into the word ‘Britain’43.
Finally, I checked every word in the dictionary that ALCESTE had constructed for the 
analysis. Because the English dictionary of ALCESTE is not as good as the French 
one, I had to correct mistakes in the dictionary and re-run the analysis.
43 Although ‘UK’ and ‘United Kingdom’ are not synonymous with ‘Britain’, the word ‘Britain’ in this 
analysis stands for the whole of the UK which is the scope of public policy regarding citizenship.
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7.3.2 Default parameters
I kept a protocol of all the changes I made to my original text (e.g. underscoring sets of 
words) and I also conducted an analysis, using the default parameters, after every 
change in the vocabulary and text. This allowed me to check the stability of the 
analysis. The results were overall stable as ALCESTE produced the same five classes 
in almost all analyses with the default parameters. In orderto interpret these results and 
conduct further analyses by changing the default parameters, I had to select one of 
versions of the text that had been changed from the original. I chose the version which 
produced the five word classes that kept re-appearing in my analyses and provided 
stable results (stability coefficient: 81.03%**). Appendix 6 provides the key details of 
this analysis.
The five classes produced by ALCESTE in this analysis were: ‘Immigration impact’, 
'Stages’ (of the citizenship process), ‘Consultation’, ‘Immigration reform’ and ‘English’ 
(see Appendix 7 for the typical words of each class and the associated chi-square 
values, and Appendix 8 for the most typical ECUs of each class). Table 8 shows the 
distribution of ECUs in each class. ‘Consultation’ and ‘English’ are the smallest classes, 
while ‘Immigration impact’, ‘Stages’ and ‘Immigration reform’ are almost equally large 
with about 24%-29% of all ECUs each.
Table 8. Classes & distribution of ECUs per class (default analysis)
Immigration impact 297 (24.48%)
Stages 303 (24.98%)
Immigration reform 362 (29.84%)
Consultation 140(11.54%)
English 111 (9.15%)
The dendrogram of the Descending Hierarchical Classification produced by ALCESTE 
shows how the classes were split (Figure 6). The first class that was created was 
‘Immigration impact’, the second was ‘Stages’, the third was. ‘Immigration reform’ 
stemming out from the same branch as ‘Immigration impact’, the fourth was 
‘Consultation’ coming from the same branch as ‘Stages’ and the fifth one was ‘English’ 
belonging in the same group as ‘Immigration impact’ and ‘Immigration reform’. What is 
important to note from the dendrogram is that the classes ‘Consultation’ and ‘Stages’ 
belong to the same branch, while ‘Immigration reform’, ‘English’ and ‘Immigration
44 The stability coefficient refers to the percentage of Elementary Contextual Units that are 
classed twice in the same classes in the preliminary analysis that ALCESTE conducts using 
slightly different context units (see also previous section).
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impact’ form a different branch. In other words, classes 1, 3 and 5 are more linked with 
each other and so are classes 2 and 4.
Figure 6. Dedrogram of descending hierarchical classification (Default analysis)45
1.Immigration imp. | - - - ------- -------------- ---------------------+
I --------------------------- +
3.Immigration ref. | ----------------------- — + | |
|  + |
5.English | -----------------------------+ |
+
2.Stages | ---------------------------+ |
| +
4.Consultation | -----------------  +
7.3.3 Modified parameters
The parameters of the analysis are either pre-determined by default or they are defined 
by ALCESTE in a way that gives the ‘best-fitting’ model. However, there are two 
benefits in changing some of the parameters of the analysis. First, the stability of the 
analysis can be further checked by seeing whether further analyses produce the same 
or similar classifications. Secondly, by modifying the parameters (mainly the minimum 
number of occurrences for the definition of an ECU and the maximum number of 
terminal classes), we can look for broader or more detailed word classes in the same 
corpus.
7.3.3.1 Broad classes
In order to look for broader classes, I modified the maximum number of terminal 
classes. I changed it from ten, which is the default value, to five. This gave me larger 
classes, some of which were ‘mergers’ of the more detailed classes described in the 
previous section. The analysis of the corpus with maximum number of five classes 
produced three classes: ‘Immigration reform’, ‘Consultation & Stages’ and ‘Immigration 
impact’ (see Appendix 7 for the typical words of each class and the associated chi- 
square values and Appendix 8 for the most typical ECUs in each class).
Table 9. Classes & distribution of ECUs per class (maximum terminal classes=5)
Immigration reform 367 (30.2%)
Consultation & Stages 541 (44.5%)
Immigration impact 308 (25.3%)
45 The numbering of classes refers to the order in which they were classified. So, for instance, 
Class 1 is the class which was first classified and remained stable (did not divide) during further 
classifications.
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The key details of this analysis were the same as when using the default parameters 
apart from the number of terminal classes which was five instead often (see Appendix 
6). The stability coefficient for this analysis was 81.2%.
Figure 7 shows the dendrogram of the Descending Hierarchical Classification produced 
by ALCESTE. The first class that was created was ‘Immigration reform’, the second 
was ‘Consultation & Stages’ and the third was ‘Immigration impact’. The dendrogram 
also shows that classes 1 and 3 stem from the same branch and are thus, more 
related, while class 2 ‘Consultation & Stages’, which is also the largest one, is quite 
independent from the other two.
Figure 7. Dendrogram of descending hierarchical classification (maximum no of 
terminal classes= 5)
1. Immigration reform |---------------------------+
| +
3. Immigration impact |---------------------------+ |
+
2. Consultation & Stages |------------------------------------------------+
7.3.3.2 Detailed classes
In order to obtain a more detailed analysis of the word classes, I systematically 
modified the following parameters:
a) Minimum number of occurrences for the definition of an ECU. By changing this 
parameter, I aimed to conduct a more detailed analysis that would use fewer 
words per ECU.
b) Length of contextual units that are used for the calculation of the double 
classification. By modifying the size of the contextual units, I sought to achieve 
a more detailed analysis of the classes.
c) Maximum number of terminal classes. I increased the maximum number of 
terminal classes from ten (default value) to twelve to allow ALCESTE to create 
more classes.
Table 10 below describes the changes in the parameters in the analyses conducted. As 
the table shows, by changing the parameters, I was able to obtain more classes and 
have a more detailed view of the data.
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Table 10. Analysis using modified parameters (for detailed classes)■
Analysis 1 4 4 12 4 97%
Analysis 2 6 6 12 5 97%
Analysis 3 8 8 12 7 92%
Analysis 4 10 10 12 6 91%
Analysis 5 12 12 12 7 93%
Analysis 6 14 14 12 9 98%
Analysis 7 16 16 12 8 93%
Analysis 8 18 18 12 8 98%
Analysis 9 22 22 12 8 97%
Analysis 10 25 25 12 8 95%
In the ten analyses of the corpus only two extra classes appeared consistently. In 
seven out often analyses, a class which I have labelled ‘Border control’ was produced 
by ALCESTE and was linked with the branch of the classes ‘Immigration reform’, 
‘Immigration impact’ and ‘English’. Also, in five of the analyses, a class, which I have 
termed ‘Penalties’, emerged from the same branch as the classes ‘Consultation’ and 
‘Stages’.
In order to explore these two complementary themes in this chapter, I will use the 
results of Analysis 8 (see Appendix 7 for the typical words of each class and the 
associated chi-square values, and Appendix 8 for the most typical ECUs in each class). 
This analysis has the advantages of having both a high stability coefficient (98%) and 
including both the classes ‘Border control’ and ‘Penalties’ in its classification. Appendix 
6 provides the key details of Analysis 8. Table 11 shows the classes and the percent of 
ECUs in each class.
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Table 11. Classes & distribution of ECUs per class (Analysis 8)
Class 1: English 295(15.9%)
Class 2: Immigration impact 248(13.4%)
Class 3: Immigration reform 244(13.1%)
Class 4: Consultation 234(12.6%)
Class 5: Earned citizenship & local 
authorities
224(12.1%)
Class 6: Border control 133 (7.2%)
Class 7: Penalties 95 (5.1%)
Class 8: Stages 384 (20.7%)
Classes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 correspond to the same themes identified in the default 
analysis of ALCESTE. Class 1, ‘English’ corresponds to Class 5 of the default analysis; 
Class 2, ‘Immigration impact’, corresponds to Class 1 of the default analysis; Class 3, 
‘Immigration reform’, corresponds to Class 3 of the default classification; Class 4, 
‘Consultation’ corresponds to Class 4 of the default analysis; Class 8, ‘Stages’ 
corresponds to Class 2 of the default analysis. Overall, there were three extra classes 
in this analysis compared with the default analysis, ‘Earned citizenship & local 
authorities’, ‘Border control’ and ‘Penalties’. As mentioned, the classes ‘Border control’ 
and ‘Penalties’ appeared consistently in a series of analyses, which suggests that they 
are significant and stable. As shown in Figure 8, ‘Border control’ is linked with 
‘Immigration reform', while ‘Penalties’ forms a different branch in the classification along 
with ‘Stages’ and ‘Consultation’. On the other hand, the third extra class of Analysis 8, 
‘Earned citizenship & local authorities’, did not appear consistently in the other analyses 
with modified parameters and will be omitted from the discussion of the results. Suffice 
it to say that this class refers to expanding the role of local authorities in delivering 
earned citizenship provisions. This theme is incorporated into the larger class 
‘Immigration impact’ in the analysis with broader classes and in the analysis with the 
default parameters.
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Figure 8. Dendrogram of descending hierarchical classification (Analysis 8)
1. English +
+
2. Impact +
+
5. Earned & Local +
+
3. Reform +
+
6. Border control +
+
4. Consultation +
8. Stages
+
7. Penalties | ---------------------------- +
To sum up, the three types of analyses conducted by ALCESTE using default and 
modified parameters produced three broad classes (‘Immigration reform’, ‘Immigration 
impact’ and ‘Consultation & Stages’), which can be further divided to five more detailed 
classes (‘Immigration impact’, 'Stages’, ‘Consultation’, ‘Immigration reform’, ‘English’), 
which, in turn, by further modifying the parameters, resulted consistently in two more 
classes (‘Border control’ and ‘Penalties’). The following section will discuss these 
results starting from the broad classes and moving on to the more detailed ones.
7.4 Discussion of results
7.4.1 Broad classes
As explained above, the three broad lexical classes produced by ALCESTE (when the 
maximum terminal classes are five) were: ‘Immigration reform’, ‘Immigration impact’ 
and ‘Consultation & Stages’.
Class 1, ‘Immigration reform’, refers to the changes in immigration legislation 
introduced by the government. This class was formed by approximately a third of all 
ECUs and was more associated with the green paper “The Path to Citizenship: Next 
Steps in Reforming the Immigration System”, which was the first to outline the new 
public policy. The most specific words in this class were46:
46 Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of times each word appears in the class.
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border+(44), chang+(40), clear+(63), control+(35), decid+(34), immigration^ 12), 
law+(57), legal+(26), legisl+(33), permit+(27), reform+(50), system+(134),
framework(26), power+(21), set_out(39), strength+(22), agenc+(18), automat+(17), 
enforce+(15), entry(22), path+(31), process+(34), single(15), visa+(14), make.(70), 
biometric+(12), consistent+(14), current+(35), easy+(18), effective+(20), heart(12), 
identity(10), illegal+(9), issue+(15), look+(16), new(60), point+(46), present+(17), 
rule+(22), simple+(37), out(16), build.(17), come.(24), deal.(13), put.(13), take.(28), 
understand.(22), abuse+(14), approach(19), architecture(14), asylum(13), bas+(42), 
cancel+(6), card+(6), challeng+(11), change+(17), coherent(8), combin+(5), 
complex+(13), comprehens+(7'), confidence(7), country+(30), detail+(15),
document+(19), earl+(8), efficien+(8), end+(9), ensur+(30), fast+(5), february(6), 
fingerprint+(6), foreign+(17), fundamental+(7), interest+(9), introduce+(29)
The idea of change in immigration law is salient in this class. Change is characterised 
as positive and necessary. The aim is to make the immigration system clearer, more 
streamlined and easier to understand. The simplification of the system is part of the 
new ‘earned citizenship’ regulations outlined in the green paper. Within this framework, 
all immigration legislation will be replaced by a single legal framework based on the 
principle that citizenship is a right that has to be earned. Under the earned citizenship 
provisions of the new system, different categories of migrants will now all fall under 
three routes to naturalisation or permanent residency: highly skilled and skilled workers, 
family members, and those in need of protection. Also, there is an effort to define the 
‘journey to citizenship’ in a clear way by having only three distinct stages: temporary 
residence, probationary citizenship and British citizenship/permanent residency. These 
stages are in line with the points-based system which determines which migrants have 
the right to enter and stay in the UK. The newly established UK Border Agency will also 
handle all immigration matters in an effort to make the system more clear, transparent 
and efficient.
The Green Paper sets out details of our plans to simplify the law’s current 
complexity and make it fit for the 21st century. W e propose that all existing 
immigration laws should be replaced with a clear, consistent and coherent legal 
framework for the control of our borders and management of migration... (T h e  
Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System”, p.5)
But, there is another dimension to the simplification process. New legislation aims to 
make the system not only more streamlined but also more effective. Effectiveness is
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defined in this context as stronger border controls which will result in less ‘abuse’ of the 
system by illegal migrants and immigration law offenders:
Our objective is to make our immigration system clearer, more streamlined and 
easier to understand, in the process reducing the possibilities for abuse of the 
system, maximising the benefits of migration and putting British values at the 
heart of the system. (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the 
Immigration System”, p. 9)
Immigration reform is, thus, linked to more powers in policing the borders and 
preventing illegal immigration. Such responsibilities are undertaken by the new UK 
Border Agency. For example, the Agency has the power to automatically deport serious 
offenders. Furthermore, fingerprint visas for anyone entering the country and identity 
cards for foreign nationals, which have been the subject of major controversies in the 
UK, are being introduced. The purpose is to have more control of the people who come 
in to the country and prevent illegal migration. Atypical ECU for this class comes from 
the following sentence:
The formation of a new, single Border Force with police-like powers to tackle 
smuggling and immigration crime, coupled with stronger controls overseas 
such as fingerprinting of visa applicants, have strengthened the UK border... 
(“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship", p. 11)
Words such as ‘control’, ‘power’, ‘permission’, ‘deport’, ‘strength’ and ‘enforce’ are 
among the typical words of this class, alluding to the idea that immigration reform is as 
much about simplification and transparency as about strengthening the British borders 
and making it harder for migrants to enter the UK. This includes tougher immigration 
controls and more policing to deter ‘abuse’. Therefore, there is an exclusionary 
undertone in this class of keeping types of migrants out of the country -  unskilled 
migrants will not be granted visas, while immigration offenders will be more efficiently 
deported.
W e will expand our detention capacity and implement powers to automatically 
deport serious offenders. To prevent illegal immigration, we will introduce the 
new points based system, introduce compulsory ID cards for foreign nationals 
who wish to stay in the UK, and introduce large on-the-spot fines for employers 
who do not make the right checks. (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in 
Reforming the Immigration System", p. 5)
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Class 3, ‘Immigration impact’, is related with this class and together they constitute 
approximately 55% of the ECUs. The most specific words in this class are:
authorit+(55), communit+(47), day+(18), fund+(41), impact+(44), labour(20), local(92), 
migrat+(66), orient+(21), pressure+(21), service+(72), skill+(38), cohes+(17), 
countrY+(29), develop+(37), employ+(30), help+(31), market(14), product+(15), 
alleviate(11), population+(13), pounds(11), short+(20), bring.(22), run.(11), advise+(14), 
brain(7), co(10), deliver+(17), drain(7), facilitate+(7), fill+(11), govern+(42), health+(14), 
import+(16), improve+(19), integrat+(34),job+(14), mentor+(8), money(IO), office+(15), 
ordinate+(10), provide+(44), role+(13), sector+(14), social+(12), transit+(16), 
volunt+(22), send. (10), amount+(7), april(8), assur+(4), attend+(5), avenue(4), 
award+(8), best(12), bodies(6), born(6), carry+(5), cent(4), ceremon+(4), circular(5), 
close+(9), committee(8), council+(5), cultur+(5), data(7), department+(14), distribut+(5), 
empower+(4), enhance+(8), entrepreneurs(4), envisage+(5), evidence(9), 
example+(14), explore+(7), extend+(13), financ+(9)
Class 3 is anchored mainly in the 2009 consultation “Earning the Right to Stay: A New 
Points Test for Citizenship”. This document outlines the provision of a points test for 
progression from temporary residence to probationary citizenship. This document 
stems directly from the earned citizenship framework and aims to help develop 
provisions in order to enhance the integration of migrants in the UK:
One of the key principles of the new earned citizenship system is to encourage 
cohesion: to help build communities where people get along together, feel 
empowered, and play an active role. W e must therefore ensure that those who 
have earned the right to, or are on the path to British citizenship are given the 
support they need to integrate into the community (“Earning the Right to Stay:
A New Points Test for Citizenship", p. 4)
There are two main strands of meanings within this class. The first one has to do with 
the impact of immigration. This refers mainly to the negative effect of immigration on 
local communities and welfare. For example, school education and English language 
provisions for migrant communities are mentioned as extra provisions that local 
councils need to undertake to accommodate migrants. This class resembles the theme 
identified in the interviews with citizenship officers who, arguing for the duty of migrants 
to contribute to the economy, claimed that migrants do not contribute as much as they 
should. This discourse is based on the underlying assumption that migrants in Britain 
are more of a burden than a benefit. The same assumption is found in this class.
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Alleviating the negative impact of immigration is a central issue. One of the proposals 
put forward is that migrants contribute financially to a special fund that will be 
established in order to help reduce the economic pressures posed by migration.
W e will [...] introduce a fund to manage the transitional impacts of migration, to 
which we will ask newcomers to contribute, and which will be used to help 
alleviate the transitional pressures we know migration can bring. (“The Path to 
Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government 
Response to Consultation", p. 5)
Skilled migration, another theme in this class, is also based on the idea that migrants 
should be contributing more to the economy of Britain. The Migration Advisory 
Committee and the Migration Impacts Forum have the responsibility of identifying gaps 
in the British economy that can be filled by migrants so that they can contribute to the 
economy in a more efficient and targeted way. On the other hand, unskilled migrants 
are not be granted work visas in the UK on the basis that there is no need for low 
skilled workers in the economy47. Thus, in this class migration is predominantly seen in 
terms of employability and profitability. Words like ‘employ’, ‘product’, ‘market’, ‘job’ and 
‘pounds’ are typical of this class. The following sentence is very characteristic of Class 
3; although the positive economics benefits of migration for Britain are mentioned, they 
are used as a ‘preamble’ for emphasising the alleviation of the negative impact:
Migration has significant economic benefits, both for GDP and GDP per head.
At the same time it produces benefits for the economy by improving the 
employment rate, wages, productivity, and by helping to fill skills gaps. But we 
know migration can have local impacts, so we are asking newcomers to pay a 
little extra to a fund to help. ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming 
the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation", p. 6)
Another negative impact of immigration, which is found in this class, is the ‘brain-drain’ 
of developing countries. Several proposals have been put forward to address this, such 
as ‘circular migration’, which entails encouraging migrants to return to their home 
countries in order to use their skills and knowledge to contribute to developing 
countries.
The second, less significant strand of meaning in this class has to do with delivering 
earned citizenship provisions on a local level with emphasis on developing integration.
47 Any need for low skilled and unskilled workers is to be filled by workers coming from the new 
EU countries such as Poland.
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It is being proposed, for instance, that local authorities can play a central role in 
enhancing the integration of migrant communities by organising ‘orientation days’ for 
new migrants. Such events would inform migrants about various issues including where 
to register for English courses and how they can volunteer for the community.
Class 2, 'Consultation & Stages’, is the largest class with approximately 44% of the 
ECUs. However, it is the least meaningful one48. It consists of words and phrases that 
appear together in the text but only in a descriptive, non-informative way. The most 
characteristic words in this class are:
feel(91), british(181), citizen+(343), comment+(101), complete+(50), demonstr+(74), 
famil+(65), period+(95), permanent+(167), probation+(138), progress+(88), 
question+(69), resid+(181), respond+(144), down(38), migrant+(223), slow+(37), 
become. (57), show.(42), commit+(58), crim+(57), custodial (25), figure+(38), 
journey+(82), stage+(87), theme+(25), unsure(31), say.(18), answer+(20),
depend+(39), multiple(17), offend+(29), propose+(113), refugee+(45), relat+(38), 
require+(80), sentence+(26), seven+(22), stop+(25), suggest+(23), suit+(22), 
choose(14), keep.(12), speed.(19), spend.(14), think.(59), abolish+(12), active+(57), 
agree+(36), categor+(23), child+(27), concern+(33), consequences(11), continu+(37), 
decreased (9), disagree+(15), discrimin+(12), eight+(10), elig+(25), forty(9),
gateway+(13), grant+(34), humanitarian(15), indicat+(10), individual+(40), 
interview+(9), ipsos(17), member+(29), minimise+(34), minor+(15), nine(15), 
parent+(9), prison(9), proportional6)
This class is mainly anchored in two documents: “The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps 
in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses”, and “The 
Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government 
Response to Consultation". The first is the analysis of the consultation responses of the 
“Path to Citizenship” green paper and the second is the government’s response to the 
consultation.
Part of this class has to do with responding to the consultation and contains words such 
as ’respondents’, ‘comment’ and ‘question’. Another part of the class is a description of 
the stages of the ‘journey to citizenship’, mainly in relation to consultation questions. 
Thus, the class also contains words like ‘citizen’, ‘resident’ and ‘progress’. The following 
is a typical sentence of this class:
48 One of the disadvantages of ALCESTE is that it groups together words that co-occur without 
any consideration of their meaning.
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...Should partners of British citizens or permanent residents be required to 
demonstrate an ongoing relationship before moving from the probationary 
citizenship stage to permanent residence? (“The Path to Citizenship: Next 
Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation 
Responses”, p. 22)
This class has, therefore, no apparent interest. However, the words ‘slow’, ‘down’, 
‘commit’, ‘crime’, and ‘offend’, which are typical of this class, suggest that a sub-theme 
of this class refers to slowing down the journey to citizenship for migrants who commit 
crimes. This alludes to the idea that a key concern within the new citizenship legislation 
is making the process harder and emphasising the assessment of migrants who wish to 
stay and naturalise in the UK. This is an interesting finding and will be discussed later in 
this chapter, as this theme forms a class on its own in the more detailed analysis of the 
corpus (class ‘Penalties’).
7.4.2 Main classes
The five classes produced by ALCESTE using the default parameters resemble the 
three broad classes described above. In particular, the classes ‘Immigration impact’ and 
‘Immigration reform’ remained almost identical with the previous classification.
Class 1, ‘Immigration impact’, consists of about a quarter of all ECUs (24.48%) and 
resembles Class 3 above on immigration impact. Like Class 3, it draws mainly on the 
2009 consultation “Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship”. Also, 
this class was the first class formed by ALCESTE in the analysis. This means that it 
remained stable throughout the analysis (it was not divided). Taken together, these two 
points show that the themes associated with this class (and with Class 3 above) are 
quite stable and salient in these documents. The most specific words in this class are 
the following:
authorit+(55), day+(17), fund+(41), impact+(44), labour(20), local(92), migrat+(66), 
orient+(20), pressure+(21), service+(72), skill+(37), communit+(45), countrY+(29), 
develop+(37), help+(30), product+(15), short+(20), alleviate(H), cohes+(15), 
employ+(30),job+(14), market(14), population+(13), pounds(H), run.(11), advise+(14), 
award+(8), brain(7), co(8), deliver+(16), drain(7), enhance+(8), facilitate+(7), fill+(11), 
govem+(42), health+(14), improve+(19), mentor+(7), million+(8), money(10), offer+(8), 
office+(13), ordinate+(8), role+(13), sector+(14), social+(12), transit+(16), volunt+(22), 
bring. (22), amount+(7), april(7), assist+(7), assur+(4), attend+(5), avenue(4),
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average+(7), best(12), bodies(6), born(6), carry+(5), cent(4), ceremon+(4), circular(5), 
close+(9), committee(8), council+(5), data(7), departmental 4), design+(5), 
distribut+(5), empower+(4), entrepreneurs(4), envisage+(5), essential+(6), explore+(7), 
financ+(9), focus+(11), forum(6)
A first theme that emerges in this class is skilled migration. As pointed out in the 
previous section, migration is seen in terms of financial benefits and profitability. Skilled 
migration is based on the idea that migration should be managed so that it can fill gaps 
in the economy and bring more benefits. The other facet of this argument is that 
migration has so far been more of a burden than a resource. This is also evident in the 
introduction of a fund to help ‘alleviate’ the short-term economic pressures of migration. 
Therefore, skilled migration aims to increase productivity and reduce the negative 
impact of migration. Taken as a whole, migration is constructed both positively and 
negatively in this class: positively, because it can potentially be a benefit to the 
economy and negatively, because it can drain the system. This is similar to the 
distinction between ‘good immigrants’ and ‘bad immigrants’ made by citizenship officers 
(see Chapter 5); the former are welcomed while the latter are seen as a burden to the 
country.
Migration brings significant benefits to the UK and its economy; bringing new 
skills and talents, increasing the flexibility of our labour market, and improving 
productivity. But migration can also bring challenges. W e know, for example, 
that migration is a significant factor in the UK’s rising population. In order for 
migration to work for the UK, it must be carefully managed and respond to the 
changing needs of the country. ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test 
for Citizenship”, p. 4)
Another theme in this class is earned citizenship from an administrative perspective. 
The issue here is the role of local authorities in delivering earned citizenship, a theme 
also present in Class 3 of the previous analysis. This subtheme draws heavily on the 
2009 consultation “Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship”.
Therefore, in addition to a simple ‘check and send’ service provided by local 
authorities, there is potential for the service to extend into the provision of 
simple advice and signposting as well as performing a pivotal role in co­
ordinating relevant local authority functions to provide a holistic service to the 
migrant. (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship”, p. 19)
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A final theme in Class 1 is the developing world. It is suggested in the 2009 consultation 
that in order to address the ‘brain-drain’ phenomenon, Britain can establish policies that 
encourage circular migration. Therefore, it is argued that while skilled migration works 
for Britain, it creates problems for developing countries. Underlying this discourse, there 
is a tension between economic profitability and international development. The 
commitment towards international development objectives is based on a moral 
responsibility towards the world and has a missionary connotation.
W e believe it is right that Government should play a role in managing negative 
impacts on developing countries, and are therefore seeking views on how we 
can better align the Government’s migration policy with international 
development objectives. ("Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for 
Citizenship", p. 29)
Class 5, 'English’, is associated with Class 1 and, like Class 1, draws mainly on the 
consultation “Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship". It is also the 
smallest class of this analysis with 9.15% of the ECUs. The most specific vocabulary of 
this class is the following:
speak(24), common+(13), course+(13), english(71), entry(18), knowledge(17), 
language+(58), level+(21), life(22), pre(11), require+(42), speaker+(25), spouse+(16), 
test+(21), text+(7), topic+(11), assess+(10), compet+(5), europe+(11), familiar+(6), 
refer+(10), read(4), write. (7), integrate(22), proficient+(4), standard+(8), tuition(4), 
take.(17), communic+(3), fluent+(3), histor+(6), import+(12), inform+(12), marr+(5), 
produce+(4), simple(5), into(13), learn.(6), meet.(12), apply+(22), bas+(21), 
britain+(38), event+(4), evidence(6), factor+(5), geograph+(4), implement+(6), 
material+(3), matter+(3), personal+(3), possible(6), practical^(4), promote+(3), 
relev+(7), able+(13), argu+(3), arrive+(7), cant(1), describ+(4), environment(2), 
explain+(2), listen+(5), location(1), opportunit+(5), political(2), safeguard+(2), 
situation+(4), strong+(5), switch(2), teacher+(2), term+(8), try+(1), vot+(2), well(6), 
box(2), contain+(2), element+(2), express+(4), regular+(2)
The predominant theme of this class is the English language requirement for migrants 
who go through the ‘journey to citizenship’ and their spouses, but also as a pre-entry 
requirement which is a proposal considered in the 2009 consultation. The language 
requirement is coupled with the ‘Life in the UK’ test which aims to assess both language 
skills and knowledge of the country. The underlying purpose of the language 
requirement is the integration of migrants.
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As part of our commitment to helping people integrate into UK society, we have 
already introduced a number of measures. From 2004, people applying for 
naturalisation as a British citizen have had to demonstrate English language 
ability and from 1st November 2005, they have also had to show sufficient 
knowledge of life in the United Kingdom. (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New 
Points Test for Citizenship”, p. 8)
Class 3, ‘Immigration reform’, belongs to the same branch as Classes 1 and 5. This 
class draws more on the green paper “The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in 
Reforming the Immigration System”. It consists of approximately 30% of all ECUs and 
is almost the same as the class ‘Immigration reform’ that was identified as one of the 
three broad classes. The most characteristic words of this class are:
border+(43), changs(40), clear+(63), control+(35), decid+(34), immigration(110), 
law+(56), legal+(26), legisl+(33), permit+(27), power+(21), reform+(49), system+(132), 
agenc+(18), set_out(39), automat+(17), enforce+(15), path+(31), process+(34), 
single(15), strength+(20), make. (68), approach(19), asylum(13), biometric+(12), 
consistent+(14), deport+(10), easy+(18), effectives(20), framework(26), identity(10), 
rule+(21), simple+(37), transparent+(14), visa+(14), out(16), put.(12), abuse+(14), 
architecture^4), cancel+(6), card+(6), change+(17), combin+(5), comprehens+(7), 
confidence(7), consult+(34), country+(29), crim+(16), current+(35), discretion(5), 
document+(19), efficien+(8), end+(9), ensur+(29), fast+(5), february(6), fingerprint+(6), 
foreign+(17), fundamental+(6), heart(11), illegal+(8), interest+(9), introduce+(29), 
issue+(15), look+(16), maximises(11), months(7), new(60), passengers(8), pieces(7), 
points(46), ports(6), presents(l7), prisons(6), proceeds(5)
This class refers to changes in the immigration system in order to make the immigration 
legislation clearer, simpler and more streamlined, under the principle of earned 
citizenship. As in the previous classification, simplification is coupled with the idea of 
strengthening immigration controls and preventing illegal immigration and ‘abuse’ of the 
immigration system. Expanding detention capacity and implementing powers for 
automatic deportation of serious offenders, as well as introducing fingerprint visas and 
identity cards for foreign nationals, are all measures aimed at controlling migration more 
efficiently and checking who comes in and out of the country. Therefore, there are two 
axes in the theme of reform: simplifying the immigration system and strengthening UK 
border controls.
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All existing immigration laws will be replaced with a clear, consistent and 
coherent legal framework for the control of our borders and management of 
migration. ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”, p. 48)
Classes 2 and 4, ‘Stages’ and ‘Consultation’, are essentially a division of the broad 
class ‘Consultation & Stages’ from the previous analysis. The two classes are closely 
related, but ‘Stages’ is larger with approximately 25% of ECUs while ‘Consultation’ is 
smaller with 11.5% of ECUs. ‘Stages’ draws more on “The Path to Citizenship: Next 
Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Government Response to Consultation", 
while ‘Consultation’ draws mainly on “The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming 
the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses”.
‘Stages’ outlines the new earned citizenship process and it is a very descriptive class. 
The most specific words of this class are:
become(48), british(127), citizen+(215), demonstr+(64), famil+(50), period+(54), 
permanent+(107), probation+(94), progress+(48), refugee+(36), resid+(120), elig+(23), 
route+(53), stage+(65), choose.(14), continu+(31), migrant+(125), relat+(29), right+(55), 
subsisting(IO), temporar+(38), speed.(15), spend.(11), categor+(18), full+(23), 
humanitarian(13), individual+(30), interview+(8), ipsos(13), journey+(44), limit+(20), 
minimise+(24), protect+(28), qualify+(26), self(10), slow+(7), tax+(20), down(9), to(268), 
leave.(13), mean.(17), access+(38), active+(36), agree+(21), believ+(23), child+(13), 
choice(5), encourage+(16), gateway+(9), grant+(23), insurance(8), member+(20), 
obey+(14), pass+(12), person+(17), restrict+(13), retired(9), society(20), status(13), 
sufficien+(13), year+(36), towards(9), under(24), up(21), aid+(3), alternative+(5), 
ancest+(9), bereaved(3), claim+(5), commit+(19), concern+(18), contribute+(38), 
creat+(18), deny+(3), enter+(18), highlight+(7)
This class describes the stages of temporary residency, probationary citizenship, and 
British citizenship/permanent residency, as well as the three routes to citizenship, 
skilled economic migrants, family members and people in need of humanitarian 
protection. The class also refers to the time periods and requirements needed to 
proceed from one stage to the next, like contribution to the economy and ‘active 
citizenship’.
‘Consultation’, on the other hand, is a rather meaningless class. Because it is anchored 
in the analysis of consultation responses document, it strictly refers to the quantitative
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analysis of consultation and contains words like ‘respond’, ‘question’, ‘comment’ and 
‘disagree’. The most specific words of this class are:
feel(47), keep.(12), show.(28), think.(31), answer+(17), comment+(58), decreased(9), 
disagree+(15), figure+(27), multiple(15), proportion+(13), question+(53), raise+(22), 
respond+(86), result+(19), seven+(17), sixt+(9), suit+(18), theme+(23), total(H), 
unsure(28), say.(10), add+(10), propose+(51), separate+(12), charg+(10),
complete+(18), discrimin+(7), eight+(6), fee+(12), forty(6), green(14), paragraph(5), 
sure(8), thirty(7), concept+(10), larg+(9), nine(7), organisation+(10), paper+(15), 
quarter+(6), abolish+(6), addition+(17), avai!+(10), correct(2), depend+(12), follow+(11), 
lack+(4), outline+(4), prove(3), similar+(6), statement+(5), unnecessary (4), 
disincentive), dual(2), eieven(2), examin+(3)> fifty(2)> idea+(7)> ongoing(4), 
parents(1), rate+(6)> suggest+(6)> top(3), unclear(3), unfair(5), analys+(2)> aspect+(2), 
difficult+(5)> educat+(8)> fourteen(2), human(2), remain+(9)> arrangement+(3)> ask+(6), 
compar+(2)> high+(9)> oppos+(2)> overseas(4)
7.4.3 Complementary classes
In subsequent analyses with modified parameters, two more classes have been 
consistently identified: ‘Border control’, which stems from the same branch as 
‘Immigration impact’, ‘English’ and ‘Immigration reform’; and ‘Penalties’, which belongs 
to the same branch as ‘Consultation’ and ‘Stages’.
In Analysis 8 (see section 7.3.3.2, p. 166), Class 6, ‘Border control’ consisted of 7.2% 
of ECUs which makes it a relatively small class. It draws mainly on the green paper 
“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System”. The most 
specific words of this class are:
out(13), automat+(17), biometric+(8)> border+(23), cancel+(5), card+(6)> count+(9)> 
deport+(11), expulsion(4), fingerprint+(6), foreign+(17), fundamental+(6)> identity(10), 
illegal+(8), iiable(4), passenger+(10), permit+(21)f port+(6), power+(17), present+(13), 
prison+(6), remove+(13), visa+(14), waive+(5), combin+(4), control+(14), enforce+(9), 
physical+(4), tackl+(4)> travel+(6)> national+(22)> secure+(8), single(7), break.(6), 
deal.(8), big+(3)> check+(8)> detention(3), end+(5)> form+(6)> obtain+(5), polic+(5)> 
prevent+(5)> pnor(4), record+(5)> roll+(3)> technology(3), underway(3), sweep(2), 
admit+(3)> comprehens+(3)> conclude+(2), condition+(4)> country+(13), 
european_union(4), fast+(2)> force+(6)> grounds(3), immigrant+(5)> issue+(8), last+(4)> 
month+(4), note+(2)> overhaul+(2)> passport+(3)t procedures(4), programme+(5)>
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purpose+(4), robust(4), specif+(9), stay+(10), strength+(7), visit+(3), outside(3), 
circumstances(5), context(3), cultur+(3), defin+(3)
As argued in the two previous sections, in both the analysis with default parameters 
and the analysis with broader classes, the theme of immigration reform had a double 
meaning. On the one hand, it referred to the simplification of the immigration system 
with the aim to make the system more transparent, simpler and clearer. On the other 
hand, reform was associated with a security discourse which emphasises border 
controls, immigration checks, prevention of ‘illegal immigration’ and ‘abuse of the 
system'. In Analysis 8, the two themes become two distinct lexical classes, 'Immigration 
reform’ and ‘Border control’. Words like ‘permission’, ‘power’, ‘removal’, and 
‘deportation’, which are salient in the ‘Border control’ class, illustrate the increased 
emphasis on securing the borders and exercising stronger force against illegal 
migration within the new immigration framework. Granting or refusing permission to 
enter the UK is a key issue in this class and it is associated with stricter requirements 
for entry (as defined by the points-based system) and stricter penalties for ‘offenders’.
Over the next 12 months we are introducing the most sweeping changes to the 
immigration system for over 30 years [...] Transforming the way we police the 
system; locking down the identity of newcomers before they come; a single 
border force with new powers to guards our ports and airports, with new 
systems to count people in and out of Britain; with compulsory ID cards for 
foreign nationals so that public services and employers can be sure about the 
identity and rights of people who stay. ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in 
Reforming the Immigration System”, p. 9)
W e are selective about who we let in. W e are introducing an Australian-style 
points based system for newcomers, with a zero cap on non-EU low skill 
migration and an end to automatic citizenship based on length of stay. ("The 
Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: 
Government Response to Consultation”, p. 6)
In the broad class ‘Consultation & Stages’ (see section 7.4.1, p. 169) a subtheme 
referring to slowing down the journey to citizenship was identified. In Analysis 8 this 
theme became a class on its own stemming from the same branch as ‘Stages’ and 
‘Consultation’. Class 7, labelled ‘Penalties’, is the smallest class of this analysis with 
only 5.1 % of ECUs. This class is not anchored in any particular document, but seems to 
draw on all of them. Typical words of this class are the following:
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down(29), attract+(13), child+(13), commit+(37), consequences(11), convict+(10), 
crim+(55), custodial(27), minor+(11), normal+(7), offend+(32), parent+(8), penalise+(9), 
prison(9), progress+(38), sentence+(27), serious+(11), slow+(32), stop+(29), fall.(4), 
behav+(6), effect+(8), delay+(5), exclude+(3), go.(5), deny+(3), refuse+(4), type+(4), 
towards(5), spend.(5), absolute+(2), approach(8), depend+(9), influence+(2), 
nature+(4), responsib+(7), abide+(2), expect+(6), highlight+(3), obey+(5), respect+(3), 
secretary(2), favour+(2), immediate+(2), drive.(1), deterr+(1), revoke+(1), table(1), 
lead. (3), chance+(1)
Words such as ‘commit, ‘crime’, ‘penalise’, ‘slow* and ‘down’ indicate that this class 
refers predominantly to crimes committed by migrants which result in slowing down or 
stopping their journey to citizenship as a penalty for those crimes. On the one hand, this 
shows that the immigration system is becoming stricter and that acquiring the British 
citizenship is increasingly harder. Indeed, obeying the law has become a key 
requirement for earned citizenship as outlined in the green paper. This links back to the 
immigration reform theme which refers to stricter rules against illegal migration and 
immigration offences. On the other hand, this class shows the increased emphasis on 
assessing and checking migrants in every stage of the process. The notion of 
assessment is foundational in earned citizenship, as it is the very practice of 
assessment which defines who can earn the privilege of citizenship and who cannot. 
The following two sentences are associated with two typical ECUs of this class:
W e will also slow a migrant’s progress through the system even where minor 
offences are committed, so that behaviour that falls below the standards we 
expect has consequences. (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming 
the Immigration System", p. 7)
W e will ensure that migrants who are convicted of serious crimes will face 
automatic deportation. Now we are going further. Individuals convicted of a 
crime attracting a custodial sentence but which falls below the deportation 
threshold will normally be refused any application for probationary citizenship, 
permanent residence or citizenship. (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points 
Test for Citizenship", p. 17)
7.5 Summary and conclusions
This chapter has explored the public policy discourse on earned citizenship, which 
frames current policies on immigration and naturalisation, by analysing the four 
consultation documents published on this topic. The documents were analysed using
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ALCESTE which identifies classes of meanings based on word co-occurrences. Three 
sets of analyses were conducted, using the default and modified parameters of 
ALCESTE, in order to explore both broad and more detailed themes in the corpus. The 
analysis of the four consultation papers published by the Home Office produced five 
stable classes (in the default analysis): a) Immigration reform; b) Immigration impact; c) 
English; d) Consultation; e) Stages. ‘Immigration reform’, ‘Immigration impact’, 
‘Consultation’ and ‘Stages’ were also identified in the analyses with modified 
parameters49. This suggests that these four classes were quite stable and can be used 
to infer the meanings associated with public policy on earned citizenship.
There were two main branches in the classification produced by ALCESTE in all 
analyses discussed in this chapter. The first three classes above were associated with 
each other and so were the final two classes. The main themes of the first branch were 
immigration reform (referring to the simplification of immigration law and strengthening 
the British borders) and immigration impact (referring to the financial impact of 
immigration, positive and negative). The class ‘English’ was quite small, less stable (as 
it was not identified in all analyses) and was associated with the class ‘Immigration 
impact’. The detailed analysis with modified parameters identified a further class 
stemming from this branch. This class was labelled ‘Border control’, as it emphasised 
the need to prevent ‘immigration abuse’. This class was closely linked with ‘Immigration 
reform’. Concerning the second branch, the classes ‘Consultation’ and ‘Stages’, which 
referred to the overall earned citizenship process, also contained a smaller class 
(‘Penalties’), identified in the detailed analysis, referring to the penalties of potential 
citizens when they disobey the law. Overall, the analysis suggests that there are three 
main clusters of meaning in the public policy discourse on earned citizenship: 
‘immigration reform’, including the themes of simplification and border control, 
‘immigration impact’, which includes both the positive and the negative impact of 
migration, and ‘earned citizenship process’, which emphasises assessment and 
penalisation. A thread linking these themes together is the idea of selective and 
managed migration.
Immigration reform refers to the new immigration system. This system operates under 
the earned citizenship principle which states that British citizenship is a privilege to be 
earned. This was also a theme found in the interviews with citizenship officers who 
argued that in order for a migrant to deserve British citizenship, he or she must be able 
to integrate, speak English, contribute to the economy of Britain and be committed to
49 ‘Consultation’ and 'Stages’ formed a single class in the analysis for broader classes.
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the country. Immigration reform, as defined in the four policy documents, is structured 
along two main axes. The first one is simplification. The aim is to develop a new, 
clearer and more streamlined immigration system so that the decision making process 
on immigration matters becomes both more transparent and more efficient. Another 
strand in this theme is border control which was also a distinct lexical class in the more 
detailed classification produced by ALCESTE. This subtheme shows the increased 
emphasis on security and prevention. The new regulations aim to prevent ‘abuse of the 
system’ by illegal immigration and, therefore, enhancing the policing of the borders 
becomes a crucial objective. This class has an exclusionary undertone, within a 
security discourse, to not allow people without ‘permission’ (a typical word in this class) 
to enter or live in the UK. It is also based on mistrust towards migrants who, by ‘abusing 
the immigration system’, are seen as a threat. In other words, this class rests on the 
assumption that the abuse of the immigration system is a common phenomenon which 
needs to be addressed. This theme, therefore, has to do with both simplification and 
having more control over who enters and stays in the country.
This idea links this topic with the theme of immigration impact. This theme is organised 
around the dichotomy of the immigrant as a resource and the immigrant as a burden. 
The former is the skilled worker who contributes to the economy of the country, while 
the latter is associated with the stereotypical image of the immigrant as someone who 
uses (or abuses) Britain’s resources without giving anything back to society. The impact 
of immigration, as in the citizenship officers’ interviews, is mainly constructed 
negatively. Migration is seen as creating a financial drain to local communities and as 
posing challenges to the welfare system. This is used as an argument for the 
introduction of managed or skilled migration legislation which aims to enhance the 
economic benefits of migration. Within this system, migrants will be evaluated based on 
their qualifications and the gaps of British economy. The points-based system 
establishes a policy of selective openness and a cost-benefit rationale for the 
evaluation of migrants. This suggests that migration is seen predominantly in financial 
terms and that migrants are viewed in terms of their employability and productivity. This 
discourse objectifies migrants as a product that the government can invest in (Jenson & 
Saint-Martin, 2003). This managerial philosophy is also evident in the proposed 
measures to combat the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon in developing countries because of 
the migration of labour force to developed countries such as the UK.
Furthermore, the dualism between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ immigrant, which is central 
in the theme of immigration impact, resonates with lay constructions of citizenship as
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\expressed by citizenship officers (see Chapter 5). It creates a distinction between ‘elite’ 
skilled migrants and ‘non-elite’ unqualified migrants, a distinction which is more and 
more salient in immigration policies all over Europe (Mahroum, 2001). While the former 
migrants are a resource, the latter constitute a risk and a threat to British society, with 
asylum seekers being the least wanted migrants as the language of ‘burden sharing’ 
indicates (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002).
Being selective about who comes in to the UK is also the underlying principle of the 
‘earned citizenship process’ theme. The new process for naturalisation consists of three 
stages: temporary residence, probationary citizenship and British citizenship or 
permanent residence. In order to proceed from one stage to the next, migrants will have 
to demonstrate that they obey the law, speak English, pay tax, are self-sufficient and 
are ‘active citizens’. In every step of the process, migrants will be assessed based on 
these criteria. Thus, like in the lay discourses of citizenship officers, duties are more 
pronounced than rights for migrants and potential citizens. This focus on responsibilities 
has been criticised by advocates of a rights-based approach to migration. While earned 
citizenship starts from the assumption of migrants’ inadequacy to contribute, an 
emphasis on empowerment and rights would encourage contribution by creating 
opportunities for equal participation (Pall Sveinsson, 2010). Furthermore, in the new 
system, criminal activity, even if it is minor, is to be penalised by slowing down or 
stopping a migrant’s journey to citizenship. The fact that ‘Penalties' was a class on its 
own illustrates both the increased importance on assessment and the mistrust on the 
part of the British government towards migrants. Penalising migrants is seen as the 
‘cure’ for a presumed abuse of the immigration system.
To sum up, the main themes and subthemes identified in the policy reports analysed 
are the following:
1. immigration reform
■ simplification
■ security & border control
2. immigration impact
■ immigration as resource/skilled migration
■ immigration as burden
3. earned citizenship process
■ emphasis on assessment & penalisation
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Overall, the earned citizenship discourse problematises immigration and focuses on the 
problems that it creates for the UK. Increasing immigration controls, enhancing security 
and being more selective about who is allowed entry are the principles that underline 
the suggested solutions. As a result of these policies, a hierarchical system is created 
that defines the desirability and trustworthiness of migrants. In this sense, naturalisation 
policies constitute a type of ‘institutionalised positioning’. The moral order of this 
positioning is defined by the differential rights (to enter, live and work in the UK) 
assigned to different types of migrants. It follows that there are different kinds of 
relationships that are established between the British state and migrants. While skilled 
‘elite’ migrants are welcomed (as an asset to the economy), unskilled ‘non-elite’ 
migrants are seen as threat (to the British economy) and are treated with suspicion (in 
order to prevent immigration ‘abuse’).
186
Chapter 8. Naturalisation in the UK: Theoretical and Societal 
Implications
This thesis has argued that practices of immigration and naturalisation constitute a 
space where national borders are drawn and negotiated. Such practices are, 
effectively, efforts to establish a balance between inclusion and exclusion. The 
distinction, however, between inclusion and exclusion is not straightforward. People can 
be included on one level and excluded on others. In the UK, which receives a large 
number of migrants every year, there is a variety of statuses that one can have. 
Undocumented migrants, temporary workers, permanent residents, citizens, EU 
citizens and, shortly, ‘probationary citizens’, are all positions that one can occupy; each 
one is associated with a different set of rights and responsibilities. There is, therefore, a 
complex classification of the population, creating what Castles (2005) has called 
‘hierarchical citizenship’. This suggests that the move from migration to citizenship has 
become a multi-level process, alluding to the complexity of self-other relations within 
and between contemporary nation-states.
This thesis has considered this multi-faceted nature of self-other relations and the 
interplay between the symbolic and the institutional spheres in processes of identity 
construction within the UK naturalisation context. Naturalisation, as a process whereby 
a non-member becomes, formally at least, a member of the national community, lends 
itself to the study of identity in that it brings the relations between the ‘self and the 
‘other’, or between sameness and difference, to the fore. Towards this aim, three key 
stakeholders were selected as the sample for this research. Thirty-three interviews with 
naturalised citizens, twenty interviews with citizenship officers and four ‘earned 
citizenship’ policy documents, representing the official public policy perspective, were 
analysed.
In order to examine these different perspectives, I adopted a dialogical perspective on 
identity and knowledge, which acknowledges the tensions ingrained in self-other 
relations and the complexity of human thinking and identity. In particular, I adopted a 
dialogical perspective on the theory of social representations which maintains that the 
process of knowledge construction involves the three-fold relations between self, other 
and object (Markova, 2000, 2003a). The relations between these three parties make 
common-sense knowledge a dynamic and open-ended process. Furthermore, the 
dialogue between different knowledge systems, that the self-other dynamics 
presuppose, creates a polyphasic representational field. People can draw on this 
multiplicity of symbolic resources in order to make sense of the world. This pluralism
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makes argumentation, dialogue and change possible. Both Billig (1987) and Markova 
(2003a) have taken this idea a step further by arguing that oppositions and tensions are 
the building blocks of common-sense knowledge. According to this viewpoint, social 
representations are based on fundamental oppositional themes. Billig and colleagues 
(1988) refer to ‘ideological dilemmas’ to emphasise the rhetorical or argumentative 
aspect of thinking, while Markova (2000, 2003a) refers to themata as the basic 
oppositional themes which form the core of social representations and from which 
further meanings are generated.
The dialogical perspective adopted here links together processes of identity and 
representation on the basis that the ontology of humanity is the self-other 
interdependence (Markova, 2003a, p. 204, emphasis in original):
The theory of social representations... is based on dialogicality. Dialogical 
knowledge is generated from the three-component process of the Ego-Alter- 
Object (social representation)... Theories of self and identity, using the 
dialogical theory of social knowledge would focus on oppositions of identity, on 
the mutuality of social recognition, on the multiple kinds of Ego-Alterand on the 
culturally embedded themata pertaining to personal identities and personal 
change.
This thesis has argued that the concept of positioning is the missing link between 
identity and representation. Drawing on the work of Duveen (1993, 2001; Duveen & 
Lloyd, 1986) and on positioning theory (Harre & Moghaddam, 2003a; Harr6 et al., 2009; 
Harr§ & van Langehove, 1999), it has been shown that a process of positioning towards 
others and towards social representations is at the core of both knowledge and identity 
construction. By positioning themselves towards social representations, people are able 
to locate themselves within their social world and acquire a perspective towards this 
world. The polyphasic nature of common-sense knowledge suggests that this 
positioning is not a simple process. Rather, people position themselves towards a 
multitude of social representations which requires a complex process of negotiation. 
This suggests that the self is polyphonic (Hermans, 2001a, 2002). Each voice or 
position taken on is a way of engaging with the world and organising experience. In 
other words, the plurality of social representations is associated with the plurality of 
identities. Equally, representational tensions and oppositions can lead to identity 
‘conflicts’, that is, to tensions between different identity positions within the same 
individual. While such conflicts are not necessarily problematic for the individual, they 
can, at times, create identity ruptures. In order to cope with such ‘identity dilemmas’,
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individuals engage in a process of re-negotiation and dialogue of opposing 
representational themes. This is an iterative and argumentative process which can lead 
to the construction of new positions. Based on these theoretical premises, this thesis 
has argued that:
■ Representations associated with naturalisation and citizenship are ‘polyphasic’; they 
are intertwined with representations about immigration and Britishness, which 
incorporate ideas about ethno-cultural similarity and difference and position different 
types of migrants in different ways along a ‘being/having’ continuum of identity.
■ Britishness is constructed on the basis of the dialogue between the opposing themes 
of prosperity/progress and decline/threat; each theme is associated with a different 
argumentation strategy or narrative regarding Britishness and immigration.
■ People negotiate this opposition by positioning themselves and others in a 
multiplicity of ways; there is a dialogical tension between these different positions, 
suggesting that identity is not a fixed state, but an inherently dialectic process.
■ Different self-other dynamics frame these representational and identity processes; 
on the whole, there is a fundamental tension, or dilemma, between openness 
towards and protection against the other.
■ Positioning processes, with respect to immigration and citizenship, take place both 
on the symbolic level of representations and on the institutional level of immigration 
policies and practices; positions can, thus, be conceptualised both as socio-symbolic 
and as institutionalised locations which define one’s place in the world.
This final chapter will discuss these issues in relation to the particular empirical findings 
of this research. The following section will discuss the dilemmatic nature of Britishness, 
while the second section will explore its implications for processes of positioning. The 
third section will examine the interplay between the symbolic and the institutional 
spheres in positioning processes, with an emphasis on earned citizenship which 
characterises current thinking on immigration and naturalisation and constructs a 
dichotomy between elite and non-elite migrants. The fourth section will consider the 
implications of this research for advancing a social psychological approach to 
citizenship. The fifth section will make suggestions for further research on citizenship. 
The last section will conclude this thesis with some final thoughts on dialogue and 
inclusion.
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8.1 The dilemmatic nature of Britishness
The analysis of the interviews with new citizens and citizenship officers showed that 
Britishness was represented in a dilemmatic way by both these sets of participants. 
One pole of this dilemma represented progress and the other pole represented decline. 
The two were in opposition to each other, creating a tension between different 
storylines associated with each theme. Each storyline can be seen as an argumentation 
pattern regarding the definition of Britishness. However, the two themes were not 
mutually exclusive. Participants, for the most part, employed narratives of both progress 
and decline in order to discuss Britishness in relation to issues of immigration and 
citizenship.
Citizenship officers, the majority of whom were British-born, construed Britishness using 
a discourse of progress/humanitarianism and a discourse of decline/threat. These two 
themes stood in opposition to each other and were associated with different types of 
self-other relations. The discourse of British tolerance and humanitarianism, in 
particular, was very salient and was a key theme in the citizenship officers’ interviews. 
Tolerance is, indeed, commonly perceived as a distinctive British trait (Condor, 2006b). 
Citizenship officers drew on this humanitarian discourse to make arguments about 
welcoming migrants to the UK and to assert that pluralism is intrinsic to Britishness. 
This ‘cosmopolitan’ frame of thinking is reminiscent of Britain’s imperial openness 
towards colonised populations (Kumar, 2000) and it can be said to be a symbolic 
resource that has been historically used to frame Britain’s relations with ‘others’.
However, thinking is not monological. As Young (1995) has observed, British colonial 
identity was constructed around the dialogue between desire for and aversion of the 
other. In the interviews, the theme of progress and humanitarianism was in dialogical 
opposition with the theme of threat and decline, alluding to the dilemmatic nature of 
social representations of Britishness. This latter theme was based on a completely 
different image of the immigrant: from a person in need, the immigrant was transformed 
into an opportunist who exploits Britain’s resources. Immigration was, therefore, 
constructed as a threat, while participants also expressed nostalgia for Britain’s past. 
Interviews were permeated by a feeling of loss of both economic power and cultural 
superiority, largely attributed to the negative effects of immigration. This sense of 
declining Britishness due to the loss of Britain’s imperial prestige is what Gilroy (2004) 
terms ‘post-imperial melancholia’.
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Abuse of welfare benefits and the British passport as a motivation for citizenship were 
the most commonly cited examples of migrant opportunism in the interviews with 
citizenship officers. Instead of cosmopolitanism, we have here a narrower nationalistic 
frame of thinking that puts the interests of the native population above any humanitarian 
duty to the world. As shown in Chapter 5, participants employed a ‘rational’ social 
exchange framework to argue against immigration. The most common argument was 
that migrants put a strain on Britain’s resources, mainly on the welfare system, because 
they do not participate in the society and do not contribute to the economy. Limiting 
immigration was, thus, presented as a ‘rational’ response in order to protect the 
economic resources of the country. Employing such ‘reasonable’ arguments has been 
identified in the literature as a typical strategy to avoid accusations of prejudice (Billig, 
1991; Figgou & Condor, 2006; van Dijk, 1992). This strategy is also indicative of an 
internal dialogue, whereby the Ego responds to accusations of prejudice made by an 
Inner Alter (Markova, 2006). This Inner Alter represents the voice of the prevailing 
normative system in Britain where rationality and tolerance are widely endorsed values. 
This internal dialogue also illustrates the inherent dialogism within concepts (Billig, 
1987). Tolerance, for instance, was construed in the interviews in terms of respecting 
minority cultures and allowing them to flourish, but also as political correctness which 
can lead to the diminution of Britishness. The same arguments, therefore, can be used 
for and against immigration (see also Verkuyten, 2004). As Billig (1987) argues, it is the 
very definition of concepts that can be the source of controversy and debate. People 
not only draw on different representations, but representations themselves are based 
on conflicting themata (Markova, 2000, 2003a).
New citizens drew on similar representations of Britishness which, in their accounts, 
were intertwined with representations of the West. As with citizenship officers, 
Britishness was represented in terms of progress, democracy and tolerance. New 
citizens migrated to the UK to make the best of the opportunities it offers. Most 
participants compared their country of origin with the UK. While Britain was seen as 
developed and tolerant, their countries of origin were seen as conservative and narrow­
minded. Some respondents showed admiration for this image of Britain and its imperial 
history. Becoming naturalised was, thus, an achievement that symbolised for them a 
‘status upgrade’. They were becoming part of a developed, civilised West. This was 
something they were proud of, while, at the same time, their country of origin was seen 
as backward. Drawing on this theme, new citizens argued that they had become more 
open-minded and tolerant by living in the UK, while they were also becoming 
increasingly less like people from their country of origin. But, integrating into the British
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culture was not a one-way street for respondents. While Britain was admired for its 
political values, it was also resented for its lack of social values. Family, community and 
respect for elders were all seen as declining values in the UK, but were still seen as 
being respected in the participants’ countries of origin. As was the case with the 
citizenship officers, the very meaning of terms was the subject of debate. Here, it was 
the meaning of freedom that was controversial. While freedom was seen as 
empowering, it was also seen as signifying lack of control and discipline. We have here 
an ideological dilemma between individual freedom and communitarian values (Billig et 
al., 1988).
On the whole, Britishness was represented in a polarised way for both new citizens and 
citizenship officers. It signified both development (economic and political) and decline 
(economic and cultural). While participants differed in how much they drew on each 
theme, the two themes were interdependent. The tension between the two themes was 
the source for the arguments of participants; it is what kept their discourse ‘in motion’. 
The next section will show that these contrary themes were the basis for the 
development of different lines of argumentation with regards to the definition of 
Britishness and one’s position towards it.
8.2 Dialogical positioning
Identity has been theorised in this thesis not only as content but also as a process. The 
process of identity construction can be conceptualised using the concept of positioning. 
As Duveen (1993) notes, identity is a process of positioning oneself towards a social 
representation. This suggests that processes of identity and processes of 
representation are intertwined. Identity can be seen as a process of appropriating social 
representations to construct a sense of our self and of our place in the world. Identity is 
first and foremost a social location (Duveen & Lloyd, 1986); it defines who we are in 
relation to others. The notion of positioning emphasises both the relational and the 
dynamic nature of identities. Thus, positioning refers at the same time to a process of 
appropriating a social representation for the purposes of meaning construction and to a 
social location in relation to others (Duveen, 1993; van Langehove & Harr6, 1999).
Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 3, the multiplicity of ways of making sense of the 
world, as described by the cognitive polyphasia hypothesis (Moscovici, 1961/1998), 
suggests that people are also positioned in multiple ways. It has been argued that 
polyphasia and heteroglossia are the two sides of the same coin (Markova, 2003a). The 
former refers to the construction of complex system of different types of knowledge and
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the latter refers to the multiple voices or positions that people employ. In other words, 
the plurality of social discourses goes hand in hand with the increasing complexity of 
the self, as the dialogical self theory also argues (Hermans, 2001a, 2002). If external 
interaction creates a state of cognitive polyphasia, then internal interaction (Markova, 
2006), whereby the voice of different others is part of the self (Salgado & Hermans, 
2005), creates a multiplicity of positions that people take on.
As shown in the previous section, Britishness was constructed in the interviews on the 
basis of the opposing themes of progress/humanitarianism and threat/decline. 
Therefore, positioning took the form of a complex negotiation between opposing 
positions or voices. By drawing on different themes, participants saw the world through 
different perspectives and positioned themselves in different ways. In the same way 
that there was a discursive dialogue between themes, there were also ‘dialectic’ 
identities, whereby positionings were in a dialogical relationship with each other.
In the interviews with citizenship officers, the theme of humanitarianism positioned 
Britain as a prosperous and freedom-loving country and migrants as people in need of 
Britain’s philanthropy. The poor, victimised asylum seeker represented the ‘prototypical’ 
image of the immigrant in this case. Britain was seen as having a humanitarian duty to 
accept and embrace underprivileged people. On the other hand, the theme of decline 
positioned migrants as indifferent opportunists. Britain was positioned here, not as a 
superior and prosperous country, but as a country in decline, threatened by 
‘immigration flows’. Hospitality towards the other gave its place to antagonistic relations 
whereby the other was seen as a threat to be ‘managed’. Citizenship officers drew on 
both themes showing ambivalence towards migrants.
A similar tension was also evident in the governmental discourse. As argued in Chapter 
7, a main theme of the public policy discourse analysed was immigration impact. This 
theme was based on the distinction between immigration as a benefit and immigration 
as a burden. While skilled migration was seen as beneficial, all other types of 
immigration were seen as burdensome. For this reason, the consultation papers 
analysed proposed that skilled migration be accompanied by firmer border controls, 
which will keep unskilled immigrants out of the country, and by a stricter assessment of 
migrants so that their contribution to the UK can be continuously checked. There is a 
tension, overall, in the official discourse between welcoming skilled migrants and 
excluding unskilled migrants. One the one hand, we have a discourse of progress and 
profitability, which sees the other as an asset, and on the other hand, we have a
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discourse of security and prevention, which sees the other as a risk and a threat to the 
nation and its resources.
It can also be said that we have here two distinct ‘moral orders’ (Harre & Moghaddam, 
2003a; Harre et al., 2009; Harre & van Langehove, 1991, 1999) which are in conflict 
with each other: Britain’s duty to embrace others in need, as defined by its ‘missionary’ 
role in the world, and Britain’s right to exclude others, stemming from Britain’s position 
as a territorially bounded nation-state. Citizenship officers and public policy discourse 
took on a humanitarian position and embraced the other, but also assumed a 
nationalistic position and made arguments for the exclusion of the other. The discursive 
strategy of ‘differentiating the other’, making a distinction between the ‘good’ grateful 
migrant and the ‘bad’ exploitative migrant, allows lay people and public policy to both 
affirm British tolerance and argue against immigration.
The themes of progress and decline were also expressed by naturalised citizens. 
Progress referred to British tolerance, freedom and economic development, while 
decline referred to Britain’s lack of social and moral values. Naturalised citizens showed 
both admiration towards Britain’s political values and resentment for its cultural values 
as exemplified in its youth culture. Becoming ‘more British’ was, thus, both seen as 
enrichment for the self and as a threat to one’s religious or cultural values and identity. 
Many participants, in different degrees, experienced a positioning conflict. The moral 
order associated with the value system of their countries of origin was in conflict with 
the moral order associated with British culture. There was, therefore, a tension between 
wanting to be British and resisting this identity because it represented moral decline. 
Participants employed both narratives of similarity and narratives of difference in 
relation to Britishness, taking on a multiplicity of positions. Being located inbetween the 
position of the ‘stranger’ and the position of the ‘homecomer’ (Schutz, 1964a, 1964b), 
they drew on the values, norms and representations of their countries of origin, as well 
as on the values associated with Britishness, in order to make sense of their place in 
the UK. The two cultural systems were used as symbolic resources on which people 
drew to construct a complex positioning repertoire (Hermans & Kempen, 1998). This 
suggests that integration in the UK was, for new citizens, a complex process of 
negotiation of their position, not only in Britain, but also in relation to their countries of 
origin.
To sum up, the antinomic nature of thinking about Britishness not only led to a 
discursive tension between the opposing themes of progress and decline, but also to a 
tension between conflicting positions, as each position corresponded to a different
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discourse about Britishness. The interviews exemplified the construction of ‘dialectic 
identities’ grounded in oppositions and ambivalent self-other relations. The migrant was 
positioned as both ‘good’ and ‘bad’, while ‘becoming British’ was both an aspired 
position and a resisted one. The ‘other’ represented, in other words, both enrichment 
for the self and threat. These positioning conflicts were essentially conflicts of the moral 
orders, rights and duties, linked with each position. The dialogue between positions was 
made possible through an ‘internal argumentation’ on the themes of Britishness. 
Thinking can, therefore, be conceptualised as a dialogue between different positions 
and the movement between different positions can be seen a process of adaptation to 
different contexts (Aveling & Gillespie, 2008; Valsiner, 2002). However, representations 
of Britishness and immigration posed restrictions on the types of positions that could be 
adopted by naturalised citizens. As the next section shows, Britishness was not equally 
accessible to all new citizens.
8.3 Institutionalised and symbolic positioning: The distinction between 
‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ migrants
This section will discuss positioning both as a symbolic and as an institutionalised 
process. Identity construction has been predominantly approached from the perspective 
of the symbolic sphere. Duveen, for example, discusses identity as a process of 
positioning oneself in relation to the symbolic field of culture (Duveen, 1993, 2001; 
Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). Through positioning, a person acquires a social location; he or 
she becomes a social actor embedded in a network of social relations. The quality of 
one’s position within the social world is defined by an actor’s rights and duties, that is, 
by the ‘moral order’ associated with a positioning, which defines what types of actions 
are expected and permitted from a social position (Davies & Harr6, 1990; Harre & 
Moghaddam, 2003a; Harr6 et al., 2009; Harr6 & van Langehove, 1991,1999). But, a 
person’s location within a network of social relations and the associated moral order are 
not only defined symbolically but also institutionally. Institutions are not just the external 
context of symbolic processes, but, by being normative and coercive, guide 
representations and frame the world (e.g. Lahlou, 2008). For issues of immigration in 
particular, institutions become key players in the social arena. In this research, this dual 
character of positions was exemplified in the distinction between ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ 
migrants. These two positions can be distinguished by their respective moral order: the 
expectations and entitlements associated with each position (its rights and duties) were 
defined both by symbolic representations and by tangible immigration practices.
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Regarding the institutional aspect of positioning, the analysis of four key policy 
documents on earned citizenship showed that the official policy discourse is structured 
around three main themes: (i) reforming the immigration system, (ii) managing the 
impact of immigration, and (iii) rigorously assessing migrants in their ‘journey to 
citizenship’. Immigration reform has two streams of meaning. On the one hand, it aims 
to create a new, transparent and simpler immigration system which will allow for better 
decision making. On the other hand, it aims to strengthen the British borders in order to 
deter ‘abuse’ of the immigration system by ‘illegal immigrants’. Words such as ‘removal’ 
and ‘deportation’ were typical of this theme, illustrating the government’s preoccupation 
with prevention and security against immigrants who ‘abuse’ the immigration system. At 
the same time, the theme of ‘immigration impact’ makes clear which types of migrants 
should be welcomed in the country. This theme constructs a dichotomy between the 
negative financial impact of immigration, which needs to be alleviated, and the positive 
impact of skilled migration. In short, what is being argued is that immigration has been 
more of a burden than a resource. New regulations aim to reverse this situation by 
keeping out the unwanted migrants and welcoming the ones who are deemed able to 
contribute. Migrants are assessed in every step of the ‘journey to citizenship’ so that it 
can be certain that are indeed eligible to reside in the country and that they are 
contributing as much as they should. We have, therefore, a tension between a 
discourse of security and prevention and a discourse of profitability with regards to 
immigration. The former positions migrants as an asset, while the latter positions them 
as a burden and a threat. Different types of relations between migrants and the ‘host’ 
society frame each positioning: skilled migrants are welcomed in the country while 
unskilled migrants are treated with suspicion and excluded with the introduction of more 
efficient removal mechanisms. In this sense, earned citizenship policies constitute a 
practice of institutionalised positioning. This positioning creates a fundamental 
distinction between ‘elite’ skilled migrants and ‘non-elite’ unskilled migrants, which 
resonates strongly with the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrants made by 
citizenship officers and, to a lesser extent, by naturalised citizens.
The differential assignment of rights of mobility constitutes the moral order of this 
positioning which is based on the institutionalisation of relations of trust and mistrust. 
Walters argues that borders, from points of reception and arrival, are increasingly 
becoming gateways serving predominantly a sorting function “differentiating the good 
and the bad, the useful and the dangerous, the licit and the illicit; constituting a safe, 
‘high trust’ interior secured from the wild zones outside; immobilising and removing the 
risky elements so as not to speed the circulation of the rest" (2006, p. 197). The
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passport in this case is not only a means of identification, but also a means of 
classification in the hierarchical world system of nation-states (Castles, 2005). It 
becomes a sign of trustworthiness and can be conceptualised as the objectification of 
social relations between different states. A European Union passport, for example, 
signifies that its carrier is trustworthy, whereas a passport from a developing country is 
a marker of a person’s untrustworthiness (see Wang, 2004). While elite migrants are 
recognised as legitimate travellers, non-elite migrants are forced to be immobile. In 
other words, elite migrants constitute a ‘transnational elite' defined by their ‘spatial 
autonomy’ (Weiss, 2005), while non-elite, unskilled migrants are ‘vagabonds’ (Bauman, 
1998). The denial of the agency of some types of migrants can be described as 
misrecognition (Markova, 2008b); by being controlled and ‘managed’, these migrants 
lack the power to define their place in world.
In the interviews with naturalised citizens, the distinction between elite and non-elite 
migrants was formulated in a ‘West vs. Rest’ narrative. The West symbolised progress, 
development and freedom, but it was not accessible to people coming from the 
‘underdeveloped’ rest of the world. Many of the participants of this study had in the past 
been forced to be immobile, thereby being denied access to what the Western world 
could offer. In contrast, other participants,'originating in ‘developed’ countries, had 
access to this world. The meanings associated with British citizenship and the passport 
were partly based on where participants came from and on how they compared their 
previous position (as migrants) to their new one (as citizens). For some respondents, 
the British passport was a symbol of freedom, recognition and opportunity, while for 
others it was just a matter of convenience. Thus, the passport had both a symbolic 
importance (as a carrier of prosperity, freedom and agency) and a practical significance 
(as a ‘ticket’ that guarantees accessibility).
Processes of inclusion and exclusion operate both on this tangible policy level, but also 
on the symbolic level of representations. As Gupta and Ferguson (1992) argue, 
immigration is an area where the politics of otherness and the politics of space 
intersect. Non-elite migrants are not only spatially confined; they are also otherised. As 
shown in Chapter 5, representations of immigration construct migrants principally in a 
negative light both in terms of putting a financial strain on British resources and in terms 
of threatening British culture. Abuse of welfare benefits, reluctance to integrate and 
ungratefulness were all commonly employed in the interviews to describe the typical 
(‘bad’) immigrant. At the same time, representations of immigration were permeated by 
ideas about ethno-cultural similarity and difference. As argued in Chapter 5 and
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Chapter 6, the earned citizenship narrative, employed by both lay respondents and 
public policy, draws on ethno-cultural representations of Britishness and on the 
fundamental distinction between two identity modes, ‘being’ and ‘having’. Britishness 
was, thus, seen as something that one has or something that one is. Naturalising allows 
a former migrant to be formally British, to have the citizenship and passport of the 
country. However, being ‘native’ British was constructed as an inevitable and 
essentialised identity. New citizens, in negotiating their position towards Britishness, 
had to also negotiate their position towards representations of immigration. The two 
were construed almost antithetically, so that if someone is classified as an immigrant, 
then he or she cannot be easily re-classified as British. Indeed, some participants went 
to great lengths to distance themselves from the immigrant category in an effort to 
assert their Britishness. But, migrants did not constitute a uniform category in the 
interviews. Along the two ends of the being-having continuum, different migrants were 
positioned in different ways and had different entitlements towards Britishness. 
Constructions of cultural and racial difference played a major part in this positioning and 
overlapped significantly with the dichotomisation of the world into ‘developed’ and 
‘underdeveloped’ nation-states.
To sum up, discourses about naturalisation and immigration, as well as associated 
policies and practices, are a space where the national boundaries are constructed both 
symbolically and physically. Therefore, public policy is not a neutral or rational decision 
making mechanism, but takes part in the construction of representations of immigration 
and Britishness. It can be argued that such practices of space management constitute a 
positioning process that assigns different types of rights and duties to different types of 
migrants. This official categorisation of people according to their trustworthiness 
perpetuates a hierarchical system of classification based on the fundamental distinction 
between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’ and between elite and non-elite migrants. The former 
are objectified in the image of the white, Western and skilled migrant, while the latter 
are objectified in the image of the poor migrant or asylum seeker who comes from a 
developing country. This top-down positioning intersects with lay representations of 
immigration and Britishness which position people as similar or different. Therefore, 
positioning, in the case of citizenship and immigration, refers to a socio-spatial location 
defined not only by one’s place in relation to representations of Britishness and 
immigration, but also in terms of one’s rights of movement and accessibility.
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8.4 The social psychology of citizenship
This section proposes that a social psychological investigation of citizenship is a fruitful 
area of research and can complement more conventional analyses of citizenship as a 
political institution. It is argued that a social psychological perspective acknowledges 
the dynamic and relational character of citizenship both on the level of policy making 
and on the level of lay everyday experience. It is furthermore argued that both a top- 
down and a bottom-up understanding of citizenship are needed in order to account for 
the complexities of socio-political membership of contemporary societies.
Citizenship is, in essence, a way of managing the balance between inclusion and 
exclusion as it is based on both universalism, within the political community, and 
particularism, in relation to outsiders. This is, for Parekh, the paradox of national 
identity, which is based on both unity and division: “Every political community needs 
some shared view of its collective identity; but every such view has an exclusivist, 
authoritarian, repressive and ideological thrust and a tendency to demean those 
outsiders who constitute its acknowledged point of reference” (2000b, p. 7). As has 
been argued in this thesis, naturalisation and immigration are spaces where self-other 
relations are played out and negotiated. The history of British citizenship legislation 
shows very clearly that these relations change over time and, thus, are not neutral or 
given (see Chapter 1). However, these processes of inclusion and exclusion have 
traditionally been seen as rather straightforward. The modern model of citizenship 
assumes that there is an alignment between the nation, as an imagined community of 
shared identity, and the demos, as a political community defined by participation in the 
democratic process. But, this assumed homogeneity is more of a utopia nowadays than 
it has ever been. Globalisation, international mobility and migration suggest that people 
are no longer rooted in a particular locality or affiliated with a single community.
In the United Kingdom the blurring of national boundaries has been met with concern 
over the diminution of Britishness. This has been reflected in the design of public policy 
on immigration and citizenship. These policies are not the result of a detached 
calculation of the national interests, as the cost-benefit managed migration scheme in 
the UK seems to suggest, but are also rooted in how the nation is imagined in relation 
to others. Indeed, discourses of control and security frame the public policy approach 
on citizenship and immigration against the background of a lost social solidarity which is 
implicitly attributed to immigration and cultural diversity. As my document analysis 
shows, this prevention/security discourse permeates current policies of earned
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citizenship. The emphasis on assessing the contribution of migrants is guided by an 
effort to ensure that new citizens are committed to the United Kingdom. At the same 
time, the introduction of citizenship tests and ceremonies, as well as the general 
discourse over ‘shared British values’, are part of an effort to ‘induce’ Britishness to 
newcomers. Thus, as the previous section also illustrated, citizenship is a site where 
the institutional and the symbolic spheres of national identity construction intersect.
This symbolic aspect of citizenship practices has been largely ignored. While identities 
and symbolic processes of inclusion and exclusion have been examined from the 
perspective of national identity construction, citizenship has been left to be 
predominantly studied by sociology and political science. There is an emphasis, in other 
words, on the institutional aspect of citizenship as a political institution. As Chapter 1 
has shown, nationalism and associated concepts, like national identity and citizenship, 
have been conventionally theorised as state processes. Their institutional aspect has 
been far more theorised than their role in everyday life. However, the focus on top- 
down constructions of nationalism should be complemented by an understanding of 
nationalism ‘from below’ (Hobsbawm, 1990). By using an interdisciplinary approach that 
combines the study of top-down and bottom-up process, we can have a better 
understanding of membership of a state. Citizenship is not just an abstract institution; it 
is also a lay experience and an everyday practice which has actual implications in 
people’s lives.
Understanding the symbolic representations that define citizenship and the social 
relations that support it can inform policy making. We need to know how naturalisation 
is viewed by those for whom it is designed in order to create more inclusive policies. 
There is a need to design and implement tolerant forms of citizenship that focus on the 
benefits of immigration, not its abuse. Paying attention to migrants’ and potential new 
citizens’ voices is the only way that this can be achieved.
There is, in general, both a theoretical and an empirical interest in investigating the 
functions of contemporary citizenship and national identity within an interdisciplinary 
framework that considers both the institutional level (which refers to processes of formal 
recognition) and the representational level (which refers to processes of symbolic 
recognition). For instance, this study has shown that while citizenship is articulated in 
terms of contribution and commitment by public policy, it acquires a different meaning 
for many new citizens who see it as a ticket for international mobility and as an 
opportunity to expand their experiences. Here, citizenship does not function as a link 
between an individual and his or her fellow nationals. It is, rather, a symbol of freedom,
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accessibility and recognition, because it allows access to the Western world. Therefore, 
citizenship, despite being nationally defined, can serve a ‘transnational’ function. This 
understanding of citizenship by migrants themselves can complement scholarly work on 
the state and future of citizenship in globalised societies, such the work on post-national 
and cosmopolitan forms of citizenship.
In order to study lay understandings of nationhood, we need a perspective that 
acknowledges the ‘interactional’ character of membership: “What is missing...is a 
sense of the interactional work that underpins how individuals position themselves in 
relation to national symbols or national narratives, about how we make sense of, 
interpret or renegotiate what our nation and our national identity mean to us" 
(Thompson, 2001, p. 27). Indeed, citizenship is a social position. It locates a person in 
relation to both ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, as well as towards the state and its 
institutions. In this respect, a dialogical approach is suitable as it emphasises the 
relational nature of positioning. It places self-other relations at the forefront of our 
understanding of identity and membership. As such, it acknowledges the dynamic 
character of processes of inclusion and exclusion.
Apart from advancing the study of citizenship as a socio-political phenomenon, a social 
psychological perspective on the issue can also benefit the discipline of social 
psychology by encouraging the incorporation of the institutional level of analysis into its 
field of research. Instead of taking citizenship as a background given, social psychology 
needs to bring it to the fore and account for both symbolic and institutional processes of 
inclusion and exclusion. Ignoring the dynamic role of institutionalised practices 
increases the risk of normalising citizenship and immigration legislation as a taken for 
granted state of affairs. Rather, as this thesis has shown, the institutional and symbolic 
levels intersect to construct both Britishness and migrant identities. The position of 
individuals and groups within this symbolic field is the outcome of symbolic processes 
of constructing the self, the other and their relationship, and tangible, institutionalised 
processes which place restrictions on how, when and whether citizenship is acquired 
and practised. Indeed, identity is not just symbolic; it is embedded and enacted in 
institutionalised practices.
Overall, a social psychological approach on citizenship can help to achieve the 
following aims:
■ Theorise the intersection of different levels of analysis in the study of citizenship 
(i.e. symbolic and institutional).
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■ Encourage social psychology to pay more attention to concrete practices and 
institutions, where representations are embedded and enacted.
■ Introduce a dynamic social-psychological perspective on citizenship, focused on 
self-other relations.
■ Complement top-down studies on citizenship with a bottom-up perspective.
8.5 Suggestions for further research
This research has contributed to our understanding of citizenship as intertwined with 
processes of identity construction. It has sought to bring together analyses of 
citizenship as an institution with analyses of national identity as a symbolic 
representation. However, this thesis is only one step towards the better understanding 
of the role of citizenship and naturalisation in contemporary diverse and highly mobile 
societies. This section will outline some key directions that further research can take.
One limitation of this study is that it was conducted solely in London. The majority of 
naturalisation applications do, indeed, take place in London (see Chapter 4). London is 
also the most ethnically and culturally diverse place in the UK, being the home of most 
of Britain’s migrant communities. However, as was argued in Chapter 1, national 
identity has different meanings and functions in different parts of the United Kingdom. It 
is quite possible that the idea of British citizenship has a very different meaning in 
Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales than it has in England. Moreover, London cannot 
be said to represent the whole of England. Rather, as a metropolitan and ‘glocal’ city, it 
constitutes a particular case. Indeed, as was shown in the analysis of interviews, ideas 
about British tolerance were often exemplified in London’s diversity and respect for 
difference, while there were also signs of the existence of London identities, mainly for 
new citizens. It is possible, therefore, that constructions of British citizenship, especially 
in terms of openness to diversity, may differ in other parts of England and the rest of the 
UK. Research on the meanings of citizenship can be complemented by further studies 
outside London.
Another point of departure for further research would be to focus on specific 
communities. This research has studied new citizens’ understandings of citizenship 
without any consideration of their country of origin. It was found, however, that the 
positions of participants in the ‘West-Rest’ continuum had an impact on how they saw 
their place in the UK and the meanings they attached to becoming British. As was 
shown, constructions of elite and non-elite migration are fundamental in understanding 
people’s different experiences of the naturalisation process and their life in the UK. A
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potential new avenue for research would be, therefore, to study specific communities 
taking into consideration their particular migration trajectories and the social, cultural 
and political context of their country of origin. This would provide a more detailed and 
nuanced view on the functions and meanings of citizenship.
Finally, it is important to study citizenship as a practice. Although this research has 
sought to investigate the interplay between the institutional and the symbolic spheres, it 
has not studied the very practice of citizenship. It is necessary to understand how the 
rights and duties associated with citizenship are played out in practice. Specifically, 
there is a need to address the question of how newly naturalised British citizens ‘enact’ 
their citizenship. Certainly, political behaviours such as voting are no longer adequate 
to understand the whole range of current citizenship behaviours. On the one hand, a 
vast amount of scholarly work on the different forms of citizenship in contemporary 
societies suggests that current citizenship practices are transnational (e.g. Soysal, 
2000). On the other hand, contemporary citizenship practices take place in various 
arenas and are displayed by a variety of political actors, such as grass-root community 
groups and voluntary sector organisations, which are not necessarily part of official 
parliamentary politics. In order to appreciate how citizenship is enacted, we need to 
look into different spheres of political action. Furthermore, it is important to also 
appreciate that political mobilisation and participation do not automatically stem from 
the official status of citizenship. As has been argued throughout this thesis, citizenship 
is embedded in a system of social relations which can empower or inhibit participation. 
It is essential to ask, therefore, whether citizens, particularly new citizens, feel 
empowered to participate in the political life of the country and what forms their 
participation takes. While both the official policy and the lay public discourse in the UK 
tend to attribute lack of integration to the reluctance of ethnic minorities to participate, 
this thesis has argued that the very design of immigration and naturalisation policies 
stresses exclusion rather than inclusion by focusing on what migrants fail to do, rather 
on what they contribute. By studying practices of citizenship of new citizens, we can 
better understand the facilitating factors as well as the barriers to political participation 
for the new members of the British political community.
8.6 Concluding remarks
Beck and colleagues (Beck, 2002, 2006; Beck & Sznaider, 2006) have argued that 
people in the West have become ‘banal cosmopolitans’. By using this term, Beck and 
colleagues suggest that people in their everyday life challenge cultural
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incommensurability and essentialising notions of otherness without being aware of it. 
Like Billig (1995) who used the term ‘banal nationalism’ to describe the ideology of 
taking the world of nations as a natural state of affairs, Beck argues that the 
dichotomising either/or principle of boundary construction has been replaced by the 
both/and principle of inclusive oppositions (Beck, 2002, 2006). This suggests that 
people have become open to diversity and alternative perspectives. But, as Gillespie 
notes: “It might be tempting to assume that an increasing plurality of co-existing 
representations would lead to an increasing plurality of mind, or at least tolerance for 
alternative forms of knowledge, but... such an assumption is not warranted" (Gillespie, 
2008a, p. 276). As this research has shown, the ‘other’ is both embraced and resisted. 
‘Banal cosmopolitanism’ is accompanied by efforts to demarcate the national 
boundaries. This is most evident in immigration policies which effectively serve as 
border management strategies. If the very concept of globalisation and the studies of 
transnationalism (Basch, Glick-Schiller, & Szanton-Blanc, 1994) make the world seem 
smaller, immigration practices highlight the boundedness of nation-states. In fact, the 
more globalised the world becomes, the stricter immigration policies become. For 
instance, while the European Union is borderless for those inside, it is securely 
bordered for those outside the EU creating a ‘Fortress Europe’ (Bhavnani, 1993). This 
constant negotiation between openness and exclusion shapes the construction of 
national identities and the management of otherness.
Taking this as a starting point, this research has sought to investigate the complexities 
of national identity construction within the UK naturalisation context. It has highlighted 
the value of a dialogical approach to knowledge and identity processes. It has stressed 
the necessity of considering identity as a process of positioning embedded in self-other 
relations which are shaped both institutionally (by state policies) and symbolically (by 
socio-cultural representations). This approach offers a dynamic relational framework 
which advances our understanding of citizenship, immigration and national identity on 
both a theoretical and a policy level. This framework allows for the conceptualisation of 
constancy and change by considering both the solidity of national boundaries, through 
processes of boundary maintenance, and their flexibility, through processes of 
negotiation and practices of boundary crossing.
It is my view that this dialogical approach can further offer a comprehensive 
understanding of processes of inclusion and exclusion, as well as open avenues for 
enhancing inter-group solidarity. According to the perspective adopted in this research, 
dialogue is not only a key theoretical concept for understanding identity and inter-group
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relations, but it is also the means by which tolerance can be enhanced. As this research 
has shown, self-other relations are, more often than not, asymmetrical. There is a need 
in diverse societies, such as Britain, to acknowledge not only the existence but also the 
legitimacy of alternative, ‘other’ perspectives. It is only then that Beck’s (2006) 
‘cosmopolitan vision’ can be achieved. The first step is encouraging mutual trust and 
recognition. As Markova notes, trust is based on recognition, that is, on a “profoundly 
dialogical Ego-Alter relation” whereby both the self and the other treat each other with 
dignity (2008b, p. 210). The official public policy on immigration and naturalisation in the 
UK is currently far from this ideal. For the most part, public policy treats migrants with 
mistrust and suspicion. It enhances otherising and racialising representations which 
distinguish between positive elite migration and negative non-elite migration. Ultimately, 
a very fundamental distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is maintained. Enhancing 
solidarity, on the other hand, means moving beyond a narrowly defined, patronising 
‘British tolerance’. It means recognition through taking the perspective of the ‘other’, so 
that “each member can appreciate the role that he or she fulfils for the other” (Gillespie, 
2008b, p. 288). With that in mind, this thesis has offered a critical perspective on issues 
of immigration and belonging, a perspective which acknowledges the need to resist 
derogating representations of immigration and encourage dialogue, with the aim of 
enhancing recognition and widening participation in British society.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Topic Guides
Citizenship Officers’ Interviews 
General
• Do you live in this borough? How do you find it?
• How long have you been living in London in general? How do you find life in 
London?
Council work
• How long have you been working in the council?
• Do you enjoy it?
• What is your work about? What do you do that is related to the Nationality Checking 
Service and/or the organisation and conduction of the citizenship ceremonies?
• Can you explain to me the process of acquiring the British citizenship?
Naturalisation process
• What are your views about the ceremonies? What are the good/bad things about 
them?
• Why do you think the ceremony was implemented in the first place?
• Do you think it will succeed or has already succeeded in that?
• What changes may it bring or has already brought?
• What are your views about the ‘Life in the UK’ test? What are the good/bad things 
about it?
• What kind of knowledge do you think is tested in this test?
• Why do you think the test was implemented in the first place?
• What changes may it bring or has already brought?
• On the whole, what are your views about the British naturalisation process?
• Is it hard/easy to acquire the citizenship? More than it used to?
• Is there something that you would change?
Citizenship
• Why do you think people apply for citizenship?
• What are the advantages/disadvantages of becoming a British citizen?
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• How would you describe a good citizen?
• How do you think new citizens view British citizenship?
• What is it for you to be a British citizen?
• What about dual citizenship? How do you think it is being a citizen of two countries? 
The Future of Britain
• How do you imagine the future of Britain in ten-twenty years from today?
• What will have changed/remained the same?
• How do you imagine your future in ten-twenty years?
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Naturalised Citizens’ Interviews 
General
• What do you do? Do you work/study? In which field?
• Do you enjoy it?
• Do you live in this borough? How do you find it?
• How do you find life in London generally?
• How is London/Britain compared to where you grew up?
Immigration History
• Why did you decide to move to Britain?
• Has your life changed? In what ways?
Naturalisation process
• What are your views about the naturalisation process in general? Has it been 
easy/difficult for you?
• What are your views about the ceremonies? What are the good/bad things 
about them?
• How was your ceremony?
• What do you think is the purpose of the ceremony?
• What are your views about the ‘Life in the UK’ test? What are the good/bad
things about it?
• What do you think is the purpose of the test?
Citizenship
• Why did you decide to apply for the British citizenship?
• Is your life going to change or has already changed?
• What are the advantages/disadvantages of becoming a British citizen?
• In general, what does being a British citizen mean to you?
• What about dual citizenship? How is it being a citizen of two countries?
• Would you live somewhere else other than Britain? Where and why? How is 
that place better/worse compared to Britain?
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The Future of Britain
• How do you imagine your future? Do you think it is going to be in London or in 
Britain generally? How do you think your life is going to be in 10-20 years from 
today?
• How do you imagine the future of Britain in ten-twenty years from today?
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Appendix 2: Typical Interviews
Participant 2 -  Registration and Ceremonies Officer in Council A
Duration 1:20:09
E: I’ll just start by asking you a few questions about yourself.
P2: Yeah.
E: Do you live nearby?
P2: No. I don’t live in the area. No. I live in [...]50 
E: Oh, so you commute everyday.
P2: Yes.
E: You’ve never lived in London?
P2: No. I’m, I’m [...]. Born, born in [...], lived there for 50 years and then I live now with a 
partner and she used to live in East London, in [...]. Her father still lives there, but she 
wanted to, to live out in, in more in the countryside having lived in London for thirty-forty 
years with no garden...
E: (laughs)
P2: ...she wanted to see some animals and things like that, so...
E: So, now you have a garden
P2: Yes, yes
E: Do you like London?
P2:1 like the outer London...not so much inner London. I think it’s too busy and you could fall 
over and hurt yourself and people would step over you. Had that happened in outer London 
or out in the countryside people would stop and help you. But because people are so busy 
with their working life and they need to be somewhere... they push and shout and, you 
know, so it’s OK to visit, to go and see some of the sites and what have you but not to 
actually live in.
E: OK, so you wouldn’t actually live in the centre?
P2: No, outer London, yes. I’ve lived in outer London. I used to live in [...] which is the 
London borough of [...]
E: OK. Yes.
P2:1 lived there for a long time.
E: Yeah, yeah. It’s nearby, like...
P2: Yeah. That’s right. About 10 miles from the centre of London, where I used to live. The 
other side of the Thames.
E: So, you know [that part of London].
P2:1 know [that part of London] quite well. Yes. Yeah. Because, as I said, my partner used 
to live in this area. So, I know the area quite well.
E: So, how do you find it? I mean those parts of London that you do know better.
P2: Yeah, It’s certainly a more cosmopolitan area here, in [this part of London] than it is say 
in other parts of London where I was living. Because...for some reason it does seems to 
attract...a multitude of, of nationalities. I’m not so sure what the attraction is. But there must 
be an attraction for so many people to want to come here. You know, with over 140 different 
languages being spoken, I think it's over, it’s about 61% of the population are ethnic 
minorities, so that makes them the majority. It’s a young borough, I understand that many of 
the residents are under 25, so, it’s a young, relatively young population compared to the 
national figures. So, all in all, I think given the mix of races, the... the population does live 
side by side, you know more or less happily. W e have the odd incidents, stabbings and 
things like that, but that seems to be all over the country now.
E: You get incidents like that.
P2: So, that, I think that is a concern for everyone where everybody live. That there are more 
often than not younger people that for whatever reasons tend to carry weapons of some kind 
for, either for their safety, a lot of them say for their safety, but more often than not those 
knives will be used against them.
E: W hat do you mean ’for their safety’?
50 Brackets are used to conceal names of people and places in order to maintain the 
anonymity of the participant.
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P2: Because, because if they go out on the street and they feel threatened, by having a knife 
with them they feel that they can then defend themselves 
E: W hat’s the threat?
P2: Well you’ve only got to read the papers, haven’t you? People that walk down the street, 
my partner that travels on the train...and you’ve only got to look at someone in a funny way 
E: OK.
P2: ...and they want to have an argument with you. And that can be said, you know, a lot of 
people are not happy to walk the streets at the night time.
E: Yeah.
P2: They’re simply not happy.
E: Yeah.
P2: And we read about it nearly every day, somewhere in the country. And it’s more often 
than, it’s more the towns, the inner cities where this happens. What causes that, I don’t know 
if it's the youngsters thinking that they have no place in society, they, they’re ignored, they 
have nowhere where they can go and perhaps enjoy their free time and therefore they make 
their own amusement by pestering people. You know? In all sorts of different ways, you 
know, throwing stones at the window, laying the tires down or ridiculing someone because 
they’ve got some disability. You know?
E: Yeah, that’s...
P2: So, you know, I have, I have a partner, I have nearly an ex-wife, I have three children, 
two daughters...and, yeah, the first thing that I did when they got to an age was to buy them 
mobile phones so they could then phone me.
E: In the case something happened.
P2: Yeah, I wouldn’t rely on them coming home on their own at 12 'o clock at night. “Where 
are you? I will come and get you". You know? And you have to take those kind of... people 
say “you can’t wrap people in cotton wool". It’s an English saying. But if, yeah, if you have 
concerns, yeah, I mean you can’t say “don’t go to that area because it’s unsafe”. You can tell 
them that, doesn’t stop them doing it 
E: Yes.
P2: ...because they have no, they don’t have the same fear. W e have the experience. So 
you hope that they will go to places where they are safer, but that again is no guarantee that 
they will be safe. You know? So, but by and large my observation here is that people live 
side by side and people that I have that come in to this building here, I get as many of the 
ethnic minorities that are polite and pleasant to me as I do of the, the indigenous population. 
So, I have no bias towards anyone. I treat everyone exactly the same. You know, I call the 
gentlemen “Sir” and the ladies “Madam" and even the younger ones I treat them with 
respect, because that’s what they deserve unless I see some behaviour where I think, well, 
that doesn’t deserve respect. Then, my “philosophy”, if you like, in life is to respect not just 
your elders, but respect the younger ones as well because there are some very big hearts in 
some of the young, younger people.
E: Yeah. It’s true.
P2: You know. And they can show that. Which is nice. As a parent and a grandparent, it’s 
nice to see. I hope that, I hope that their experience meeting me for Nationality Checking 
Service or for citizenship ceremony, performing their marriage, I hope that they will go away 
having enjoyed the experience and having enjoyed met me. And when they come along and 
say “thank you for that, I really enjoyed that service”, then it’s good. It’s good to get that 
feedback.
E: Let me just ask you a few questions about your work here. How long have you been 
working in the Council?
P2: 20, this is my 21st month.
E: Month.
P2: Month, yes. I was made redundant from previous job after nearly 26 years, so this is a 
change of direction for me.
E: Oh, OK. How do you find it?
P2: There is a lot to learn, I still don't know everything. But it...the job is quite varied. I do 
enjoy the job, there’s a lot less pressure in this job than I had in my last job.
E: Your last job was...?
P2:1 was a contract manager. So, it’s very different. Very different. Yeah, it was a good 
package with a good salary and a company car and private health and what have you. This,
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this package here is half what I was getting, but now this gives me a good work-life balance, 
whereas that couldn’t be said before.
E: Yes. OK, I mean, it’s a give-and-take thing, I guess.
P2: Yeah. Yeah.
E: So, how is it? W hat do you do in the Council?
P2: My job is Registration and Ceremonies Officer. There are 5 other people that have that 
title and then below that we have deputies throughout positions. There should be 6 positions 
but we have 3 vacancies at the moment. Then, we have a Deputy Manager and then the 
Superintendent Registrar. So that’s... and then we have a receptionist as well. So that’s the 
make-up. And my responsibilities are... and we have rotated work here so that w e’re not 
doing the same thing every week. W e vary the work. So, one week I can be doing the 
Nationality Checking Service, which is meeting, probably 6 applicants, unless it’s a double 
applicant, husband and wife or a mother and child, each day, except Wednesdays when it’s 
5 appointments because we have a staff meeting in the morning. So I see those people, I 
check all their application forms, I look all their documents, I photocopy their documents 
which I’m entitled to do, because Home Office trained me. I give them all their original 
documents back, I can then send their application off to be considered by the Home Office 
for them to become British citizens. But it is a Home Office decision. It’s not my decision at 
all.
E: You just help them with the documentation.
P2:1 just check all their paperwork and send them off and may they know that once I have 
done that I have no further involvement. Only when they get the decision that says that 
they’ve been accepted maybe, or they’ve been told to contact the Local Authority, that would 
be our contact centre, to see what date and time they can come along for the ceremony.
E: OK.
P2: And then I might see them again because if it’s my turn to do the work, It might be that I 
recognise the name or the face of the person...
E: Yeah.
P2: ...and so it then completes the circle. So that could be one week of doing the Nationality 
Checking Service, then it could be one week of actually doing the ceremonies.
E: Yeah.
P2: ...group ceremonies, as you’ve witnessed...
E: Four ceremonies per week.
P2: That’s it. Four group ceremonies. W e can, we can make that more, if we have a lot of 
people coming through and we find that our ceremonies are booked four weeks in advance. 
E: Really?
P2: Yeah, Tuesdays and Thursdays for group ceremonies. So on the days I’m not doing 
group ceremonies, then I would either be registering marriages which is the actual writing of 
the marriage book, the Register...
E: Yes.
P2: ...and the certificate or performing the marriage. You need two people for a marriage; 
one to write the legal bit, the other one to perform the marriage. So, Monday, Wednesday 
and Friday I’ll be doing that, but I could also be doing individual ceremonies where people 
don’t want a group ceremony or they can’t wait three or four weeks and they would then pay 
50 pounds for an adult to have an individual ceremony. And we tend to do those 9.30 and 
9.45 in the morning, before anything else really starts. So that’s that. Other days my work 
could be registration of births and deaths. And during the course of the day we will, say, 
older people coming in to register new babies, those people that are coming in to register 
possibly still-born babies and also those that are registering the death of loved-ones. So that 
can be quite a taxing job.
E: I’m sure.
P2: If you have three deaths one after the other, you know and you’ve got to try and do the 
job and deal with people’s emotions as well. And it’s harder with a still-birth. So, this job can 
be quite demanding and touch upon your own experiences.
E: Yes, yes.
P2: But it’s what makes us such people, it’s character building and you can empathise with 
people, not that you necessarily want to share with them your experiences, but you can, 
yeah, you can, where it needs, you can converse with them. Yeah, I mean it makes do the 
job [if you just] take the details, do what they want and then go. But sometimes you don’t feel 
like doing that. You feel that you need to give them some time.
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E: Yes.
P2: Yeah. I’m quite happy to do that. I do see that as part of the job; never mind what the 
bosses say...
E: (laughs)
P2: -I think, I think you have to show some sincerity and understanding to people. And 
people when they can stand up at the end, big six-feet-two men, you know, and they can 
shake you by the hand and tell you “thank you for listening, thanks for your help" and it, you 
know, it makes the job worthwhile.
E: You basically deal with people in your job, as I understand it.
P2: You can, you can deal with them from the start to the finish. You know, you could 
potentially be registering a baby for a couple one week and three weeks later the same 
people could be coming in to register the death of the grandmother. You know? And in- 
between that, you might even see them here have their marriage and potentially to see them 
have their citizenship ceremony as well. You could see them for every important event of 
their life.
E: OK, lets talk about the citizenship ceremonies...
P2: Yeah.
E: W hat’s your general view about them?
P2:1 quite enjoy the ceremonies. I think you fully might gather that from last week when you, 
when you came in. I try to, as much as it is a... it’s serious business to request and to 
become a British citizen. I think that when the people come in, that we should try and make it 
a happy event, where we can. Some people are simply not interested in that aspect of it. 
They just wanna come in and get the certificate, get the passport and that’s it, which to me is 
sad. So when they actually come in, I do try to have a little bit of humour with them, which 
normally would start in the... when we actually receive them for registration in the waiting 
room, just to let them see that I’m human. I’m not an ogre, no one’s fear. But at that point 
they don't, they still don’t know that I’m actually going to do the ceremony, not till I walk back 
in the room with my jacket on and then I can say “it’s me that's, that's doing the ceremony". 
So to try and make them as relaxed as they can be. The same as when I'm performing a 
marriage.
E: W hy are people nervous?
P2: Yeah, they don’t know what to expect, if they’ve not been to a ceremony before, where, 
you know, they watched what someone else has done or something like that. But it’s just 
trying to make them relax and so... once they are there, if they are relaxed then they can 
actually take it in and enjoy it for what it’s worth and, as I said to you before, when actually 
people come up to you at the end and shake you by the hand and say “thank you very much, 
I enjoyed that”, you know, that little bit at the end when I say about the pictures, you know, 
“you’re not obliged to buy them but if you don’t buy one, our Civic Ambassadors will be very 
upset"
E: (laughs)
P2: ...you know, again they laugh and now they're gonna walk out with a smile on their face. 
E: Yeah.
P2: And then they come along and say “could I have a picture with you?”. The City Dignitary 
is there to present the certificate. If they have family, I ask them “do you have family or 
friends here today?” [and they’re like] “Yes", right, “do you want a picture?”. They don't all 
want a picture. So, in they come for a picture. More often than not, the Civic Ambassador 
wants me in the picture. Sometimes, I’ll just step back. If there’s three or four family 
members, fine, it’s your day. If there’s one person on their own, I’ll ask them “do you have 
any friends or family here today?”. I already know the answer cos I’ve seen them when they 
come in to register and they say “no” and I say “would you like to join me in the picture with 
you?”. [They say] “Yes ”, I say “I’ll be your uncle today ”. Yeah, “uncle” or “your brother”, “I’m 
too young to be your dad”...
E: (laughs)
P2: .. .“I’m your uncle today”. And they, they’re grateful for that. And the reason I do that: a) 
they’ve then got someone else in the picture, it’s not just two of them and by me saying “I’ll 
be your uncle today", a lot of the people that we’ve got here are Black or, yeah, they’re, 
yeah...by virtue of what they’re here for, they’re not White English (laughs), are they? So 
when I say “I’ll be your uncle" and this guy is, you know, so far removed from me cos he’s, 
he’s, he’s Black-African, they laugh. So again, it just, you know, it breaks the ice and it 
rounds off the occasion. And when they’ve gone back into the waiting room, if I’ve got time,
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then I’ll go in there or they’re coming out and they’ve got the pictures [and I say] “Oh, let me 
have a look", you know? Same when they’re with children. I might say to them “Yeah, if 
you’ve got, it's nice to see the children here”, yeah, I could put up with some noise, it’s not a 
problem, but if they get restless and by that I mean noisy, it’s not fair for everyone else. Then 
you might need to step out of the room.
E: Of course. Yes.
P2: And if they quiet down, bring them back. You know? So, it’s all about making it as, as 
good an experience for them. And if it’s good an experience for them, it’s good an 
experience for me. Cos I’m getting satisfaction. Cos a lot... most jobs get repetitive, don’t 
they?
E: Yes, of course. O f course.
P2: Professional footballers can get bored with kicking a ball...a snooker player, you know, 
flashing balls round the table can get fed up. It’s what you put in, it's what you get out, to 
make the job...you know.
E: I think it’s two-three years since the ceremonies started?
P2: Well, it’s obviously going before I joined. I think, I think w e’ve actually got registers that 
go back possibly to... until late 2003.
E: It’s recent...
P2: Relatively recent because if you hear some of our Civic Dignitaries that have become 
British citizens 30, 40 years ago, it was a much simpler process where they simply apply, 
they were then told to go along to a solicitor, swear the oath, pay 3.5 pounds and that was it. 
E: Is it better now?
P2: Well, I think so from, from...many different respects. In that they have a ceremony that 
they can attend. I tell people to come along with their guests or someone else and they said 
“Oh, we didn’t have this when I got my citizenship". They get a medal as well as, it’s little 
keep-sake, you know, [they say] “I haven’t got one of those". W e have even, we have even 
considered but we’re not so sure if we could afford the time and also have the 
accommodation to maybe do a renewal of citizenship vows.
E: W here did that idea come from?
P2:1 think one or two people alluded to it and then I picked up on it and said “hm, that’s 
something to think about".
E: So, there would be people that became British...
P2: 25 years ago.
E: And they would do the ceremony...
P2: It’s a bit like people that come in and renew their marriage vows.
E: Yes. Yes.
P2: Yeah? Then maybe we could do the same. But, at present we, we would struggle 
because of accommodation, because of staff numbers. You know, we do sometimes find 
ourselves up against it and when you’re like that, you can’t always then give the same kind 
of service that I’ve just explained to you.
E: Yes.
P2: If you’re really, yeah, up against it, well, you’ve got other things to do and you haven’t got 
enough people in the general office and you’ve got people who want marriage certificates 
and copies of birth certificates, so that they can go get a passport, yeah, all this, all this has a 
knock-on effect.
E: How are the people at the ceremonies? How do you think they respond to the process? 
P2: It’s a mixed bag. W e get those that have some enthusiasm for it, those that are very 
quiet by their nature, that’s they way they are. The real...one of the tests is at the end when I 
say “right, we now finish with the playing of the national anthem. The words are printed on 
the back of the card you’re reading from earlier. It is only the first verse, so you won’t get out 
of breath when you join it”. Otherwise they’ll think “you can play the national anthem, fine, I’ll 
just stand here.” A lot of them do, but I’m trying to invite them.
E: And do they respond to that?
P2: Some of them do. Some of them respond very good. It's the same as when I ask them to 
say their... to say their pledge or to swear the oath. I do say to them, “you can all speak at 
the same time provided you speak up.” Because I mean to actually see everyone of them 
say the words. I can’t hear them all. Some, some of them could just be mumbling. And 
anyone that’s over 65, isn’t required, to sit the exams 
E: Yeah.
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P2: ...because they might find it difficult to learn the language or whatever. But it, it...I am in 
a position, if I’m not happy with an applicant, to not allow the ceremony to take place.
E: Has that happened?
P2: Yes.
E: What happened?
P2: He came in and he couldn’t understand what I was saying. People say “I want to use an 
interpreter!”. I say, “well that defeats the object of them becoming British citizens”, sitting the 
Life in the UK test, which shows that you’ve got some ability to actually acquire knowledge 
about England, to be able to speak and understand. And this chap didn’t...in my opinion 
could not have sat and passed the test. So, he had someone else do it for him. There have 
been, there have been examples up and down the country where people have got their Life 
in the UK test falsely.
E: Oh, OK.
P2: OK? So I said "I’m not prepared to do your ceremony today” and afterwards I sent, I sent 
the certificate back to the Home Office, with my views. I said I wasn’t happy with his standard 
of English, comprehension, you know, his friend was slightly better than him. I said “at the 
end when I was trying to explain to him, I used a 14-year old boy as an interpreter". So, in 
my eyes, he, he couldn’t pass that test. Therefore, he doesn’t deserve to be a British citizen. 
All he kept saying was “please, boss”. He kept just saying “please, boss, please, boss”. I 
said “you can say ‘please’ as much as you like, I’m not happy that you are in a position to 
become a British citizen". I told him what I was going to do. I wasn’t rude. And he wasn’t rude 
back. He was a relatively young man, in his early 20s. And he did actually come back some 
weeks later, but there was no, I had no certificate back from the Home Office for him, so he 
turned up hoping that someone else would be there and he would be able to, perhaps, not 
force his way in, but buy some kind of deceit. Cos people, we get people that turn up, they’re 
not on our list and what we do is we go on “OK, you are here. I’ve only got 12 people here 
today instead of 15, I’ve got time, I'll go and find your certificate and yes you can do happy 
ceremony". Provided they've got the paperwork. So, they can do that. And he was maybe 
hoping that he would get someone, he didn’t realise I’d sent, he didn’t remember I was going 
to send his certificate back.
E: He was hoping that you still had his certificate.
P2: Maybe, maybe. I spoke to him, I said “you’re here with someone else, sir?". Yeah, you 
don’t assume that you know that he's here for that. You're giving the opportunity and he said 
“I’ve actually come along for the ceremony, sir”. So, I said to him “I haven’t got your 
certificate, sir. It’s back with the Home Office. I did tell you that I was returning it”. So, you 
need to speak to them.
E: People should be able to speak English then?
P2: Oh, that’s the purpose. When we do the Nationality Checking Service, when those 
people come in, if they say that they come in with a friend and you ask them a question, 
"when did you get indefinite leave to remain?" and the friend answers us and I say “excuse 
me, sir. I need the gentleman or lady to answer this question for me, it’s their application, not 
yours" and then they keep interrupting and my answer is then “sir, if you can’t keep quiet, as 
I’ve requested, then I’ll ask you to sit in the waiting room". Cos if they can’t answer simple 
questions, like “where did you sit your Life in the UK test?”, then I’ve to suspect there’s 
something not quite right about their application.
E: And does this happen?
P2: A couple of times I’ve sent people away. And said “If I send your application off now, I 
would feel obliged to say that I was not happy with your standard of speaking English or 
understanding". Doesn’t mean to say they’ve got to know every word in the English 
language, but at least be able to answer the basic questions.
E: But they have passed the Life in the UK test.
P2: Well, I’ve got, I’ve got a Life in the UK test letter that it’s been issued. But, if I believe that 
from my experience with them, that they couldn’t have sat that test, then I’ve got to make 
some comment to them. And if, if, if they insist [that] I send off their application, I would do 
that. But I would say in my notes to the Home Office, “this person’s standard of, of speaking 
English and understanding English, it was very poor and I would question whether or not 
they could have sat and passed the Life in the UK test". Now, where they listen to me and 
understand and like I said, well, it’s nervous, it’s this and that, what I say to them is “I’m 
going to make you another appointment, not charge you anymore money”, cos it’s 40 
pounds for an individual. “What I’m going to do is make another appointment for you in say
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two months or three months, tell you what that date is, that time is so you know when you’re 
coming back and during that time I want you to go away and to try and improve your 
English”. When I’ve got an 8-year old boy there that’s telling his mum what I’m saying, what 
does that tell you? I said “you must spend more time with your son, to learn from your son." 
Yeah? If you’re not able to get out of the house, because you’ve got other children and what 
have you, you must improve your English.
E: W hat are your views on the content of the test?
P2:1 don’t know. I’m not, I’m not, I’ve not gone, gone on the system to actually look at that 
test. Yeah my, my hours here, Monday to Friday are fully employed in doing my work without 
actually going and looking at the test.
E: It’s not part of your job.
P2: No, it would...there are lot, lots of different things that we can go and look at... yeah, we 
have access to the Home Office website, where they issue updates on the...on the 
guidance notes for the Nationality Checking and what have you. There are other websites 
that we have to go on where they issue updates concerning marriages, registration of births 
and deaths. There’s enough to do in that area without having to find the time to go and look 
and see what this test involves. Yeah? I mean I hear snippets from people, yeah, about 
aspects of it and I think, yeah, fair enough. But, I’m fairly sure that a lot of the questions in 
that test couldn’t be answered by the indigenous population, let alone the immigrants. So, 
what does that tell you? So, how, how, how good is that test as part of this process? I don’t 
know. If I looked at the test, I might be a little more critical of it, so, I’ve intentionally not found 
the time to go and look at it.
E: Should people have some sort of knowledge about the UK?
P2:1 do, because...
E: Do you agree with the idea of the test?
P2:1 do, because, you know, we are but an island and this island is... is becoming densely 
populated, to the extent we’re having sufficient housing, you know, the government talks 
about having to build 3 million homes in 10 years. Yeah, we have...well according to the 
newspapers, I don’t look at any of the official statistics, but, you know, they say that we, we 
receive 500.000 people a year. Well, there's only so much that we as a country can provide 
for. And if the people that come into to the country are unable to provide for themselves, 
then, that then becomes a burden on our society. It becomes a burden on our schooling, on 
the National Health, social welfare, all those kind of things. So, unless the people are able to 
contribute, and the only way they can contribute by is, is...mixing with people, you know, 
working across the different kind of cultural divides, then it will always be a burden to us. 
W e’ve, w e’ve got to, we’ve got to make sure that everyone can work together. If they come 
in and think that they will just see this country as a remote island of that country or that 
country or that country, that’s not the way to do it. You know, if that’s what you want, stay in 
the country where you’ve come from. If you’re looking to come to this country, then you’ve 
got to be prepared to mix, understand. And we are the most tolerant society probably in the 
world. Because of the, the, the diverse, diverse mix of people that we have here. And we in 
this country seem to give more time and understanding to foreign people's needs than our 
own indigenous...
E: Does this happen, you think?
P2:1 do. I do. Yeah.
E: In what sense?
P2: If you look at schooling, at schools. Yeah? There are some schools now where they 
don’t actually teach English. I’ve got that from one of my colleagues. [There are] three white 
children in the class that are English and they’re not actually teaching English as a subject.
E: Is that a state school or...
P2:1 don’t... I think it’s a state school. I’m not sure. But, I mean, that’s an observation they 
made at that, I’m not...so, it’s third party information, but, every, every school, they say “we 
are, we are obliged to take that child because it moved into this area and we will take them 
on, but we haven’t got a teacher that speaks that language”... So, it then becomes a drain on 
their resource to find someone that can come in and in some instances, I’ve even heard that 
even the children act as interpreters. So, again it’s got an impact on the, on the quality of the 
teaching. Now, if you actually you check, check that out, I’ve a 24-year old daughter, who’s a 
primary school teacher. She’s been doing teaching and she starts in January full-time with a 
reception class. That’s over, back in [...]. But, you know, I've got experience, my 4-year old 
granddaughter started in September, so I know that this does happen. And it does put a
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drain on our, on our resources, that and how they’re used. You can't, you can’t [inaudible] for 
everyone, so in effect what we do is we reduce the service. It’s no different from this office. 
You know, if I’ve only got seven people in this building, and our full complement of staff is 
meant to be fifteen, something has to give. But the town hall say “why would someone need 
to wait two hours to register a baby?” You can’t have it all. Yeah, they say “you’ve got, 
you've got to give quality and value of service”. Well, you can, within reason. Yeah? I mean 
I’ve had many years of not taking lunch breaks and my colleagues now say “you must take a 
lunch break". You know, when I was manager and I had staff, you know, I would just take a 
15-minute break and that would be it. But they don’t, they don’t share that view downstairs 
and they’re ‘Tm gonna take my hour”. So, you’ve got four people waiting in the waiting room. 
You’re used to say to them “I’m sorry, you’ve got to wait another hour till you’re gonna have 
any certificate issued.” So, if that... you know, w e’ve had people who come in here and 
they’re asking for things but they don’t speak English. [They say] “I’ll speak to that gentleman 
because he speaks Urdu”. [And I’m like] “Sorry, that gentleman is registering births and 
deaths. He’s not here to be your interpreter”. “Ah, but he spoke to me last time I was here”. 
He may have done, but we’re not here to provide a translation service.
E: Should the government be, then, stricter on how many people they receive...
P2: Yes. Not, not, not to be difficult for those people who want to come into the country, but 
simply for the overall balance, if you like, in the country in terms of who come into the 
country, what skill sets they bring to the country, what demands they will put on our, on our 
society, the schools, the hospitals, the social service, all these things that w e’ve mentioned, 
but... and, and, and housing. You know, people will come into this country and, and, and 
they may well have come from an, an oppressed regime, you know, where, where they’ve 
come from and they will be given accommodation. Where we had people in this country 
that’ve been 10 years on some kind of housing list with the council, they live with, with family, 
they’re overcrowded, yet they’re bypassed. You know, I’m not, I’m not in any way racist. You 
know, it doesn’t... and I’ve been, I’ve been accused of being racist...by neighbours.
E: What, what for?
P2: A white mother and a black daughter, and when we first moved in they weren’t that 
communicative and if they had a problem [like] “oh, my car has broken down, could you 
come and have a look at it?’’, [I was like] “Oh, yeah, fine”, or [she would say] “I just bought a 
television for my daughter for Christmas, I can’t tune it in. Could you drop in and have a 
look?” [and I would say] “Yes, I’ll do that for you" and the first time that they actually parked 
the car on a shared drive, you’re not meant to park on shared drives, they’re for access only, 
my partner said “could you move the car, cos I can’t get my car out?” [and the neighbour 
replied] “where do you want me to put it?". She [my partner] said "either on the drive”, 
politely, “either on the drive or in your garage”. So, yeah she slammed the door shut and my 
partner came in, she said “could you believe that woman?”. And she didn’t say that “black 
woman” or anything like that cos my partner has lived in this area so she’s been brought up 
with the mix of societies.
E: Yeah.
P2: You know, like me, she works with all sorts of different races. And she told me what had 
happened, so I said "hang on a minute”. So, I went out and as she parked the car, she took it 
back down the shared drive, and I thought she was going to knock down the gas-box off the 
side of the wall. I said ‘“excuse me”. She said “Don't talk to me. You’re racist”. I said "Oh, 
you’re gonna pull that one, are you?’’. So, from that point on, I was no longer a good 
neighbour. I didn’t take up their bins every week when they would full, because the mum was 
all around, the daughter was working night work. You know, if they, they would knock on my 
door and said “oh, the car is not working". So all the time I was a good neighbour, that was 
fine. The minute politely she was asked to move the car, we were racist. So...it could, it could 
act like, like an excuse, you mean. Like... They, they can, these people can use it, like a chip 
on their shoulder. And I’m not saying that white people can’t do the same in, in a slightly 
different way cos they can. Cos they always make, you know, find some reason to, to point 
the finger at you rather than themselves, yeah, their failure. But, as I said, I’m, I’m not racist,
I treat everyone the same here.
E: You said there should be some limits on how many people the country receives. What 
about the people that become citizens?
P2:1 think, I think that if you put a limit of... cos, because people that come to the country, 
they don’t necessarily have to apply to become British citizens. Our Civic Ambassador has 
been in this country 34 years and she's still Indian.
232
E: OK. Yeah.
P2: And she came here as a victim of an arranged marriage. Her husband was member of 
the Armed Forces in [...] and, I’m not so sure of his nationality, he's an Asian, I know that, 
and at 19 she was made to come over here.
E: And she didn’t decide to naturalise...
P2: No, I think she will do it at some point, but, but she hasn’t done it. She says this is her 
home, even when she goes to India and visit, you know, she’s looking to come home. When 
she’s been to see family and, and what have you. So I think that... if, if you limit the number 
of immigrants, then it follows that the number of citizens would reduce. And I don’t, I don’t 
mind if every person who was allowed into the country became a British citizen. I really don’t. 
If they pass the test, then, and, and there’s a new point system that’s going to come into 
being, which is what a lot of other countries do. You know, Australia and, and New Zealand 
and such like. If you, if you have no skill sets to offer to this country, then no. Sorry, no. 
Because you need to be able to contribute to society. Not to come in here and live off the 
state. Yeah, we’ve got pensions, in this country where in years to come my pension is not 
going to anywhere near worth what it was, say, 20 years ago. Why? And that’s because the 
amount of money that’s being paid out of the government coffers for all of these other 
benefits for people, you know, single parent families and, and things like that and people that 
say that they’re incapable of work and therefore want incapacity benefit, are they really 
incapable or they’re just lazy? And that can be as many white people as it can be foreign 
people. So we do need to have some kind of... there’s no control over them. Yeah, we’ve 
seen over the last two years that the criticisms at the various Ministers that have been 
responsible for the Home Office. And now that one is gone and someone else’s stepped in 
and that someone else. They keep moving the people, so that they can’t keep hitting them 
with the same kind of criticism. They say, “Well, I ‘m just taking it on, you know, I can’t be 
responsible for what went on then”.
E: Yeah.
P2: But there’s got to be, there’s got to be some kind of control. It’s the same as there’s got 
to be some degree of control in schools over discipline. Yeah, I’m not just homing in on 
immigrants.
E: Yeah.
P2: Yeah, there are, you know, maybe we don’t provide enough entertainment for the 
teenagers of this country. Yeah, where they can go to youth clubs and not be hanging 
around on the street corners and mugging old people and, and doing, yeah, obviously it’s 
terrible, when you hear of 80-year old people being beaten up for a few pence. So, rather 
than let this happen and give very weak jail sentences because the prisons are 
overcrowded, let's spend some money at the front end to try and make sure that they’re not 
taken, taken down that path. That they are good members of society. It’s what unfortunate, 
the youngsters is. They’re likely to take more notice of bad influences in their life than good 
influences. Yeah, they’ll always mock mum and dad when they say "Oh, you need to be in 
such and such a time” or "no, you're not going out with that particular person because he’s a 
trouble-maker”. You know? Or “don’t smoke, it’s not good for you”. They’ll always do the 
opposite of what you tell them.
E: Well, yeah...
P2: Unless, unless you set a good example. None of my children smoke. My parents 
smoked, my in-law smoked. And I say to my children “they all died as a result, or main 
contributing factor, of them smoking". My mum didn’t speak for the last 11 years of her life 
cos she had throat cancer. She lost her voice chords. I said to the children “Nanny smokes 
from a young age. I can remember when I was small Nanny always smoking”. And so 
they’ve accepted me for what I said there. Now, I may, may not be factually correct in saying 
that, but they’ve accepted what I said and it's worked.
E: It works.
P2: None of them smokes. None of them are great drinkers. I’m not a great drinker. My dad 
was. My father-in-law was. But it ruins your life. If it gets hold of you.
E: It does, yes.
P2: So, it’s, it’s... it’s trying to set examples and that’s when... I don’t only talk about setting 
examples at home, but also examples here... If I choose, if I treat an 18-year old with respect 
in here as I will do with a 75-year old in here, then I would hope that he would acknowledge 
that... Well, it takes you through life. You know? The same as if a guy comes to my house to 
do a job or work, I'll respect him for the job that he’s doing. Whether it’d be the gas man,
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yesterday, when he came to look at the boiler, or the man that is going to chop down some 
trees. You know. Can you give me a quarter to do that job? Yes, I can. Right, nice to see 
you. And then he goes to offer his hand and his hand's dirty. So, I said “don’t let that put you 
o ff. I said “You’re a working man”. I said “I can wash my hand" you know, I’d shake his 
hand, unless, he's been down the toilet (laughs).
E: (laughs)
P2: But that’s the respect. You know?
E: Yeah.
P2: So, if you take that through life, I don’t think you can go very wrong. The trouble is that 
youngsters today have a bit of a problem with respect. They don’t get up and stand on the 
train to let you sit down. Even pregnant ladies, that have, you know, 8 months gone and they 
don’t do it. They don’t do it. And it’s because it’s not enough of an example being set to 
them. W e ’ve got second generation now families where the parents have never worked, the 
children aren’t working and the next ones are coming along.
E: Yeah, to get back to this, you mentioned contribution earlier. So, how can people 
contribute?
P2: Well...if the, if we, if we use the system that the Australians use and the New  
Zealanders, they only take professional people. Plumbers, carpenters, accountants. People 
that they know when they go into the country can actually pay their own way, not live off 
savings, can contribute to society. OK? People that go out there and all they are is road 
sweepers, they’re not going to get in, because they’re gonna struggle then to live, they’re 
gonna struggle to find somewhere to live and have sufficient money to live on. So, they won’t 
get enough points. And that could be said here.
E: So, in terms of work...
P2:1 think so, because... I mean that’s, when you consider how much of our, our, of our life 
is either spent working or sleeping, you know, you’ve got to then say “wait a minute, I’ve got 
to take this person during their working hours, what they can contribute to the society, to this 
company, to this country”. OK? In terms of taxing. Now a lot of the, the immigrant workers 
that are coming in are contributing. You know, there are nearly 6 billion pounds that comes 
into the Exchequer. Because we’ve got so many people now that won’t go and pick potatoes 
in the fields, but Eastern Europe people will do that. Well, if our people won’t do it, then fine, 
invite them in. For all the ones that are here, come up with something that where they’ve got 
to find some work, they’ve got to do something. Even if it means going cleaning up all of the 
areas that have become run down. You know, like this community work. Or if someone does 
a crime, they don’t actually put him in prison, they say “Right, you're gonna go clear all that 
nature reserve cos it's all got overgrown". Find something for them to do.
E: Why do you think people come to Britain in the first place?
P2: Because they think that the country is a soft touch, because they will get benefits without 
so much... trouble. Yeah, they get, they get somewhere to live. Now, if, if we have to reduce 
the numbers of the people who come to this country, I’m not saying that they should all be 
workers. It may well be that you’ve got a percentage of those people that are true asylum 
seekers. I think the term asylum now is grossly misused. But if there are people that live in 
fear of their life, because of what they say or their religion or whatever, then we’ve got to 
make some room for some of these people. But we shouldn’t take on all of the problems of 
the rest of the world. Other countries don’t do it. But w e’ve got a European policy now that 
tries to dictate to us what we’ll do. Rather than our own government. Would you not agree? 
E: I’m not sure. I'm not familiar with...all the laws and everything. But, yeah, I know that the 
UK and the EU have been having, there’s some tension there in terms of immigration.
P2: Yes. I mean why is it all the all the Eastern Europeans all, all flock through France and 
then sit in Calais waiting to jump on the back of the lorry? Or train or something like that. 
Because they know that England is, is the place where they want to be. So they can get as 
much as they can out of the country. I mean I’ve met some, some youngsters that have 
come into this country, 12 or 14 year old, and then they’ve gone to 18 or 19, they apply to 
become British citizens. And then they’re telling me what they’ve done and I’ve met some 
nice, and they’ve got letters that they’ve brought in from particular places and they say “He’s 
done a fantastic job. Voluntary work. He’s helping do this and he’s helping do that and he’s 
now, you know, he’s got a little job as a photographer and bla-bla-bla". Great. This is a 
success story. So, I’m not, I’m not looking to put the shutters out for the sheer hell of it. I 
think we need it so that we can continue to be a worthwhile society to help other people. But 
if we get swarmed, we won’t be able to do that.
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E: OK, there are some reasons that people actually come to the UK. Why do you think 
people decide... some of them decide to get the citizenship?
P 2 : ... (long pause)
E: I mean you’ve talked to many of them, I guess.
P2: Probably not as much as I’d like to because again it comes down to time. I think you can 
see with some of them how much it means, you know, when they get a bit tearful or they 
come up and they show their gratitude that they've got that. Others, we give them the wallet 
where it’s got the application form for the passport, you step outside and all you find is the 
wallet. They’ve got the application form for the passport. The rest is thrown away. All they 
want is the passport because it might well give them more entitlement, it certainly makes 
their travel easier than got to get visas to go all over the place. And they think that well “once 
I’m a British citizen, then, you know, I’m secure". Reality is that in this country you don’t have 
to have a British citizen, to be secure. If you’ve been resident in this country for 10 years or 
more, then you can stay here, don’t have to be a British citizen. You can’t be kicked out. Not 
so long ago, there was a guy, can’t remember the exact detail, he committed crimes and I 
think it was a murder and the Home Office said “we’re gonna kick him out” and he reminded 
that “you can't do that". He’s, he’s got a right to family life. He’s been in this country for about 
14 years, more than a 10-year old, he’s got to stay. So, I guess his punishment here, which 
is much much less than if he had committed that crime back in his own country, he’d be 
dead now. This country gave him...7 years? And people that they let out, they then commit 
same crimes, worse crimes. So, our punishment in this country isn’t good enough. That’s 
not, that’s not the fault of the immigrants. That’s the fault of weak, weak government. But 
again, they won’t build more prisons cos it, again, it costs money. It costs a lot of money to 
keep a prisoner each week in a cell.
E: Yeah, I never thought of that, but I guess it does.
P2: More, it costs more money to keep them in a cell than it would cost you to stay in the 
Dorchester for a week.
E: (laughs)
P2: That is the truth. If we won’t build any more prisons, then we can’t punish people to the 
same extent or the same kind of tariff as they call it, as what we did 5 years ago or 10 years 
ago. Yeah, when they say “he’s got life for committing murder" and it’s 20 years, that’s a 
generation, that’s not a life, is it?
E: Yes.
P2: So, they say “but if he, if he, if he behaves himself, then he’ll get time off’. Yeah, that 20  
years could be reduced effectively to 10. And then they let him out and he does it again. 
Yeah, w e’ve got care in the community in this country that doesn’t work. Since that was 
introduced in the early 1990s by the Conservatives, there’ve been over 700 people killed by 
people that are cared in the community, that are no longer taking their drugs. There’s, there’s 
a name that you might recall, “Ziko”, a woman whose husband was killed on a, on a platform 
station, underground station. And she’s now been for years and years trying to make young 
people more aware of this and these people need to support and they need to make sure 
they’re taking their medication, and they’re doing it. Because we should close all, all the 
mental hospitals. So, they’re let out with the community for the community to worry about 
them. But if you don’t know who’s living next door to you, how can you look after them? How 
would you know to look after them? I’m not a professional nurse or psychiatrist, a psychiatric 
nurse. How can I do that? You know, there’s, there’s so much wrongness in this country and 
w e’ve gone right off the track from what you wanted to meet to talk about (laughs).
E: No, I think, I mean, in a way or another these things are relevant...So we talked about the 
legal requirements of becoming British. What is British for you? W hat does it mean for you to 
be British?
P2:1 want to say that it, it means anything more to me than say... where do you come from? 
E: Greece.
P2: To say, you know, I think that the British is any better than, than Greek people. You 
know? I’ve got friends that are Greek people. I’ve got, my, my son, his sister in-law is 
married to a Greek man. And they live in [...] and it’s funny listening to a Greek Barnsley 
accent, (laughs)
E: (laughs)
P2: So, I suppose, yeah, people talk about being British and it’s really, it's a thing of the past. 
It is a thing of the past. Because British now means so many different things to so many 
different people. It’s not just the Union Jack, the flag, it’s not just the monarchy. Yeah, these
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are all small facets. I would sooner... I mean I’m not particularly Christian person or a 
religious person. I have, I am a humanitarian. So, if someone said to me, someone landed 
from another planet and said "What are, who are you?", I’d say “I’m a person from this 
planet”. Not a person from this country. And I like to think I’m a good person. You know? So, 
I’m no better than anyone else. I think I'm proud to be part of this...nation... and whatever 
makes that up. Whether it be the white English, Black, Greeks that’ve become... that 
relinquish their, their Greek citizenship and then become British. I mean that to me is a great 
shame. If you then sacrifice your own... country in order to become a British citizen.
E: W hy is that?
P2: Not, not... it’s a shame, it’s a disappointment that they feel that they’ve got to do that. 
Why should they do that? Is it because they feel that their country has nothing to offer? 
Nothing to offer them? As we said earlier it’s all about give and take. You know? You need to 
make this place better by what you do and what you contribute, yeah, if I have more leisure 
time, then I’d like to do more things for the society. Years ago, I used to drive voluntarily an 
ambulance.
E: Yes.
P2: For a club for people that had multiple sclerosis. You know... Every Thursday night from 
about 6 ’o clock to 11 ’o clock, with an hour’s break, I need to get grab some dinner, I pick 
people up, take them to their little club and that was the only time they got out. They were in 
wheel chairs. They couldn’t actually get out. So, they went to a church hall and they played a 
little game of bingo and did this and did that. And that was the only time they could get out. I 
had to stop doing that when my job moved away and I wasn't able to carry on. So, it’s all 
about, it’s more about what you give to than what you take. Mainly to people because 
countries are made up of people...
E: Yeah.
P2: ...they’re not made up of buildings and the green spaces and things like that. It’s all 
about the people. And what they, what they want their country to be. The area in which they 
live. Yeah.
E: Would you ever live outside this country?
P2: No ... The only time I would go and live outside this country is if my family were with me. 
When my job is relocated... for many many years, I’ve always left the family where they were 
and I’ve commuted long distances and lived in digs, you know, lodgings rather than travel 
every day. My partner would like to go and live in Greece, Crete...
E: Yeah?
P2: W e had our first holiday there and we have friends that live in Crete, we were out there 
in September. And she would move there tomorrow, but I...
E: But you wouldn’t?
P2:-l have 3 children. I’ve a granddaughter, hopefully I’ll have another grandchild with my 
son, I have a sister and her family, a brother and his family. And I suppose that those family 
ties are greater than...yeah, I love going to, to...I mean we go all over the place, different 
countries. W e have two holidays a year. But it’s good for a holiday. Not to live. The...the 
novelty would wear off. Living in Crete with all the sun and what have you. W hat would it do? 
It would...it’s the same as if I won the lottery. If I win five million pounds on a lottery, I don’t all 
of a sudden then go and buy a Ferrari sports car, I don't go and buy a yacht, football club, 
race horses, a big house with a massive drive, because that then puts me in an environment 
that I’m not familiar with. So that I’m uncomfortable with. Money is helpful to you and I would 
get more satisfaction with that money helping people than I would doing anything with it 
myself. You know, I’d sooner quietly say to family “your mortgage is paid off”. If they wanted. 
Some people are very proud. You have to respect that.
E: Of course.
P2: So I’d be happy that I could, that I’ve got the means to do what I want, but not actually 
going to do it. OK, maybe have few more holidays a year...
E: Yes, yes.
P2: But if I’m still working, then I’ve only got five weeks to take, yeah... So, I think you have 
to be realistic as to the way you are in society, how happy you are in your life and where you 
want to be. And I’m relatively content. You know, the job I enjoy, gives me enough 
satisfaction, good work-life balance, as I said earlier. And it gives me a chance to meet 
people which is quite an important part of the job. And sometimes when you get people that 
are difficult... and I’ve had one or two and I’ve had a woman sitting there giving me a lot of 
aggravation, the husband sitting there saying “No, no, no, no". Eventually, I won her over.
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You know and I’ve offered my hand to shake her hand and I’ve not let go of the hand and 
said “don’t want to let go of your hand till I see you smile." And then she said she forced 
herself but she managed to smile. And when they come in for ceremony, [it was] fine. But 
they just... we kept them waiting and then they said about the appointment and I said “Look, 
if I could have changed anything, I would have done it. I have apologised for other people, I 
can't apologise anymore” and she would keep going and that's why her husband said “look, 
he’s trying to help us”. So I said “well, thank you for saying that, Sir, cos I am trying to help 
you, I’m trying to make it better than it was". So that, you know, you get all those little 
challenges and that can be as rewarding as all the other good... handshakes that you get, 
“thank you for doing that" and “that was nice” and...
E: I’m sure it is.
P2: You know?
E: OK. I’d like to ask you something else.
P2: Yes.
E: Since w e’ve been talking on issues around the UK and Britain, how do you see this 
country say in the future like say 10 years’ time, maybe 20 years’ time?
P 2 : ... (long pause) If we continue as we are... and we don’t see... some significant changes 
in, in certain areas, then this country will not be as popular as it is. People will come to this 
country... potentially come to this country, with a misguided view of what this country is about 
cos they’re based on history rather than on what is now or what has actually happened.
E: W hat do you mean by ’history’?
P2: Well, being, yeah, people come to this country because we've got a good social, yeah, 
benefit system. You know, you come to the country as an asylum seeker, then you get help, 
you get perhaps a home and so on. OK, you can’t work, yes you’ve got a husband but he’s 
back wherever that may be... yeah, all that kind of thing. If they've got false impression of 
what this country is about, w e’re no longer able to fulfil that. I wouldn't say that we'll have 
anarchy. But we will have more unrest...more dissatisfied people and that will be a mix of 
people. So, we will have the indigenous population still criticising this and that. W e’ll have the 
foreign input that also say “yeah, this is what I expected and I’ve not got that" and there will 
be more friction, I believe. You know, w e’ve got UKIP, one of the political parties, yeah, 
United Kingdom Independence Party who has, who... the, their man that heads that up is 
seen more to be National Front.
E: Yeah.
P2: OK? They’ve got very very strong views on, on immigration. Extremely strong views. And 
some, some people could say that elements of their issues are correct and maybe that we 
should, should adopt them. But if, if we don’t, if we don’t recognise some of the issues that 
w e’ve got and they are major issues, then it will get worse. And then I think we’ll have, I think 
we'll have some...to show how it will actually manifest itself, we’ll probably get more rallies 
for London, you know, going on about immigration, if we don't put a cap on it, we’ll then get 
more rallies about the poor punishments given to offenders for murders and rapes and things 
like that. You know, the whole fabric of society will start to...
E: To weaken, somehow?
P2: It will. I’m sure it will. And, that, that gives me a great problem, because I’ve got children 
and I’ve got grandchildren. So, that doesn’t bode very well for them. You know, I’m now, 
yeah, in the last quarter of my life circle. So, it’s not perhaps going to affect me quite as 
much as it will affect them if that continues to perpetuate itself.
E: Yes.
P2:1 don’t know. W hat I believe would help... (long pause) would help this country, and not 
just this country, because so many countries around the world have got problems... (long 
pause) more often than not through religion...A lot of the wars have been caused by religious 
views and beliefs, it is if we could have a coalition government which is made up of all 
parties, so you then get a consensus of what we should do and how we should do it rather 
than the Conservatives all wanting to look after their haves that’ve got all the money, the 
Labour people trying to say that they help the people that haven’t got a lot, but they’re a little 
bit too feisty in what they say there and the Liberals that say “wouldn’t it be nice, if everything 
was nice and green and rosy and happy, it would be an idyllic world”, but, you know, w e’re 
not gonna get that. But if you had a mix of all of them and we came up with... fairly reasoned 
ways in what earned an explanation to why w e’re gonna do things, I think the country, 
country would benefit. And that could be said of any country that you looked at. Israel, Iraq, 
Iran, Cyprus, you know, where they’ve got this split there, where they don’t wanna get on.
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You know? Life is too short and you can’t hide behind religion to say "oh, that’s why I don’t 
like that person”, because he’s got another religion. That’s why this country, a lot of people 
are happy to come here. Because the see that, you know, you can believe in what you want 
and no one is going to put you down. But if you live in Iraq, you know, if you are a Shia or 
whatever it is, I think the Shia rule the...or is the...?
E: Sorry, are you talking about Iraq or Iran?
P2: Either because they both have similar... religions, but I mean when, when Saddam was... 
E: Yeah, it’s Shia and Sunny.
P2: Yeah, that’s right. When Saddam Hussein was there, the way that he treated... I mean I 
thought it was right that we did go and invade them. Because of what had happened to all 
the Kurds. You know. So that the Kurds have a right to live. But you know to go in and gas 
them. That was totally wrong, but people say, yeah "well, the Americans did it because of the 
oil situation”. Probably right. I think George Bush... I think he, he went for the invasion simply 
because he’s got very weak home policies, domestic policies and they needed something as 
a smoke screen to keep him in power. Cos he’s a muppet. He’s not got a lot of brain.
(laughs)
E: (laughs)
P2: But he's got a lot of power!
E: Yes, he does.
P2: So, I think that’s his real reason for going there, just as a smoke screen. Because he 
then says “yeah, look at me, I’m going out there, I’m defending us against terrorism and so 
on”. Yeah? That’s why there’s this conspiracy theory about the two planes...
E: Yes, yes.
P2: ...flying into the towers, you know. I mean I’ve, I mean I’ve watched various programs on 
that and that frightens me. To think that someone could possibly do that.
E: OK, I think, I think we are done.
P2: W e’re done.
E: Unless you want to add something.
P2: No, I don’t think so. I don’t think so. I’ve covered quite a bit there. Probably more than 
you wanted!
E: Thank you very much.
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Participant 45 -  Naturalised Citizen in Council B
Duration 1:25:31
E: So, OK, I’ll just start by asking just a few questions about yourself and what you do.
P45: I’m a dental technician.
E: OK.
P45: I’ve been doing it for thirteen, fourteen years now.
E: Long time.
P45: Yeah, it is a long time.
E: And you told me that you work nearby, right?
P45: Twenty minutes drive from where I live.
E: Twenty minutes.
P45: So I live in [...]51,1 work in [...]
E: Is that a nice part of London?
P45: Yeah, it’s very nice, very nice. Very nice, so...
E: Have you always been living there, in London?
P45: No I... no, I’ve started in the UK in... when I first arrived in London, then went to 
Glasgow...
E: Oh.
P45: And stayed there around fifteen months, in Glasgow and then I moved to London.
E: Did you work in Glasgow?
P45: Well, the first six months I didn't have the work permit.
E: Yeah.
P45: But after six months I’ve got my work permit and, but meanwhile I was... the first six 
months when I arrived there I wanted, cos in my kind of work, if you stop for few months you 
really slow down, you know, cos you have to do it all the time, otherwise if you leave a few 
months you get really really slow in your work, so I wanted not to be out of work, but I didn’t 
have a work permit. So I went, I went and worked in a lab as a volunteer. I used to go there 
for like five hours a day or something.
E: Oh, OK.
P45: And not ask for money, just work for him and just so I could keep in touch with the 
work.
E: W hat does your work entail? What does a dental technician do?
P45: For instance, if you go to dentist and you need a bridge or [inaudible] or anything of.... 
prosthetics, that’s what we do. Dental, that’s the word. So the dentist takes impressions and 
sends to us and we make the teeth and send them back to him and he fits it.
E: OK, OK.
P45: W e ’re the foot soldiers in the back.
E: (laughing) Nobody understands...
P45: (laughing) Nobody knows about the dental technicians. Everyone thinks that the dentist 
does it and...
E: Oh, so patients could go directly to you then, instead of...
P45: No, no. You’d be illegal. It’s because we’re not dentists, so w e’re not allowed to...
E: You don’t have like a medical...
P45: Yeah, w e’re not allowed to work on the patient. Unless, unless you’re a clinical 
technician which mainly works with if you’re making dentures and because in dental 
technology you can get, you have different branches, some people work in only orthodontics 
for instant (sic), they make all the wires and there are certain wires you need in the lab as 
well. And, but those people who does the dentures they do the orthodontics as well, you 
know remove the dentures? Then you can be clinical technician mainly if you do dentures 
because you can take impressions and you can maybe, cos, because if it’s only dental you 
don’t need any treatment cos all the teeth are out so, so you can work with patient, but the 
one I do is crowns and bridges so it’s more fixed work. So, once you put it, cement there and 
that’s it you don’t...
E: Do you like it?
51 Brackets are used to conceal names of people and places in order to maintain the 
anonymity of the participant.
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P45: Yes, I do, I do like it. But at times it can get very boring as well. Because the 
environment that I work, I work in a confined space, within, with four, five people and it’s not 
always nice, you know, because it’s you know the same people all the time, facing each 
other and it’s normal, you get, you get bored with it and you do the same thing every day.
E: Yeah.
P45: W hat makes it rewarding, I think makes it rewarding that if I get a good outcome, good 
results and the patient’s happy and you get feedback from the dentist saying that the patient 
is happy, I think that’s quite rewarding, or rewarding for me. At least you know that you’re 
doing something nice or giving a nicer smile to someone, you know. I think that’s the 
rewarding part for me. And plus, plus I like to think that I’m good in it, so... (laughing), so it’s 
quite good to know that you are doing something, you are good at something, you know?
E: Yeah.
P45: So, that’s the rewarding part. A few times, doing this thirteen, fourteen years, I sort of, 
you know, ’why don’t I change it or go do something else?’ I think the main reason for that is 
the financial because, not always, I didn’t get always good salaries. Because I’m, I’m an 
Armenian but I was born in Syria.
E: You’re Armenian?
P45: I’m an Armenian. I consider myself Armenian. But now I’m British-Armenian 
(laughing)... as you know. I born and bred in Syria. Here, I carry all this time, I had Syrian 
nationality.
E: Yes.
P45: But, but I don’t consider myself, I always considered myself Armenian.
E: Well, yes. W e ’ll get back to that.
P45: W e ’ll get back to that, OK. So I had, all this time I mean, I studied in Syria, the dental 
technology, graduated there and worked there for, I don’t know, five, maybe more than five 
years, more than five years. Worked there and salary was, was... wasn’t good.
E: W asn’t good.
P45: Only good when you own the lab. I mean, even here, salary is OK, I don’t have any 
complaints about that, but always, it is better, you know, the more is always better but 
sometimes...
E: But it’s better than Syria.
P45: Oh, much better than Syria. Here is everything is better organised, compared to there, 
you’re obviously better paid, but obviously you get much better results financially if you own 
the lab, your own business.
E: Yeah, of course.
P45: But that’s, that has it own difficulties as well.
E: So, you got your degree, worked there and came to Glasgow?
P45: My... I came to London and my, my reason I came to London to stay, it wasn’t, it wasn't 
like that I came to stay. And I came when I asked asylum to stay on the basis of my 
sexuality. Because I’m, I’m gay.
E: Oh. Did you have problems in Syria?
P45: Well, in Syria it’s crime.
E: W ere you prosecuted?
P45: Well, I didn’t, I wasn’t that unlucky to be caught but I was, I was this much close to.
E: Oh...
P45: And I mean it was like three years in prison, up to three years in prison and the 
situation was absolutely horrendous. Like for instance there’s a special section of prison that 
unofficially, unofficially for gay people that have been caught as doing any gay act. And even 
there, you know, the things people talk about it, not officially... So, you know, the things that 
you hear from people about that section is horrendous, you know? From rape being probably 
the simplest thing you get. If you got caught it would be the wrong day because they do 
consider homosexuality one of the lowest kinds of type of people or you know, or act against 
God...Because, for instance, although it doesn’t say, it doesn’t say it’s against God, but it is 
against the law to see two men having sex together because they consider this against the 
nature, an act done against the nature. Which is more or less in there, in there. It’s a Muslim 
country, majority. And in there it says it’s law, that God’s law was shaken when you saw two 
men having sex or things like that.
E: Are you Muslim yourself?
P45: I’m an Orthodox.
E: You’re an Orthodox?
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P45: Christian, yeah. Most Armenians are. Most Armenians.
E: I know. I’m Greek myself.
P45: Yes. Most Armenians are. Although there are Armenians Catholics and Protestants, but 
most the majority are Orthodox. So...
E: So you came this close to getting caught.
P45: Yeah, it was very close. You know I discovered at some point that the park it was a 
cruising area for instance, you know? And then, and there, as it was here like many years 
ago, police would...
E: Here in Soho you mean? In London?
P45: Here. Here in the UK. Police used to go with a friend, go and seduce people. This was 
talking maybe here... It was in the, in the... I cannot, I cannot be for sure. I think it’s the 70s. I 
think it was in the 70s.
E: And they would do that in Syria then, now?
P45: Up till now they do it in Syria.
E: So they would approach you in the park...
P45: Yeah, like for instance, if you’re ’cottaging’ in the park or in the toilet, public toilet, they 
approach you, they seduce you and they try to trap you there and if you get in he has 
handcuffs in his back, you’re handcuffed and that’s it. You probably don't see the daylight 
again for a few years. It’s not nice at all (laughing).
E: Yeah, that’s...
P45: Yeah, it’s a huge problem. So, finally, I came here.
E: So, was that the reason you decided to migrate?
P45: Yes. I mean, I was, I was, it wasn’t, it wasn’t that... I mean, apart from anything else it 
was a need for me to get out of there. It was a need for me to get out of there because I 
always knew that my life was going to start when I leave there and go to a Western country 
when I can, even if I shout out, say ‘I’m gay’ or whatever I am and nobody, no policeman 
would come and say 'Oh, you can’t say that’ or 'You can’t do anything like that’. So it was, for 
me it was a need, it was essential, it was a matter of survival. If I’d stayed there, that must, I 
don’t even wanna think what might happen or what my life would have taken a completely 
different direction.
E: And how come you came to Britain?
P45: No, it kind of, it kind of... I always wanted to come to England, but at the time... I kind of, 
I had basically, I had to, I had visa, I had Schengen visa to Europe.
E: That didn't cover the UK?
P45: That’s not for the UK. But what happens after I get the Schengen visa, which my aim 
was to go to France because I had a family friend. But I didn’t know anyone in the UK and 
although I knew the language, I knew English, but I didn’t know French. I was depending on 
that family. So I got the Schengen visa and then I was flying, I was coming with British 
Airways, I apply for a UK visa which obviously I got it, I got the visa...
E: Oh, was that easy for you?
P45: It wasn’t, no; that’s one really long story.
E: You got a UK visa while being in France?
P45: No, no, no, in Syria, before I leave. Before I leave. But the whole visa thing, I don’t 
really wanna go in that details, cos it’s a bloody mess, you know...
E: W as it a tourist visa?
P45: Yeah, it was all tourist visas. So eventually when I got there, my intention wasn’t to 
come to London, well I wanted to come to London but what was I going to do in London, eh? 
E: Yeah.
P45: Then I arrived in France and there is this family. I went there, kind of, you know, I was 
hoping that they would tell me to stay, cos you know my visa was going to expire after some 
time...
E: Yeah.
P45: And either you stay legal or you do something.
E: Yeah.
P45: But they, they... it’s quite strange. Cos they had... I think they’re a very Armenian family, 
very Armenian family.
E: Traditional you mean?
P45: Very traditional. More than, I mean very, very traditional.
E: Oh, OK.
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P45: Kind of, they don’t like, for instance, their kids are born and bred in France, but they 
didn’t want any interfere like for instance, or marriage or any, even boyfriends to their 
daughter with a French person would be, you know, like no-go area.
E: Yeah.
P45: So, when I arrived there it’s kind of, I think they were hoping that I’d get engaged or 
married to one of their daughter.
E: With their daughter...
P45: But little they knew that, you know (laughing).
E: (laughing) that it would never happen.
P45: That would never happen (laughing). So, obviously that didn’t work but they didn’t know 
I was gay. And there were a homophobic family as well, they didn’t like the gays, especially 
the father. He used to shout on gays every night, you know?
E: Oh...
P45: So, it wasn’t nice, it wasn’t comfortable at all. But luckily I met this French girl who knew 
English and I spoken to her and we went out for a drink and she realised I’m gay and I want 
to stay in France, I don’t want to go back. She was very, very helpful. She was the one who 
introduced, who took me to this... like an organisation who helped gay people who was 
involved in prostitution. But because she knew someone who knew this guy they said they 
might be able to help you in this matter. So, they were very, very, very nice, very helpful. 
They took me even to a legal adviser.
E: So they were the ones that suggested that you get, that you request asylum?
P45: Yeah, because the adviser said that -  she speaks English -  she said you have two 
ways ‘Either you get married or you become a refugee. There’s no other way for you to do it.’ 
And plus, she said, because you know, 'your first entry was the UK, first safe entry, because 
in the Geneva law it says the first safe entry, you have to apply asylum in the first safe 
country you arrive’. Say for instant, your life is in danger, you are running away from your 
country, and you arrive at a safe place, you have to stay there. You know, you can’t pick and 
choose.
E: W as that France for you?
P45: No, because at first when I flew, I flew to the UK and then went to...
E: Oh, OK, OK.
P45:1 stayed one day here and then went to... to Lyon and then Valance. So my first safe 
entry...
E: W as the UK.
P45: W as the UK. That’s where the idea came that I come, I come here. And plus, you know, 
it was kind of, it worked in... it worked out very well for me, because there’s, there I was 
stuck with this family, they were very homophobic. The girl had hoped, has hoped and she 
has started even, it was very obvious, she started hoping. I don’t know if she had feelings as 
well that, towards me within this month I stayed there. And it was very dangerous move from, 
you know...It was kind of...
E: Not a good start.
P45: Not a good start, you know. I stay there in a family they don’t like the gays, and they’re 
hoping that I get married to their daughter which will never happen and plus making 
someone who is only twenty at the time, or ninteen, I didn’t want to give any false hopes to 
anyone and when that happens and as I say, you know, and I decided T h a t’s it, I go there’. 
Cos I knew that was the only way. And I can’t get married to anyone, obviously, and I don’t 
want to get married to anyone to stay somewhere...
E: Yeah.
P45: And my only choice was to ask asylum.
E: So was that easy to get?
P45: Well, it was and it wasn’t. It was because, it was, in a way, because I was lucky I got it 
within eleven months. So, it wasn’t a long wait for me compared to other people.
E: OK.
P45: When I first arrived here, 1 went to the Home Office and I asked, so it was a 
government thing. When someone arrives in London and asks asylum they send you out of 
London. They don’t let you stay here. Because of everyone wants to stay in London and the 
population is... that was my time, this is seven years ago, everyone who arrives here, unless 
you have someone to stay with in London, so if you are, if you don’t have anyone else to 
stay, you can’t stay in London. You have to be dispersed out, outside, somewhere in the UK. 
So,I don’t want to get into much detail cos you know, it was like a drama (laughing), a lot of
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things were happening, but eventually I got, I got after months staying in like emergency 
accommodation.
E: Outside of...
P45: No, no, here in London, waiting to be sent somewhere else.
E: OK.
P45: So initially, the process, initially you fly, they don’t ask you much questions, just initial 
questions, you reply so you’re going into the system, your papers go in there, and then you 
wait till you get dispersed to somewhere else. And also... so anyway, after a month of 
waiting, my... because I don’t know why, I got two, three different places that I could choose 
from. I think because in my application I said I’m gay and I don’t want to be dispersed in 
places where the gays are not welcome, take that into consideration. But I think because of 
that I got first Cardiff, and that didn't happen because I was the only one to be sent there and 
they didn’t want to spend a whole bus to take me there so they cancelled that (laughing).
E: (laughing).
P45: And then I got Bolton and Glasgow at the same time. And I asked the people there, 
they were very nice, because I was helping them in translating cos I know Arabic, Turkish, 
English and Armenian. So, I was...
E: Oh (impressed)!
P45: No, it’s not (laughing)... It's not that big deal. W e grew up with few languages, you 
know, in Syria. So, they were quite helpful to me because I was helping them.
E: In Glasgow?
P45: No, no, this is in London who, you know, a group of people who’s responsible for, to 
disperse these people who have left their towns and everything. So they have an office in 
this emergency accommodation.
E: Oh, OK.
P45: So they cannot govern all, organise, you know, the people who come from all over the 
place, different languages, most of them they don’t know English, so I was kind of there 
helpful to them cos I could speak with the Turks, with the Arabs, there were few Armenians 
as well (laughing). So I was a hero there for them (laughing). And they were very helpful 
because when I got those letters they say ‘Oh, take our advice and go to Glasgow, don’t go 
to Bolton.’ And now I know it is definitely the best choice because Bolton, Glasgow is much 
better than Bolton to start with, especially as a gay man rather than... so...
E: As a city, yeah.
P45: And people were very nice and helpful and friendly. And it was, I mean, you have to 
imagine that everything was a new start for me, even though, I knew I was gay for a long 
time and, but everything I knew about this life it was theoretical, for I had loads of 
experience, but living in a place that you can gay, you can say you’re gay, go to gay bar and 
meet gay people, it was, everything was new. So it was very, very good for me to start in 
somewhere like Glasgow. Because, because people were nice and the scene was small, not 
like London. London can be a scary place if you arrive the first time, you know, especially if 
you are not experienced, you don’t know how to deal in a certain situations. It was, 
everything was new for me, everything was new. So that’s how I ended up in Glasgow, so I... 
the law of asylum the first six months you can’t work. But if within six months you haven’t 
heard anything from the Home Office, you haven’t heard any reply or decision.
E: Yeah, approval.
P45: Approval or denial you can apply for work permit. So after six months I haven’t heard 
anything so, and I was working as a volunteer in this lab...
E: Yes.
P45:1 went and applied for work permit and, and I got it. I went to the Immigration [Office] 
there and at the same day, within half hour, they gave me the work permit.
E: W as it that quick?
P45: Well, it wasn’t, again I was, I think I was a bit lucky. Because people apparently they 
don’t go themselves. They send letters and when you send letters it takes a long time, some 
of them they don’t get at all.
E: Yeah.
P45: But I was lucky because I just, I think, I think, there was a helpful person there and she 
was the one who said ‘you know, usually my colleagues they don’t care that much'. But what 
she's done, what they need to do [is] they have to check with London that if this person is 
saying right, if this person’s decision hasn’t been made and that if everything that I’m saying 
is correct, they give you the work permit. Simple as that.
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E: So, it’s a simple process.
P45: It’s a simple, straightforward process.
E: And then if you get, if you, if they reject your application for asylum then you just...
P45: Then it’s a different matter.
E: It’s a different matter.
P45: This is just to work because up to that point I’m depending on the government. They 
give me vouchers to eat, they provide me with accommodation and I don’t have the right to
work, you know? But after six months, I got the work permit, I couldn’t believe myself that I
got it.
E: W as it easy for you to find a job?
P45: Well, I was already working in that lab.
: W as it in that place that you found a job then?
P45: In that place when I was working he liked my work.
E: Oh, good.
P45: And when I got the work permit he employed me full-time. So I started working there 
full-time.
E: Yeah.
P45: But the money was not good at all. Money was, was enough to start, but it wasn’t good, 
you know, you can, you can only survive, you know? And if I stayed there it would have, it 
wouldn’t improve, I wouldn’t get anywhere. So, after I got the work permit, start working, 
basically they asked me to declare everything that I’m working, I’m earning this much money, 
they asked me to move out of the accommodation, so then I became dependant on myself. 
So I wasn’t taking any benefits from the government at all after six months. So only it was 
this first six months. So after that maybe, I don’t know, five months after that, I got an 
invitation for an interview, so after that interview I’ve got the second best option which was 
the ‘exceptional leave to remain’. They declined my asylum application, they refused it.
E: Yes.
P45: But at the time, in the UK, it was, the exceptional leave to remain...
(Recording pause -  Changed batteries)
E: I hope it’s been recording. So, yeah, you were saying that you like London.
P45:1 arrived in London and it was a whole new experience. But, but one thing, one thing 
was good; I learned a lot in Glasgow. When I arrived here, I knew, I knew how to survive or 
deal with situations in a much better way than I started because everything, even though, 
even though I always been, kind of Western-minded orientated, even when I was in Syria. I 
was the odd one out, I didn’t fit in, in that situation. Even within the Armenians.
E: W hy do you say that?
P45:1 think, I think the way I was thinking, the way I used to think, it was more for Western 
rather than Eastern mentality.
E: Are there differences between the two?
P45: There are lots of differences. The way, the way people look at women for instant (sic), 
the simplest, you know that... I never liked the fact how all of my friends talk about women, it 
is quite degrading. I don’t know if that has anything to do with me being gay. I’m not sure, 
you know. It could be, it could not be, I’m not sure. But, for instance, you know, one of the 
examples that I didn't, I didn’t like it when people come and talk about, this is, this is 
happening within Armenians, you have to realise this is Armenians, they are Christian, they 
are not Muslim, but this because they are living in that kind of environment, it’s affected by 
the surroundings, you know, they’re affected by the mentality. And if you’re not careful... 
very, very, very easily to drag into that circle and you become part of it without realising what 
you’re doing, you know? If you don’t watch yourself back or try hard to say ‘No, this is not 
right’, you know, or, or, you know, what you're saying is bullshit or this is an old-fashioned 
mentality and you have to look, you have to look outside that, I think, and it’s quite difficult, I 
think it’s quite difficult thing to do but I always had, I always had a problem with that. I am not 
talking only about the women issue, with lots of things, you know?
E: Being more open-minded you mean?
P45: Yes, you can put it that way. And I always, one of my friends used to call me, used to 
call me ‘W est’ in Arabic, used to call me ‘W est’ because, because the things I come up with 
were more Western and that’s you know in a nice way and I quite enjoyed that (laughing).
E: Yeah.
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P45: So, so I wasn’t fitting in there at all and I knew that you know this is, this is more, this is 
more where I’m going to feel comfortable. And I’m not talking only about the UK, I think in 
any Western countries I would adapt a lot quicker that I ever adapted in Syria.
E: Yeah?
P45: Yes and when I first arrived here I felt ‘I arrived, I’m home.’ You know, this is, I was, I 
was more confident, I could say what I wanted to say, not like there, you know, you have to 
think about, oh, if you say something like that people would., and your friends are going to 
take the piss out of you and start laughing at you or you’d be in trouble if you say things like 
that, or even the simplest things, if you say, if you say the gay thing is OK you would be in 
trouble for instance, you know? Or even you say ‘I’m gay’ would be even double that trouble. 
So it was a very, very restricted, under pressure life. In a way, well, I was living a double life. 
Not, not like, don’t get me wrong, I never been with a woman and I never gone to that way 
and that was the other thing as well. You try realise now that loads of people, loads of people 
that they would go and marry with a woman, have kids, just to satisfy their surroundings, 
their parents and, because of the pressure. And I could never understand that. Because I 
always think if I can do that, if I can stand up and say ‘No, I’m not going to marry you’, 
whatever my reasons are, everyone else can do it as well, you know? So when I arrived 
home I was more home, you know? I didn’t have any fear, I could be myself eventually, you 
know, and that was such liberating feeling. It was like you're born again. It was like that. Like 
you, I’m always saying ‘Ah, you know, I’m seven years old.’ (laughing)
E: (laughing) That’s nice.
P45: And it was like that, you know. I’m not exaggerating at all. It was like that. It was like 
being born again. And it was, it was difficult, you know, don’t get me wrong, it wasn’t, it 
wasn’t like everything’s easy, you know, it’s being a difficult road to get here where I’m now. 
And I think, I think I achieved quite a bit, you know, the only, the simple fact I’m now British 
citizen after seven years.
E: Yeah.
P45: That, that’s bloody huge for me. It’s a big, big, big thing. It’s a big thing, (laughing)
E: Did you have any difficulties? I mean, first you had difficulties in getting the visa and that 
kind of stuff. But after arriving here, how was it?
P45: After arriving here the fact that I asked asylum, I think it was the society at the time, it is 
still now to certain extent cruel, still now, they... it was the one of the lowest, lowest title you 
can get. Like if you are someone entering as an asylum, or an asylum seeker I think through 
my experience, having said that, there’s a lot of, there’s always people, almost 50-50. You 
get the really nice ones, the really understanding ones, and you get the really, you know, 
awful ones. And the reactions that you get, they are just unbelievable. And it wasn’t only the 
asylum situation, and being gay as well, you get again, you know, this is, all the stuff is in 
Glasgow.
E: You mean in everyday kind of conversations. With everyday people...
P45: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Your work colleague, I mean friends, who was... mainly I had gay 
friends, I didn’t get in touch with the straight people, because I lived 28 years of straight life, 
surrounded mainly by straight people and I didn’t need that anymore, I wanted to be only 
surrounded with gay people, feel free and say what I want to say, do what I want to do. But, 
at the same time, it was difficult because being a foreigner in Glasgow it wasn’t that easy. 
Being a foreigner, asylum seeker and gay, those are three concepts that, that you need to be 
careful with. There are some people were very supportive, there are some other, like being a 
refugee w as...w as... it was... people look at you as you coming here, you’re sucking the 
blood off the country and that you’re and awful person, you know, regardless why you are 
here, regardless the reasons, you know, it’s the stigma, the taboo of that name is huge, it’s 
really huge. And plus, plus the government at the time, you know, giving vouchers to you.
For six months I survived on these vouchers, you have to go to certain super markets to buy 
your food and everyone around you, you know, looking at you and they see that voucher and 
they know what it is and either you can see the faces they change, they don’t even talk to 
you, they were talking to you and then they would stop talking to you, it was quite a 
degrading experience, that experience that I had to... I mean, I’m not complaining because 
that was my survival and that was needed and that’s that. I’m grateful for having that, at the 
same time it was a degrading experience. On one aspect it was the asylum thing, but on the 
other aspect it was me learning all over again how to deal with coming out to people. For 
instance, I worked in a... this is my third lab in the UK. The first lab in Glasgow, first of all I 
didn’t say I was gay. Yeah, I didn’t come out and then at some point I decide this stupid, you
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know, why wouldn’t I say, you know? And then I came out one by one to people, you know, 
and that was a mistake as well. I think it was a mistake not to come out from the beginning. 
That’s my personal opinion. Because everyone else has different ideas. When you come out, 
people, even you know, you expect everyone will be understanding or everyone will be 
open-minded, but not at all. Like for instant, there’s one example I can give you, there’s this 
one, one of my work colleagues. He was forty-five or forty-eight years old. I’m not being 
horrible, but not good looking at all! I’m not being horrible, he wasn’t blessed with good look, 
whatsoever. He was married with kids. I had not some interest in any of them anyway 
(laughs), they were all straight, I was the only gay one. But at some point, you know, I come, 
he sits on his bench and I came to pick up something from which is like there, so I leaned 
over a bit closer like, as you see, I leaned over and 'Oh, oh, oh’ he’s done like that 
(laughing).
E: (laughing).
P45: Oh, oh, what the... Don’t flatter yourself (laughs)! Things like that. This is, you know, it 
could be, you know, now I laugh about it but at the time it was quite frustrating that you 
know, how stupid can you be, you know, just because, how narrow-minded you can be, just 
because I am gay do you think, and you’re a man, I’m gonna jump on you? It was things like 
that you know. Andit’s one thing dealing with the gay issue with the straight people and then, 
and then at the same time you feel, you feel a bit like a, like broken because you have that 
title, you have that title, the asylum [title], even though I didn’t, I didn’t have any lack of 
confidence, I was, especially when I arrived here, I was very confident because for some 
reason, because I knew the law is with me, you know, nobody can say to me or do anything 
to me because I’m gay. So that gave me quite a bit confidence. So, I didn’t have any fears. 
The only, it wasn’t, I didn’t have any fears, but at the same time you’re not relaxed at the 
same time, because it’s all learning process, it's all learning, how to deal with people, how to 
say or the comments that people come up with, how to deal with those comments. Because 
if you let yourself go, you get irritated and you get annoyed and that affects your life and 
you’re becoming some sort of bully, if you don’t, if you let it, if you let it go. So it was all, 
everything was a learning process. And in the second lab where I worked in London, I made 
it clear from the beginning. When I went to the interview with the boss, at some point he 
asked me about ’Do you have a family or anything or something like that?’ And I immediately 
mentioned, it was a, I wanted to mention, I said ‘No, but I’m gay. I don’t have a boyfriend but 
I’m gay.’ So I thought, if they had any issue with that, so they won’t hire me. But, you know, 
they cannot not hire me on that reason, but they can find hundreds of reasons not to hire me. 
But, if they don’t have any problem with that, at least I know that I’m coming to a gay friendly 
environment. So I think that was a much better approach. And in the third lab which I’m 
working up to now for the last five years, again, I’ve done the same policy, say from the 
beginning, be out and open about it, and that’s the best policy. And now I’m much, much 
better on dealing with things, you know because straight people, they can come up with 
certain comments. It’s quite... it can, it can make your mouth wide open, you’re thinking you 
know, how can they think that or how can they come up with things like that?
E: Yeah.
P45: You know? This is all you learn, how to do it, all you learn. I mean now I'm in a stage 
that I joke with my bosses about lots of gays, this is no problem at all. But, it took us a long 
time, it took us five years to get where we are now. So difficulties on that aspect, you know, 
the gay issue was enjoyable but not easy.
E: But you had your mind set on staying here as you said.
P45: Absolutely, absolutely. There was no other way around it, no other way around it. I 
mean I was lucky that I was given the exceptional leave to remain. That’s it, you know, once 
you get that, at the time the lawyer said, you know, this is the second best thing you can get.
I mean after that finished, expired, so, and the law changed in the UK. Everything got more 
difficult after 2003 I think, they changed everything. So now the system is completely 
different, completely. I do, I have no idea how it is now, but it’s completely different. But 
because I fell into the old system, so when I, when that expired, [I proceeded to] 
straightforward application, they sent it to the Home Office and you should get indefinite 
leave. There’s no other way, as long as you’re not a criminal or, you know, you had clean 
records, everything, I’m working, I’m not unemployed, I’ve never been unemployed even one 
day after I start working. But even though I waited seven months and I hadn’t heard anything 
from them, right, that was seven months amnesty, you know, so a friend of mine advised me 
actually to write to my MP. So I wrote to my MP explaining my situation that this is how it is
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and he is, he was very helpful. [...] was my MP. And they were very, very helpful. They 
wrote a letter to the Home Office to, just to ask; they sent me a copy of the letter as well 
saying This is a member of my constituency, his application’s with you, what’s happening?’ 
And one week later I’ve got the indefinite leave to remain! (laughing).
E: (laughing).
P45: It worked very well (laughing). Unbelievably well, you know. I was so lucky that my 
friend advised me. I wouldn’t even have thought about that at all. A friend of mine said, ‘why 
don’t you write to your MP? They’re there for these kinds of things.’ So I got the indefinite 
leave and I had to wait for twelve months, so twelve months over and I applied for citizenship 
and I'm citizen now (laughing).
E: W ere you planning to do that from the beginning, to become a citizen?
P45: In the beginning it doesn’t even cross your mind. The only thing you can think about is 
to have the right to stay here. That’s the only thing. But then, but then when you get to the 
point that you have indefinite leave obviously then you don’t wanna stay any more time to 
become citizen and get over with all this, you know? Because I don’t wanna be, I don’t 
wanna be considered Syrian at all. If somebody asked me now I’ll say 'I’m British of 
Armenian descend’.
E: Do you have dual nationality?
P45: Well, Syria allows dual nationality. But one thing it doesn’t allow is the, what’s the 
word? When you give up your nationality. I don’t know the word, for that.
E: Yeah... well, I don’t know.
P45: Syria doesn’t allow that.
E: You can’t do that?
P45: You can’t do that. If you’re born Syrian, you die Syrian, for them, obviously. But the 
thing is with me when I left Syria, I left Syria. That’s it.
E: You’ve never been back?
P45: No, never, I don’t think I will be back. First, I will have trouble with the authorities if I go 
back, you know. Apart from anything else, being away from the country for seven years, 
come back with the British nationality, it will cause me huge trouble. Probably it changed now 
in Syria, probably it’s better, but this is something that I wouldn’t like to take the risk, you 
know? So, that was it, Syria page is over for me, you know? I lived there from eight years, I 
studied there, I done the military service, which is national service you have to do, so I paid 
my dues to that country, you know? I think that this is, it’s not my place, it’s not, it’s not, I 
don’t have a life there, you know? Because life is here, my life is here. Because I’m a 
completely different person than I was seven years ago.
E: You are a different person?
P45: Definitely. Definitely, big time.
E: Do you talk to, you know, friends or family in Syria?
P45: Yeah, few, yeah, few friends, yeah. Few friends, they are there. Few of them they know 
I’m gay. I think now there are lots of people know. Somehow the news got there.
E: Yeah...
P45: Armenians, ’woo-aah’ (as if they’re scared of gay people), that’s how everybody goes. 
Yeah, everybody knows. That’s another reason for me not to go. Because I would, I would 
get, I think I would get into trouble with the Armenians as well. Because Armenians, they are 
the first nation in the world history after war that they adopted Christianity. So, it’s the first 
Christian nation, this was 1700 years ago. Therefore, they are very, very proud Christians, 
you know? It’s like one of those things they say ’Oh, you can’t be Armenian and gay’, you 
know? Those who live in the Western world obviously they are more different, they are more 
open-minded. But whoever lives in the Middle East or you know, in that kind, they'll be 
extremely close-minded about this sort of issue, you know? Being with a man...I mean, it’s 
still, still a, it’s a problem, you know? That I wouldn’t like to face and I don’t know how to face 
it because it’s a situation that you can’t win. Or that you can't get anywhere, you know? It’s 
when the reason doesn’t exist, what can you do? That’s it, you can’t do anything. When the 
reason goes out the window...
E: I know what you mean. So, OK, yeah. Let’s talk about the citizenship. On the whole do 
you think it was an easy process or a difficult process...?
P45:1 think, I don’t say, I don’t say, it was a frustrating wait for me. Because I wanted this to 
happen and get done with it, you know? But because, you know, one of the main things is 
the travelling, because I don’t, once you have British passport you can go anywhere. It was a 
frustrating wait for me, but if I look at the system or the way that I have done through my
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personal experience, I don’t think it was a difficult, difficult process. I think it was a very, I 
think it was a very well organised process for the citizenship. Cos the citizenship process, it 
didn’t take more than four months. Within four months when I applied, I was citizen. So, 
considering that... But the thing is, everything was, you have to, you have to wait for your 
own time. You couldn’t apply before you completed the last twelve months after your 
indefinite leave, you have to, it has to be indefinite leave, after five years of staying. My only, 
my only kind of wasted time was that seven months, when I was waiting a decision for that, 
and it was probably sitting there on the shelf and waiting to be processed. But once I got 
that, once I was in indefinite leave and I decided to become, when I applied for the 
citizenship the process was not difficult at all.
E: You’ve been through the whole process. W hat do you think? I mean, in the whole, how do 
you find the process? Do you think it’s easy or hard for someone to...
P45: For me, I can only speak for myself. I can only for my personal experience. For me it 
was, it was, it was reasonable. For me it was reasonable. But I think, I think my major, my 
major advantage was I knew English. I knew English and more or less I knew myself, where 
I am and here I’m, you know, I knew why I’m here and why I’m applying, so, so... my mind 
was, it was, you know, I had a clear view of where I’m going. I think those are my true 
benefits, advantages that once you put that in forward, then you have no problem about 
interpreter, having interpreter to come and translate for you, all the time. You could do 
everything yourself. You can read the letter, you can apply, you can, you know, reply and do 
your own job. I think the system for me was reasonable. It could, it could have been 
obviously, it wasn’t that reasonable about the process of the, of buying food, for instance. 
That was, that was degrading. That was degrading to any human, you know? You know, in 
this day and age you don’t give to someone vouchers to go and buy food in a First World 
country, in a developed country like this. So that was, that was the fault for me and plus, I 
mean, I wasn’t living in poverty in Syria. I was, I come from a... not that, financially, you 
know, not rich, but not poor, middle family. W e didn’t have any, we had everything that we 
wanted, we weren’t in need of anything, so come from there, to come from Syria, living in 
Syria and being comfortable and come to Britain and buying food with vouchers that was...
E: You had no money on you? No money at all...
P45: That’s my problem because I, that was the process before. Because I had savings, I 
had money like I said, but it’s gone to the process to arrive here. When I arrived in the UK 
and believe me, you are free not to believe that, I had only one pound left on me (laughing). 
E: Oh, no.
P45: One pound left on me. One pound left, I was, with that one pound I arrived to the Home 
Office to ask asylum. And from there it was all on them. They provided everything.
E: Yeah, not easy...
P45: Yes, it was actually at first, first time they don’t believe me, but it was the case, I had 
one pound left on me (laughing). But after that, but I didn’t care, you know. It wasn’t, for me it 
wasn’t like ‘oh, I don’t have money, I won't survive.’ It was the first time for me being 
penniless and you don’t have anyone around that you can ask, you know. Back in Syria even 
if you don’t have money, you can ask your mum, dad, friends and you can have, there’s no 
problem at all. But here, you don’t know anyone, but it didn’t, it didn’t scare me. It didn’t 
scare me. I wasn’t, I wasn’t feeling and saying, ‘oh what am I going to do?’ because I knew I 
trust, I trusted, I trusted the system here, you know. It was a system that, it wasn’t great in 
terms of providing you with food and shelter, no, no shelter, food, but at the same time, they 
won’t let you die of hunger or they won't let you sleep in the street. Everything was provided 
for me. And in that sense it was reasonable, you know? Plus looking around to see the sheer 
of people who arrive in this country and everyone with different needs, you know families 
and kids. You know, I was on my own, another benefit, I was a single man on my own, I 
didn’t have anyone dependant on me so I could survive on just a normal bread if I wanted to, 
if I needed to. I didn’t have a family to feed so in a way it was a bit easier for me in that 
sense; because I was on my own.
E: W hat about the criteria to enter? You told me you had a few problems getting the visa, the 
visa that you got...
P45: It was, it was, the problem was there, to get the visa in Syria. Once you get the visa, 
that’s it, you go. You have no problem at all. It’s a known fact in Syria, there’s very strict rules 
about getting visa to Europe. You have to have money in a bank account, you have to have 
business, you have to be rich basically, and I didn’t, I didn’t have that money in my...
E: I see.
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P45: Yeah. If you’re carrying Syrian passport, you’re a young man, and you wanna go to 
Europe or States or Australia, Canada, whichever Western country, they will reject you 
because they know you go, most likely you go and won’t come back. And obviously Western 
countries they don’t want that. They don’t want people, you know they have to have strict 
rules to keep you away from them and that's, I think that’s a normal thing to do but, at the 
same time, it’s not that fair, but understandable. That the Western countries they have 
certain rules to, because when you arrive here, because, you know, there’s lots of people 
arrive in this country, lots of migrants and lots, you know, they have problems with the 
migrants, you know, no integration, and you know, people come and ask for benefits. So you 
do understand why the difficulties, but at the same time also it’s not fair, you know, why can’t 
I go? It’s just not fair because the world, because if you have that Syrian passport, that’s it, 
you know, you have a Syrian passport, you are doomed. Because wherever you go, you, 
because as Syrian you’re considered as an Arab, without people realising your background 
they consider you Muslim, so those two things sometimes it’s a ‘no-no’ for many countries.
E: So, it’s hard coming from Syria.
P45: Exactly. Before it was the President, it was economic sanctions from Western countries 
for long time, and the government, the Syrian President was very adamant about, you know, 
Israel, Palestine and all these matters. So, it wasn’t very welcomed country by Westerners, 
so the citizen of the country obviously you won’t be welcome to go there as well.
E: Yeah, OK, yeah. Let’s talk a bit about the very process of becoming a citizen. So, first of 
all I wanna ask you about the ceremony. How did you find the ceremony?
P45: Ceremony, I found it quite, very formal, which was very good to see, very well 
organised, even though that guy who was the Mayor of somewhere, didn’t arrive.
E: Yeah.
P45: He was late and then he arrived. But even with that, I think it was a very well organised, 
served the purpose.’ I think it served the purpose. I think...
E: What's the purpose?
P45: The purpose of, the purpose of to welcome you to this, to this, to welcome you as a, it’s 
kind of if you consider it joining a club; joining any club. And this is, this is a one hell of a big 
exclusive club, to join in, you know? You becoming...
E: Exclusive?
P45: Well you’re becoming part of the UK, which is part of Europe, and you’re coming from 
Syria and you’re becoming part of this. I didn’t realise the, the, it’s kind of, I realised the 
feeling that I had afterwards, it was quite a strange, I wasn’t expecting to have that feeling.
All this time I felt, I felt home, here. I didn’t feel estranged, I felt that I had rights here, I felt 
that, you know, I can do whatever I want, I experienced lots of things, so it was, so this was 
home for me. But I didn’t, I only realised that my feelings was completely different after I 
become British citizen. After I become British citizen, when I, I cannot feel now, you feel you 
have even more rights. You feel that, no, you feel that you have the right to be in this place. 
You have the right to stay in this country. You are one member of this country. That’s, so you 
become, it’s quite strange to explain, it’s like, it’s like renting a car and then you buy your 
own car, you know? Let’s put it that way. When you buy your own car, you start being more 
careful, I don't wanna to scratch the door, I don’t wanna do anything to the window, you 
know. But while it is rental you don’t care that much, so if something happens the insurance 
covers it. It’s insured. But you have your own car, it’s a completely different feeling. And I 
think it’s something like that, you know? You have a beautiful feeling about you know, you 
are British citizen, it’s, it’s ... you give, you give yourself some sort of value. I mean it has a 
different value to become British citizen.
E: Yeah.
P45:1 think for that particular reason, seeing, experiencing the afterwards, of becoming 
British citizen, and going back and inside to see the ceremony, I think, yes, it deserves, it 
deserves to be that formal, it deserves to be exactly how it was. It was like a single 
partnership wedding, you know, it was something similar to that business. It was very, very 
formally, everyone was very formal, then wearing certain clothing, which was formal, the 
readings... I think it was a very nice formal...
E: Did you have like a celebration or a party after that?
P45:1 invited, I invited people...
E: I remember you had some friends with you, right, in the ceremony?
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P45: Well yeah, it was my flatmate and his boyfriend. Yes. It was very, I mean, if it was, if I 
had the chance to invite loads of people, I would have invited lots of people. But they said 
'strictly two guests’. And then afterwards they said 'no guests at all'. But then they...
E: Yeah, I remember.
P45: They let the door open and you know...
E: Yeah.
P45: So, I could have invited lots of people. But then afterwards, just last Saturday, I invited 
people to have a drink with me in a pub around the area...
E: Oh, OK.
P45: So, that was my celebration.
E: That’s really good. OK, you also had to do the 'Life in the UK' test. Yeah?
P45:1 think the ‘Life in the UK’ test, they should have, they should have had that for like 
many years ago; they should have had that, to be honest. I've done it and I think it was a 
very good thing to do because you can’t pass that test unless you have certain knowledge in 
English and all this time people here, you know, they talk about the integration, they talk 
about this and that and without a test like this. I think this is a test that something they 
already, a big time late...
E: Is there a problem with integration?
P45:1 think, yeah, yeah, I think to a certain extent there is. The problem is especially, I don't 
know about the rest of the UK a lot, but I know about Glasgow, talk about London for 
instance, even though it is a melting pot, even though you can see people from all over the 
place, fantastic place to be and one of the, probably, few places in the world they can find 
people from all over the world. When they are in the same area they’re getting by, they’re 
getting along with no problems, and it’s, it’s very good to see that, but on the other hand, 
they are, within my experiences within the gay world. You know, in the gay world, people 
are, people are, I like to believe that they are more open about foreigners, they are more 
open about welcoming people in, you know? Because every, most gay men at my age and a 
bit older they, most of them they had some sort of difficulties to come out and you know, in 
their lives by families, friends, the society. So, I’m not saying everyone, there’s a lot of, lots 
of, please don’t mind my language, assholes in the gay men world. But majority...
E: They are kind of more sensible...
P45: Sensible and open minded about this particular thing. So I think my environment, the 
friends I have around, even the straight or gay, they are more multicultural, welcoming and 
open minded. But at the same time I can see that there is, you know, there is difficulty, 
although probably there’s no big ghettos in London, just small ghettos here and there, but 
still you can see people that they don’t know, they’ve been here for the last 10-15 years and 
they know little bit of English, or they don’t know any of things, and that’s sad, you know? 
And I'm, I’m, you know, I come from Armenian background, and some Armenians they do 
the same as well. I’m not excluding me or my background from it, it’s a, I think it’s in every 
culture and every nation, even the Greeks when they go, for instance, to Spain they stick 
together, you know? They... so...
E: Yeah.
P45: Yeah, I think there’s small, small ghettos all around, you know? I think that’s always 
gonna be a problem. I think in that sense there is a problem with integration because 
everyone tries to keep their culture and they’re very afraid of...
E: How about the test? Will it make a difference? You said you agree with it.
P45: It would, definitely make difference. In the test they do ask, they changed the book after 
my test. They added two more chapters. I did the old one. I don’t know what chapters they 
add. I think, I think overall, overall, overall the test was very, very good, because, because if 
you read that book, you’ll have a good history of Britain and you will have a good knowledge 
of how to live your daily life and you know how... It was information, it was about lots of 
things like how to, how to rent a flat, how to do this and do that, but the main thing I wish it 
was, that they introduce something like that from earlier stage rather than leave it to the end.
I mean now they changed it after me, again they changed it. You need to have a test to 
apply for the indefinite leave to remain.
E: Yes, yes.
P45: In my time it was only for the citizenship. I already got the indefinite leave when I apply 
so that’s, that’s good. But even if they put it even further back to the process, even much 
better. I think that would force people to learn English and when it’s become common 
knowledge that you have to learn English to pass certain test, you have to learn about British
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life and style, I think that would be, that would push people to do things. Because lots of 
people if you don’t kind of give them a stick to do it, they won’t do it, you know? It’s very 
human nature. If I come and give you this cup of tea every day to you in front of you, you will 
say 'thank you very much’, you will drink it. But when I say to you the next day ‘oh, I’m not 
doing your tea anymore, go and you do it’, you will get irritated in the beginning, you know, 
why not, but eventually you don’t have any other choice, you need to drink your tea, you go 
and do it yourself. I mean it’s something like that. And this is exactly the same thing with, 
they have to, they have to put that as a rule, it’s so good that it’s now, they can do even 
better from the beginning, even though so for instant (sic), if you wanna migrate to the UK, 
do the test...
(Phone ringing -  pause)
E: OK, so you’ve done your, you know you’ve done everything, you have your certificate, so 
how do you feel now?
P45: As I said, I think, I think that was the feeling that you have the right to be here.
E: The right to be here.
P45:1 think that’s the, that’s the main...
E: Is your life going to change?
P45: After the...
E: Having the citizenship.
P45:1 think, I think my life gonna change, the main change in my life will be the passport and 
the travelling. I think that will be the main change that you feel the difference.
E: Travel in the European Union?
P45: Yes, I think then, then I will feel, everyone around me or few people that they come 
from different backgrounds and they become British citizens and the one thing that they say 
’oh, you will love it when you start travelling.’ And I think I knew that anyway because it 
opens such doors and you become, all the troubles that you had in the past, of visas and this 
and that, you know, becomes... You know, it’s just...
E: It makes you a member of the European Union...
P45: Oh, definitely! I always felt European (laughing). But definitely I, I think that’s, that’s, in 
my case, I don’t think this has to do anything with being, having that certificate to become 
European. I think it was a feeling within me. That I always...
E: That you belong more here?
P45: Belong more here, yes. I think, I think that’s my, when I say ‘belong here’ that’s what I 
mean with that. Nothing’s gonna change genetically, because I belong, genetically I belong 
to the Armenian nation wherever they come from, but...
E: Is that important for you? I mean, where you come from, genetically...
P45:1 think it’s important to know that you belong to, you have a... you have roots, yeah. 
Don’t get me wrong, I’m not typical Armenian at all. Lots of things that Armenians do, I don’t 
agree with, you know, my lifestyle or my behaviour or my way of thinking is very different 
from Armenians, but at the same time, I am very proud Armenian. I don’t, I don’t, when I, as I 
said, when I say, even though I’m born in Syria when I, when someone asks me, all this time 
when they ask me I say ‘I’m an Armenian but born and bred in Syria.’ I never said ‘I’m 
Syrian’, because I never felt I’m Syrian.
E: W hy’s that?
P45: It’s quite, it’s quite a strange...because when I say to people, lots of people they don’t 
understand that. It’s, it is difficult to explain but I think, I think because, I think, I think 
because I was, as I said, I was the odd one out there, you know. I never, I never felt close to 
the culture, I never felt close to the mentality, way of living, everything was not right for me, 
you know? Even, even though... But I can only compare it with here, you know. Here was 
everything opposite that was there, you know. Even though I’m not bom here, but I felt here 
more home and more close to everything else. Here I was more surrounded with like-minded 
people, the percentage of that was higher, than back in Syria. In Syria probably there was 
one or two guys that I, you know, mentally were compatible...
E: Yeah...
P45: It was like, yeah, in that sense, mentally compatible. I think, I think that was the reason, 
since we were kids we always, my dad used to be, used to be a merchant, you know, like go 
to Germany and bring stuff from there and sell it in Syria. It was like with big cars, we used 
cars, so we had a... we had... so it’s, we had this attachment to Europe since we were kids. 
And I think, I think that was a big effect on me, because everything was from Germany in our 
family, like, you know, at the time, when there was economic sanctions on Syria there was
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lots of things you couldn’t get, although our getaway was Lebanon. Lebanon was next door 
neighbour, and Lebanon was more Western and you could find anything in Lebanon and 
Lebanon was Christian country and open-minded. So it was that getaway on one side and 
there was Germany on the other side. Everything in Germany was fantastic. Imagine a kid, 
who in Syria you don’t have, you know, nice trainers or nice clothes and we were the one 
who were wearing the Adidas and the Puma and the Levi’s, you know, and those were big 
things, you know, it wasn’t, it wasn’t a small thing at all. W e got the Twix, the Mars bar, you 
know, everything, we grew up with this. W e never used to wear clothes from Syria. All our 
clothes my dad used to get it from Germany. And I think that had a huge, huge impact. And 
how to...
E: So you preferred to call yourself Armenian...
P45: It’s quite, it’s quite difficult, I think, I think because probably I had two choices. But it 
wasn’t a choice that I sat down and I thought about it. It was a natural instinct, that in one 
hand you are born in Syria and you have the Syrian values and everything, so I mean, and in 
the other hand you have Armenian, you are different from the Arabs surrounding them. 
Everything was different, lifestyle, everything was different. And, so that was already one 
step ahead than the Syrian, being Syrian, so immediately you say 'oh, no, I’m an Armenian' 
because you feel this one is more right, you know? If you felt close to that maybe I would say 
‘oh, yeah, I’m born in this country’ and I heard lots of people they say 'well, you know, this 
country’s given us, you know, in the past they helped us, they helped our grandparents, they 
were refugees from Turks and all this happens and we belong here’ and all this stuff. I never 
felt that. For me, all the Armenians there they should move on, go out and live somewhere 
else. Don’t stay there, cos this is not our place. You know?
E: Where should they go?
P45: (laughing) Anywhere but there. As I said, I had problems with me being gay, you know? 
E: Yeah.
P45: So, like I said, I was the odd one out. And I think plus that my dad being, you know, 
going to Germany all the time and I went and helped him there when I was eight or nine, 
once, unfortunately only once (laughing). So, it kind of, it kind of, so you hold down, I think 
subconsciously to being Armenian and seeing the Western world is obviously, you know this 
is the right direction to go because, because you want to go forward in your life, you don't 
want to go backwards. And Germany is the forward and Syria is the backwards. You know, 
as simple as that. So which one you choose? It’s up to you. It's up you how, how your mind 
operates.
E: So if people about your nationality, I mean, what do you say to them?
P45: Here, now?
E: Yes.
P45: Now I’m British of Armenian descendancy (sic).
E: Not Syrian...
P45: God no! (laughing)
E: Do you have family there?.
P45: No my family left. They’re in Los Angeles now.
E: Los Angeles?
P45: Yeah, they are in the States.
E: OK, so you don’t have any...
P45: No. Extended relatives which I’m not, you know, close with them anyway. I’ve only 
friends which I’m in touch. And I’m...
E: How come your family moved?
P45: Different reason, economical reasons more like it. You know, it wasn’t, so... it wasn’t 
going well for my dad’s business, you know. That was the major thing for them.
E: So you kind of lost your attachment to the place.
P45: Yeah, I mean, ideally, in an ideal world, I would like to go for one day and have a 
looking back, you know, to see what’s happening there... That’s the only thing that I would 
like to do about, about that country, but apart from that you know, I wouldn’t go. Not in the 
foreseeable future (laughing).
E: I take it that you are happy here.
P45: Yes, yes.
E: From what I understand you belong here more than you belonged to Syria?
P45: Yes, but because, because Britain gave me the rights that I need in my life. But Syria 
didn’t give me these rights, you know? Syria forced on me the rights that they think is right,
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you know? They forced on me the national service, which I didn’t want to do. They forced on 
me certain sort of obligation you don’t have any other choice to do, you know? It was, the 
way you live in Syria is forced on you. It says to you, this is you, this is the way and you 
gonna go this way. You don’t have a say, you can’t say no, you can’t choose another way, 
so it's kind of a feeling of everything is forced on you indirectly. But here, Britain, maybe 
there are certain things is forced on you here as well in an indirect way, but nothing close to 
that. Here I had choice. I always had a choice here to do whatever I want, you know? I f ... 
This country gave me the right as a gay man. And that’s an important and huge thing. How 
can I do not, how can I not love being here or appreciate being here, but if someone, 
someone give me that right, which I didn’t have for twenty-eight years of my life, you know? 
E: Is there something you don’t like? Is there something that you would like to see changing? 
P45: I’m not saying this is a perfect place. There’s lots of faults in this country. You know, 
there’s lots of, certain things they do is a bit, you know, old-fashioned or, you know, the way, 
the way they deal with different things... There’s lots of things, you know, they can change, 
but needs to be changed, but it's not happening. But it’s no perfect place, at the same time, 
there is always, wherever you go, there is pros and cons and...
E: OK, that’s good. I wanna ask you, if you can imagine your life in ten-twenty years. W here  
are you gonna be?
P45:1 can’t say that. I, because I think, I think for me it would be very unrealistic if I say ’oh, 
no, in twenty years I’ll be here.’ You never know. I never know. I didn’t know seven years 
ago that I would be here, sitting here and I’ll be British citizen. So, I cannot predict the future. 
But, so far I’m here. So, what brings future, I have no idea.
E: You might be somewhere else...
P45: Yeah, it could be anything, you know, and that’s the other, that's the other freedom that 
it gives you. You can be free to live wherever, even, you know? Now I have a German 
boyfriend and God knows what happen if, I’ve known him for four months only, and I don’t, 
you never know what future brings to us, you know? But this was a very important stage of 
my life and it’s been done completely and I’m very, very happy with it, you know? It’s the 
first, I think all happens in good time, in my life that’s been so far the case, that’s good, 
everything happened in good times and this was even a bit late, but, you know, but at least it 
wasn’t too late, you know, at least it was the time now, now I can move forward than this, 
you know, this is, you can't, you can’t always... some people... you know I have a friend, 
there’s one friend back in Syria and when I say things to him and he cannot, he cannot get, 
he cannot, he doesn’t understand it, because he thinks that I arrived in the UK and I should 
be and I’m living here, having the life I have and I should be grateful and that’s it. You know? 
But I don’t think that way. I think, I think you achieve something and there’s the next step 
forward.
E: You want more out of life...
P45: You want more. It's not that you, I think it’s the human, human nature, and that’s, it’s a 
progress, it’s a going forward situation. You can’t go back, you can’t, you can't sit there, OK, 
you’d be grateful for everything you have but that doesn’t mean that you can spend the rest 
of your life standing there in the same position just because this was a big thing to achieve. 
You achieve this big thing, and it is a big thing, but that’s kind of push you to the next stage 
of your life, which God knows what’s gonna happen, you know? And now, after, you know, 
this is a new, it’s kind of opened new, new doors for me, in a way, you know the travelling, 
going and seeing different things and it might, might open different horizons for me, you 
know, and I don’t know exactly where it’s gonna go from here, but, but it’s gonna get 
somewhere, you know (smiling)?
E: You're optimistic about the future...
P45: Yeah, I think you have to, yes, you have to. You can’t sit down and... It’s, I can, I can 
assure you, I can assure you this was, this was a huge thing. For me it was a huge thing, 
you know? Having been able to say to someone that I am a British citizen. For me it’s an 
achievement, you know? That I achieved that, because, because lots of, you know, for 
instant (sic), yourself, you’re from Greece probably you won’t, probably you would appreciate 
it, but you wouldn’t understand fully the importance of it. Because, because you didn’t have a 
Syrian passport, you didn’t have that difficulties, you didn't have, you didn’t get treated like a 
second class citizen when you were travelling or you were doing anything really, even talking 
to someone. But, but, but coming from there and getting a British passport this is a huge 
thing for me. It’s a huge thing.
E: OK. Thank you very much. It’s been very interesting talking to you.
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P45: Yeah, I hope so (laughing).
E: Thank you so much for your time. 
P45: You’re welcome.
Appendix 3: Information Sheet
London School of Economics and Political
Science
Institute of Social Psychology 
St Clements Building 
Houghton Street 
London WC2 2AE
Interview Information Sheet
This interview study is conducted as part of a PhD research project in the Institute of 
Sodal Psychology at the London School of Economics and Political Science. The aim is 
to explore people’s views and experiences regarding the process of acquiring the  
British citizenship. This research has the potential to m ake a valuable contribution to 
our understanding of the meaning of citizenship in contem porary societies and its 
relation to people’s sense of national belonging.
If you choose to partidpate in this interview, you should know that there are no right or 
wrong answers; I am  only interested in your personal point of view. T he  interviews are  
semi-structured, m eaning that they are more similar to a discussion rather than a 
questionnaire. They normally last around 60 minutes and m ay be conducted wherever 
and whenever would be most convenient for participants.
Interviews need to be recorded for transcription and analysis purposes. However, they  
are confidential and anonymous in accordance with the British Psychological Society’s 
ethical prindples and guidelines.
Your participation is also voluntary. You can refuse to answer any question and/or 
term inate the interview at any point. You are also free to withdraw your consent and  
discontinue your participation at any time.
If you have more questions about this study, I would be happy to answer them. 
Thank you for taking the tim e to participate in this study and for your contribution.
Contact Information:
Elenl Andreouli
Institute of Social Psychology
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
Email: e.andreouli@lse.ac.uk
Te l:+44 (0)20 7955 6231
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Appendix 4: Consent Form
London School of Economics 
and Political Science 
Institute of Social Psychology 
Houghton Street 
London WC2 2AE
Interview Consent Form
agree that the interview data
which I provide to Eleni Andreouli on this date m ay be recorded
and used for research purposes, provided that my identity is not revealed by the  
researcher.
I also agree that extracts from the recording can be used in reports relating to that 
research, providing that confidentiality is respected in all cases.
Contact Information:
Eleni Andreouli
Institute of Social Psychology
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
Email: e.andreouli@lse.ac.uk
T e l:+44 (0)20 7955 6231
Interviewee Eleni Andreouli
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Appendix 5: Coding Frameworks
Citizenship Officers
Belonging Cultural diversity Plural Britishness
Tolerance/Political correctness
Cultural threat
Cultural enrichment
Lack of integration
Lack of cohesion/Decline of 
Britishness
Shared values
Accommodation of different identities
Citizenship & 
belonging
Citizenship as identity
Irrelevant to identity
Welcoming new citizens
Raising significance
Opportunity Decline Strain on economy by immigration
Limit immigration
Lack of commitment/opportunism
Progress & Prosperity Freedom & democracy
Humanitarianism & safety
Economic prosperity &opportunities
Other rights
Pride/Commitment
Positive contribution
Earned
citizenship
Duties Citizenship as privilege
Duty to contribute
Duty to integrate
Duty to be committed
‘Being’ and ‘having’ Earned vs. birthright
Block naturalisation process
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Naturalised Citizens
Life in Britain & 
Belonging
Place belonging Familiarity
Settled
Integration Contribution to economy
Commitment
Civic participation
Learning the culture
Accepted
Identity negotiation
Representations of 
immigration
Similarity & difference
Being scrutinised
Immigration restrictions
Britishness as ethno-cultural 
identity
Whiteness
Culture
Born with
Language
Exclusionary
Acculturation
Britishness as negative 
identity
Threat to identity
1 Moral decline
Britishness as progress Freedom & democracy
Openness & tolerance
Economic development & 
opportunities
Other identities Country of origin
London
Other
Citizenship ‘Closure’ Recognition of contribution
Settling
Earned citizenship/ 
‘Being’ and ‘having’
Contribution
Earned vs. birthright
New status Right to mobility
Right to reside
Opportunity & Empowerment
Achievement
Enhances participation
‘Practical’ aspect of 
citizenship
Differs from identity
‘Instrumental’ use of 
citizenship
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Appendix 6: Key Details of ALCETE Analyses 
Default Analysis and Analysis for Broad classes
Number of words in corpus 56,638
Number of different textual forms52 4,004
Average frequency of textual forms in the 
corpus
14
Number of analysed occurrences53 29,633
% of analysed occurrences 54.89% (of the total occurrences)
Number of ECUs 1,497
Average number of words analysed per 
ECU
19.56
No of CUs in first classification 1,115
Minimum no of words per CU in first 
classification
17
No of CUs in second classification 1,012
Minimum no of words per CU in second 
classification
19
No of different analysed forms in first 
classification
924
No of different analysed forms in second 
classification
924
Stability coefficient 81.03%
No of classes 5
No of maximum terminal classes 10 (5 for Broad classes analysis)
Minimum chi-square for word selection (to 
be classified in a class)
4.04
52 Textual forms are words in their grammatical form. For example, the words ‘eat’ and ‘ate’ 
belong to the same form ‘eat’.
53 After the reduction of plurals and conjugation endings and the elimination of words which 
appear only once in the text.
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Analysis 8 (Detailed classes)
Number of words in corpus 56,638
Number of different textual forms 4004
Average frequency of textual forms in the 
corpus
14
Number of analysed occurrences 29,633
% of analysed occurrences 54.89% (of the total occurrences)
Number of ECUs 1,889
Average number of words analysed per 
ECU
15.50
No of CUs in first classification 1,115
Minimum no of words per CU in first 
classification
18
No of CUs in second classification 1,115
Minimum no of words per CU in second 
classification
18
No of different analysed forms in first 
classification
924
No of different analysed forms in second 
classification
924
Stability coefficient 98%
No of classes 8
No of maximum terminal classes 12
Minimum chi-square for word selection (to 
be classified in a class)
6.19
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Appendix 7: Typical words and associated chi2 values (>20) in ALCESTE analyses
A. Broad classes
Words C l^ 1 Words Chi2 Words Chi2
immigration 233 *consan08 351 local 260
*green2 165 citizen+ 183 authorit+ 151
system 117 resid+ 164 *cons09 124
reform 101 permanent 143 service 116
border 97 comment 128 fund 89
our 79 probation+ 125 skill 65
control 79 were 123 migrat+ 65
legisl+ 78 British 118 impact 63
clear 62 those 114 orient+ 63
legal 57 should 102 labour 60
permit+ 56 respond+ 100 communit+ 55
chang+ 54 feel 88 day 54
decid+ 53 period 86 pressure 54
we 52 who 77 employ 49
law 51 progress 66 cohes+ 46
power 49 question 63 product 45
framework 47 their 62 country 44
set out 43 demonstr+ 58 develop+ 44
strength 40 that 53 help 43
1 Chi-square values indicate the strength of association of each word with the entire class. A  high chi-square value of a  word m eans that the word is typical of 
the class.
2 Asterisks indicate which document(s) each class draws more on. ‘G reen’ refers to the green paper “The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the 
Immigration System ”; ‘consan08’ refers to “The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System: Analysis of Consultation Responses”; 
‘cons09’ refers to “Earning the Right to Stay: A  N ew  Points Test for Citizenship"; ‘consresp’ refers to “The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the 
Immigration System: Governm ent Response to Consultation”.
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agenc+ 35 complete 53 market 42
single 35 famil+ 51 short 37
path 33 slow 48 pounds 33
visa 33 they 48 alleviate 33
entry 32 migrant 44 could 31
authomat+ 32 down 43 CO 30
enforce 31 figure 40 job 30
process 30 journey 40 advise 30
rule 29 commit+ 38 ordinate 30
will 28 unsure 37 population 30
simple 28 not 36 office 29
biometric 28 show 35 no 28
point 27 become 34 fill 28
new 26 crim+ 32 role 27
make 26 theme 32 health 27
identity 23 custodial 32 sector 27
effective 23 was 31 social 27
issue 22 time 31 transit+ 27
consistent 22 stage 31 money 25
at 21 refugee 29 improve 25
now 21 seven 28 run 24
look 21 sentence 27 govern+ 24
heart 21 be 26 mentor 24
illegal 21 did 26 integrat+ 24
present 21 stop+ 26 deliver 23
current 20 relat+ 26 per 22
transparent 20 require 25 import 22
or 24 brain 21
depend 24 bring 21
offend 24 drain 21
say 23 volunt+ 21
twenty 23 facilitate 21
suggest 23 uk_border_agency 20
262
suit 22
answer 22
multiple 22
four 21
grant 20
propose 20
minimise 20
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B. Main Ciasses
Class 1: Im migration Class 2: Stages Class 3: Im migration Class 4: Consultation Class 5: English
Impact_________________ Reform _______
W ords Chi2 W ords Chi2 Words Chi2 W ords Chi2 W ords Chi2
local 269 resid+ 185 immigration 229 *consan08 721 English 452
authorit+ 163 citizen+ 156 *green 156 were 346 language 413
service 119 permanent 152 system 111 respond+ 313 speaker 196
fund 87 British 121 reform 97 question 300 spouse 116
impact 69 probation+ 121 border 96 comment 288 level 104
migrat+ 68 demonstr+ 91 our 75 unsure 210 life 92
orient+ 63 *consresp 85 legisl+ 75 feel 163 pre 90
labour 58 become 80 control 73 theme 162 topic 90
*cons09 58 famil+ 76 legal 62 figure 141 *cons09 87
pressure 57 they 59 clear 57 answer 123 knowledge 87
day 53 their 59 decid+ 57 disagree 116 require 71
skill 53 refugee 52 permit+ 57 was 108 course 67
country 49 progress 51 chang+ 53 suit 108 test 64
communit+ 48 period 50 law 50 multiple 107 entry 52
product 47 elig+ 47 power 50 seven 101 text 51
short 46 route 44 we 48 show 93 common 51
develop+ 45 those 44 set out 48 who 86 compet+ 50
help 41 stage 42 agenc+ 43 keep 84 assess 47
could 40 choose 38 single 36 raise 74 Europe 45
market 39 right 36 process 34 decreased 69 refer 44
cohes+ 38 during 36 will 33 proportion 66 familiar 42
employ 37 continu+ 33 authomat+ 33 think 64 read 40
job 35 migrant 33 strength 33 not 56 proficient 40
pounds 34 temporar+ 32 path 32 sixt+ 54 other 38
alleviate 34 or 31 enforce 32 total 52 standard 36
population 32 relat+ 30 simple 29 result 52 write 35
fill 30 speed 30 rule 28 add 50 integrat+ 31
role 28 should 30 biometric 28 propose 49 fluent 30
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sector 28 protect 30 make 26 did 44 tuition 30
transit+ 28 individual 30 framework 26 separate 44 marr+ 28
volunt+ 28 ipsos 27 deport+ 24 these 42 histor+ 28
run 26 humanitarian 27 identity 24 say 41 import 27
money 26 categor+ 26 effective 24 six 41 produce 24
CO 25 limit 25 asylum 23 further 41 simple 23
advise 25 interview 24 easy 22 green 39 inform 22
health 25 tax 23 approach 22 should 39 take 21
office 25 complete 23 new 20 ninety 38 communic+ 21
social 25 minimise 23 visa 20 paragraph 38 geograph+ 20
ordinate 25 MORI 22 change 20 those 37 practical 20
govem+ 24 self 22 foreign 20 sure 36
per 23 spend 22 consistent 20 some 35
improve 23 full 21 transparent 20 thirty 34
brain 22 show 21 discrimin+ 34
drain 22 that 21 period 33
mentor 22 qualify 21 non 32
deliver 22 require 21 charg+ 32
facilitate 22 person 20 eight 32
award 20 journey 20 forty 32
close 20 fee 31
offer 20 conplete 31
enhance 20 larg+ 29
million 20 quarter 27
nine 26
half 25
paper 24
concept 22
time 21
that 20
simple 20
organisation 20
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C. Complementary Classes
W ords Chi2 W ords Chi2 W ords Chi2 W ords Chi2 Words Chi2 W ords Chi2 W ords Chi2 W ords Chi2
English 398 migrat+ 186 immigrati
on
289 *cons08 1007 local 378 authoma
t+
174 crim+ 627 resid+ 229
languag
e
318 country 153 Set_out 135 commen
t
469 authorit+ 226 permit+ 161 stop+ 490 citizen+ 195
*cons09 238 skill 139 simple 129 were 358 service 147 power 148 custodial 488 permane
nt
168
test 141 labour 109 legisl+ 98 respond
+
343 communi
t+
136 passeng
er
130 offend 486 probatio
n+
141
speaker 130 develop+ 85 system 98 question 218 fund 122 border 123 slow 472 British 126
speak 108 product 84 reform 93 feel 182 money 95 foreign 123 sentence 437 demonst
rat+
105
day 107 bring 81 legal 91 unsure 180 govern+ 69 identity 117 down 343 *conresp 85
integrat+ 88 job 78 *green 91 theme 152 design 65 visa 113 commit+ 246 elig+ 77
life 79 populatio
n
78 decid+ 78 who 122 pressure 64 illegal 91 consequ
ences
170 become 74
pre 62 impact 76 framewo
rk
78 figure 120 cohes+ 56 card 78 progress 166 famil+ 73
point 58 market 70 law 77 disagree 105 group 48 port 78 prison 149 refugee 65
level 56 work 68 path 73 multiple 104 alleviate 45 *green 78 minor 126 stage 64
spouse 55 econom
+
62 easy 65 was 97 amount 44 prison 78 attract 121 period 60
inform 54 stud+ 60 understa
nd
61 seven 91 deliver 43 fingerpri
nt
78 convict+ 118 they 59
simple 53 tier 59 process 60 nine 89 across 41 count 76 serious 117 minimise 50
topic 51 fill 58 rule 58 suggest 89 office 41 remove 66 parent 104 temporar
+
49
require 49 growth 52 clear 58 twenty 86 short 36 present 66 normal 87 journey 48
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knowled
ge
44 negative 47 complex 57 answer 85 operat+ 34 waive 65 penalise 81 protect 48
entry 43 brain 46 consult+ 56 discrimin
+
84 housing 34 deport+ 65 child 68 their 45
sign 37 drain 46 confiden
ce
53 show 81 April 32 out 57 deport+ 62 complete 45
attend 37 manage 46 chang+ 43 those 76 million 32 fundame
ntai
56 fall 47 route 44
other 35 world 40 border 40 suit 75 volunt+ 31 cancel 53 behav+ 45 speed 40
common 34 gross 39 make 35 sixt+ 69 welcome 31 biometric 53 effect 42 choose 40
course 33 born 38 our 34 raise 65 policy 30 liable 52 delay 37 progress 39
personal 31 income 38 consiste
nt
34 six 62 undertak
e
30 expulsio
n
52 remove 32 subsistin
g
39
no 30 Britain 38 radical 33 decease
d
62 envisage 29 control 48 exclude 31 relat+ 38
take 29 benefit 36 efficien+ 33 did 61 distribut+ 29 enforce 44 permane
nt
30 right 38
possible 29 positive 35 transfer
m
33 thirty 55 departm
ent
29 travel 42 non 29 continu+ 38
into 28 maximis
e
34 streamlin
e
33 not 54 assist 28 tackl+ 40 type 29 qualify 34
compet+ 27 talent 33 case 32 proportio
n
54 uk_bord
er_agen
cy
26 combin+ 40 whose 29 migrant 33
text 26 circular 33 paper 32 these 51 us 25 physical 40 any 27 categor+ 32
online 26 net 32 public 29 add 44 verify 25 single 35 deny 25 during 31
learn 25 mobil+ 32 summar
+
28 keep 42 enhance 25 national 34 even 25 self 29
assess 25 invest 32 guide 27 think 42 role 24 secure 33 refuse 25 humanit
arian
29
compuls
ory
25 licens+ 32 piece 27 some 41 pounds 24 entry 32 or 24 or 28
threshol
d
24 employ 30 discretio
n
27 eight 41 best 23 form 30 go 23 year 25
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refer 23 come 28 straightf
orward
27 say 39 sense 23 big 28 prevent 20 grant 25
Europe 23 care 26 overall 26 further 38 agenda 23 underwa
y
28 member 25
import 23 avenue 26 stakehol
der
26 charg+ 36 share 22 detentio
n
28 status 25
meet 22 industr+ 26 publish 25 total 36 ceremon
+
22 prior 26 partner 23
mentor 22 domestic 26 and 24 period 36 empowe
r
22 break 25 limit 22
familiar 21 remittan
ces
26 asylum 24 unfair 36 statistics 22 Britain 25 conventi
on
22
introduc
e
21 Entrepre
neurs
26 the 23 separate 36 homeles
sness
22 deal 24 time 21
proficient 21 transit+ 25 staff 23 forty 35 wide 20 check 24 active 21
for 20 average 24 reflect 23 ninety 35 address 20 polic+ 24 after 20
select 20 free 22 February 23 result 35 record 24 sufficien
+
20
promote 20 high 22 we 22 fourteen 35 without 24
list 21 step 22 abolish+ 34 end 22
pay 20 agenc+ 22 should 32 obtain 22
boost 20 uk 21 propose 32 prevent 22
output 20 gov 21 concept 31 roll 21
source 20 single 21 that 30 technolo
gy
21
nations 20 outline 21 avail 30 separate 20
will 20 four 29
larg+ 28
sure 28
wait 28
fifty 28
stateme
nt
28
fee 25
268
five 25
had 22
concern 22
half 21
ties 21
quarter 21
thirteen 21
disincent
iv+
21
refer 20
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Appendix 8: Five most typical ECUs in each class and associated chi- 
square values in ALCESTE analyses1
A. Broad Classes
Class 1: Immigration Reform
1. Chi2= 37 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the immigration 
System”)
the task now is (to) (ensure) that all routes of (entry) (to) and (stay) in (britain) (combine) (to) 
(form) a (coherent) and (comprehensible) whole, (issues) with the (current) (legislation) 248. 
w e need (to) embody in (legislation) the (new) (approach) (to) the (path) (to) citizenship which 
is (set_out) in the (earlier) (chapters) of this (document).
2. Chi2 = 31 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”)
w e will (look) further at the best (approach) (to) temporary (admission) within the (new) (legal) 
(architecture) w e are proposing. 7. 5 (purpose) of (entry) and (stay) (context) 246. as the 
(earlier) (chapters) (m ake) (clear), w e are already (introducing) the most (sweeping) 
(changes) (to) the (immigration) (system) in its history.
3. Chi2 = 30 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”)
4. our (objective) is (to) (m ake) our (immigration) (system) (clearer), more (streamlined) and 
(easier) (to) (understand), in the (process) (reducing) the (possibilities) for (abuse) of the 
(system),
4. Chi2 = 30 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”)
our (objective) is (to) (m ake) our (immigration) (system) (clearer), more (streamlined) and 
(easier) (to) (understand), in the (process) (reducing) the (possibilities) for (abuse) of the 
(system),
5. Chi2 = 29 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”)
(going) forward, the (use) of (biometrics) will (underpin) other (changes), in the (future), 
(secure), (unique) (identity) (cards) will also be required for non (european_econom ic_area) 
(nationals) who do not require a (visa) (to) enter (britain) and do not already have a (secure), 
(unique) (identity) (card) (recorded) by the (agency).
Class 2: Consultation & Stages
1. Chi2 = 37 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Analysis o f Consultation Responses”)
A (quarter) of (respondents) (disagreed), 125, and the (remaining) 65, 13, w ere (unsure), 
these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 15. (question) 4. 3b should (partners) of (british) 
(citizens) or (perm anent) (residents) be (required) to (demonstrate) an (ongoing) (relationship) 
before moving from the (probationary) (citizenship) (stage) to (perm anent) (residence)?
2. Chi2 = 37 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses”)
(sixty) (seven), 13, (agreed) that this (requirement) should be (m andatory) and 33, 6, w ere  
(unsure), these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 18. further (comm ents) on this (question) w ere  
provided by 240  (respondents); some (raising) (multiple) (them es). A  (total) of 219  
(respondents) who did not support the (idea) of (active) (citizenship) (raised) the (following) 
(themes).
3. Chi2 = 36 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses”)
38% thought it should (stop) (progression) and 39% thought it should (slow) (down) rather than 
(stop) (progress). 5. in the (ipsos) M O RI (research), (respondents) were (asked) how  
(migrants) who (commit) (minor) (offences) which do not (result) in a (prison) (sentence) 
should be (penalised).
1 Words in parentheses indicate characteristic words of the class.
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4. Chi2 = 36 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses”)
these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 21. further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 
158 (respondents), some (raising) (multiple) (themes). A (total) of 109, 69%of those who 
(commented), (felt) that any (slowing) (down) or (stopping) of the Qourney) to (permanent) 
(residence) should (depend) on the circumstances, (type) and severity of the (crime) 
(committed).
5. Chi2 = 34 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
are the (proposed) (minimum) time (periods) for a (migrant) to (complete) the Qourney) to 
(permanent) (residence) (suitable)? 3. should (partners) of (british) (citizens) or (permanent) 
(residents) be (required) to (demonstrate) that they are in an (ongoing) (relationship) with the 
(citizen/) (permanent) (resident) before (progressing:)
Class 3: Immigration Impact
1. Chi2 = 38 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
lawrence (homeoffice). gsi. (gov), (uk) nigel lawrence consultation (co) (ordinator) (performance) 
and (delivery) (unit) (home) (office) 3rd floor, seacole 2 marsham (street) (london) S W 1P4D F.
2. C/7/2 = 35 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Government Response to Consultation’)
we also proposed to require newcomers to (contribute) a (little) (extra) (financially) to (help) 
Britain (manage) the (transitional) (impacts) of (migration), which would allow us to (release) 
limited (amounts) of (money) (quickly) and responsively and (help) (local) (service) (providers) 
deal with the (short) (term) (pressures) resulting from (migration).
3. Chi2 = 34 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”)
the (department) for (innovation), (universities) and (skills), DIUS, has already initiated a 
package of (measures) to encourage (employers) (contributions) to the (costs) of (english) for 
(speakers) of other (languages) for (work).
4. Chi2 = 34 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
the (migration) (advisory) (committee) chair has been appointed: david metcalf, professor of 
(industrial) relations at the (london) (school) of (economics), LSE. the (migration) (advisory) 
(committee) will (provide) (independent) and (evidence) based (advice) to (government) on 
specific (sectors) and (occupations) in the (labour) (market) where (shortages) (exist) which can 
sensibly be (filled) by (migration).
5. Chi2 -  34 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship’)
A further means to (promote) (integration) might be for (local) (authorities) to (run) (orientation) 
(days) for migrants, to (provide) (information) about (local) (services) and (resources) to (help) 
them (integrate) more (quickly).
B. Main Classes
Class 1: Immigration Impact
1. Chi2 = 42 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship’)
and (managing) the (impacts) of (migration) on the (developing) (world). A points test for 
citizenship 4. (migration) (brings) great benefits to britain. it has (significant) (economic) benefits, 
both for (gross) (domestic) (product) and (gross) (domestic) (product) per (head), and (improves) 
the (employment) rate and (productivity), (helping) to (fill) (skills) gaps.
2. Chi2 -4 1  (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship’)
this (group) could be chaired by (home) (office) ministers or (officials), and might (include) 
(representatives) from the (voluntary) (sector) as well as from (local) and (central) (government).
3. Chi2 = 40 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
the (migration) (advisory) (committee) chair has been appointed: david metcalf, professor of 
(industrial) relations at the (london) (school) of (economics), LSE. the (migration) (advisory) 
(committee) will (provide) independent and evidence based (advice) to (government) on specific
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(sectors) and (occupations) in the (labour) (market) where (shortages) exist which can sensibly 
be (filled) by (migration).
4. Chi2 = 39 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”)
(volunteering) with a (recognised) organisation, (employer) (supported) (volunteering), 
(volunteering) (activity), which may (involve) (short) periods overseas, to (support) britains, 
(international) (development) objectives, (running) or (helping) to (run) a playgroup which 
encourages the different (communities) to interact, (fund) raising activities for (charities) or 
(schools), (serving) on (community) (bodies), for (example) as a (school) (governor), (running) or 
(helping) (run) a (local) sporting team.
5. Chi2 = 39 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship")
(bringing) new (skills) and (talents), (increasing) the flexibility of our (labour) (market), and 
(improving) (productivity), but (migration) can also (bring) challenges, we (know), for (example), 
that (migration) is a (significant) factor in britains rising (population), in (order) for (migration) to 
(work) for the britain, it must be (carefully) (managed) and respond to the changing needs of the 
country.
Class 2; Stages
1. Chi2 = 32 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
150. (migrants) who (wish) (to) (become) (permanent) (residents), on the other hand, by (choice) 
or because they are (unable) (to) (become) (british) (citizens), would (spend) a (minimum) of 3 
(years) as (probationary) (citizens).
2. Chi2 = 32 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Government Response to Consultation’)
(family:) (family) (members) of (british) (citizens) and (permanent) (residents); 3. (protection:) 
those in need of (protection), (refugees) and those (granted) (humanitarian) (protection), and 
three (stages) in the Qourney:) 1. (temporary) (residence); 2. (probationary) (citizenship); 3. 
(british) (citizenship) or (permanent) (residence).
3. Chi2 = 32 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Government Response to Consultation’)
and those on the (protection) (route) (to) (demonstrate) a (continuing) need for our (protection), 
we will (speed) (up) the (journey) (to) (british) (citizenship) and (permanent) (residence) for 
(migrants) who (demonstrate) (active) (citizenship).
4. Chi2 = 31 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
151. (to) (encourage) (migrants) (to) (actively) (contribute) (to) the wider community, they will 
only be (eligible) (to) (qualify) for the (minimum) time (periods), 1 (year) for (progression) from 
(probationary) (citizenship) (to) (british) (citizenship) and 3 (years) (probationary) (citizen) (to) 
(permanent) (residence), if they have (demonstrated) such a (contribution).
5. Chi2 = 30 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
(migrants) who do not would be (eligible) (to) apply for (citizenship) after a (minimum) (period) of 
3 (years). 170. (migrants) who (wish) (to) (become) (permanent) (residents) and who have 
(demonstrated) (active) (citizenship) would (spend) a (minimum) of 3 (years) as (probationary) 
(citizens).
Class 3: Immigration Reform
1. Chi2 = 46 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
bia. (homeoffice). (gov), (uk/) (aboutus/) (consultations/) (current/) (chapter) 1 migration: the 
(challenges) and (reforms) 1. 1 (introduction) 17. (over) the next 12 (months) we are 
(introducing) the most (sweeping) (changes) to the (immigration) (system) for (over) 30 years: 
revolutionising the way in which we Gudge) who can (come) through the (points) based (system), 
PBS;
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2. Chi2 = 43 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”)
we have (amended) the (immigration) (rules) to (reduce) the (grounds) on which (deportation) 
might be (prevented), and we have (legislated) through britain (borders) (act) so that (foreign) 
(prisoners/) (convicted) of (serious) (crimes) will (face) (automatic) (deportation) unless one of a 
narrow (set) of exceptions applies.
3. Chi2 = 40 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”)
(introduce) (automatic) (deportation) for (serious) (criminals) and (build) more (detention) spaces 
to help but a compassionate (system) 10. (honour) our (asylum) (obligations) but (make) and 
(enforce) (decisions) much (faster), and with a more (sensitive) (treatment) for children 1.
4. Chi2 = 39 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”)
bia. (homeoffice). (gov), (uk/) sitecontent/ (documents/) (aboutus/) (consultations/) 
closedconsultations/ simplification 1 stconsutlation/ 50. (immigration) (law) is very (complex), the 
(immigration) (act) 1971 is still at its (heart).
5. Chi2 = 38 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”)
4. our (objective) is to (make) our (immigration) (system) (clearer), more (streamlined) and 
(easier) to (understand), in the (process) (reducing) the (possibilities) for (abuse) of the (system),
Class 4: Consultation
1. Chi2 = 90 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses’)
A (large) (proportion), 73 ,373  of the 513respondents who (answered) this (question) supported 
the (proposal) for the creation of a permanent residence category, (eighty) two, 16, did not 
support this (proposal) and 58, 11, were (unsure), these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 8. 
further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 158 (respondents), some (raising) 
(multiple) (themes) in their (response).
2. Chi2 = 86 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses’)
(sixty) (nine), 15, (thought) it was (correct), but 141, 30, (thought) it was not (correct), these 
(results) are (shown) in (figure) 30. further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 27 
(respondents). Some mentioned more than one (theme), thirteen (suggested) that the 
citizenship application (fees) were excessive.
3. Chi2 = 85 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses’)
(sixty) (seven), 13, agreed that this requirement should be mandatory and 33 ,6 , were (unsure). 
These (results) are (shown) in (figure) 18. further (comments) on this (question) were provided 
by 240 (respondents); some (raising) (multiple) (themes). A (total) of 219 (respondents) who did 
not support the (idea) of active citizenship (raised) the (following) (themes).
4. Chi2 = 82 ("The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses’)
(overall), a (total) of 110,21, (thought) the (concept) was a good (idea) and the (remaining) 62, 
12, were (unsure), (responses) from british citizens and non british citizens are (shown) 
(separately) in (figures) 6 and 7.
5. Chi2 = 82 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses’)
further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 162 (respondents), some (raised) 
(multiple) (themes), of these, 156 who (disagreed) with the imposition of an (additional) (charge) 
(raised) the (following) (themes).
Class 5: English
1. Chi2 = 77 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
can (describe) in (simple) (terms) aspects of his/  her background, immediate (environment/) and 
(matters) in areas of immediate need, (english) for (speakers) of other (languages) (entry) (level) 
1; (common) (european) framework of (reference) A1; can understand and (use) (familiar)
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everyday (expressions) and very (basic) phrases (aimed) at the satisfaction of needs of a 
concrete type;
2. Chi2 = 69 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”)
(english) for (speakers) of other (languages) (entry) 3 (requires) the migrant to be (able) to 
understand and (communicate) on (familiar) (topics), (write) (simple) (text) and (describe) 
experiences and emotions.
3. Chi2 = 69 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship”)
we now propose to rename this (requirement) a (pre) (application) (english) (language) 
(requirement) for (spouses), rather than a (pre) (entry) (requirement). 3. 17 the new (pre) 
(application) (requirement) will be for (applicants) to (speak) (english) to (level) A 1, (basic), of 
(common) (european) framework of (reference).
4. Chi2 = 69 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Government Response to Consultation”)
(english) for (speakers) of other (languages) (entry) 3 (requires) the migrant to be (able) to 
understand and (communicate) on (familiar) (topics), (write) (simple) (text) and (describe) 
experiences and emotions.
5. Chi2 = 68 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship’)
3. 5 at present, there are two ways in which (applicants) can (meet) the (language) and 
(knowledge) of (life) in (britain) (requirement:) by successfully (taking) the (life) in (britain) (test), 
(based) on the (information) (contained) in the handbook (life) in the (britain)
C. Complementary Classes
Class 1: English
1. Chi2 = 61 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
(english) for (speakers) of other (languages) (entry) 3 (requires) the migrant to be able to 
understand and (communicate) on (familiar) (topics), (write) (simple) (text) and (describe) 
(experiences) and emotions.
2. Chi2 = 61 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Government Response to Consultation’)
(english) for (speakers) of other (languages) (entry) 3 (requires) the migrant to be able to 
understand and (communicate) on (familiar) (topics), (write) (simple) (text) and (describe) 
(experiences) and emotions.
3. Chi2 = 60 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship’)
3. 5 at present, there are two (ways) in which (applicants) can (meet) the (language) and 
(knowledge) of (life) in britain (requirement:) by successfully (taking) the (life) in britain (test), 
(based) on the (information) (contained) in the handbook (life) in the britain:
4. Chi2 = 50 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship’)
this is a (threshold) at which (people) can deal with most situations in (english). for those who 
(take) the (language) with citizenship (course) route, it is (possible) to (meet) the (requirements) 
for citizenship by progressing from no (english) at all to a minimum of A1 (level) on (common) 
(european) framework of (reference), (basic).
5. Chi2 = 50 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship’)
(box) 2 (assessing) (pre) (entry) (english) under the (points) (based) system those entering 
under the (points) (based) system are (required) to provide (evidence) of their (competency) in 
(english) (language) by (proving) that they:
Class 2: Immigration Impact
1. Chi2 = 75 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Government Response to Consultation’)
we are (maximizing) the (benefits) of (migration) for (britain) and (managing) local (impacts), 
(migration) has (significant) (economic) (benefits), both for (gross) (domestic) (product) and 
(gross) (domestic) (product) per (head).
2. Chi2 = 60 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the immigration 
System’)
274
our position is clear: (carefully) (managed) (migration) (brings) (significant) and undoubted 
(benefits) to (britain). 26. (today), migrant (workers) are (filling) (skills) shortages and meeting 
(labour) (market) (demands).
3. Chi2 = 56 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”)
g. (scientists) or (entrepreneurs) (tier) two: (skilled) (workers) with a (job) (offer), e. g. nurses, 
(teachers), engineers (tier) three: (low) (skilled) (workers) (filling) specific temporary (labour) 
shortages, e.
4. Chi2 = 55 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
migrants in the other three (tiers) will not. (tier) one 108. this (tier) (consists) of (highly) (skilled) 
(workers), (entrepreneurs) and (investors) (bringing) the (skills) that we need to (boost) our 
(economy).
5. Chi2 = 52 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship”) 
chapter 1 context 1. 1 (carefully) (managed) (migration) (brings) (significant) and undoubted 
(benefits) to (britain). in the same way that (free) (trade) and capital (mobility) (boost) our 
(income), so too does (migration).
Class 3: Immigration Reform
1. Chi2 = 62 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
the (green) (paper) (set_out) (details) of our (plans) to (simplify) the (laws) (current) (complexity) 
and (make) it (fit) for the 21st century.
2. Chi2 = 62 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
(chapter) 7 (simplifying) the (system) and (reforming) the (law) 222. as we (look) to (reform) the 
(path) to citizenship and continue to (transform) the (immigration) (system), we need to (simplify) 
the (laws) (current) (complexity) and (make) it (fit) for the 21st century.
3. Chi2 = 57 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
(key) (provisions) will be (set_out) in a single focused (piece) of (primary) (legislation), the (key) 
(principles) which we believe should (underpin) the (simplification) (process) are that it should 
maximise: (transparency), (efficiency), (clarity);
4. Chi2 = 56 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
(simplifying) the (system) and (reforming) the (law:) 14. as we (look) to (reform) the (path) to 
citizenship and continue to (transform) the (immigration) (system), we need to (simplify) the 
(laws) (current) (complexity) and (make) it (fit) for the 21st century.
5. Chi2 = 56 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
bia. (homeoffice). (gov), (uk/) sitecontent/ (documents/) (aboutus/) (consultations/) 
closedconsultations/simplificationlstconsutlation/ 50. (immigration) (law) is very (complex), the 
(immigration) act 1971 is still at its (heart).
Class 4: Consultation
1. Chi2 = 99 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses’)
(eighty) two, 16, did not support this (proposal) and 5 8 ,1 1 , were (unsure), these (results) are 
(shown) in (figure) 8. further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 158 (respondents), 
some (raising) (multiple) (themes) in their (response).
2. Chi2 = 88 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses’)
further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 162 (respondents), some (raised) 
(multiple) (themes), of these, 156 who (disagreed) with the imposition of an (additional) (charge) 
(raised) the (following) (themes).
3. Chi2 = 81 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses’)
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51 %thought it should be (decreased) and 4%were not (sure), once (responses) from migrants 
and (organisations) were (added) in, a (larger) (proportion), 78, 404 of the 516 (respondents) 
who (answered) this (question) (felt) that the (proposed) eight year period should be 
(decreased).
4. Chi2 = 79 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses”)
under a (quarter), 24, (disagreed) with this (statement) and a (similar) (proportion), 26, neither 
(agreed) nor (disagreed), these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 17.
5. Chi2 = 79 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses’)
these (results) are (shown) in (figure) 21. further (comments) on this (question) were provided by 
158 (respondents), some (raising) (multiple) (themes).
Class 5: Earned Citizenship & Local Authorities
1. Chi2 = 58 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship’)
and (identifying) areas of research and (best) (practice), its (value) could be (enhanced) by the 
(inclusion) of a limited (number) of (independent) experts from the (voluntary) and (community) 
(sector).
2. Chi2 = 58 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Government Response to Consultation”)
how will the (money) from the (fund) be (distributed)? the (fund) is (designed) to (assist) (local) 
(service) (providers) in dealing with the (short) (term) (pressures) of migration.
3. Chi2 = 55 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Government Response to Consultation’)
this (calls) for public (service) (providers) to respond (quickly) and (innovatively) to this 
challenge. The (government) has (provided) a fair settlement for (local) (government), and many 
are already responding to this challenge; but with a (relatively) small (amount) of additional 
(money) we could (alleviate) some of 
the (short) (term ) (pressures).
4. Chi2 = 51 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship’)
this (group) could be chaired by home (office) ministers or (officials), and might (include) 
(representatives) from the (voluntary) (sector) as well as from (local) and (central) (government).
5. Chi2 = 50 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship’)
16. we are not seeking to (place) a (duty) on (local) (authorities) to (deliver) these new 
(services), but if we pursued any of these (options) we would (envisage) (extending) the 
(number) of (local) (authorities) working in partnership with us to (deliver) (increased) 
(geographical) coverage.
Class 6: Border Control
1. Chi2 = 99 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship’)
1. 3 the (formation) of a (new), (single) (border) (force) with (police) like (powers) to (tackle) 
smuggling and immigration crime, coupled with stronger (controls) overseas such as 
(fingerprinting) of (visa) applicants, have (strengthened) britain (border),
2. Chi2 = 88 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
(check) (fingerprints) before we issue a (visa) anywhere in the world 4. (count) (foreign) 
(nationals) in and (out) of the (country) 5.
3. Chi2 = 82 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
to further (secure) our (borders), we are now (checking) (fingerprints), as a matter of course, 
before we issue a (visa) anywhere in the world for those wishing to (travel) to britain, and we will 
again begin to (count) (foreign) (nationals) in and (out) of the (country).
4. Chi2 = 79 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Government Response to Consultation’)
(rolling) (out) systems for (counting) people in and (out) of the (country); and the introduction of 
(identity) (cards) for (foreign) (nationals).
5. Chi2 = 71 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Government Response to Consultation’)
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we are creating a (single) (border) (force); introducing (new) electronic (controls) including 
(counting) people in and (out) of the (country);
Class 7: Penalties
1. Chi2 - 1 5 2  (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Government Response to Consultation”)
individual non (custodial) (crimes) should not have an (effect), while numerous non (custodial) 
(crimes) should (slow) (down) (progression), individual, this (depends) on the (nature) of the 
(crime).
2. Chi2 - 1 4 6  (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Government Response to Consultation’)
we would welcome views on this, there was some support for (slowing) (down) or (stopping) a 
(parents) (progression) (towards) citizenship on the basis of their (childs) (criminality), with 
respondents (highlighting) their views that a (childs) (behaviour) is the (responsibility) of the 
(parent).
3. Chi2 -141  (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System”)
we will also (slow) a migrants (progress) through the system even where (minor) (offences) are 
(committed), so that (behaviour) that (falls) below the standards we (expect) has 
(consequences).
4. Chi2 - 1 2 8  (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Analysis of Consultation Responses’)
38%thought it should (stop) (progression) and 39%thought it should (slow) (down) rather than 
(stop) (progress). 5. in the ipsos MORI research, respondents were asked how migrants who 
(commit) (minor) (offences) which do not result in a (prison) (sentence) should be (penalised).
5. Chi2 - 1 1 9  (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the immigration 
System’)
do you think that (committing) a (crime) which (attracts) a (custodial) (sentence) should (slow) 
(down) or (stop) a migrants (progression) to permanent residence?
Class 8: Stages
1. Chi2 = 39 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System: Government Response to Consultation’)
and those on the (protection) (route) (to) (demonstrate) a (continuing) need for our (protection), 
we will (speed) (up) the (journey) (to) (british) (citizenship) and (permanent) (residence) for 
(migrants) who (demonstrate) (active) (citizenship).
2. Chi2 = 35 (“Earning the Right to Stay: A New Points Test for Citizenship’) 
(probationary) (citizens) are therefore (able) (to) apply for (british) (citizenship) after a (minimum) 
(period) of one (year), (migrants) who (wish) (to) be obtain the (alternative) (category) of 
(permanent) (residence) (status), on the other hand, either by (choice) or because they are 
(unable) (to) (become) (british) (citizens), would need (to) spend a (minimum) of three (years) as 
(probationary) (citizens).
3. Chi2 = 34 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
(family) (members) of (british) (citizens) and (permanent) (residents) 3. those in need of 
(protection), (refugees) and those (granted) (humanitarian) (protection), and there should be 
three (stages) in the (journey:) 1.
4. Chi2 = 34 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
148. those who (qualify) as (family) (members) of (british) (citizens) or (permanent) (residents) 
would be (eligible) (to) (become) (probationary) (citizens) after 2 (years).
5. Chi2 = 32 (“The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration 
System’)
150. (migrants) who (wish) (to) (become) (permanent) (residents), on the other hand, by (choice) 
or because they are (unable) (to) (become) (british) (citizens), would spend a (minimum) of 3 
(years) as (probationary) (citizens).
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